This post is text details of YouTube video.  The main crux of the post is that Japan was ruled by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that was founded by Nobusuke Kishi a War Criminal.   The LDP had 38 years of continuous power. CIA uses Moonies Church to Launder money and support the LDP. Nobusuke  Kishis grandson Shinzo Abe PM, assassination leads to investigation of Moonies

This is the outline on video
a) 3:10 How the CIA Built Modern Japan
b) 7:29 The Moon Cult, Money Laundring and Christian Zionism
c) 10:17 Shinzo Abe’s Assassination and the Collapse of the Unification Church

a-i) Nobusuke Kishi was imprisoned as a suspected Class A war criminal, but U.S. occupation authorities did not charge, try, or convict him, and released him in 1948 during the Reverse Course (see wiki)
During this time, a group of influential Americans who had formed themselves into an “American Council on Japan” came to Kishi’s aid, and lobbied the American government to release him as they considered Kishi to be among the best men to lead post-war Japan. The American Council on Japan included former ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew, retired diplomat Eugene Dooman, Newsweek journalists Harry Kern and Compton Packenham, and corporate lawyer James L. Kauffman

a-ii) Kishi becomes Japans PM in 1957 with US and CIA help. Kishi creates the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) LDP has a 38 year uninterrupted run of power.

b-i) CIA finds a new partner to mobe money around the Mooneys Cult. The Family Federation for World Peace and Unification. In 1954 Sun Myung Moon claimed Jesus Christ appeared to him and asked him to continue Jesus works from 2000 years ago. To his followers Moon was the Messiah (prophet). Then Kishi noticed Moon and established the Federation for Victory Communism.

b-ii) Moons Church becomes key funder for Christian Zionism in Asia. Korea identified as third Israel. Forges direct ties with Netanyahu and the Likud Party. In 2003 Launches Jerusalem Summit and brings together Evangelicals and Israeli hardliners.

c-i) Kishis grandson Shinzo Abe Japans PM since 2012 to 2020. Provided political cover for the Moon Church. Assasinated by Tatsua Yamagami. Yamagamis mother had donated over 100 million yen (USD 650,000) to the Moon Church. Moon church get investigated and dissolves.

After the Moon Church gets dissolved CIA tyrns to Turning Point USA, Charlie Kirks organization. 2018 is significant year for Charlie Kirk he meets his wife Erika France. The organizations Economic Libertarian message turns from Economic Libertarian to Judeo Christian Nationalism with strong support for Israel.

You can watch the rest which is speculation on the YouTube

See It/Shoot It: The Secret History of the CIA’s Lethal Drone Program. by Christopher J. Fuller

Book Review from Major Agha Humayun Amin. 

This is an interesting endeavor by a self-styled expert on drones from the University of Southampton in United Kingdom.

I first read about this great expert on drones in a review by one Mr. Phillip O Warlick II of Air Command and Staff College who elevated the book and its author to prophetic heights.

Having witnessed some drone strikes personally and having extensively travelled in the area affected by the so called US drone program I decided to buy this book which was quite a blunder as I now reflect in retrospect.

Blunder in the sense that I learnt nothing additional about the drone program.

Disappointing right from the first few pages i.e the prologue of the book when he starts discussing Mustafa Abul Yazid or Saeed Al Masris death in a drone strike. The writer claims that he was killed in retaliation for the Bagram attack of  17/18 May 2010 or so. Now Bagram attack was launched by Afghan Taliban with headquarters in Kuchlagh Quetta and hardly any link with Saeed Al Masri based in North Waziristan.

To support his assertions the author quotes letter from Osama Bin Laden held in West Point.

The source of the assertion is highly questionable but above all the organizational set up is totally contradictory , in that an attack carried out by an Organisation known as Afghan Taliban is linked with a totally puny and insignificant organization known as Al Qaeda.

What our brilliant author does not answer is “why US drones should strike a target which has nothing to do with Bagram Air Strike” or more precisely “ Why US drones should not target Kuchlagh , instead of Abul Yazid”.

 I started having serious doubts about the credibility of the books narrative .

This scribe will offer an answer to these questions in this narrative at a later stage .

Our author claims that Abul Yazid had congratulated the Khost December 2009 attacker? But this was done by various people on the internet , you tube and on other public forums ? (page-3)

In a fit of verbosity and oratory our author makes some non factual claims :– (page-1)

What huge dragnet ? The two agencies North and South Waziristan where 90 % of all US drone attacks in last 12 years or so were carried out are a puny area not very large and it is common knowledge that most of so called foreigners, Arab,Uzbek,etc are in a small area surrounding Miram Shah.

Now our learned author calls an area 90 x 50 miles as huge , where the CIA has a huge dragnet as he brags, but says nothing why the mighty CIA never attacked the area some 1500 Km long along Afghan border on Pakistan border from where 90 % of Taliban attacks on US troops were carried out ?

This is one of the huge loophole in Mr Fullers narrative ?

Mr Fuller indulges in much dramatics not suitable for a serious writer of non fiction military analysis like describing women operating drones like on page -4 describing a drone sensor operator :–

My issue with Mr Fuller is not at all about the human rights or ethical aspect of drone strikes but why US drone strikes only targeted two small districts North Waziristan and South Waziristan and why not Pakistani Baluchistan where 90 % of killers of US troops in Afghanistan were housed ?

Fuller gives no answer in his whole narrative which focuses on melodramatics and verbosity which is neither relevant nor accurately linked to the subject of the book.

In chapter titled “ Let Him Sleep” the author makes much of Al Qaeda in US Afghan war but throughout the narrative fails to prove that Al Qaeda was the major player in inflicting maximum casualties on US troops in Afghanistan which were inflicted by Mulla Omar based in Pakistani Baluchistan and never targeted by US drones who are so much projected in this book.

There was only one US drone strike in Pakistani Baluchistan in 2016 when US troops had withdrawn from most of Afghanistan and the war was literally over since 2012.

On page 9 the author claims that the Abbottabad raid against OBL was carried out without Pakistan’s consent , which may be treated as authors conjecture or speculation but not a confirmed fact .

On page 9 and 10 our brilliant author claims that there are three drone programs in operations and the book is more concerned with drone program run by CIA , the James Bond that our author is !

There is no map to explain who runs which program in which area which is certainly a major analytical draw back of the book.

I severely dispute the authors rabid bias against President Bush like on page 13 :–

As a matter of fact Obama was a far bigger disaster not only in presiding over decisions involving  unwarranted drone attacks but in causing maximum casualties to US troops in Afghanistan by sanctioning a pointless escalation in Helmand Kandahar and Kunnar in 2009-11.

As I read the book , repeated impression I got was that this book was funded by the CIA or sponsored by some CIA asset who wanted to white wash CIAs drone program .

At times the writer appears like a spokesman of the CIA in rationalizing and defending CIA sponsored drone strikes.

Reagan era chapter is pure hogwash.

The author fails to note that Reagan acted as unwitting midwife of so called future Islamic extremism by extensive capacity building of so called Islamists which were concentrated with CIA and Saudi efforts from worldwide into Pakistan’s western provinces.

Glorification of Haig on page 26 is exaggerated and irrelevant to the main subject of the book i.e Drone Warfare:–

Terrorism was never the issue in Reagan area where the prime US concern was USSR and a low intensity conflict against the USSR.

On page 27 he makes one sided statements like USSR sponsoring terrorism while conveniently ignoring that USA was doing the same thing in Afghanistan since 1980 :–

The writers tone throughout is one sided i.e he sees all actions not taken by USA or UK as actions of bad guys while ignoring US policy in supporting so called Islamists in Afghanistan against USSR.

The problem with Fullers analysis is supreme confusion like on page 28 he claims that US Secretary of State identified state sponsored terrorism and US CIA’s  drone program was its logical conclusion.

However he fails to note that 99 % of US drone strikes in Pakistans FATA region were carried out against small time non state actors who hardly had any connection with vast bulk of US military deaths in Afghanistan.

On the other hand throughout this book Fuller fails to establish why no US CIA or JSOC or military drone strikes were carried out against the real killer of US troops i.e the Pakistani state sponsored Afghan Taliban based in Pakistani Baluchistan.

The writer has nothing to say about so many massive compromises made by Reagan administration with so called Muslim or Arab states where there were clear indications that citizens of these states were involved in terrorism.

How Reagan administration sat like a duck when US embassy was attacked in Beirut on 18 April 1983 or again on 23 October 1983.

How apologetically lame was Reagan administrations response when his secretary Defence Casper Weinberger stated that the US lacked knowledge about who did the Beirut Bombings although he was in full knowledge of the fact that the US National Security Agency had an intercept where Iranian state had ordered the Beirut bombings.

In 2006 January a US Second Secretary in Kabul named Doug Scherer summed it up well while defining US bureaucrats fear of Iran in words “my seniors are wet pu_____s hiding behind e mails and would have a heart attack if they see a war game plan simulation of an attack on Iran “ !

This irrational US fear of Iran and the resultant US strategic irresolution is nowhere discussed by Fuller.

Reagan administration lacked moral courage to confront terrorism.Just look how they blinked after the 1983 bombings in Lebanon.

All that the indecisive Reagan administration could say was not now ?

What was Reagan policy against Iran or against radicalism in Arab world , evasive and apologetic at best.

But our author finds no fault with Reagan administration.

Our author then goes on to glorify George Schultz as the ultimate warrior against terror.

The whole premise of Fuller is fallacious. He fails to establish a case that non state actors caused maximum casualties on US troops in Afghanistan and totally ignores and hides the fact that some 80 % casualties on US troops in Afghanistan were causes by Pakistani state supported Afghan Taliban. This remains he most serious conceptual flaw of this book.

The author is rightly critical of Reagan administrations passiveness but fails to note that this passiveness carried on in all US policies till today including George Bush ,Obama and now President Trump.

Fuller misses the essential point that US has always avoided the real hard targets like Iran,North Korea while going for non entities like Afghanistan or droning small time characters in North and South Waziristan Agency.

On page 88 our authors extols CIAs war in Afghanistan but fails to note that there was hardly any fighting in Afghanistan as Taliban simply withdrew to safe havens in Pakistan and Afghanistan was captured without a single US casualty.

Al Qaeda who Fullers so much exaggeratedly  projects, was a non player in Afghanistan while the real player Afghan Talibans were never attacked inside Pakistan by Fullers favorite CIA drones.

Throughout the book Fuller beats around the bush talking about Al Qaeda in Pakistans FATA region while totally ignoring the fact that Al Qaeda was a non entity in terms of inflicting casualties on US troops in Afghanistan.

The worst drawback of this Yale published book is that it does not contain a single map .

I am surprised and shocked at the cartographic petty parsimony of our brilliant scholar from Southampton and Yale !

Our brilliant scholar has no conception about size of groups that attacked US forces in Afghanistan and embarks on this totally Quixotic and Utopian endeavor to educate the world about US drone warfare !

As an example the map below shows the approximate size of the so called extremist groups in Afghanistan:–

What Fuller has been doing in this 369 book , a total loss of stationery is talking about US drone attacks on the smallest group in Af Pak i.e Al Qaeda.

What Fuller states and his entire perception about Afghanistan is flawed.

There is no hesitation if I state that this book is one big failure and it is so because the writers basic perceptions are totally flawed and out of touch with reality of the situation in Afghanistan.

Book Review sent in by Maj Agha Amin. Unfortunately the pictures in the original are low quality and I was unable to fix that problem. Still, you will get the gist of it. 

This is a very interesting book by a Montana University (adjunct) Professor (Owen Sirrs).

The author explains that the  genesis of this book was his:– (page-9)

“Two- month stay at the Counterinsurgency Training Center in Kabul, Afghanistan during the summer of 2009. It was there that I learned a great deal more about Afghanistan–Pakistan relations in general and ISI operations in Afghanistan in particular.”

The book examines the following issues in the writers own words:–

1. How has ISI evolved as an institution exercising intelligence and security responsibilities at home and abroad? What were the driving forces behind that evolutionary process?
2. How does ISI fit into the larger Pakistani Intelligence Community?
3. What does the decades- old relationship between ISI and the CIA tell us about the larger US–Pakistan security relationship?
4. What is ISI’s record in providing accurate and timely early warning intelligence to decision- makers?
5. To what extent has ISI disrupted and abused Pakistan’s democratic processes? 
6. Is ISI a rogue agency or a state within a state? 
7. Can ISI be reined in and the PIC (Pakistani Intelligence community) reformed? 
8. How has ISI employed UW (Unconventional warfare) in support of the state’s national security objectives? To what extent has UW been a successful strategy for Pakistan?

 These are the very interesting question that the writer has formulated as stated in the books beginning and has attempted to answer in this most interesting book.

On page-7  I must add that some of the authors sources have produced some really classical pearls of confusion and nonsense like late Syed Saleem Shahzad and living Steve Coll.

On page-7 our author starts moralizing and states :–

How writers can assume such an air of arrogance is hard to understand ?

Map of Kashmir on page 15 is apology of a decent map.I am surprised at the cartographical poverty of our learned adjunct professor.

Our author makes false and uninformed assertions about how the Kashmir proxy war started on page-16 in a haste to blame the Pakistani military for all the so called perceived ills as the author views them.Like he fallaciously claims that the idea of Kashmir war originated from Colonel Akbar Khan,DSO:–

The Muslim League’s high command had tasked Mian Iftikhar ud Din Minister for Refugees to prepare a plan aimed at ensuring that the Muslim majority state of Kashmir should join Pakistan. Brigadier Akbar Khan then serving in the Pakistani GHQ  wrote an appreciation ‘armed revolt inside Kashmir ‘ on Mian Iftikhar ud Din’s request.

The writers assertions on above mentioned page 16 are nothing short of sheer intellectual dishonesty as he falsely claims that it was the army colonel Akbar Khan who forced Jihad in Kashmir on the government.This is a factually incorrect statement.

On page 214 of his book Sardar Shaukat Hayat the man directly responsible for Pakistans proxy war invasion of Kashmir clearly states the sequence of events :–

“Seeing the Maharajas and Indias bad faith,we therefore decided to walk into Kashmir.I was put in charge of operations.I asked for the services of Brigadier Sher Khan and Brigadier Akbar both of 6/13^th Frontier Force”.

 The author could have easily found this book published in April 1995 but did not ! And more deadly is his basic intellectual dishonesty in preparing a moral case against Pakistan Army by falsely claiming that the invasion was Colonel Akbar Khans idea forced upon civilians who were not very keen possibly !

On page 16 our author starts making basic factual mistakes :–

As a matter of fact the tribal invasion of Kashmir began on 20^th October 1947 and the tribesmen on night of 20/21^st October had crossed the Neelam River bridge in Kashmir.

Muzaffarabad had been captured on morning of 21^st October 1947, while our author states that the tribal invasion commenced on 22 October 1947.

On the same page 16 the author makes broad brush statements, like he states that proxy war precedent was a Pakistani innovation;

He totally ignores or forgets or is not aware that proxy wars was a British inheritance of Pakistani state.

The British regularly used proxies for their military purposes as in 1929 when they planned and executed a huge operation with base in North Waziristan to assemble a tribal lashkar very similar to Kashmir 1947 to remove Bacha Saqao in Kabul.

The writer is bad and sloppy with his sources also. He could have quoted Colonel Yahya Effendis book published in 2007 to reinforce his elaboration of proxy war in Kashmir. Effendi in his book examines in detail how Pakistan Army supported the war in Kashmir.

The writer could have inserted a major Pakistani intelligence failure in his book if he read all the available sources carefully. Like in late 1947 many days before Indian Army arrived in Kashmir the Indians by mistake sent the whole war plan to Lahore by mistake. The plan was sent to Pakistans Director Military Intelligence Brigadier Sher Khan in Pakistan Army Headquarters but Sher Khan as per General Musas narrative in his book “From Jawan to General” just sat on the crucial information.

On page 17 I started having serious doubts about our authors research when he totally falsely states that Pakistans first Intelligence Bureau boss G.Ahmad was a Bengali !

I am perplexed why on earth American authors have to get involved in such unnecessary and fallacious matters.

The fact of the matter is that G.Ahmad was a diehard Punjabi and had no connection with Bengal. Interestingly G.Ahmad was brother of Aziz Ahmad and both brothers had the unique precedent of serving as Pakistan’s ambassadors to USA one after the other.

On page 21 the author again starts making nonsense statements like elevating Sahibzada Yaqub to an Indian ruling family while he was a small time younger son of an Indian nawab.

On page 22 , again the writer starts making uninformed and naieve statements like below :–

As a matter of fact Pakistans official history of Kashmir war, published in 1970 , contrary to our brilliant adjunct professors assertions states that Pakistan wanted a ceasefire and the very strategic aim of Pakistans Operation Venus was creating conditions where India should accept a ceasefire. But our brilliant author claims that both Pakistan and India were unhappy with ceasefire.

On page 50 our brilliant analyst promotes Aziz Ahmad who was Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary to the rank of Minister of State !

The worst part of the book is the authors sloppy handling of Pakistan’s greatest strategic intelligence failure in 1965. Here he most unimaginatively quotes Shuja Nawaz whose book was only published in 2008 and gives a totally “false and misleading picture of Pakistans greatest intelligence failure”.

In endnote number 6 our briliant author quotes Shuja Nawazs books dumb passage below but fails to explain what actually happened and who failed in Pakistans intelligence set up ?

 The above is page 222 of Shuja Nawaz’s book Crossed Swords which our author quotes.  Shuja in turn quotes Major General Shaukat Razas book which also conveniently hoodwinks who committed the intelligence failure. As Shaukat Riza meekishly and evasively made a very round about statement :–

 Our brilliant adjunct professor leads the reader who hardly knows anything into total darkness ! Major General Shaukat Riza in above passage committed the worst possible act of intellectual dishonesty. He passed the total blame to Pakistans foreign office whereas it was Pakistans Director Military Intelligence Brigadier Irshad Ahmad Khan who had actually failed. This I discovered only in March 2001 when I met and interviewed Major General Naseer ullah Khan Babar who explained as below :–

“Q: Did the standard of training of the Army improve after 1965 or not?

I would say that very few lessons were learnt. The Army was run on personal likes and dislikes. Thus Brigadier Irshad who was one of the principal characters responsible for the intelligence failure as Director Military Intelligence was promoted whereas in terms of justice he should have been retired. Characters like A.A.K Niazi who had nothing to do with any fighting were awarded Hilal-i-Jurrat for some action which never took place at Zafarwal simply because he was from Ayub Khan’s unit. Thus Niazi was promoted to General rank and we finally saw him in East Pakistan. That is history. In 1962 while writing a.a k Niazi’s ACR for the year 1960-61 Major General Atiq ur Rahman had written that “This officer had reached his ceiling and should not be promoted to Brigadier rank”. Unfortunately, it was an Army run on personal likes and dislikes. Niazi was from Ayub Khan’s unit!  Ayub Khan ignored Atiq ur Rahman’s report and promoted Niazi to Brigadier rank.

Q: Please describe this intelligence failure on part of the dmi in greater detail ?

The SSG captured a dispatch rider of the Indian Army on the Jammu Samba Road on night 3/4 September 65 carrying the mail of the Indian 1st Armoured Division. This mail bag was taken by Director Aviation Brigadier Mahmud to the DMI Brigadier Irshad who dismissed it as an Indian deception plan! Thus the DMI insisted that the Indian 1st Armoured Division was at Jandiala Guru, East of Amritsar while in reality it was in Samba area right next to our jugular vein in Sialkot sector! Thus once the Indian 1st Armoured Division attacked us opposite Chawinda on 8th September  we were caught off balance. And then kept reacting to situations. The initiative had been lost, thanks to intelligence. The move of the formation takes 7-10 days, which acts as warning time.

(Refers this scribes interview published in Defence Journal April 2001 issue).

This interview was available on internet and the so called brilliant writer and chronicler on ISI could have found it and quoted it .

Shuja Nawaz’s book was published only in 2008 and  like Shaukat Riza,  covered up Pakistan Army Military Intelligence and not ISIs greatest strategic intelligence failure in its history.

Brigadier Irshad the greatest intelligence failure culprit in Pakistans military history was given clean chit by both Shaukat Riza in 1984 and Shuja Nawaz in 2008 and now by our brilliant author in 2017.

In chapter titled ISI at War I agree with the writers analysis that ISI was a total strategic failure in 1971 war. On the other hand, a major failure of the author in this chapter is the fact that ISI managed to get hold of complete Indian plan to attack East Pakistan in December 1971 but Pakistan’s military leadership failed to tailor Pakistan’s counter offensive plans. This is a major failure of this book in the sense that obtaining this Indian plan was a major ISI coup. Indian Western Command chief Candeth in his book The Western Front states that if Pakistan Army had launched a pre emptive attack before 26 september all of Indian plans to attack East Pakistan would have gone to winds. So ISI had achieved a major intelligence task by getting hold of this plan but Pakistan’s military leadership failed, not the ISI, but our brilliant author remains biased against ISI.

The writer’s knowledge of ISI role in Afghan war is faulty; for example on page 114 he mentions a very junior major Tarar but totally forgets about the real ISI pioneer of Soviet Afghan war, Brigadier Raza Ali .

The authors sources about Akhtar Abdul Rahman are incomplete . I interviewed Colonel Salman of 2 Commando and ISI in 2000 and he described Akhtar Abdul Rahman as mediocre and singled out Brigadier Raza Ali as the real architect of ISIs Afghan covert war.

The author’s claims about suicide bombings in Afghanistan is non factual .

Below map from this scribe’s book illustrates the point :–

On page 232 , evasive and tactful to the point of being intellectually dishonest our writer gives a light touch to USA’s total strategic intelligence failure in Afghanistan while correctly assessing ISIs true strategy in Afghanistan :–

I wish he was more blunt and truthful.

On page 237 the author states that by 2009 all westerners thought that no military solution in Afghanistan was possible but he has little to say about Obama, Bruce Riedel, Mc Chrystal and Petraeus pointless and totally unnecessary so called surge of 2009-11 and the resultant massive US casualties.

On page 239 the writer repeats the age old US nonsense about Haqqani group but forgets that the real ISI proxy which inflicted maximum casualties on US army was Mulla Omar group.

The writers assertions about ISI CIA cooperation in drone strikes is interesting but fails to note that ISI only allowing drone strikes in north and south Waziristan created a huge pashtun insurrection in Pakistan :– (page-271)

And the worst part is that the author has nothing to say about the fact that the so called CIA drones he fallaciously calls successful failed to target the real killers of US troops in Afghanistan based in Pakistani Baluchistan.

The writers criticism of ISIs wars in Afghanistan is without substance :– (page-291) 

He has nothing to state about why USA failed in Afghanistan and why USA lacks the strategic resolution to confront the Pakistani state and the ISI ?

On page 296 our evasive and non committal author gives the ISI a clean chit :–

But he fails to analyse that the real issue is not that ISI is not a state within a state but the fact that Pakistan is not a state with an army, but an army with a state.

More seriously all along the author fails to analyse why the CIA failed as an agency in judging true ISI intentions in Afghanistan war that the USA waged inconclusively .

I agree with the last paragraph of the book :–

The book is interesting and thought provoking.

Writing intelligence history of an intelligence agency is no easy task , so Mr Owen deserves credit for that . However he could still have done better if he had been more careful with his sources and more blunt and truthful in his analysis.

This is a very interesting book by
Montana University (adjunct)
Professor .
The author explains that th genesis
of this book was his:– (page-9)

“Two- month stay at the
Counterinsurgency Training Center in
Kabul, Afghanistan during the
summer of 2009. It was there that I
learned a great deal more about
Afghanistan–Pakistan relations in

10

general and ISI operations in
Afghanistan in particular.”

The book examines the following
issues in the writers own words:–
1. How has ISI evolved as an
institution exercising intelligence
and security responsibilities at
home and abroad? What were
the driving forces behind that
evolutionary process?
2. How does ISI fit into the larger
Pakistani Intelligence
Community?
3. What does the decades- old
relationship between ISI and
the CIA tell us about the larger
US–Pakistan security
relationship?

4. What is ISI’s record in providing
accurate and timely early

warning intelligence to decision-
makers?

11

5. To what extent has ISI
disrupted and abused Pakistan’s
democratic processes?
6. Is ISI a rogue agency or a state
within a state?
7. Can ISI be reined in and the PIC
(Pakistani Intelligence
community) reformed?
8. How has ISI employed UW
(Unconventional warfare) in
support of the state’s national
security objectives? To what
extent has UW been a
successful strategy
for Pakistan?
These are the very interesting
question that the writer has
formulated as stated in the books
beginning and has attempted to
answer in this most interesting book.
On page-7 I must add that some of
the authors sources have produced
some really classical pearls of
confusion and nonsense like late

12

Syed Saleem Shahzad and living
Steve Coll.

On page-7 our author starts
moralizing and states :–

How writers can assume such an air
of arrogance is hard to understand ?
Map of Kashmir on page 15 is
apology of a decent map.I am
surprised at the cartographical
poverty of our learned adjunct
professor.

13

Our author makes false and
uninformed assertions about how the

Kashmir proxy war started on page-
16 in a haste to blame the Pakistani

military for all the so called perceived
ills as the author views them.Like he
fallaciously claims that the idea of
Kashmir war originated from Colonel
Akbar Khan,DSO:–

The Muslim League’s high command
had tasked Mian Iftikhar ud Din
Minister for Refugees to prepare a
plan aimed at ensuring that the
Muslim majority state of Kashmir
should join Pakistan. Brigadier Akbar
Khan then serving in the Pakistani
GHQ wrote an appreciation ‘armed
revolt inside Kashmir ‘ on Mian
Iftikhar ud Din’s request.
The writers assertions on above
mentioned page 16 are nothing short

14

of sheer intellectual dishonesty as he
falsely claims that it was the army
colonel Akbar Khan who forced Jihad
in Kashmir on the government.This is
a factually incorrect statement.
On page 214 of his book Sardar
Shaukat Hayat the man directly
responsible for Pakistans proxy war
invasion of Kashmir clearly states the
sequence of events :–
“Seeing the Maharajas and Indias bad
faith,we therefore decided to walk
into Kashmir.I was put in charge of
operations.I asked for the services of
Brigadier Sher Khan and Brigadier
Akbar both of 6/13th Frontier Force”.
The author could have easily found
this book published in April 1995 but
did not ! And more deadly is his basic
intellectual dishonesty in preparing a
moral case against Pakistan Army by
falsely claiming that the invasion was
Colonel Akbar Khans idea forced upon

15

,civilians who were not very keen
possibly !
On page 16 our author starts making
basic factual mistakes :–

As a matter of fact the tribal invasion
of Kashmir began on 20th October
1947 and the tribesmen on night of
20/21st October had crossed the
Neelam River bridge in Kashmir.
Muzaffarabad had been captured on
morning of 21st October 1947, while
our author states that the tribal
invasion commenced on 22 October
1947.
On the same page 16 the author
makes broadbrushes like he states
that proxy war precedent was a
Pakistani innovation:–

16

He totally ignores or forgets or is not
aware that proxy wars was a British
inheritance of Pakistani state.
The British regularly used proxies for
their military purposes as in 1929
when they planned and executed a
huge operation with base in North
Waziristan to assemble a tribal
lashkar very similar to Kashmir 1947
to remove Bacha Saqao in Kabul.
The writer is bad and sloppy with his
sources also.He could have quoted
Colonel Yahya Effendis book
published in 2007 to reinforce his
elaboration of proxy war in
Kashmir.Effendi in his book examines
in detail how Pakistan Army
supported the war in Kashmir.

17

The writer could have inserted a
major Pakistani intelligence failure in
his book if he read all the available
sources carefully.
Like in late 1947 many days before
Indian Army arrived in Kashmir the
Indians by mistake sent the whole
war plan to Lahore by mistake.The
plan was sent to Pakistans Director
Military Intelligence Brigadier Sher
Khan in Pakistan Army Headquarters
but Sher Khan as per General Musas
narrative in his book “From Jawan to
General” just sat over the crucial
information.

On page 17 I started having serious
doubts about our authors research
when he totally falsely states that
Pakistans first Intelligence Bureau
boss G.Ahmad was a Bengali !

18

I am perplexed why on earth
American authors have to get
involved in such unnecessary and
fallacious matters.
The fact of the matter is that
G.Ahmad was a diehard Punjabi and
had no connection with
Bengal.Interestingly G.Ahmad was
brother of Aziz Ahmad and both
brothers had the unique precedent of
serving as Pakistans ambassadors to
USA one after the other.
On page 21 the author again starts
making nonsense statements like
elevating Sahibzada Yaqub to an
Indian ruling family while he was a
small time younger son of an Indian
nawab.

19

On page 22 , again the writer starts
making uninformed and naieve
statements like below :–

As a matter of fact Pakistans official
history of Kashmir war, published in
1970 , contrary to our brilliant
adjunct professors assertions states
that Pakistan wanted a ceasefire and
the very strategic aim of Pakistans
Operation Venus was creating
conditions where India should accept
a ceasefire.
But our brilliant author claims that
both Pakistan and India were
unhappy with ceasefire.

20

On page 50 our brilliant analyst
promotes Aziz Ahmad who was
Pakistans Foreign Secretary to the
rank of Minister of State !

The worst part of the book is the
authors sloppy handling of Pakistans
greatest strategic intelligence failure
in 1965.
Here he most unimaginatively quotes
Shuja Nawaz whose book was only
published in 2008 and gives a totally
“false and misleading picture of
Pakistans greatest intelligence
failure”.
In endnote number 6 our brilliant
author quotes Shuja Nawazs
books dumb passage below but
fails to explain what actually
happened and who failed in
Pakistans intelligence set up ?

21

The above is page 222 of Shuja
Nawaz’s book Crossed Swords
which our author quotes.
Shuja in turn quotes Major
General Shaukat Razas book
which also conveniently
hoodwinks who committed the
intelligence failure.
As Shaukat Riza meekishly and
evasively made a very round
about statement :–

22

Our brilliant adjunct professor leaves
the reader who hardly knows
anything into total darkness !
Major General Shaukat Riza in above
passage committed the worst
possible act of intellectual dishonesty.
He passed the total blame to
Pakistans foreign office whereas it
was Pakistans Director Military
Intelligence Brigadier Irshad Ahmad
Khan who had actually failed.

23

This I discovered only in March 2001
when I met and interviewed Major
General Naseer ullah Khan Babar who
explained as below :–

. Did the standard of training of the Army
improve after 1965 or not?
I would say that very few lessons were learnt. The
Army was run on personal likes and dislikes. Thus
Brigadier Irshad who was one of the principal
characters responsible for the intelligence failure as
Director Military Intelligence was promoted whereas
in terms of justice he should have been retired.
Characters like A.A.K Niazi who had nothing to do
with any fighting were awarded Hilal-i-Jurrat for
some action which never took place at Zafarwal
simply because he was from Ayub Khan’s unit. Thus
Niazi was promoted to General rank and we finally
saw him in East Pakistan. That is history. In 1962
while writing a.a k Niazi’s acr for the year 1960-61
Major General Atiq ur Rahman had written that
“This officer had reached his ceiling and should not
be promoted to Brigadier rank”. Unfortunately, it
was an Army run on personal likes and dislikes.
Niazi was from Ayub Khan’s unit! Ayub Khan
ignored Atiq ur Rahman’s report and promoted Niazi
to Brigadier rank.

24

22. Please describe this intelligence failure on part
of the dmi in greater detail ?
The ssg captured a despatch rider of the Indian
Army on the Jammu Samba Road on night 3/4
September 65 carrying the mail of the Indian 1st
Armoured Division. This mail bag was taken by
Director Aviation Brigadier Mahmud to the dmi
Brigadier Irshad who dismissed it as an Indian
deception plan! Thus the dmi insisted that the Indian
1st Armoured Division was at Jandiala Guru, East of
Amritsar while in reality it was in Samba area right
next to our jugular vein in Sialkot sector! Thus once
the Indian 1st Armoured Division attacked us
opposite Chawinda on 8th September we were
caught off balance. And then kept reacting to
situations. The initiative had been lost, thanks to
intelligence. The move of the formation takes 7-10
days, which acts as warning time.
Refers this scribes interview
published in Defence Journal April
2001 issue.
This interview was available on
internet and the so called brilliant
writer and chronicler on ISI could
have found it and quoted it .

25

Shuja Nawaz’s book was published
only in 2008 and also hoodwinked
like Shaukat Riza, Pakistan Army
Military Intelligence and not ISIs
greatest strategic intelligence failure
in history.
Brigadier Irshad the greatest
intelligence failure culprit in Pakistans
military history was given clean chit
by both Shaukat Riza in 1984 and
Shuja Nawaz in 2008 and now by our
brilliant author in 2017.
In chapter titled ISI at War I agree
with the writers analysis that ISI was
a total strategic failure in 1971 war.
A major failure of the author in this
chapter is the fact that ISI managed
to get hold of complete Indian plan to
attack East Pakistan in December
1971 but Pakistans military
leadership failed to tailor Pakistans
counter offensive plans .

26

This is a major failure of this book in
the sense that obtaining this Indian
plan was a major ISI coup.
Indian Western Command chief
Candeth in his book The Western
Front states that if Pakistan Army had
launched a pre emptive attack before
26 september all Indian plans to
attack East Pakistan would have gone
to winds.
So ISI had done a major intelligence
task by getting hold of this plan but
Pakistans military leadership failed,
not the ISI ,but our brilliant author
remains highly biased against ISI.
Certainly one quality he severely
lacks is intellectual honesty.
The writers knowledge about ISI role
in Afghan war is faulty for example
on page 114 he mentions a very
junior major Tarar but totally forgets
about the real ISI pioneer of Soviet
Afghan war Brigadier Raza Ali .

27

The authors sources about Akhtar
Abdul Rahman are incomplete . I
interviewed Colonel Salman of 2
Commando and ISI in 2000 and he
described Akhtar Abdul Rahman as a
mediocre and singled out Brigadier
Raza Ali as the real architect of ISIs
Afghan covert war.

Colonel Salman on extreme right.

28

The authors claim about suicide
bombings in Afghanistan is non
factual .
Below map from this scribes book
illustrates the point :–

29

On page 232 , evasive and tactful to
the point of being intellectually
dishonest our writer gives a light
touch to USAs total strategic
intelligence failure in Afghanistan in

30

correctly assessing ISIs true strategy
in Afghanistan :–

I wish he was more blunt and
truthful.
On page 237 the author states that
by 2009 all westerners thought that
no military solution in Afghanistan
was possible but has little to say
about Obama,Bruce Riedel,Mc
Chrystal and Petraeus pointless and
totally unnecessary so called surge of
2009-11 and the resultant massive
US casualties:–

31

On page 239 the writer repeats the
age old US nonsense about Haqqani
group but forgets that the real ISI
proxy which inflicted maximum
casualties on US army was Mulla
Omar group.

32

The writers assertions about ISI CIA
cooperatiuon in drone strikes is
interesting but fails to note that ISI
only allowing drone strikes in north
and south Waziristan created a huge
pashtun insurrection in Pakistan :–
(pag-271)

And the worst part is that the author
has nothing to say about the fact that
the so called CIA drones he
fallaciously calls successful failed to
target the real killers of US troops in
Afghanistan based in Pakistani
Baluchistan.

33

The writers criticism of ISIs wars in
Afghanistan is without substance :–
(page-291)

He has nothing to state about why
USA failed in Afghanistan and why
USA lacks the strategic resolution to
confront the Pakistani state and the
ISI ?
On page 296 our evasive and non
committal author gives the ISI a
clean chit :–

34

But he fails to analyse that the real
issue is not that ISI is not a state
within a state but the fact that
Pakistan is not an army with a state
but an army with a state.
More seriously all along the author
fails to analyse why the CIA failed as
an agency in judging true ISI
intentions in Afghanistan war that the
USA waged inconclusively .
I agree with the last paragraph of the
book :–

35

The book is interesting and thought
provoking.
Writing intelligence history of an
intelligence agency is no easy task ,
so Mr Owen deserves credit for that
.However he could still have done
better if he had been more careful
with his sources and more blunt and
truthful in his analysis.

Review from Major Amin: Directorate S –The CIA and Americas Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001-2016-Steve Coll -Allen Lane- Penguin Books-2018-ISBN-978-1-846-14660-2 ISBN-13: 978-1987659184 ISBN-10: 198765918X

A leading US-Israeli Intelligence analyst and operator recently summed up pathetic state of US intelligence operators in Pakistan as following:–

“ They are afraid of their own shadows”

As great powers decline , their quality of strategic judgement and decision making and their operational effectiveness also markedly declines.

Steve Coll’s voluminous and bulky book reconfirms this fact .

The first defect of this book is that it does not contain a single relevant map connected to the subject i.e Directorate S.

On page 12 the writer repeats a false and unsubstantiated claim that CIA pilots had to fly Russian MI series helicopters for Northern Alliance , whereas in reality Afghanistan never had any shortage of Afghan helicopter pilots.

On page 14 the author confirms his absolute lack of knowledge of geography when he fallaciously claims that Panjsher valley slices north towards Tajikistan , whereas in reality Panjsher valley inclines towards Chitral in Pakistan towards the Northeast , ending at Anjuman Pass.

The authors analysis is a clear testament to the fallacious assessments of US policy makers about Afghanistan like on page-17 he discusses Al Qaeda and US policy makers obsession with Al Qaeda.

As a matter of fact Al Qaeda was never the real player in Afghanistan all along . It was a puny group with limited strategic ability. The real players in Afghanistan all along were Taliban supported by Directorate S of the ISI.

This basic US perceptual error repeatedly appears in Steve Colls voluminous narrative and Steve Coll himself is quite confused about it.

Steve Colls factually flawed statements like page-17 where he states “Recalling the miserable fates of Imperial Britain” while referring to Britain”s Afghan wars. Why Coll has to make such baseless statements is perplexing. As a matter of fact all three Afghan wars were a strategic success , the first being waged by a British private company. All three Afghan wars made British strategic position in India and West Asia stronger and created a more stable Afghanistan.I guess it is fashionable in western authors to make such statements about what a terrible place Afghanistan was and is .

Nowhere does the author analyse that every intelligence agency generates warnings about likely attacks so that its reputation and credibility is protected when one attack occurs.

On page-37 Steve Coll admits that 9/11 was a CIA intelligence failure.Page-38 discusses the interesting finding that an inquiry board in 2005 recommended action against Cofer Black for failing to perform to professional standards at the time of 9/11.

Steve Coll nowhere analyses why and how Al Qaeda succeeded in 9/11 attacks but could never repeat this performance .

On page-41 Coll discusses inflated perceptions in the CIA about Afghanistan where Coffer Black thinks that four or five dozen CIA personnel may perish in the planned attack on Afghanistan in late 2001.

Al Qaeda is all along exalted by Steve Coll to a very high pedestal. Like on page 50 he discusses that US policy makers feared an alliance between Al Qaeda and the Pakistani state.

On page-54 Coll starts fabricating Pakistani history absolutely baselessly when he states that General Musharraf was awarded a gallantry award for action behind Indian lines in 1971, whereas in reality Musharraf never saw any action in 1971 India Pakistan War. This false statement was first mentioned in Steve Colls earlier book and now repeated in the book under review.

I interviewed General Musharraf’s commanding officer Brigadier Iqbal Nazir Warraich now settled in Canada in 2005 and he dismissed this assertion of Steve Coll as absolutely baseless nonsense.

Coll is master in exaggeration and spicing his narrative but nowhere rationalizes as to why the US forces suffered only one fatal casualty in the invasion of Afghanistan , due to actual enemy action and that too a non military CIA specialist. Whereas Coll leaves no stone unturned to portray Al Qaeda as a very dangerous adversary.

I agree with Colls observation on page-64 that the ISI was a master in manipulating both the USA and the Taliban.

Page-83 contains an interesting example of CIA inefficiency where the CIA was adamant of bombing a place whose coordinates had already been passed to CIA as a US position.

On page-88 Steve Coll fallaciously claims that ISI shifted its covert action headquarters to Ojhri camp in 2001 whereas Ojhri Camp was ISI covert action Headquater as early as 80s and 90s.

All along the narrative the US fallacy of regarding Al Qaeda as the strategic objective of Afghan war recurs and is repeated . While in reality the real players in  US Afghan war were the ISI and its Afghan Taliban proxies.The Al Qaeda was a bogey and a much inflated and misused term.

Like on page 102 Coll states “ The objective of Operation Enduring Freedom was not to seize Kabul ; it was to destroy Al Qaeda” . This remained the cornerstone of the totally flawed US strategy in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda did exist but was a minor player and apart from 9/11 there is hardly any significant feather that can be attached to the cap of Al Qaeda and 9/11 also remains a massively complicated affair.

On page-105 Coll discusses total lack of resolution of US general Dell Dailey during the Tora Bora attack.

On the same page as per Colls analysis General Tommy Franks stands out as a typical no risk , no boldness , hole puncher. A typical windbag general.

On page 107 Steve Coll fallaciously places Tora Bora in the Hindu Kush mountain range whereas Tora Bora has absolutely no connection with Hindu Kush mountain range.

Dick Cheneys assessments as discussed on page-110 that the war in Afghanistan may spill out to Pakistan and endanger Pakistans nuclear arsenal may be endangered , stands out as a case of how unrealistic US judgements could be . A conflict in which the US did not lose a single soldier in actual fighting was being exaggerated by characters like Cheney as a gargantuan life and death struggle.

On page 110 Steve Coll is intellectually dishonest when he states that US suffered 12 military deaths. As a matter of fact the US did not suffer a single military death due to enemy action and all 12 US deaths reported by Steve Coll to add some glory to US conquest of Afghanistan were accidental or friendly fire deaths which had no connection with real enemy action.

Even the CIA ex military civilian who died at Mazar Sharif died because of his excessive and misplaced zeal and over enthusiasm.

On page 119 Coll discusses erroneous assessments which CIAs Richard Blee foresees a final battle at Gardez.

As a matter of fact the Taliban had all withdrawn to Pakistan and there was no question of any great battle at Gardez.

On page 124, Coll’s assertion that few KHAD veterans were retained by Engineer Arif is totally erroneous. The KHAD and now NDS all along was majority composed of old USSR trained leftist era veterans and the same situation continues till to date.

On page 124 Coll repeats that the CIAs mission was Al Qaeda. As we saw it Al Qaeda was never the key player in Afghanistan.Thus one can conclude that the CIAs mission in Af Pak was totally out of touch of harsh battle and on ground realities.

On page 127 Coll admits that the US military massively exaggerated so called Al Qaeda fatal casualties in Operation Annaconda launched in Shahikot in 2002. In reality this was a puny operation much inflated and the US suffered very few casualties not exceeding 8 including friendly fire deaths.

On page 128 Coll fallaciously claims that the Kabul suburb Wazeer Akbar Khan was named after an Afghan king whereas the Wazeer was son of an Afghan king Dost Mohammad Khan who was allegedly poisoned by his father as per Afghan historian Qasim Reshtia.

Colls narratives discusses all along how US decision makers deceived themselves all along what role ISI was playing and failed to arrive at a final and firm resolution.

On page 151 he discusses how Pakistanis were massively inflating coalition support fund bills and the US was paying them despite fully understanding all the lies and exaggerations.

Map on page 162 showing CIA posts is vague and disappointing and Coll fails to note that US lost maximum soldiers at Shkin post simply because it was badly sited.

Steve Colls analysis repeatedly brings out the fact that US indecision and strategic vacillations allowed the ISI to regain the initiative.

Steve Coll rightly analyses Amrullah Saleh as the only key Afghan decision maker who most realistically assessed the ISI role and double game in Afghanistan but was snubbed and ignored by dumb and irresolute US commanders and decision makers and finally removed by Karzai.

Steve Coll on page 200 brilliantly analyses that US ambassador Nancy Powell was a total strategic disaster and a major part of US strategic failure in Af Pak.

Steve Coll accurately assesses Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad in assessing the Pakistani double game in Af Pak.

On page 201 Coll is wrong when he states that Pakistan Army action started in Waziristan after the assassination attempt on President Musharraf in December 2003.

As a matter of fact Musharraf launched an unprovoked action in FATA/Waziristan in October 2003 as a deception plan to fool the Americans while providing full sanctuary to the vast bulk of Afghan Taliban in Pakistani Baluchistan.

On page 202 Coll is blunt and intellectually honest where he identifies total CIA intelligence failure in accurately assessing ISI complicity in aiding Afghan Taliban.This is a valuable service to posterity and intelligence history.

Coll however fails to discuss the hard fact that the April 2004 assassination attempt on Musharraf was planned and conceived by lower rank soldiers of Pakistans elite SSG commandos and included many Pakistan Airforce lower ranks.

Page 209 analysis shows how erroneously US fallaciously misperceived insurgents centre of gravity in Pakistans FATA region and was totally fooled and deceived by General Musharraf. Steve Coll fails to highlight this hard fact while discussing joint US Pakistani action in FATA against Nek Mohammad.

On page 212 Coll rightly assesses the CIA as a confused organization with a hazy and totally fallacious perception, all the time inflating Al Qaeda to massive dimensions and failing to see Taliban as the central strategic issue.

On page 216 Coll hits the nail on the head where he finds a confused CIA totally fooled and deceived by Musharraf and is shocked to see a naïve CIA so deferential to Musharraf and ISI. This in reality was biggest US strategic perceptual failure in US Afghan war and Coll must be commended here for his intellectual honesty.

On page 217 Coll discusses brilliant foresight of Afghan intelligence chief Amrullah Saleh where Saleh foresaw Taliban resurgence in 2009.

On page 218 Coll brilliantly discusses extreme naiveté of Killcullen in dismissing Amrullah Saleh’s brilliant assessments about ISI.

It is a super mystery why the Americans were so foolish in selecting and handpicking a man like Killicullen to advise them regarding Afghanistan war.  

Coll discusses in detail how the CIA was repeatedly fooled by ISI and how CIA naievely shared Amrullah Salehs brilliant Pakistan assessments with ISI who simply assigned them straight  into the dustbin.

In the chapter Digging a Hole into the ocean this matter is discussed in considerable detail.

Colls discussion of Swat operation is totally fallacious (page-310 to 316).Pakistan Army never faced any serious odds in Swat operation and its victory in 2009 was a foregone conclusion. I interviewed Brigadier Ajab Khan who was deeply involved in Swat operations all along. Ajab described in detail how Pakistani generals all along massively lied and exaggerated odds in Swat to win potential promotions etc and some 48 battalions were pitched against a puny force of 1,000 to 2000 badly armed insurgents in Swat . Ajab Khan also narrated how a famous Paakistani general ordered some 500 air strikes against a puny rebel force in Bajaur and Mohmand agency.

Ajab Khan an outstanding professional was passed over and not promoted on the totally irrelevant pretext that his wife a doctor was working for a US organization although Pakistani state was playing concubine to USA all along, at least outwardly and milked the USA of some 25 Billion US dollars for doing nothing.

Coll fails to analyse and note that despite getting over 25 Billion USD Pakistan did not deploy a single battalion to interdict 90 percent of Taliban infiltration in Afghanistan along the entire 1500 km Baluchistan Afghan border.

Coll rightly analyses that the decision to deploy in Helmand had no strategic rationale.

Colls discussion of military operations is sketchy and confused and the book does not contain a single map to illustrate US military operations of 2009-11.

The book is interesting but ends inconclusively.There is no detailed and definite conclusion .

What we have is an interesting narrative but no subtle analysis. Passing references to US lack of strategic insight but no details.

What Coll fails to admit or openly state is that the entire US war in Afghanistan was an exercise in massive self deception . Since the US lacked the strategic resolution to confront the Pakistani state , it fooled itself and its public with vague entities like Al Qaeda, which never was a serious player in Af Pak.

Coll refuses to see the hard and harsh picture that 90 % US casualties in actual fighting were caused by ISI proxies and not Al Qaeda.

It is a harsh admission that whole nations and states and this includes a super power like USA can go on deceiving themselves and their public and Steve Colls massive and exhaustive gargantuan book offers no definite conclusions.

The book was an interesting but mediocre read .It was necessary to buy this book to review it and Steve Coll again disappoints me with his typical Washington Post non committal dilly dallying.

Raiders of the China Coast is the account of a little known CIA operation that trained and managed anti-communist guerrillas and agents on the various islands that were retained by the Taiwanese regime (the “Republic of China”) after the Chinese mainland was captured by the Chinese communists. The author, Frank Holober, spent his life in the CIA and later in several academic institutions teaching about China. The book is one of the few memoirs written by people who personally took part in various CIA covert operations on the “hot” fringes of the cold war and has been vetted by the agency to ensure that no secrets are spilled (the author thanks some in the agency for approving it, and criticizes others for needless bureaucratic obstruction and “security theater”, but he got a foreword from General Robert Barrow, USMC, who had served with Frank (and the CIA) in the 1950s, so it is all good).

The book is mostly a fond look back at the author’s male-bonding days, not a detailed history of CIA covert operations during the Korean war (which is the somewhat misleading subtitle of the book). As the author relates in the first chapter (“Old Haunts Beckon”), the idea of the book came to him after he retired and revisited Taiwan after a gap of 40 years and was reminded of the days of youthful adventure and excitement he had spent there with his CIA comrades in “Western Enterprises Inc”; that nostalgia is clearly the main driver of the book. Which is fine, because while his family and friends (and those of the other adventurers he mentions in the book) will no doubt get an extra-special thrill from reading the book, other readers can also learn about an interesting aspect of the early cold war, about CIA covert operations in general, about the colorful characters who took part in these events, about China and it’s fascinating recent history, and of course, about male-bonding, buddy movies and all that jazz. 

Western Enterprises Inc was the name of the cover operation set up by the CIA to run guerrillas and agents from Nationalist held islands in an attempt to divert Communist Chinese resources from the Korean conflict. Eager recruits were available within the local population of these islands as well as among the various Nationalist forces still fighting on (or hiding out) within Communist China and it was the job of Frank Holober and his fellow CIA officers to organize, train, equip and direct these efforts. The scale of the effort was larger than most people know, but whether it had a real impact on the Korean conflict (its main raison d’etre in American eyes) is very much an open question. General Barrows sums up the greater significance of this effort in his foreword and I don’t think we need to add to this: ” What did we accomplish? Any contribution to the Korean War was modest at best. Any real success was local, mixed with failure, and of short duration. Early on, lofty expectations gave way to lure of adventure. And along with Frank Holober, I sincerely salute the adventurers”

Frank Holober himself says that “the mighty power of the US government resembles the marriage of Aladdin’s genie with the three stooges”. Enuff said.

The author reveals very little about how he himself came to be working for the CIA, but is more forthcoming about several of his comrades, who have the expected colorful names (“One-Eyed Dragon,” “Great White Father,” “Two-Gun Creacy,” “Fat Wang,” “Little Huang” and “Earthquake McGoon”, among others) and personalities to match (their propaganda specialist for example would sit at the bar in his kimono, and nothing but his kimono, ranting about communism and telling stories such as the time he was cured of venereal disease via camel dandruff while on a ride across Eastern Turkestan). Readers will pick up all sorts of details about CIA bureaucracy, Chinese officialdom (frequently corrupt and inept, but not without its heroic characters), local color (including the fact that there was a Chinese opera complete with a good-looking star who was the local celebrity, even on the tiny island of Quemoy) and covert operations (flying across the length of China in aging B-17s and Dakotas to drop agents, weapons and money, including one attempt to pick up an agent using a hook and wire, Dark Knight style).

If you are more interested in conventional history then the buddy antics of this books will likely leave you cold, but the book does have little capsule summaries of Chinese history that are interesting and insightful, though with a distinctly old-fashioned “imperial American” (think Texas-CIA) flavor that may be off-putting to more woke readers. The author clearly knows his Chinese history and culture though, so readers who can see past the old fashioned attitude will learn some useful facts and some pretty cogent analysis.

The basic outlines is simple enough; after the Nationalists were chased out of China by the Communist forces, they retained their hold on several offshore islands (some within hailing distance of the mainland) and because the civil war had not officially ended (for either side), these were not just quiet islands with a few spies, they were the scene of regular guerrilla actions, amphibious assaults, artillery duels and naval operations (or piracy, as the case may be). While I had some vague idea about these events, I had no idea about the scale of the operations (some assaults involved hundreds of troops) or the extent to which interior China remained un-pacified that far into the 50s (in one scene the CIA drops weapons to Muslim  guerrillas loyal to the Ma clique in Qinghai, who are waiting on hundreds of horses and ride more than 50 miles to pick up the weapons after the plane missed the drop zone). Among the fascinating details is one where a British ship captain is captured by ROC pirates (they were blockading several eastern Chinese ports and tried to intercept any shipping heading to these ports, including from British-held HongKong) and is interrogated by an inept interrogator; he ends up learning more about his captors than they learn from him; an interrogation of which William Burroughs would have been proud (one of Burroughs’ ideas was that the best interrogators learn not by asking questions but by answering them).

One problem with the book is that it uses Wade-Giles and traditional English forms for all names, and by now we are so used to Pinyin that a lot of these are hard to understand. Another is the lack of maps (there are a couple, but not enough), which means I had to use Google and Wikipedia while reading it. But these are minor qualms, overall the book is fun to read and full of interesting anecdotes and does have some scattered commentary and analysis, though not enough to justify the subtitle. Those who enjoy late imperial adventure yarns, or are so interested in recent Chinese history that they will read anything, will enjoy this book, but it is not for everyone.

Incidentally, while looking for images for this review, I happened to see something about an artwork created by Taiwan artist Chen Chieh-jen, who happens to be the son of one of the Chinese who worked for Western Enterprises Inc. The blurbs for this art show say

“Almost all of Chen’s recent films have dealt with the impact of global capitalism on individuals, through various systems of exchange. In collaboration with Chinese Arts Centre, AND proudly presented the UK premiere of Empire’s Borders II – Western Enterprises Inc. This video installation, based a number of documents the artist’s late father left behind, painted an intriguing picture of a life lived in Cold War secrecy. It presented a compelling account of his father’s journey and the legacy of the Cold War on the contemporary politics of global trade and neo-liberal economics.

Through Chen’s characteristically charged re-enactments, the figures in the film encounter the ghosts of history and move through the vacuous spaces of struggle, absence and erasure, which echo present-day realities”

I leave the reader to judge if this flavor of “analysis” is superior to the Texas-CIA flavor of the book’s author. But you will have to read the book to judge..

Raiders of the China Coast. Published 1999 by Naval Institute Press.

Book Review – Directorate S: The CIA and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan by Steve Coll.

 Hamid Hussain

 Steve Coll’s new book is an excellent account of events of the last two decades in Afghanistan-Pakistan region.  Steve has all the credentials to embark on this project.  He is one of the best and well-informed journalist and his previous book Ghost Wars is the most authentic work of the history of Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA’s) war in Afghanistan in 1980s.  For his new book, he has used important American sources from different departments of US government engaged with Afghanistan and Pakistan. He has also used some Afghan and few Pakistani sources, but it is mainly an American perspective of the events. There is need for work on Pakistani and Afghan perspective which is a far more difficult task.

 Book is about events of Af-Pak region and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) gets a lot of attention. Relations between CIA and ISI are not black and white. In the aftermath of September 11, majority of ISI officers were leery about too close cooperation with US and especially CIA.  On the other hand, especially in early phase of 2001-2003, a small cadre of ISI officers viewed foreign fighters as serious threat to Pakistan’s security and wanted to use this opportunity of close cooperation with CIA to neutralize this threat.  In this period of convergence of interest focused solely on al Qaeda, there was close cooperation and certain degree of trust between ground operatives of both agencies. CIA Islamabad station as well as satellite facilities in Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar housed several dozen personnel from different US intelligence agencies especially technical intelligence staff.  CIA used its technical superiority of surveillance while ISI used its human sources to dismantle al Qaeda in the region.

 There were many thoughtful ISI officers who provided analysis of possible scenarios of US intervention in Afghanistan at a time when everyone was raising Champaign glasses for victory toast.  Some CIA officers agreed with ISI point of view especially regarding Pushtun question of Afghanistan.  In the winter of 2001, CIA station chief in Islamabad Robert Grenier comprehended the American dilemma better than many of his colleagues. He agreed with military action but understood Pakistan’s position.  CIA Director George Tenet’s Chief of Staff John Brennan agreed with some of Grenier’s analysis. However, they were in minority and events unfolded differently.  There were others like former Islamabad station chief Milton Bearden who thought that given enough time, Taliban may give up Bin Ladin thus avoiding a military mission, however there was no customer in Washington willing to buy this item.

 Predictably, CIA exaggerated while ISI downplayed the role of ISI in Afghanistan and truth is somewhere in the middle.  ISI unclear about US mission in Afghanistan as well as feeling hurt by CIA’s last mission and its fall out was not enthusiastic to jump on American wagon in haste.  Director General of Analysis (DG-A) at ISI then Major General Javed Alam (later Lieutenant General) admitted that less than a dozen ISI officers were working in Afghanistan prior to American invasion. He also disclosed that most of the Pakistanis who went to Afghanistan to defend collapsing Taliban regime in the winter of 2001 were from Southern Punjab. He wryly commented that most of them died and ‘they got their just deserts’.

 Later, mistrust between Pakistan and US widened and involved all agencies.  ISI has some influence in Afghanistan and some of its policies contributed to the instability in that country.  However, to blame ISI for all American follies in Afghanistan is incorrect and unfair.  ISI is a huge bureaucracy with a checkered past. It is not a monolithic entity and there is wide range of opinion among senior and mid-level officers.  The aura of playing in the ‘big league’ gives the agency a clout in internal and external policies but it comes with a price that it is also blamed for sins of others. 

 Steve provides details of genuine difference of opinion on policy matters as well as turf wars of US government agencies.  This provides a window to US decision making process and impact of institutional and personal friction on policies on the ground.  We tend to generalize government policies for easy comprehension and ignore these subtle changes.  Steve provides this perspective as far US decision making process is concerned.  There is no serious attempt to understand similar case of Pakistan.  In my own work on Pakistan army, I found similar challenges of Pakistani decision makers. Army brass was reluctant to share details with civilian government especially when Asif Ali Zardari was President. In the army, there was friction between officers involved in operations against militants and intelligence officers. Professionally competent and confident officers took charge of the operations and realized that some ISI policies were detrimental to ongoing operations.  These officers relied less on ISI and kept intelligence officers at arm’s length.  On the other hand, officers who were less confident, relied more on ISI. I found former lot much more successful than the later.

 A small error in caption of a 2005 picture about Pakistan on first page of pictures.  Caption wrongly identifies two Pakistani army officers flanking Colonel David Smith as Lieutenant General Tariq Majid and Major General Asif Akhtar. The officers are then Lieutenant General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani and Lieutenant General Muhammad Yusuf.

 This book should be on the reading list of anyone interested in Af-Pak region. It is summary of major events of the last two decades that affected Pakistan and Afghanistan and Steve takes us on this journey as an informed guide. It covers events as seen from the tall citadels of power of Washington to individuals who do heavy lifting like mules in a big caravan. For a thoughtful reader, it is a sober and humbling reading of limits of power.

 Steve Coll.  Directorate S: The CIA and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan (New York: Penguin Press), 2018. 757 pp.

 Hamid Hussain

coeusconsultant@optonline.net

25 August 2018

The Unblinking Eye
Hamid Hussain

“With the monstrous weapons man already has, humanity is in danger of being trapped in this world by its moral adolescents”.  General Omar Bradley

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) commonly known as drone is the most open secret of modern warfare.  UAV is primarily an intelligence platform but use of armed drones for target killing generates heated debate in public.  Opponents of armed drones consider it an indiscriminate killer while proponents claim that this is the cleanest way of eliminating opponents.  In the last fifteen years, information about several aspects of drone operations has become available to sketch a reasonable picture. In the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, U.S. intelligence community was busy capturing terrorists from all over the globe.  Existing legal system was seen as inadequate therefore detainees were kept at ‘black sites’ all over the globe. Several alleged prisoner abuse scandals sent shock waves and ‘jailers’ got a pretty bad name.  If you can’t jail the bad guys then the only other option is to eliminate them.  This is how the drone warfare started and then rapidly expanded.

In the last fifteen years, drones have evolved.  Initially drones were used for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and later some were weaponized for targeted strikes.  A number of unmanned aerial systems are operated by all branches of armed forces but Predator and Reaper became famous.  Army uses Hunter, Pointer, Raven and Shadow, air force uses Desert Hawk and Marine Corps uses Pioneer and Dragon Eye.

MQ-1 B Predator’s primary mission is ISR.  It is also armed with two AGM-114 Hellfire missiles (each missile costing $99’000).  MQ-1C Gray Eagle is advanced version with increased endurance, updated electronic equipment and armed with four Hellfire missiles. Unit cost of this bird is $4.98 million. MQ-1C will eventually replace MQ-1B.  MQ-9 Reaper is a larger version with double the speed of Predator and better surveillance and targeting systems.  It is armed with four AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, two 500 pound GBU-38 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) or two GBU-12 Paveway II laser guided bombs. The unit cost of this exotic bird is $13.7 million and maintenance cost about $5 million per year.

UAV is a two operator craft with one piloting the aircraft and the other operating sensors.  Hellfire missile can be fired in several different modes depending on the location of the target.  Direct strike mode takes missile directly to the target and high mode drops missile vertically down on a target.  In indirect mode, missile dives to earth and then in low trajectory skims earth surface to hit the target under cover. UAVs need ground support systems that collect, analyze and process incoming data, disseminate to other entities and then direct strikes on specific targets. Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receiver (ROVER) used by soldiers on the ground can see the Predator feed in real time.

In the early season of hunting, CIA operated Predators and coordinated with Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).  Air Force, army and CIA waged some tough turf battles about who would control these new birds.  When it was suggested that all UAVs should be placed under air force command, army pushed back arguing that its own UAVs were now integral parts of the division.  A high level ISR task force was established at Pentagon to address these conflicts.  In the end, army ended up keeping Gray Eagle and Air Force getting Reaper. However, a percentage of drones controlled by air force are operated by CIA.  Inside CIA, there was also a fight between its paramilitary section known as Special Activities Division (SAD) and Counter Terrorism Center (CTC) over control of drones. In the end CTC got control over drones and eventually became the most powerful division. It rapidly expanded with a large budget and ever increasing number of personnel.  Anyone aspiring to climb the career ladder was rushing in for a stint at CTC.  Director of CTC became a powerful player inside and outside the agency. In 2006, a new director who was a convert to Islam and a strong proponent of assassination program took over. He served for long due to his connections with White House and Capitol Hill despite clashes with colleagues including director of the CIA.

A ‘targeted strike’ is elimination of a known high value target after prolonged surveillance.  A ‘signature strike’ is not a confirmed strike on a known target but simply targeting a suspicious activity. When it became evident that after the first strike, militants sealed off the area to hide the identity of the killed and therefore the initial crowd after the strike only consisted of bad guys, a new tactic of ‘follow up strike’ also called ‘double tap’ was implemented. Initially strikes were directed at buildings that inevitably resulted in death of civilians inhabiting the same building.  When pressure mounted regarding deaths of civilians, the process was refined and more strikes were directed at vehicles to avoid civilian casualties.

President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney were executives before coming to White House while President Obama and Vice President Joe Biden are lawyers. The difference between Bush and Obama White House was difference between corporate and attorney cultures.  In case of drone warfare, Bush made the decision and let the agencies work out details.  When CIA needed legal cover, Bush would provide them necessary legal cover.  Obama looked at the problem with the eye of an attorney and first put in place all legal elements and then sat on top of the food chain personally signing off on almost all drone strikes.

Three days after his inauguration, President Obama authorized two drone strikes in North and South Waziristan. These were not directed at a high value target and several civilians were killed.  CIA director Michael Hayden went to White House to explain ‘signature strikes’ and Obama was not happy. He overhauled the whole process of selection and targeting.  Now, a whole bureaucracy nick named ‘Kill Chain’ is involved in the process.  The first part is ‘developing the target’ where intelligence community provides all the information about the target and risks it poses to U.S. national security. The second ‘authorization process’ starts from regional command and moves to Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), Secretary of Defence, Principles Committee of National Security (consisting of National Security Advisor, CJCSC, Attorney General, Advisor of Counter Terrorism, Director National Intelligence, Secretaries of State, Defence, Homeland Security, Treasury, Ambassador to United Nations and White House Chief of Staff) and finally the President.  Final authorization has an expiration date of sixty days and if target is not eliminated in this time period the process starts all over again.  This gives a hint that there may be pressure on those executing the order to hit the target before the expiration date and in this rush ‘certainty’ bar may be lowered resulting in wrong strikes and death of civilians.

President Obama is a fan of St. Thomas Aquinas and his theory of just war is based on theory expounded by Aquinas. According to Aquinas, three requisites of a just war are authority of the prince, a just cause such as avenging an injury and a right intention of promoting good and avoiding evil. However, President Obama conveniently forgot other advice of Aquinas about excesses of war warning about “eagerness to hurt, bloodthirsty desire for revenge, an untamed and unforgiving temper, ferocity in renewing the struggle”. This was the case in many strikes in Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) of Pakistan where frustration, anger and revenge took precedence over use of a tactical weapon based on a meticulous and thoughtful strategy.

The case of Lebanese born British citizen Bilal Berjawi is a good case study to understand the new face of modern warfare.  He was travelling to Kenya and Somalia and attending all militant pow wows.  Berjawi was under British surveillance for over four years. From all the evidence collected over the years, it was quite clear that he had gone to the ‘dark side’.  However, he had not yet committed any crime and couldn’t be charged under existing laws. One the other hand from the profile developed over the years, it was clear that he will commit some violent act possibly in Britain.  In September 2010, Britain revoked his nationality and in January 2012, he was killed by a U.S. drone strike on his vehicle in Somalia.  After his death, militant group issued a statement confirming that he was a senior al-Qaeda commander in Somalia and released a video about plan of a suicide mission by Berjawi. Proponents and opponents of use of drones can study this case and suggest how these tricky issues can be addressed.

When any new weapon system is introduced, there is a risk of ‘infatuation’ resulting in overuse and runaway costs.  In April 2008, during the battle for Sadar City against a Shia militia, one army brigade was supported by two Predators from air force, two drones operated by Special Forces and several Shadow and Ravens of army. This was in addition to several manned platforms including intelligence aircrafts, U-2; six Apache attack helicopters and national satellite network.  Each party has a vested interest to exaggerate its importance in the battle therefore it is crucial to have independent supervision and audit. In addition, ‘obsession’ with the toy can cloud the judgment about the weakness of the system.  Feeds from the drones can be hacked by the third party and it was recently disclosed that United Kingdom and United States were able to hack the feeds from Israeli drones and watching feeds in real time. There are also serious issues about the stability of Reaper drones during flight and an unprecedented twenty Reapers crashed in 2015. Only money is burned in a crashed drone and no human life is lost but that should not be the case for complacency.

Earlier versions of drones carried a very small price tag compared to high ticket items such as fighter jets therefore major defense contractors had very little interest in the project.  However, when Pentagon bureaucracy fell in love with this new toy and willing to dole any amount of money, then major defense contractors jumped on the bandwagon with the thought that if they can make drones bigger and expensive as well as get into the support services business then it is worth the effort.  In 2008, a new ISR task force was established with acquisition authority.  In four years, the task force spent $10 billion.

Northrop Grumman manufactured Global Hawk at the cost of $300 million per piece.  Northrop also made two delta winged X-47 B for navy to be operated from an aircraft carrier at the cost of $1.7 billion. Battlefield Airborne Communication Node (BACN) covers areas out of range of normal systems. This was specific for mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Bombardier business jet was converted into an ISR platform.  Northrop Grumman got a $250 million contract for three BACN Bombardiers. Global Hawks were also fitted with BACN (EQ-4) by Northrop Grumman and fifty birds cost a staggering $10 billion.  Raytheon manufactures sensors and radars for the UAVs.  It provided Enhanced Integrated Sensor Suite (EISS) for Global Hawk. Initial cost estimate of $10 million skyrocketed to $233 million per copy. A stealth drone RQ-170 manufactured by Lockheed Martin is secret therefore cost is not publicly available but some estimates put the price tag at $200 million per copy.  

UAVs are only platforms and support systems are very costly.  Distributed Common Ground Systems (DCGS) is the nerve center and air force DCGS was primarily supporting airstrikes.  Other services also jumped in and army instituted its own DCGS-A at the cost of $2.3 billion and navy is not behind to create its own DCGS-N.  Air Force started to expand its ground networks supporting UAV missions called ‘reach back sites’.  EUR-I in Germany supports missions in Asia and Central Asia, EUR-2 in Italy for missions in Africa, PAC-1 at Kadena Air Force base in Japan and PAC-2 in Pacific Ocean for UAV flights over South East Asia and South China Sea.

Every system needs a cost benefit analysis as money cannot be thrown in a bucket with no bottom.  In one case, six hellfire missiles from Cobra attack helicopters and five from Predators were used to kill about a dozen low level foot soldiers in al-Qaim on Iraq-Syria border. Each Hellfire costs $ 99’000 and simple math tells us that one million dollar worth of ammunition was dropped on a dozen low level foot soldiers.  In another case, two GBU-12 bombs; each carrying a five hundred pound warhead and each with a price tag of $19’000 were dropped on two people in two tents in a remote area in Kunar in Afghanistan.  Only one bomb exploded while other was a dud but incidentally dropped directly on one tent killing its occupant. They forgot President Bush’s promise in September 2001 that “when I take action, I’m not going to fire a $2 million missile at a $10 empty tent and hit a camel in the butt”.

Drone is a tool of warfare like tanks, artillery and jet planes and like any instrument of war has its benefits and side effects.  It is easy to be mesmerized by a new war toy and loose the bigger picture.  On the other hand, it is also easy to denounce the tool because of its side effects or misuse.  UAV is an excellent ISR platform and there is enough proof that compared to all other options, armed drones had the major impact on disrupting militant activities in Pakistan’s tribal areas especially taking out high value targets.  However, it is also true that a large number of civilians were also killed.  In my view it was overused thus negating many of its benefits.  I think only about twenty five to thirty percent of the strikes were successful removing important leader’s especially foreign militants.  Killing of two to three hundred foot soldiers which could be easily replaced didn’t serve any strategic purpose.

A tactical weapon has an impact on strategy and just like introduction of artillery, tanks and fighter jets had an impact on the larger strategic canvass of the art of war, drones will also have a similar impact.  Like tactical nuclear weapons, the production and deployment of drones is going at a fast pace before its role in strategy is figured out.  Another area of concern is rapid escalation of cost and now all major defense contractors are in the game putting out products with marginal benefits but with an astronomical price tag.  This is right time for adult supervision at Pentagon to prevent establishment of another behemoth drone bureaucracy that can eventually become ‘too big to fail’. In addition to the military aspect, a broader discussion about legal, ethical and moral aspects need to involve broader segments of the society. UAV will ultimately settle down as ISR platform with marked reduction of use of armed drones.

Sources:

– For specifics of Predator and Reaper, see air force fact sheets; http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104470/mq-9-reaper.aspx
– http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104469/mq-1b-predator.aspx

– The Drone Papers.  The Intercept,  https://theintercept.com/drone-papers/

– Lt. Colonel T. Mark McCurley and Kevin Maurer.  Hunter Killer: Inside America’s Unmanned Air War (New York: Dutton, 2015)

– William M. Arkin.  Unmanned: Drones, Data and the Illusion of Perfect Warfare (New York: Little Brown and Company, 2015)

– Andre Cockburn.  Kill Chain: The Rise of the High-Tech Assassins (New York Henry Holt and Company, 2015)

– Chris Woods. Sudden Justice: America’s Secret Drone Wars (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015)

– Richard Whittle. Predator: The Secret Origins of Drone Revolution

– Jeremy Scahill.  Dirty Wars: The World is a battlefield (New York: Nation Books, 2013)

– Mark Mazzetti.  The Way Of The Knife (New York: The Penguin Press, 2013)

– Steve Coll.  The Unblinking Stare: The Drone War in Pakistan.  The New Yorker, November 24, 2014.

– Der Spiegel, December 04, 2013, Pakistani CIA Informant, http://www.spiegel.de/international/zeitgeist/interview-pakistani-cia-informant-on-drone-warfare-and-taliban-a-937045.html

Hamid Hussain
coeusconsultant@optonline.net
February 27, 2016

Defence Journal, March 2016

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Apart from L.A.K. we also have (Tariq Ali) claims that ZA Bhutto was killed on instructions from the CIA. Osama-ji was definitely killed by the Great Satan (or was he?). And the show goes on……
……………
Declassified US document discusses the possible reason for the
disenchantment of the US and the UK governments with the Pakistan prime
minister and his government. Liaquat was not ready to toe the US line,
the newspaper pointed out and hence the US wanted him eliminated.

…….

While the UK was pressing Pakistan for support on the issue of Iran,
the US demanded Pakistan use its influence in Tehran and persuade it to
transfer control of its oil fields to the US (oil apparently has
remained a major issue with the Americans ever since, especially while
Mohammad Mosaddeq was in power in Tehran then).

…
According to the article, Liaquat Ali Khan declined to accede to the
request. “The US then threatened to annul the secret pact on Kashmir
(between Pakistan and the US). Liaquat replied that Pakistan has annexed
half of Kashmir without American support and would be able to take the
other half too.” Not only that, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan also
demanded that the US vacate air bases in Pakistan.

…
“Liaquat’s demand was a bombshell for Washington. Americans who had been
dreaming of conquering Soviet Russia from Pakistan air bases were
flabbergasted,” the article emphasized. And hence the plot to kill
Liaquat was hatched, says the article.

…
However, “the US wanted a Muslim assassin, so as to obviate
international complications. The US could not find a traitor in Pakistan
(apparently for the reason that the new country was then brimming with
nationalistic pride and hope for future),” the article added.

…
The US then turned to Kabul. “Washington contacted the US Embassy in
Kabul. They in turn got in touch with Pashtoonistan leaders, pointing to
Liaquat as their only hurdle and assuring them that if some of them
could kill Liaquat, the US would undertake the task of establishing
Pashtoonistan by 1952.”

…
At this the “Pashtoon leaders induced Akbar to take the job and also
made arrangements for him to be killed immediately after so as to
conceal the conspiracy. The Pakistani currency recovered from the
assassin’s body also reveal that others were also involved. Due to
already strained relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan no currency
exchange was then taking place between the two countries. Hence only the
“American Embassy (in Kabul) could have supplied the Pakistani currency
notes to the assassin,” the summary argued.
 
The article also mentioned that the cartridges recovered from the body
of the assassinated Pakistani premier were US made. The type of bullet
used to kill the Pakistani prime minister were in “use by high-ranking
American officers”, and were “not usually available in the market”. The
rest is for us to deduce.

…
The article then summarized that all these facts prove that the real
culprit behind the killing was the US, which had committed similar acts
in the Middle East as well.
 
There are many parallels between then and now. And all this could not be
just a matter of chance. Oil, assassinations, dollars, Iran, air bases,
all these sound familiar even today. Fifty years have passed, yet
things may not have really changed.

…….

Link: http://defence.pk/threads/which-foreign-agency-killed-liaqat-ali-khan.234612/

…….

regards