The Army is on the job..

So General Raheel wants to make sure the world knows he is dong the right thing all alone in Punjab and (hint, hint) the prime minister and the bloody civilians are (as usual) not up to the job.


ISPR and its superb media machine are busy making sure everyone knows that the army is out there all alone, leading the nation to greatness. This is one aspect of Pakistani internal politics that is reliably unchanging: that the army will use any and all crises to further elbow the civilians aside and to undermine their authority, usually in self-defeating and completely unnecessary ways (unnecessary in the sense that the civilians may not even be resisting “the right thing”, though there can be exceptions to that). Thus the first thing the army did after the latest horrendous attack is to start sending out press releases and tweets via the ever vigilant and extremely efficient ISPR about how it has started taking action in Punjab and to make sure that their supporters/agents in the media amplify this as unilateral action and undermine the credibility of the counter-terrorism department and police (both of which have in fact been active recently against the terrorists) as much as possible. Action is needed against Jihadis, and it is great that the army now wants to kill some of them, but does it have to undermine the police and the civilian institutions as it does so?

And when the hapless (even more hapless in PR, than in law enforcement) civilian regime tried to point out that these were joint operations and that they were fully on board, the army chief went so far as to put it out that the army was NOT doing any joint raids. Every retired air marshal and general has been on TV making sure everyone gets the message.

This would all be fine if the army was as capable in this area as they pretend. But they have a long history of pushing aside civilians (admittedly, corrupt and incompetent civilians) and failing to do what even the corrupt civilians were managing to do. Thus everything from the Water and Power authority to the Railways to everyday policing deteriorated further under army rule (they have also deteriorated under civilian rule, the story is bad all around, but part of that is also due to how the army has undermined civilian institutions for decades, undermining trust in them and tolerating corrupt politicians who do its bidding while making sure anyone half-effective is cut to size).
In the case of the police and the administration the issue is not just that the army does not really know how to handle stuff even at the British Raj level (which outdated level is about the best the civilian administration can manage), but that the army introduces dual responsibility in administration; everybody knows the real power lies with the army, but the civilian chief or police are still responsible on paper, so both sides have no incentive to take any responsibility. It never works well, but the army will do it anyway.

This is more of the same.

They would do much better if they cooperated with the civilians (pushing, if necessary, from behind the scenes in the national interest; but then again, who does that?) but that is never job 1. Job 1 is grabbing more power and making sure the bloody civilians get no credit. This is, at a minimum, unfortunate…

Though I wouldnt mind if the army fires Choudhry Nisar, the interior minister. The thing is, he is probably the one person they will keep when and if they get rid of Mian Nawaz Sharif. So it goes..

But there can be little doubt that it works in the short term. Especially with Uncle Sam and Uncle Chin, both of whom have invested good money in this venture and want a steady well-dressed military hand on the tiller.

Scott Atran Proposes.. Boy Scout troops??

Scott Atran  is one of those smart and capable people who have many good ideas, but are dead sure they have ONLY good ideas. This one, from his prediction (likely correct) that the worst is yet to come in Europe, is the weirdest yet:

The best hope we have to counter the lure of ISIS and its ilk in the long run will come from a global push for community-based initiatives led by trained young activists who are equipped to offer an alternative expression of idealism founded on adventurous, festive and glorious forms of “peace-building” as enticing as war.

What does that even mean? It is one of those brilliant things that you can always say, and you will never be wrong because it is not happening, so the onus of failure is on the human race for not making it happen. 

This actually applies to his famous suicide-bomber theories as well. They are just enough removed from the actual conflicts and counter-measures being taken or capable of being taken to make them pretty much useless. There is information in his research, but there are no actionable recommendations. Those have to come from someone else who can read that information and maintain just enough detachment to be able to say: “yes, this part seems true, and even though it is padded around with BS, I think I can come up with something actually useful here” 
I am not that detached wise warrior saint. But there must be one out there. I hope 🙂

Meanwhile, I do have some background reading here 🙂

Brussels. Islam, War on Terror, History..

The latest Islamist-terrorist atrocity hit the city of Brussels. The attackers no doubt think they are about to meet their 72 virgins. I have nothing new to say about this, but am posting excerpts from two previous posts (one written after the Paris attacks, the second after the San Bernadino attack) that may shed some light on SOME of the cultural and religious issues in this war. I do want to add that I while I think cultural issues are critical in the long run, they matter far less in the short term than policing, spying, arrests and retaliation. Wars tend to do that: they concentrate matters and short term immediate action is what counts most. Intellectuals who specialize in history and philosophy may matter more in the long term, but once war has begun, it’s “action this day”. This distinction is not news, but it does sometimes get lost.

And I would add that I do not believe the “Eurabia” BS either. Even Sweden will not become Muslim. Muslims will assimilate into Europe, or will face fascism, expulsion and worse. And I will go out on a limb and even predict that England will neither become Islamic, nor resort to naked fascism (it has a culture strong enough to survive/avoid both). Maybe this is true of most European countries. We will see. But the “Eurabia” paranoia is just slightly less silly than the Islamicate dream of an Islamicized Europe.

The following post is an unedited mishmash at places, but you will get the point.

1. Is ISIS Islamic? 
Short Answer: Yes
For a “secular observer”, this is a no-brainer. The secular (and even more so, religious) outsider obviously does not believe in any particular version of Islam as the one true faith, etc etc. To them, Islam is (or should be) whatever any Muslim claims as his religion (this obviously means that for any such observer there is no one Islam, there are many Islams). To such an observer (if he or she is well-informed), Islam is a religion that started in Arabia, took up very notable strands from Rome (aka Byzantium), Persia, Judaism, etc and evolved into many different schools and sects. An exceptionally well-informed observer could indeed comment that ISIS does not replicate the dominant Sunni theology of the Ummayads or the Abbasids and has more in common with the relatively small Kharijite tradition, but even so, it would be the height of “Whitesplaining” for, say, professor Juan Cole to step in and deign to tell Syrian and Iraqi Muslims in ISIS that they are doing it wrong and their Islam is not “real Islam”. The appropriate answer (and this is exactly the answer many different Jihadist groups have given) is “WE know what Islam is and you dont have to come down from Michigan to tell us what our religion should look like”.  To sum up: well-informed outsiders can indeed note that ISIS is more like this, less like that; not representative of ALL Muslims (who is?), not representative of all Muslim states, not typical of all Islamist movements, etc. But for Bush or Blair to announce that ISIS is not really Islamic carries no weight. Islamic is what Islamists think is Islamic. THEY disagree among themselves, giving rise to many different Islams, Some represent bigger groups and larger sects, some are small cults, but all are Islamic.

For the believing Muslim, the answer depends on what sect/group/tendency they believe in. If their sect/tendency regards extremely vicious and extremely literalist Islamists as unislamic, more power to them. But some of them do indeed regard ISIS as Islamic (as is obvious from the thousands of Muslims (including neo-converts) who have flocked to the banner of ISIS in recent years. Others regard them as mostly Islamic, but occasionally doing things that a good Muslim would not do. This group is not trivial in numbers. Finally, countless others hold no firm opinion, but waiver between admiration of some acts and total opposition to others. Humans have complicated loyalties and psychologies. Would it surprise anyone (or at least, anyone not educated in the current Western postmodern left-liberal “tradition”) that a Palestinian or a Turk or a Pakistani may hold internally contradictory views on ISIS; sometimes admiring their deep faith and readiness to fight for Islam, even against overwhelming odds, other times cursing them for their cruelties, and last but not least, at other times worrying about what ISIS’ actions may do to his or her job prospects, visa status or college prospects. We are all human.

My own view: ALL of Islamic history is characterized by a struggle between three political-theolgoical camps that all appeared fairly early in the rise of the Arab empire and the Islamic religion (the two, empire and religion were obviously intertwined and interdependent):

1. Sunnis. Those who thought the rising Arab empire was best led by the consensus of the elite, with a tendency to rally around whoever had managed to fight his way to the top, provided he paid lip service to religion, patronized the rising ulama class and (most important) kept his eyes on the ball as far as managing and growing the empire was concerned. While Sunni clerics developed what seems to be a theory of politics (who is a just ruler? who has the right to rule? what do the people owe their ruler? etc.) on closer inspection it turns out to be pretty much divorced from actual politics. Rulers and their courts had more in common with past Roman, Persian and Central Asian traditions than anything specifically Islamic. Rulers usually grabbed power by force, then tried to pass it on to their children rather than some ideal “just ruler”. Dynasties rose and fell with little concern for theological rules. No “Muslim church” acquired a tenth of the influence of the Roman Catholic church. This tradition is not ISIS-like in detail, but it also paid lip service to ideals that ISIS can and does fling in the face of “court clerics” who happily go along with whoever happens to be the ruler (from King Hassan to Hussain to Salman..and even Sisi). Sunni tradition is not ISIS, but it trains and teaches children using ideals that ISIS may aspire to more strongly than the Sunni rulers themselves. This hypocrisy-crisis is a recurrent feature of modern Islamicate politics. And it is the reason why “moderate Muslims” (aka mainstream Sunnis) regularly fall prey to “Wahabism”. They are not falling prey to a new religion, they are falling prey to a more distilled and internally consistent version of what they have been taught is indeed their own religion. Classical Sunni ideals overlap with modern Jihadist ideology, their true-believers tend to find Wahabism attractive.

2. Shias. Those who felt there was something special about the family of the prophet and in particular, the family of Ali and developed theologies that included varying combinations of the charismatic Imamate and its heritage of revolt against Sunni authority. Since Shias are a majority in only a few places, (most important, Iran) and their history includes long periods of conflict with mainstream Sunni rule, they are more or less immune to the appeal of Sunni revivalists, whether they are the milder Maudoodi types or the harsher ISIS types. They have set up their own theocracy in Iran (much more effectively so than any Sunni revivalist has managed to do) but they are not ISIS. For the purposes of this post (i.e. for outsiders who dont have to live in Iran), they are “objectively liberal”.

3. Khwarij. The Khwarij insisted that neither the elite, nor the family of the prophet had a special right to rule. Only the most pious, the most thoroughly “Islamic” person could do that. Muslims who committed major sins or failed to meet their standard of Islamic fervor were as much the enemy as any infidel. Even more so in fact. The Khwarij were always small in number and they were repeatedly defeated by both Shia and Sunni rulers, but their tendency has never completely gone away. Something within Islamic tradition keeps them alive. Mainstream Sunnis frequently pay only lip service to Jihad and the harshest punishments of shariah law (particularly in modern times), but these ideals are present in their theology. This theology that was rarely an impediment to statecraft and its priorities in the actual golden age of Islamic imperium, but it still paid lip service to those ideals. In fact, the more divorced it was from actual politics, the more it could fly off into discussions about the ideal ruler,the ideal law and the ideal Jihad, all un-encumbered by any contact with reality. But ideals can effect some people. True believers arise, and in times of anarchy and state collapse, they may be the lowest common denominator, providing a framework around which the asabiya of Islam can cohere and in which the community can see hope for a return to a commonly-imagined (though mostly imaginary) golden age.

Groups like the Wahabis, Lashkar e Tayaba, the Taliban and ISIS are simply combining the waters of 1 and 3, usually with more 3 than 1. But they are NOT relying on some new ideology invented out of whole cloth by Wahab or some other evil Saudi. They are (in their own mind and in the mind of many idealistic Muslims) simply purifying actually existing Sunnism (with its tendency to compromise with realities). 

In fact, even reformers who have some mainstream cred can drink quite a bit from #3 in this age of Western domination (perhaps to be replaced soon with mixed Chinese AND Western domination, but still with no Islamic empire in sight); see Maudoodi, Syed Qutb and others. Not as far from ISIS as you may wish.

Just as an aside: What about Sufism? In many cases Sufis can simply be described as mainstream Sunnis with mystical or humanistic instincts; trying to get the most good out of religion while leaving out most of the imperialist and legalistic baggage.  In some cases, they may be more akin to a secret society (like the Freemasons), influencing much from behind the scenes, but by definition, it is not really easy to disentangle myth (and self-promotion) from shadowy reality in this scenario.  In other cases, they may think of themselves as  the perennial philosophy, operating within Islam as it operates in all true religions. And in some cases, they are hardline Sunni Jihadists with a “master and novice” framework added to it, rallying the troops for holy war and conversion of the infidels. Take your pick. But do remember that Sufism is not really a sect with any single reasonably well-defined theology.

This post is not really qualified to go too deeply into what religion (any religion) may mean (and may do) to those struck by epiphanies on the road to Damascus. That whole issue is alluded to here by the always erudite Tanner Greer. Hopefully, he will have more to say in a longer post soon.

2. Does Islamist Terrorism have anything to do with Islam?
In light of the above, one answer would be: of course not. There IS no one thing called Islam. There are many Islams. And most of them are not terrorist. Case closed.
But, again in the light of the above, one may also say that mainstream Sunni Islam is remarkably uniform in its theology and its ideals. The vast majority of the world’s Muslims are Sunnis. Within Sunni Islam, there are four recognized schools of law. In principle, the vast majority of Sunnis honor and respect these schools and their doctors. The vast majority has no idea what is IN those schools or in the writings of their doctors, but they honor them and idealize them. It is very common for educated Muslims to own a book or two of fiqh and hadith. Rarely read, but always honored. A small minority of highly westernized postmodern Muslims believe that those medieval books and their authors are no longer valid for us and Islam (like modern Christianity) is more or less “spiritual” and can (or should) be whatever a believer sincerely thinks it is. Even these postmodern Muslims frequently believe that the Quran is the inerrant, literal word of God, but given that most classical Islamic theology is not lifted straight out of the Quran, they feel they can safely reject aspects of classical theology that are no longer fashionable. That they have usually not read the Quran makes this kind of cherry-picking even easier. But as numerous public opinion polls have repeatedly shown, most Sunni Muslims do not share this postmodern view of their religion. Whatever they may do in practice (and they frequently do exactly what adherents of all other religions are doing in similar econcomic and political circumstances; the much-mentioned “Muslims who just want to have a sandwich and send their kids to good schools”), they do believe that Islam is more than just an identity token. They believe it is “a complete code of life” and if enforced in its true letter and spirit, it holds the possibility of reversing all our communal ills. And what is that letter, if not that spirit? it is the books of Shariah written by medieval Sunni theologians. Books that were composed in the midst of a warlike expanding empire by confident intellectuals of a dominant creed. Books that idealize holy war (not “inner struggle”, Karen Armstrong notwithstanding) and a society where Muslims rule and non-Muslims know their (inferior) place in society. Books that idealize pious rulers and the enforcement of shariah law (stonings and amputations included). Books that idealize martyrdom and war against the infidels. Books that prime some of them to fall for preachers who preach purity and a true Islamic state.  Only some of them. But that is enough. A convert from France felt strongly enough about this to sacrifice his own life in a suicide mission that aimed to kill random innocent Frenchmen. Well, not innocent in his eyes any longer.

 So yes, classical Sunni Islam tends to prime some people for joining Jihadist organizations (whether ISIS or LET or Islamic Jihad or any other of an alphabet soup of Jihadi groups) and committing atrocities with a good conscience. See the ten young men who went to Mumbai on the first “Mumbai-style attack”; what motivated them to go on that suicide mission? Nothing to do with Islam? I think is hard to say that with a straight face..
Unless you happen to be in the postmodern Western liberal elite, in which case you may suffer from what Tanner Greer calls “the limits of liberal education in the 21st century, far better at teaching platitudes than exploring the depths of the human condition; and the inability of secular elites to understand religion and the religious masses who earnestly believe in them…

3. George Bush/Western colonialism/imperialism is responsible for this attack. 
Short answer: Yes.
Long answer: Yes, But.
It is true that the rise of Western power and the defeat of the Ottomans in the first world war created the modern middle east. And it is a staple Western left-liberal talking point (picked up and used by Islamists and by other imperial powers like Russia as needed) that British and French imperialists created the modern Middle East via the Sykes-Picot agreement and messed it up, leading to all or most current problems. This is obviously not true in any strong sense. Britain and France did not look at some blank piece of paper and convert it into the modern Middle East. They grabbed and missed opportunities galore (as did the Turks, who chose the losing side in world war one when they may not have had to do any such thing), worked around existing populations and structures (many of them Imperial Ottoman in origin), argued and tried to double-cross each other before and after Sykes-Picot, were resisted by new forces, adjusted to the results of world wars and local wars, and so short, history happened; not just two people meeting and making up what they wanted and determining all that has happened since then. But let us leave details for another day. Let us use Sykes-Picot as short hand for the modern post World War II Middle Eastern system of nation-states that arose after the brief British and French colonial interlude, primarily (but not always) under the control of local elites groomed or put in place by those two powers.

These elites ruled what were formally (if not very deeply), “Westphalian” nation-states on the “European model”. What that means and why that is so bad (or such an improvement) over past models is another debate we can leave for another day. But the modern Middle East came into being. The states that were created were like most postcolonial states, a mixture of past divisions and new creations, some of them more arbitrary and artificial than others (Pakistani nationalists, take a bow).
Israel was the obvious outlier. With a more Westernized/modern population and with a direct (and at least temporarily, mostly sympathetic) connection to the Western world, it was an order of magnitude more capable (in terms of knowledge, organization, sophistication, ability to fight) than it’s unfortunate neighbors and it’s own aboriginal inhabitants. Even though the physical infrastructure of the state (and the weapons it was able to acquire) were not (at least initially) much superior to those of its enemies, the software was so much better that they were able to whip larger opponents with some regularity. Even so, an order of magnitude is still only an order of magnitude. It may have reached or exceeded the limits of it’s superiority by now. Or it may not. In a battle, it does not matter who is absolutely good at fighting, just who is relatively better. In purely military terms, the Israeli advantage may yet grow; and if present trends accelerate and the Sunni-Shia-Wahabi-Whatever shit totally hits the fan, they may well annex some more territory. History can be cruel. Vae Victis and all that. But moving on..
What about the Arab states of the region?

A. Iraq has splintered after the American invasion and is unlikely to see peace in the immediate future. Some sort of three way division seemed possible, but with ISIS taking over the role of “Sunni resistance”, enough Sunnis may prefer cohabitation with Shias, so maybe the split is not totally final. On the other hand, with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states still interested in fighting Shia-Iranian domination, anti-Shia forces may still get enough weapons and money to keep fighting for a very long time. The safest bet is “more of the same”. But whatever happens, in the near future it will not be able to contend for regional hegemon, that much is given.

2. Syria has totally crashed and burned. Neither the Assad regime nor its various opponents(including irreconcilable Sunni-Jihadists) are in a position to win completely anytime soon. Continuing violence seems to be the near and medium-term future.

3. Yemen is in flames and has now been invaded by a multi-national coalition led by Saudi Arabia (ostensibly in support of the last “elected” government of the state). Conquering North Yemen has never been an easy prospect and great powers from Rome to the Ottomans have tried and failed to impose their authority over the whole country. The British took control of Aden (all they really wanted) and managed the surrounding tribes with bribes and punitive policing, but never controlled the whole country. The Egyptian adventure in the 1960s ended up being “Egypt’s Vietnam”, so the chances that the Saudis will prevail completely are pretty much nil. Stil, in the near-term it is likely that the people of Yemen will pay the heaviest price, not the people or the elites of Saudi Arabia. Yemen is broken and no policy, no matter how sensible (a faint possibility in any case) will put it together again in the foreseeable future.

For some White or Desi (as in Indian-ish) Leftists, this is time to say “I told you so”. Some of them have reacted to these implosions with barely disguised glee, celebrating the collapse of the borders and states they had always decried as a colonial imposition, and throwing in formula appeals for a “revolutionary” or “pro-people” program to build a new future, blah blah blah. We can ignore this lot. Other Leftists (especially those with family and friends in the region, who do not have the luxury of simply enjoying being “right” about Sykes-Picot) are more confused. They know there is no leftist hegemon or potential hegemon in view that has a reasonable chance of building a new peace out of this chaos, and they have too much local knowledge to blithely generate fantasy stories about the heroic Syrian regime, or the Yemeni rebels for that matter. Between Asad and Sisi and ISIS, who is one to root for? Many of them will likely end up rooting for the existing “Sykes-Picot” states and forget the dream of erasing those hated borders?  But still, that order was neo-colonial and will not return to status quo ante even if many people wish it were so. As the colonial and neo-colonial order fades, what will replace it (in the region as a whole)? With little local knowledge it is not for me to attempt a detailed prediction, but even with limited knowledge, we can say this much: as in any region, the power that imposes order will have to possess sufficient solidarity and ideological clarity to be able to ensure the loyalty of their own core and to compel the loyalty of a critical mass of those they incorporate into their system of rule. What ideal and what asabiya will provide that glue and that motivation in the middle east?

Sunni Islam is one obvious contender (Arab nationalism was another, but seems to have lost out. Marxism was never a serious contender, smaller ethnic nationalisms will save some). Western intervention has destroyed some states, but not provided an alternative (and really cannot provide an alternative). The result, in Syria and Libya and Sunni Iraq is chaos. In that chaos, ISIS has risen to power in parts of Syria and Iraq. And it has been attacked by many powers. Among them, France and Hezbollah and Russia. And all three have been hit by atrocities against soft targets in response.

Even if one does not believe conspiracy theories about the CIA and Mossad creating or helping ISIS (I don’t), one can easily say that ham-handed/short-sighted Western intervention in Iraq and Syria created the conditions that allowed ISIS to rise. They also created or supported many of the grievances (real and imagined) that local Muslims find humiliating and unjust (again, whether the anger is all justified or not, it hardly matters, this is how it feels to many people). So yes, Bush and imperialism do share the blame. But not necessarily in the total and exculpatory way the postmodern Left imagines.

Second, and equally important: the Saudi Royal family is not the source of religious ideology in Saudi Arabia. They allied with this religious movement to gain power, but at crucial points, they have been willing to go against the wishes of their Wahabi base. It is the people of Najd (the wahabi heartland, so to speak) and specially their religious scholars, who are the real fanatics in Saudi Arabia. A democratic Saudi Arabia would likely be more Wahabist than the royal family.
Incidentally the main oil reserves are located in the (relatively small) Shia region of Saudi Arabia. This region became part of Saudi Arabia  by conquest (not by imperialist manipulation or “Sykes-Picot”;  Brown people have agency, their leaders can conquer people too). American companies (invited in by Al Saud because he, quite rationally, feared the British imperialists more) found oil there. Soon the world war accelerated oil demand and the US became an ally of the Saudi Royal family, which it remains to this day. For a long time, the US ignored and sometimes (most egregiously, in  Afghanistan and Pakistan) actively encouraged the export of Jihadist Islam from Saudi Arabia. This was short-sighted and morally wrong, but it was based on a serious under-estimation of the potential of jihadism as an ideology, as well as a prioritization of anti-communism over good sense. But contrary to Eurocentric Left-wing propaganda, Saudi support for pan-Islamic causes was not primarily initiated by the US. It was the “push” of their own religious motivation plus the “pull” of demand for pan-Islamism in newly minted “Islamic” countries like Pakistan that drove most of this effort .

In any case, the US has not actively encouraging this process after  9-11. The Saudi Royal family has also slowly (too slowly for most of us) moved away from unrestrained support for the most extreme international  Jihadists, but continues to support many Islamic causes worldwide (not just Wahabi causes, but mainstream Sunni causes that it hopes to co-opt) and continues to support “moderate Sunni Jihadis” in their regional war against Shia Iran and its allies. And of course, they continue to impose ISIS-like punishments (cutting off hands and feet, beheading  etc) for crimes including the crime of apostasy (all of which are a standard part of mainstream Sunni Shariah, and that therefore have the theoretical, but not always the practical, approval of mainstream Sunnis). This causes many liberals in the West (and elsewhere) to insist that the US should break its alliance with Saudi Arabia and even bomb them.  But what happens then? Will they become less jihadist or more? And who gets the oil? Iran? Russia? China?

The point is this: if there is a quick and direct way to weaken Saudi power and the hardline shariah-based Islam they encourage, it requires taking the oil away from them (since oil wealth is the source of their power). This can be done. The local population is historically Shia. Maybe Iran can capture the oilfields and set up a Shia-client state and defend it against Saudi attack? Or Russia Or China can do this job? Or the US can do it itself; but such a grab would be a naked imperialist military intervention, and it would surely require shooting any Wahabi who shows up in the oil-region. There is no pretty way to do it. If the US just breaks off relations, the Saudis will look for a new protector. Pakistan, China, maybe even Russia could be tempted. But Jihadism does not come solely (or now, even mostly) from the US alliance, and will not go away if that alliance breaks. It likely can be moderated if the Royal family is pressured, but it will be moderated against the wishes of the people of Saudi Arabia, not on their behalf. And it will be moderated by an authoritarian regime willing to use torture and violence to impose its will on a hardline Islamic population (at least in the Najdi heartland). If all this is not clear, then the appeals to “break off our alliance” are just liberal posturing and virtue-signaling, not real policy.

By the way, any such invasion and occupation to impose liberalism and good 21st century behavior would also invite the ire of all pro-Shariah-true-believer Sunnis in the world. Prepare for that too. Otherwise, the Royal family is the best bet in Saudi Arabia and that is simply the ugly unpalatable truth.

The alternative to a bad situation is sometimes worse. Shit happens. There is no universal framework of liberal democracy (or socialism, or whatever you regard as ideal) and human rights that exists a priori in all places, only waiting for the overlay of imperialism or neoliberalism to be removed to allow universal peace and tranquility to break out. Everything is hard work. Institutions take time. Ideologies matter. Humans are humans everywhere, but they do not live in the same history and the same circumstances. Within the limits of what can be done with human biology, much can vary. And sometimes, things fall apart.

Even when they don’t fall apart, one can easily see that not everyone is happy in liberal democracies. In fact, some of their best intellectuals are the most unhappy, and are willing to entertain almost any movement that threatens to overthrow this sorry scheme of things entire…Some of us may fear what will follow if the revolution actually happens, but all of us can agree that the revolutionary dream has support. In the Middle East, this dream may take Islamicate forms. No surprise.

4. What next? Spontaneous Jihad Syndrome?

 Any Muslim can become radicalized and fall victim to spontaneous jihad syndrome at any time.
This is the right-wing fringe’s mirror-image of the liberal belief that Islam never causes jihad and all of it can be explained by “inequality” or “Sykes-Picot” or some such story.  Both mirror-images are clearly false. The real situation is that we can look at the Muslims of the world and see several disparate groups; Shias, Ismailis and Ahmedis are outside the Sunni Jihadist universe and so are not going to spontaneously take up arms in the war between shariah-based Islam and other civilizations.  They are all relatively small minorities, but they are the most obvious examples of “Muslims who will not get radicalized and join the Sunni Jihad, foreign policy, Israel, Sykes-Picot and Picketty notwithstanding. These supposedly powerful motives for hating America will not cause these groups to go postal. There is a lesson in there somewhere.

 Coming to Sunni Muslims, we have a very large number are “moderate Muslims”, which is shorthand for Muslims who were not brought up in shariah-compliant households and who do not practice that kind of Islam. Their numbers vary from country to country, but one can say with a lot of confidence that they are not spontaneous jihad material either. They can covert, but it is a slow process, it is observable and even preventable (if they are kept away from hardline preachers). Then there are the shariah-compliant Muslims who believe that the Shariah’s orders for Jihad are meant for very specific situations where a Sunni state has declared Jihad and those situations (fortunately) do not exist. So they get on with life in all parts of the world. Many of them are model citizens because they avoid intoxicants, deal honestly and follow the law. A very tiny fraction of them may “radicalize” but most will not. The same applies to converts. So yes, about these (small) groups one may say “they can radicalize” , but very rarely. And even then, there are warning signs and it is never an overnight process. Finally, there are the true-believer Jihadists. They have obvious links with Jihadist schools, groups and teachers. They are small in number and they are not hard for the community to identify, if is so chooses. And they are indeed high risk. Liberals see none of them, right-wingers see too many. Both are wrong.

I guess what I am saying is that notions of Muslim hordes just waiting for a chance to attack are far outside the bounds of reality. Common sense can actually be a guide here. There is no need to throw the baby out with the bathwater and equally there is no need to be willfully blind to warning signs. Biased agenda pushers on BOTH sides of this debate have obscured common sense options. And while Liberals may underestimate or misrepresent the threat from radical Muslims, conservatives frequently generalize the threat to all Muslims.

Last but not the least, all nutcases cannot be stopped beforehand. Some surprises will always happen in a large and complex society . There is no risk-free society, with or without Muslims. But this is not World-War Three. Not in the United States. In parts of Europe the proportion of jihadists is likely higher (for various reasons, including racism and multiculturalist liberalism). Meanwhile, in the core of the Muslim world itself, all bets are off. There is no well-articulated theology of liberal Sunnism. Other organizing ideologies (like Marxism and pan-Arab nationalism) have manifestly failed. The authoritarian regimes that exist are (for now) the only game in town. These authoritarian elites, who disproportionately  benefit from the modern world,  impose their will using a combination of force, persuasion and foreign support. But they lack a deep legitimating ideology. This crisis of ideology is extremely serious, and it may devour some of those countries (though the survival of Jordan is a good example of the fact that even the most arbitrary modern states have more strength than we sometimes imagine). Those Muslim states that are further away from the Arab heartland (and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) may do better. They can frequently rely on other identities to maintain the legitimacy of their states and new Islams can arise in them with time. But even they will not be compltely free of Jihadist conflict. No state is completely free of conflict of course, and many conflicts unrelated to Islam or Jihad could easily kill millions and destroy whole countries. But predominantly Islamic countries do have the added burden of the conflict of Classical Islamic ideals with modern civilization (not just Western civilization), and it will take time to resolve this conflict.
Hold on tight.

Do read Tanner Greer’s post about the limitations of the Western liberal worldview when it comes to Islam, or any religion for that matter.
Excerpt: The truth is that most faiths, though of course not all, possess a concept something like what the Christian Church Fathers called metanoia — usually translated as “repentance” but more properly the transformation of the soul. It is visible in the tales of Paul, Raskolnikov, and Malcolm X. It is not “people get[ting] out of [religions] what they bring into them.” Quite the opposite: it is people getting out of religion what they never had before. Max Fisher of Vox does not misunderstand this because he lacks a grasp of faith: he misunderstands this because he does not grasp the nature of man. He possesses a graduate degree in international security issues from the Johns Hopkins University, writes for a major publication, is a go-to for White House narrative promulgation, and he lacks this most basic element of the liberal education.

This is not to condemn him as any sort of unusual creature. He is not the exception. He is the rule. Our elites are well credentialed: but the danger they pose to us lies in the dismaying truth that they are not wise. Worse, they are not even smart.

Also See this from Razib Khan for another angle.
The power of the Islamic State derives in part from the fact that it inverts the moral order of the world. Some of its soldiers are clear psychopaths, as the most violent and brutal of international jihadis have been drawn to the Islamic State (as opposed to Al Qaeda, which is more pragmatic!). But a substantial number believe in its utopian vision of an Islamic society constructed upon narrow lines. A positive vision of a few evil goals, rather than a grand quantity of small evil pleasures. The Islamic State ushers in an evil new order, it does not unleash unbridled chaos. Though its self-conception that it is resurrecting the first decades of Islam is self-delusion in my opinion, it is still a vision which can entice some in the Islamic international.

I do not think that the Islamic State is here to stay. I believe it will be gone within the next five years, torn apart by its own contradictions and its rebellion against normal human conventions, traditions, and instincts. But that does not mean it is not going to cause misery for many on its way down. The irony is that the iconoclastic Islamic State may as well be worshiping the idols conjured in the most fervid of Christian evangelical apocalyptic literature, because they shall tear the land end to end and leave it in a thousand pieces, a material sacrifice to their god. They live under the illusion that they are building utopia, but they are coming to destroy an imperfect world and leave hell in its wake.

* The modern Salafis are just the latest in a particular extreme of Sunni belief, which goes back to individuals such as Ibn Taymiyyah.

And Shadi Hamid’s excellent post from 2014: The roots of the Islamic State’s appeal.  

Islam is distinctive in how it relates to politics. This isn’t necessarily bad or good. It just is. Comparing it with other religions helps illuminate what makes it so. For example, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his ruling BJP may be Hindu nationalists, but the ideological distance between them and the secular Congress Party isn’t as great as it may seem. In part, this is because traditional Hindu kingship—with its fiercely inegalitarian vision of a caste-based social order—is simply less relevant to modern, mass politics and largely incompatible with democratic decision-making. As Cook writes in his new book Ancient Religions, Modern Politics, “Christians have no law to restore while Hindus do have one but show little interest in restoring it.” Muslims, on the other hand, not only have a law but also one that is taken seriously by large majorities throughout the Middle East.

..If ISIS and what will surely be a growing number of imitators are to be defeated, then statehood—and, more importantly, states that are inclusive and accountable to their own people—are essential. The state-centric order in the Arab world, for all its artificiality and arbitrariness, is preferable to ungoverned chaos and permanently contested borders. But for the Westphalian system to survive in the region, Islam, or even Islamism, may be needed to legitimate it. To drive even the more pragmatic, participatory variants of Islamism out of the state system would be to doom weak, failing states and strong, brittle ones alike to a long, destructive cycle of civil conflict and political violence.

Last but not the least, from Ali Minai, unreal Islam. 
Which brings us back to the issue of “real Islam”. As someone in love with the cultural traditions of Islam and as a diligent student of its history, I agree that the acts of the jihadis do not represent the vast majority of Muslims today or in history. Humans are a violent species and Muslims have contributed their share, but it is completely asinine to think that Muslims have been, historically, any more violent than other groups. However, it is equally absurd to deny that the ideology underlying jihadism draws upon mainstream Islamic beliefs and is, therefore, undeniably a form of “real Islam” – albeit of a very extreme form. It is more accurate to say that this extremism is “not the only Islam”, and, by historical standards, it is a version very different from what the vast majority of Muslims have practiced. That’s why groups espousing such puritanical and rigid attitudes were traditionally called “khawarij” – the alienated ones. At the same time, Muslims should acknowledge that they have not constructed the logical and theoretical framework within which extremism can be rejected formally. If anything, the opposite has happened in the last century, with increasingly literalist attitudes gaining strength for political reasons. And that is the core problem: A literal reading of even moderate Muslim beliefs can, and does, lead to behaviors incompatible with modern society. Like Christians, Jews, Hindus and others, Muslims have to turn towards a less literal, more inspirational and humanistic reading of their sacred traditions, drawing from them principles that can stand the test of time rather than literal, ahistorical prescriptions. This does not require the invention of a “new Islam”, or the imposition of an “official Islam” by states. Nor does it require a rewriting of Muslim sacred texts any more than the Enlightenment needed a rewriting of the Old Testament – Thomas Jefferson notwithstanding. What is needed is a change of attitude, of how people relate to the texts and traditions. Strong strands of humanism, compassion, diversity of ideas and acceptance of differences already exist within the Islamic tradition – among Sufis, among poets, and even among scholars. The trick is to rediscover, re-emphasize and reinterpret them for our times. And even as we wring our hands in despair, brave individuals within Muslim societies are trying to ignite just such a change at great risk to their lives. The least we can do is to add our voices to theirs.

Oh, and Razib Khan on the poverty of multicultural discourse: Excerpts
The problem with the bleeding over of academic “discourse” into the public forum is that it obfuscates real discussion, and often has had a chilling effect upon attempts at moral or ethical clarity. Unlike the individual above I am skeptical of moral or ethical truth in a deep ontological sense. But I have opinions on the proper order of things on a more human scale of existence. You don’t have to reject the wrongness of a thing if you reject the idea that that thing is wrong is some deep Platonic sense. I can, in some cases will, make the argument for why some form of the Western liberal democratic order is superior to most other forms of arranging human affairs, despite being a skeptic of what I perceive to be its egalitarian excesses. I can, and in some cases will, make the argument for why legal sexual equality is also the preferred state of human affairs. But to have this discussion I have to be forthright about my norms and presuppositions, and not apologize for them. They are what they are, and the views of those who disagree are what they are.

An academic discourse tends to totally muddy a clear and crisp discussion. The reality is that most Egyptians have barbaric attitudes on a whole host of questions (e.g., ~80 percent of Egyptians favor the death penalty for apostasy from Islam). It was not surprising at all that the majority of the Egyptian electorate supported parties with reactionary cultural political planks; because the classification of these views as “reactionary” only makes sense if you use as your point of reference the Westernized social and economic elite. The majority of Egyptians have never been part of this world, and for them upward mobility has been accompanied by a greater self-consciousness of their Islamic identity.

This reality is not comforting to many, and so there has been an evasion of this. If we accept, for example, the hegemonic superiority of sexual equality, should we not impose the right arrangement upon those who oppress women? This is a serious question, but the fear of engaging in “dangerous” analysis in the “discourse” allows us to sidestep this question. Rather, by minimizing the concrete realities of cultural difference and the depths of their origin, Egyptians are easily transformed into Czechs in 1989 with browner skins and a Muslim affiliation. This is a totally false equivalence. As Eastern Europeans go the Czech population is atypical in its secularism and historical commitment to liberal democracy (one could argue the weakness of the Catholic church goes as far back as the Hussite rebellion and the later suppression of Protestantism by the Habsburgs). While other post-World War I polities switched toward authoritarianism in the inter-war period, the Czechs retained a liberal democratic orientation until the Nazi German invasion. After the collapse of Communism they reverted back to this state. Notably, extreme nationalist parties with anti-democratic tendencies have come to the fore in most post-Communist states, but not so in the Czech Republic.

The irony here is that an academic position which espouses the deep incommensurability of different societies and cultures in terms of their values, rendering inter-cultural analysis or critique suspect, has resulted in the domain of practical discussion a tendency to recast inter-cultural differences of deep import into deviations or artificialities imposed from the outside. In this particular case that artificiality is the Egyptian military, but in most cases it is Western colonialism, which has an almost demonic power to reshape and disfigure postcolonial societies, which lack all internal agency or direction. This is simply not the true state of affairs. The paradoxical fact is that there is commensurability across very different cultures. You can understand, analyze, and critique other societies, if imperfectly. For example, I can understand, and even agree with, some of the criticisms of Western society by Salafist radicals for its materialism and excessive focus on proximate hedonism. The Salafists are not aliens, but rather one comprehensible expression of human cultural types. But that does not deny that I find their vision of human flourishing abhorrent. I understand it, therefore I reject it.

And my own comment on the multiculti question: 

“One angle (not the most important one, but I think its there) could be that while many casual adherents and self-satisfied groupthink nurtured “thinkers” are just mindlessly repeating the party line there ARE a number of people who are seriously committed to what they imagine is a worldwide organized movement to overthrow the existing system (including the system in which they work and draw a salary or get grants). i.e. they may know that a lot of their bullshit is bullshit, but its useful bullshit in a higher cause. It undermines the dominant civilization and its armies and bankers (or so they think..I think the actual contribution of Tariq Ali or even the far more scholarly Vijay Prashad to bringing down Western civ is negligible compared to the contribution of wall street bankers). but there IS a hardcore of calculation and conscious propaganda mixed into the postcolonial bullshit…

Once war has been undertaken, no peace is made by pretending there is no war.
—- Duryodhana (the Mahabharata)

“With two thousand years of examples behind us, we have no excuses when fighting for not fighting well.” T. E. Lawrence

Everyone has a plan ’till they get punched in the mouth.
Mike Tyson

Trump, the phenomenon

This “explanation of no-explanation” is the best piece on the Trump phenomenon yet (because it is not really about the Trump phenomenon, but about phenomenae and societal norms in general).
 I think the internet and its ability to bypass ideological and behavioral gatekeepers in the establishment has been part of the “why now” question. Interestingly, some on the more clueless sections of the “left” are surprised that the internet is not just promoting “progress”. Ironies abound.

The last two paragraphs of the Adam Elkus piece: 

The key for future historians to analyze is simply Kurzman’s “why now?” question. Our institutions — formal and informal — have been fraying for a very long time. And the strategy of ingroup-outgroup outbidding that Trump has exploited is not exactly new to modern American politics either. Perhaps the answer lies in a very granular analysis of what precisely happened in the ground during the GOP primary as a flawed and increasingly tottering array of institutions tried and failed to bend the electorate to their will and people began to feel like they were part of something larger and greater than themselves. But the reason why I have focused on the flaws, contradictions, and weaknesses of institutions and professionals despite Kurzman’s emphasis on contingent outcomes is that social structures work by minimizing possibilities for contingent outcomes.

When the possibility for great upheaval exists in contingency, the hour may go to the man or woman willing to seize it. This is something Karl Marx explained quite well in his 18th Brumaire, the story of why a revolt that might have succeeded in an earlier time failed catastrophically. The uncertainty of how much adherence to what we would think to be common norms of behavior exists as well as the impact of the manner in which our institutions and elites only partially at best observe those norms creates a space for contingency, chance, and possibility. And this space has been dramatically and vigorously seized by a quasi-fascist populist sloganeering thug with a bad haircut and his army of passionate followers. For now, explaining Trump may just be as simple as that.

Image result for trump

 Allah will sort things out (and some will no doubt land on their feet even after the revolution), though I do hope Trump appoints Christie as chief garbage collector just to humiliate him some more. We all have our dreams 🙂

By the way, I am firmly convinced that Trump is not some kind of “genius manipulator” and he is definitely NOT some kind of political genius who has a vision (or even the latent ability to generate a vision) of what to do with power once he has it..His entire record indicates that he is a shrewd businessman and conman who fails at more deals than he makes, but who frequently manages to leave someone else holding the can as he exits. He has hit on a few clever moves, but his repertoire is limited. He will not be some kind of revolutionary leader in any way, shape or form. He will make a mess of things. The only question is: how big a mess? If the US is lucky, it will be a small mess (and mostly just a continuation of establishment Republican policies; good, bad and awful), but who knows. Allah may have more dangerous intentions. Simply put, he is no Napoleon or Bismarck or Octavian or even Nixon. He is not Hitler either. He is just a salesman who has hit on a winning sales pitch. But being president is not the same as running for president. A mediocrity can get by, with conventional ideas, a conventional team, conventional decisions, an occasional gaffe. The system can handle that. But his fans are expecting hope and change well beyond what Obama fans were expecting .. And they aint gonna get it.

In fact, my main hope for why he may lose in November is his clueless low IQ team (yesterday his spokeswoman was confused by “bringing a knife to a gunfight” and it was painful to watch). Unless he dumps most of them soon, THEY will trip him up.. Inshallah. They were hired when he had limited options (and when even he may not have been too sure of getting this far) and they are absolutely not ready for prime-time.

There is a much larger group of analyses that focus on Trumpers as authority worshipers , proto fascists, racists or retards, I am a bit leery of them though. There is more than a whiff of elitist self satisfaction about a lot of them.. And some of them are almost comically the race-obsessed and race-baiting SJWs complaining that Trump is racist.

The ones that seem to confirm the favorite prejudices of their authors are especially suspicious. If they are such profound analysts, maybe they would have seen this coming before it happened? They do frequently appear to retrospectively paint every event as confirmation of their own pet theory about people/politics/society… I am a bit skeptical

Of course the Republican party has spent a lot of time building up a constituency that can be “activated” using these cues and yes, now Trump has hijacked that group using their con against them.. Good for him. Ali Minai said this very eloquently recently, ,and so have others. But what I find suspicious is the extension of this (relatively straightforward) observation into psychobabble about dumb hicks craving authority figures blah blah blah. THAT too may be true, but it may also be be junk-social-psychology, of which there is an awful lot about. 🙂

I don’t think a Republican alternative is really possible now. They have all been happily selling snake oil for ages (in their defense they can say that they were only doing what the entire political class regarded as “appropriate political behavior”, i.e. tell lies and deal in pithy soundbites and then do what you really want to do after you are elected. The problem is, having done that all their life (including in the first half of this primary season) they have now been Trumped at that game and have no defense. It is too late to argue that you have a real plan and the short-fingered vulgarian casino-operator does not.

Sic transit gloria mundi..

Though the libertarians at Reason see it more positively..

PS: @Sam_Schulman on Twitter argued that Trump’s most important winning point is his attack on political correctness. save image

I think that is definitely a factor, though I dont think the “Muslim-ban” part is the biggest differentiator from other Republicans (all of whom are perfectly willing to kill Muslims in large numbers, so I don’t think Trump is getting too much special credit for being the only one who stands up to “secret-Muslim-Obama”). I think it is his attack on PC more generally; with race and immigration being two of the most critical factors. But then again, as a Muslim maybe I am trying/wishing to see less “muslim-ban” intensity in the Republican electorate than is really out there.

Of course, the “arugula Left” has left no stone unturned in its quest to make PC as silly and monumentally stupid as possible. See this post from Razib Khan for an excellent example: Sumo-scale cultural appropriation. 

Btw, he is not bad at reading poetry 🙂

And his enemies list includes FOX news and Romney-Ryan 2012. Interesting times.. This may be more interesting than I thought..

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Drone Warfare; The Unblinking Eye

From our regular contributor, Dr Hamid Hussain.

The Unblinking Eye
Hamid Hussain

“With the monstrous weapons man already has, humanity is in danger of being trapped in this world by its moral adolescents”.  General Omar Bradley

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) commonly known as drone is the most open secret of modern warfare.  UAV is primarily an intelligence platform but use of armed drones for target killing generates heated debate in public.  Opponents of armed drones consider it an indiscriminate killer while proponents claim that this is the cleanest way of eliminating opponents.  In the last fifteen years, information about several aspects of drone operations has become available to sketch a reasonable picture. In the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, U.S. intelligence community was busy capturing terrorists from all over the globe.  Existing legal system was seen as inadequate therefore detainees were kept at ‘black sites’ all over the globe. Several alleged prisoner abuse scandals sent shock waves and ‘jailers’ got a pretty bad name.  If you can’t jail the bad guys then the only other option is to eliminate them.  This is how the drone warfare started and then rapidly expanded.

In the last fifteen years, drones have evolved.  Initially drones were used for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and later some were weaponized for targeted strikes.  A number of unmanned aerial systems are operated by all branches of armed forces but Predator and Reaper became famous.  Army uses Hunter, Pointer, Raven and Shadow, air force uses Desert Hawk and Marine Corps uses Pioneer and Dragon Eye.

MQ-1 B Predator’s primary mission is ISR.  It is also armed with two AGM-114 Hellfire missiles (each missile costing $99’000).  MQ-1C Gray Eagle is advanced version with increased endurance, updated electronic equipment and armed with four Hellfire missiles. Unit cost of this bird is $4.98 million. MQ-1C will eventually replace MQ-1B.  MQ-9 Reaper is a larger version with double the speed of Predator and better surveillance and targeting systems.  It is armed with four AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, two 500 pound GBU-38 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) or two GBU-12 Paveway II laser guided bombs. The unit cost of this exotic bird is $13.7 million and maintenance cost about $5 million per year.

UAV is a two operator craft with one piloting the aircraft and the other operating sensors.  Hellfire missile can be fired in several different modes depending on the location of the target.  Direct strike mode takes missile directly to the target and high mode drops missile vertically down on a target.  In indirect mode, missile dives to earth and then in low trajectory skims earth surface to hit the target under cover. UAVs need ground support systems that collect, analyze and process incoming data, disseminate to other entities and then direct strikes on specific targets. Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receiver (ROVER) used by soldiers on the ground can see the Predator feed in real time.

In the early season of hunting, CIA operated Predators and coordinated with Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).  Air Force, army and CIA waged some tough turf battles about who would control these new birds.  When it was suggested that all UAVs should be placed under air force command, army pushed back arguing that its own UAVs were now integral parts of the division.  A high level ISR task force was established at Pentagon to address these conflicts.  In the end, army ended up keeping Gray Eagle and Air Force getting Reaper. However, a percentage of drones controlled by air force are operated by CIA.  Inside CIA, there was also a fight between its paramilitary section known as Special Activities Division (SAD) and Counter Terrorism Center (CTC) over control of drones. In the end CTC got control over drones and eventually became the most powerful division. It rapidly expanded with a large budget and ever increasing number of personnel.  Anyone aspiring to climb the career ladder was rushing in for a stint at CTC.  Director of CTC became a powerful player inside and outside the agency. In 2006, a new director who was a convert to Islam and a strong proponent of assassination program took over. He served for long due to his connections with White House and Capitol Hill despite clashes with colleagues including director of the CIA.

A ‘targeted strike’ is elimination of a known high value target after prolonged surveillance.  A ‘signature strike’ is not a confirmed strike on a known target but simply targeting a suspicious activity. When it became evident that after the first strike, militants sealed off the area to hide the identity of the killed and therefore the initial crowd after the strike only consisted of bad guys, a new tactic of ‘follow up strike’ also called ‘double tap’ was implemented. Initially strikes were directed at buildings that inevitably resulted in death of civilians inhabiting the same building.  When pressure mounted regarding deaths of civilians, the process was refined and more strikes were directed at vehicles to avoid civilian casualties.

President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney were executives before coming to White House while President Obama and Vice President Joe Biden are lawyers. The difference between Bush and Obama White House was difference between corporate and attorney cultures.  In case of drone warfare, Bush made the decision and let the agencies work out details.  When CIA needed legal cover, Bush would provide them necessary legal cover.  Obama looked at the problem with the eye of an attorney and first put in place all legal elements and then sat on top of the food chain personally signing off on almost all drone strikes.

Three days after his inauguration, President Obama authorized two drone strikes in North and South Waziristan. These were not directed at a high value target and several civilians were killed.  CIA director Michael Hayden went to White House to explain ‘signature strikes’ and Obama was not happy. He overhauled the whole process of selection and targeting.  Now, a whole bureaucracy nick named ‘Kill Chain’ is involved in the process.  The first part is ‘developing the target’ where intelligence community provides all the information about the target and risks it poses to U.S. national security. The second ‘authorization process’ starts from regional command and moves to Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), Secretary of Defence, Principles Committee of National Security (consisting of National Security Advisor, CJCSC, Attorney General, Advisor of Counter Terrorism, Director National Intelligence, Secretaries of State, Defence, Homeland Security, Treasury, Ambassador to United Nations and White House Chief of Staff) and finally the President.  Final authorization has an expiration date of sixty days and if target is not eliminated in this time period the process starts all over again.  This gives a hint that there may be pressure on those executing the order to hit the target before the expiration date and in this rush ‘certainty’ bar may be lowered resulting in wrong strikes and death of civilians.

President Obama is a fan of St. Thomas Aquinas and his theory of just war is based on theory expounded by Aquinas. According to Aquinas, three requisites of a just war are authority of the prince, a just cause such as avenging an injury and a right intention of promoting good and avoiding evil. However, President Obama conveniently forgot other advice of Aquinas about excesses of war warning about “eagerness to hurt, bloodthirsty desire for revenge, an untamed and unforgiving temper, ferocity in renewing the struggle”. This was the case in many strikes in Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) of Pakistan where frustration, anger and revenge took precedence over use of a tactical weapon based on a meticulous and thoughtful strategy.

The case of Lebanese born British citizen Bilal Berjawi is a good case study to understand the new face of modern warfare.  He was travelling to Kenya and Somalia and attending all militant pow wows.  Berjawi was under British surveillance for over four years. From all the evidence collected over the years, it was quite clear that he had gone to the ‘dark side’.  However, he had not yet committed any crime and couldn’t be charged under existing laws. One the other hand from the profile developed over the years, it was clear that he will commit some violent act possibly in Britain.  In September 2010, Britain revoked his nationality and in January 2012, he was killed by a U.S. drone strike on his vehicle in Somalia.  After his death, militant group issued a statement confirming that he was a senior al-Qaeda commander in Somalia and released a video about plan of a suicide mission by Berjawi. Proponents and opponents of use of drones can study this case and suggest how these tricky issues can be addressed.

When any new weapon system is introduced, there is a risk of ‘infatuation’ resulting in overuse and runaway costs.  In April 2008, during the battle for Sadar City against a Shia militia, one army brigade was supported by two Predators from air force, two drones operated by Special Forces and several Shadow and Ravens of army. This was in addition to several manned platforms including intelligence aircrafts, U-2; six Apache attack helicopters and national satellite network.  Each party has a vested interest to exaggerate its importance in the battle therefore it is crucial to have independent supervision and audit. In addition, ‘obsession’ with the toy can cloud the judgment about the weakness of the system.  Feeds from the drones can be hacked by the third party and it was recently disclosed that United Kingdom and United States were able to hack the feeds from Israeli drones and watching feeds in real time. There are also serious issues about the stability of Reaper drones during flight and an unprecedented twenty Reapers crashed in 2015. Only money is burned in a crashed drone and no human life is lost but that should not be the case for complacency.

Earlier versions of drones carried a very small price tag compared to high ticket items such as fighter jets therefore major defense contractors had very little interest in the project.  However, when Pentagon bureaucracy fell in love with this new toy and willing to dole any amount of money, then major defense contractors jumped on the bandwagon with the thought that if they can make drones bigger and expensive as well as get into the support services business then it is worth the effort.  In 2008, a new ISR task force was established with acquisition authority.  In four years, the task force spent $10 billion.

Northrop Grumman manufactured Global Hawk at the cost of $300 million per piece.  Northrop also made two delta winged X-47 B for navy to be operated from an aircraft carrier at the cost of $1.7 billion. Battlefield Airborne Communication Node (BACN) covers areas out of range of normal systems. This was specific for mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Bombardier business jet was converted into an ISR platform.  Northrop Grumman got a $250 million contract for three BACN Bombardiers. Global Hawks were also fitted with BACN (EQ-4) by Northrop Grumman and fifty birds cost a staggering $10 billion.  Raytheon manufactures sensors and radars for the UAVs.  It provided Enhanced Integrated Sensor Suite (EISS) for Global Hawk. Initial cost estimate of $10 million skyrocketed to $233 million per copy. A stealth drone RQ-170 manufactured by Lockheed Martin is secret therefore cost is not publicly available but some estimates put the price tag at $200 million per copy.  

UAVs are only platforms and support systems are very costly.  Distributed Common Ground Systems (DCGS) is the nerve center and air force DCGS was primarily supporting airstrikes.  Other services also jumped in and army instituted its own DCGS-A at the cost of $2.3 billion and navy is not behind to create its own DCGS-N.  Air Force started to expand its ground networks supporting UAV missions called ‘reach back sites’.  EUR-I in Germany supports missions in Asia and Central Asia, EUR-2 in Italy for missions in Africa, PAC-1 at Kadena Air Force base in Japan and PAC-2 in Pacific Ocean for UAV flights over South East Asia and South China Sea.

Every system needs a cost benefit analysis as money cannot be thrown in a bucket with no bottom.  In one case, six hellfire missiles from Cobra attack helicopters and five from Predators were used to kill about a dozen low level foot soldiers in al-Qaim on Iraq-Syria border. Each Hellfire costs $ 99’000 and simple math tells us that one million dollar worth of ammunition was dropped on a dozen low level foot soldiers.  In another case, two GBU-12 bombs; each carrying a five hundred pound warhead and each with a price tag of $19’000 were dropped on two people in two tents in a remote area in Kunar in Afghanistan.  Only one bomb exploded while other was a dud but incidentally dropped directly on one tent killing its occupant. They forgot President Bush’s promise in September 2001 that “when I take action, I’m not going to fire a $2 million missile at a $10 empty tent and hit a camel in the butt”.

Drone is a tool of warfare like tanks, artillery and jet planes and like any instrument of war has its benefits and side effects.  It is easy to be mesmerized by a new war toy and loose the bigger picture.  On the other hand, it is also easy to denounce the tool because of its side effects or misuse.  UAV is an excellent ISR platform and there is enough proof that compared to all other options, armed drones had the major impact on disrupting militant activities in Pakistan’s tribal areas especially taking out high value targets.  However, it is also true that a large number of civilians were also killed.  In my view it was overused thus negating many of its benefits.  I think only about twenty five to thirty percent of the strikes were successful removing important leader’s especially foreign militants.  Killing of two to three hundred foot soldiers which could be easily replaced didn’t serve any strategic purpose.

A tactical weapon has an impact on strategy and just like introduction of artillery, tanks and fighter jets had an impact on the larger strategic canvass of the art of war, drones will also have a similar impact.  Like tactical nuclear weapons, the production and deployment of drones is going at a fast pace before its role in strategy is figured out.  Another area of concern is rapid escalation of cost and now all major defense contractors are in the game putting out products with marginal benefits but with an astronomical price tag.  This is right time for adult supervision at Pentagon to prevent establishment of another behemoth drone bureaucracy that can eventually become ‘too big to fail’. In addition to the military aspect, a broader discussion about legal, ethical and moral aspects need to involve broader segments of the society. UAV will ultimately settle down as ISR platform with marked reduction of use of armed drones.


– For specifics of Predator and Reaper, see air force fact sheets;

– The Drone Papers.  The Intercept,

– Lt. Colonel T. Mark McCurley and Kevin Maurer.  Hunter Killer: Inside America’s Unmanned Air War (New York: Dutton, 2015)

– William M. Arkin.  Unmanned: Drones, Data and the Illusion of Perfect Warfare (New York: Little Brown and Company, 2015)

– Andre Cockburn.  Kill Chain: The Rise of the High-Tech Assassins (New York Henry Holt and Company, 2015)

– Chris Woods. Sudden Justice: America’s Secret Drone Wars (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015)

– Richard Whittle. Predator: The Secret Origins of Drone Revolution

– Jeremy Scahill.  Dirty Wars: The World is a battlefield (New York: Nation Books, 2013)

– Mark Mazzetti.  The Way Of The Knife (New York: The Penguin Press, 2013)

– Steve Coll.  The Unblinking Stare: The Drone War in Pakistan.  The New Yorker, November 24, 2014.

– Der Spiegel, December 04, 2013, Pakistani CIA Informant,

Hamid Hussain
February 27, 2016

Defence Journal, March 2016


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