An outstanding book. Michael Cook is wiser than he lets on (ie he does not explicitly make big sweeping statements about the lessons of history, but his presentation of the facts is nonetheless based on very sophisticated and wise analysis, which may remain implicit, or he may just hint at the issue and expect that the reader will know why he brought it up exactly like this) and always worth reading.
This is a survey of all of Muslim history from the time of the prophet to the early 20th century. He covers every region and pretty much every dynasty or group that ever ruled from Morocco to Malaysia, but it is not just a recitation of facts; at every point he has interesting things to say and he has a remarkable ability to convey a lot of information in a very short passage. Still, a lot of the details can be skipped if it is not an area you are interested in.
For example, I am very interested in Indian history and I found the short (just 60 pages) section on India to be one of the most balanced and accurate summaries of the 800 years of Islamicate colonization of India and its consequences. So the book passes the Gell-Mann test with flying colors.

A must read.

The Plagues of Amwas and Justinian: The 200 years long series of plagues and pestilence and the conquest of Muslims over Rome and Persia

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gypsyheart – September 7, 2021 @ 6:49 pm · Filed under Uncategorized

The Caliph and the Imam

A Shocking Decision

Sometime in 816 CE – year 200 in the Hijri calendar of Islam – the seventh Abbasid Caliph al-Mamun made a very strange decision. If near-contemporary historical narratives are to be believed, he offered his throne – and thus power over lands from India to Morocco – to the leader of his fiercest opponents, the Shi’a. It was a breathtakingly audacious decision – so audacious that it failed almost immediately. The eighth infallible Imam of the Shi’a, ‘Ali bin Musa al-Rida, was not interested.  Al-Mamun had to recalibrate, and he did so by nominating Ali al-Rida as his successor. The Imam demurred again, but this time the Caliph was adamant: The Imam must accept or he and his family would suffer. Imam Ali al-Rida’s family was no stranger to suffering. Almost all of his ancestors – direct descendants to the Prophet himself – had been persecuted, many martyred or imprisoned. His own father, the seventh Imam Musa al-Kadhim, had perished as a prisoner of al-Mamun’s father, the famous Harun al-Rashid of A Thousand and One Nights. Whatever the reasons, Ali al-Rida acquiesced, and on the 27^th day of Ramadan in 201 AH (April 18, 817 CE), he was proclaimed “wali ‘ahd al-muslimin” – the designated successor to the 31-year old al-Mamun. Coins were soon minted asserting this new designation – the standard way of declaring authority – and the traditional black flags of the Abbasids were replaced by the green flags of the Shi’a Imams. A little more than a year later, the Imam was dead. Al-Mamun would rule for another fifteen years.

The Historical Preamble

This strange chapter in Muslim history – so central to the Shi’a and so little known among the non-Shi’a Muslims – began long before the events of 201 and 202 AH. It could be said to have begun when, after the death of the Prophet of Islam in 632, some Muslims disputed the succession, asserting that the new title of “amir al-mu’minin” – Commander of the Faithful – should go to the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, Ali ibn Abi-Talib. Twenty-four years later, it did, but by then the rift had festered, and upon Ali’s death in 661 CE, resulted in Islam’s most fundamental sectarian split, with the supporters of Ali’s cause – the Shi’a, or partisans, of Ali – and the rest, termed Sunni, heading into centuries of hot-and-cold conflict.

Or perhaps one could say that it all began in 743 CE, when the death of the powerful ruler Hisham bin Abdul Malik threw the ruling Umayyad dynasty of Islam into utter disarray. It was not a situation conducive to ruling an empire that stretched from the Guadalquivir in Spain to the borderlands of India. As Caliphs came and went quickly in Damascus, rebellions broke out all over, but nowhere more dangerously than in the northeastern part of the empire in what is now called Central Asia. This region had a long and storied history of revolts and insurrections going back centuries, and had been a hotbed of esoteric faiths – some militant, others peaceful – for millennia. It is said that Zoroaster himself was from this region. Now it became the center of a Shi’a rebellion against their hated enemies, the Umayyads. Not one but several such rebellions broke out in Central Asia as well as Persia, which already had a significant Shi’a presence. The obvious leaders for these rebellions were the direct descendants of Ali b. Abi Talib, but they were not the ones who succeeded. Instead, a clan descended form al-‘Abbas, an uncle of the Prophet, took up – some would say hijacked – the Shi’a cause, using an almost certainly fabricated story of a grandson of Ali having, on his deathbed, secretly designated the Abbasid clan as his successors. The Abbasids were able to harness not only Shi’a discontent but also the simmering frustrations of the non-Arab populations of Persia and Central Asia, who resented Arab domination of their ancient cultures. Led by the Abbasid clan and fueled by a charismatic figure, Abu Muslim of Khurasan, the so-called Abbasid Revolution had slowly been gathering force in the Khurasan province of Central Asia for several decades. Now, in a matter of three years from 747 to 750, flying the black flag of the Khurasanis, its armies routed the Umayyads across the whole empire except Spain, and took over the rule of the great Muslim empire, thus ending the third civil war – the Third Fitnah – of early Islam. Ever vigilant and supremely ruthless, one of the first things the new rulers did was to destroy the power of Abu Muslim and the Shi’a. The former was executed in 755 and his army that had led the Abbasid Revolt disbanded. And so, once again, the Shi’a fell into their familiar cycle of persecution and rebellion, this time with their erstwhile champions as the antagonists.

Though Harun al-Rashid has the romance of the Arabian Nights, it is the reign of his son, Abdullah al-Mamun that is generally regarded as the peak of the great Islamicate civilization. But al-Mamun did not come to it easily. Succession generally being a hazardous matter in empires, the Abbasid Caliphs often designated two successors to follow them in a specific order – trying to ensure that the second successor would bide his time instead of fighting immediately for power. Harun al-Rashid was extra-careful: He designated three successors from among his sons. Under the influence of his favorite wife, Zubaydah – an Arab – he chose Muhammad al-Amin has his first successor and al-Mamun – six months older than al-Amin but born of a Persian mother – second. The third designee, al-Rashid’s son al-Qasim, given the title al-Mu’tamin, never made it to caliph and has disappeared from history. As was the custom, each of the successors was given part of the empire to govern. Crucially, al-Mamun was given the governorship of Central Asia, the cradle of the Abbasid Revolution, and many before it. It did not disappoint.

In 808 CE, a revolt broke out in Central Asia and Harun al-Rashid himself found it necessary to travel there to quell the revolt, with al-Mamun accompanying him. But, upon reaching the area around Tus in modern northeastern Iran, he fell ill and died on 24 March, 809. He was buried in the small village of Sanabad, which was to play an important role in the history of al-Mamun’s audacious move.

The Choice

Crucially, the rebels Harun al-Rashid had gone to quell did surrender – to al-Mamun. Meanwhile, al-Amin, who had remained in Baghdad, took power as designated by his father. Almost immediately, he sought to change the succession by removing his brothers from it and adding in his sons, who were still children. Predictably, al-Mamun revolted, initiating the Fourth Fitna of Islam. The empire remained divided until his largely Khurasani forces took Baghdad again in 813 and al-Amin was summarily executed. Al-Mamun became Caliph at that point but, perhaps wary of Arab power in Baghdad, chose to rule from the ancient city of Merv in Khurasan – the origin of his ancestors’ revolution. Thus, it was to Merv that, in early 816 CE, he summoned Imam Ali al-Rida. The decision to offer him the throne had probably been made in 815, and there must have been some understanding for the Imam, who lived in Madinah in modern Saudi Arabia, to travel two thousand miles to Merv. He arrived sometime in late 816, and was proclaimed the successor to al-Mamun in March 817.

By this time, it was becoming untenable for al-Mamun to rule from afar. His designated governor in Baghdad had been overthrown and a rebellious faction of troops had taken control. In the spring of 818, the Caliph set off for Baghdad. A character who played a central role in all these affairs was the Grand Vizier, al-Fadl bin Sahl. So much did al-Mamun trust him that he had been made head of the civil administration and commander of the army. He has thus gone down in history with his title, Dhul-Riyasatayn – the holder of two commands. There is some indication that he influenced al-Mamun’s decision to appoint Ali al-Rida, though the evidence is far from clear. What is clear is that he died in mysterious circumstances in the town of Sarakhs while accompanying al-Mamun on his march to Baghdad. Son of a Zoroastrian convert, he had become quite unpopular among the established elite in Baghdad, and rumors were fomented about al-Fadl conspiring to bring the Shi’a to power or to re-establish Zoroastrian rule in Persia and Central Asia. Some have speculated that he was killed by al-Mamun because of this unpopularity, and possibly because the appointment of Ali al-Rida had, by then, become a liability for al-Mamun and he blamed al-Fadl. Whatever the truth of that, it is significant that a few months later, when the Caliph’s entourage was resting near Sanabad – the burial place of Harun al-Rashid – Imam Ali b. Musa al-Rida also fell ill and died. In one of history’s great ironies, he was buried in the same tomb as Harun al-Rashid, his father’s nemesis. Today, that village has grown into Iran’s second largest city, Mashhad – the place of martyrdom – a central pilgrimage site for the Shi’a faithful who believe firmly that the eighth Imam was poisoned by the man who had just appointed him his successor. Thus closed one of the most remarkable chapters in Muslim history.

A Piece of History

Apart from reports in (often unreliable) contemporary history texts, the only concrete testament to this episode are the coins al-Mamun minted declaring Ali al-Rida as his successor. Today, these coins are quite hard to find. Fortunately, I was able to add one to my collection last month. For an 1,100-year old object, it has survived very well – perhaps buried in a horde by a careful saver or given as payment to a Viking trader.

Most of the text on the coin is fairly standard for Abbasid coinage, but some parts are interesting:

On the obverse, below the standard shahadah “There is no god but Allah, unique, He has no associate”, we see the word al-mashriq – “the East”. This refers to the fact that, when the coin was issued, al-Mamun was ruling from the eastern province of Khurasan.

Also on the obverse, the inner margin says: bism allah duriba hadha’l-dirham bi-muhammadiyya sana ithnatayn wa mi‘atayn, “in the name of God this dirham was struck in Muhammadiyyah (in) the year two and two hundred”. The 202 AH year corresponds to the announcement of Imam al-Rida’s nomination. Al-Muhammadiya was the name the Abbasids gave to the ancient city of Rayy near modern Teheran in Iran. The name referred to the third Abbasid Caliph, Muhammad al-Mahdi, who was al-Mamun’s grandfather. The outer margins on both sides quote verse 33 from the 9^th chapter of the Qur’an, al-Tawbah, which states: muhammad rasul allah arsalahu bi’l-huda wa din al-haqq li-yuzhirahu ‘ala al-din kullihi wa law kariha al-mushrikun,  “Muhammad is the messenger of God who sent him with guidance and the religion of truth that he might make it supreme over all other religions, even though the polytheists may detest it” (the obverse only has a part of this). This famous line was first added to the Islamic coinage by the Umayyad Caliph ‘Abd al-Malik when he reformed Islamic coinage in 696 CE – possibly as a jab to the Christian Byzantines. At the bottom of the field on the reverse, we see the word dhu’l-riyasatayn, “holder of two commands”, referring to al-Mamun’s powerful prime minister, al-Fadl bin Sahl.

But the key inscription is in the center of the reverse field, reading: lillah / muhammad rasul allah / al-ma’mun khalifat allah / mimma amara bihi al-amir al-rida / wali ‘ahd al-muslimin ‘ali ibn musa / ibn ‘ali ibn abi talib, “for God, Muhammad is the messenger of God, al-Ma’mun is the Caliph of Allah, among the things ordered by the Prince al-Rida, Recipient of the Oath of the Muslims ‘Ali ibn Musa ibn ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib”. Several things are notable here. First, al-Mamun is named on the coin as the “Caliph (deputy) of Allah”, which was not the universal practice – most early Abbasid coins are anonymous. Perhaps, using the name was thought to lend more significance to the statement. Second, Imam al-Rida is cited both by his title (al-Rida) and name, but referred to as “the Prince” (al-amir), not as the Imam. Third, the lineage of Imam al-Rida is specified by naming his father, Imam Musa al-Kadhim, and then ‘Ali ibn Abi-Talib, the first Imam. The clear implication is that Imam al-Rida had the right to rule because he was the direct descendant of ‘Ali – a nod to the Shi’a.

Explanations and Speculations

Why did al-Mamun go through this cruel farce? There are many theories, all of which are plausible. Not surprisingly, there is a gulf between Shi’a and Sunni opinion on this, though the vast majority of ordinary Sunni Muslims today are unaware of the event. The mainstream Shi’a belief is that Imam al-Rida was killed on al-Mamun’s orders, and that the entire gambit was a political move by the Caliph to break the Shi’a resistance to Abbasid tyranny. Within this general framework, there are several different views. The first – and the simplest – is that al-Mamun drew the Imam to his side so he could be assassinated at an opportune time. The fact that he died in Sanabad and was buried in Harun al-Rashid’s tomb would seem to support the idea of a planned assassination. Another view is that al-Mamun wanted to get the Imam out of his power-base in Madinah and curtail his ability to organize his followers into any sort of movement that could trouble the Caliph. A related idea is that, by co-opting Imam al-Rida into the Abbasid political structure, al-Mamun was trying to undermine his legitimacy among Shi’a true believers. There is a report that al-Mamun tried to humiliate the Imam by staging a debate between him and his doctrinal adversaries (including non-Muslims), but the attempt failed because of the Imam’s brilliant arguments. This increased al-Mamun’s fear that the Imam could still become the center of a revolt, and he decided that assassination was the only way out. A lot of detailed stories – apocryphal or otherwise – have become attached to these events within Shi’a sacred history.

Most mainstream Sunni historians such as Ibn Kathir and Ibn al-Jawzi have dismissed the entire assassination theory, and have seen al-Mamun’s move as a well-meaning – though still self-serving – attempt to bring together the Shi’a and Sunni factions, thereby solving the perpetual problem of Shi’a revolts. Historians from al-Tabari and Ibn Kathir through Ibn Khaldun to Madelung and Crone have investigated this unique event in Muslim history. One interesting and quite plausible narrative that one can construct from the various sources (including Shi’a ones) revolves around the Prime Minister, al-Fadl bin Sahl. It has been argued convincingly that al-Fadl was deeply involved in the scheme to nominate Imam al-Rida. Indeed, it may have been his idea all along. There is much debate about his motives: Some see it as a move to strengthen al-Mamun’s position by nullifying the Shi’a opposition; others – especially at the time – saw it as a conspiracy by a crypto-Shi’a al-Fadl to hand over the empire to the Shi’a, or even as a way to reinstate Zoroastrian rule, since al-Fadl was a convert from that faith. Whatever the truth of the matter, we know two things. First, the appointment of Imam al-Rida as the Caliph’s successor was received very poorly by the powerful Arab elite in Baghdad, who saw it as a big loss of their power. They rebelled and overthrew al-Mamun’s governor, al-Hasan bin Sahl, who happened to be the Prime Minister’s brother, and replaced him with an Abbasid figure. For al-Mamun a thousand miles away in Merv, this was a calamity, and it precipitated his return to Baghdad. Second, we know that al-Fadl suddenly decided to retire from his prime ministership to, as might be said today, “spend more time with his family”. Of course, this did not come to pass because he died during the march back to Baghdad, quite possibly assassinated on al-Mamun’s orders. It is quite plausible that this fall from grace – and from life – was because al-Mamun blamed al-Fadl for his new troubles. This same problem made it impossible for him to show up in Baghdad with Imam al-Rida – hence the need for a second assassination. An excellent and detailed analysis of the historical sources and narratives surrounding all these events is provided by Buyukkara, though his conclusion is that al-Mamun acted with benign intentions.

Whatever the truth of the matter, the remarkable story of the Caliph and the Imam remains one of the strangest, most mysterious, and most tragic events in the long and complicated history of Islam. Twelve centuries have passed since these events transpired, but for millions of Shi’a around the world, they are refreshed in memory as thousands upon thousands of the faithful make pilgrimage to the sacred city of Mashhad to pay their respects to the Imam who was briefly designated for secular monarchy.

Today – 11 Dhul-Qa’da in the Islamic calendar, is his birthday.

It is hard to imagine a young kid finishing high school without ever coming across The Life and Adventures of Robinson Crusoe?  Written in 1719 by Daniel Dafoe, it is among the claimants of the auspicious stature of first English novel, and widely believed as a true travelogue upon its inception.  However, there is seldom a casual reader who can trace the legend back to the 17^th century roots of literary tradition with an autodidact character at its center; and few are aware about the Arab-Spanish mentor of this optimism in human reason and contemplation, Ibn Tufayl (d. 1185).

Almost six hundred years between Dafoe and him, we know very little about the life of Ibn Tufayl, except that he was a polymath, serving as a physician and adviser of Sultan Abu Yaqub Yusuf (d. 1184) of the Almohad dynasty ruling Morocco and Spain. It is unfortunate that his complete interdisciplinary work is lost, except his philosophical experiment involving an isolated autodidact, named Hayy Ibn Yaqzan; literally translated as Alive, Son of the Awake.

It is the story of a boy, the nature of whose existence is shadowy to an extent that there are two completely rivaling accounts of his origins. One account ascribes his origin to spontaneous generation from matter; the other is necessarily a legendary human drama in which a royal infant somehow grows up away from society and culture. Being isolated from all intelligent life, he gradually becomes conscious, thereby discovering shame, jealousy, aspiration, desire, eagerness to possess and practical reasoning. He experiences love through affection of his foster doe, and death, as it ultimately departs.

To know is necessarily an obligation for Hayy Ibn Yaqzan. Desperately seeking meaning, his search guides him to explore various disciplines such as anatomy, physiology, metaphysics and spirituality. He deduces the presence of God through contemplating  the unity of cosmos and its boundedness; and in his ascetic code of conduct, he seeks satisfaction and salvation.

After thirty-five years of isolation, he finally meets Absal, a hermit refugee from a land of conventional religious believers. In Absal, Ibn Tufayl modeled a religious divine who has learnt many languages to gain mastery of scriptural exegesis. Absal’s first reaction is a deep sense of fear for his faith as he encounters an exotic being. As they interact well, Absal endeavors to teach Hayy to speak and communicate, in order to make him aware of knowledge and religion.

However Absal soon discovers that Hayy is already aware of the truth, to envision which, Absal’s own intellect bears nothing except revealed symbols.

Judging Absal’s good intentions and the veracity of his message, Hayy proselytize to this religion and Absal introduces Hayy to his people. As Hayy gets familiarized with civilization, two basic questions continue to puzzle him in great deal. First, why people must need symbols to assimilate and express the knowledge of the ultimate truth; and why can’t they just experience the reality more intimately? Second, being completely oblivious to practical religion, he continued to wonder why there is an obligation to indulge oneself in rituals of prayer and purity.

He keeps on wondering why these people consume more than their body needs, possess and nurture property diligently, neglect truth by purposefully indulging in pass-times and fall an easy prey to their desires. He finally decides to accompany Absal to his land, thinking that it might be through him that people encompass the true vision and experience truth rather than believing it with their seemingly narrow vision.

What follows is a tale of a neophyte philosopher teaching ordinary people to rise above their literalism and open another eye towards reality. His interlocutors on the other hand, recoil in their apprehensions and being intellectual slaves to their prejudices, close their ears. He consequently realizes that these people are unable to go beyond their usual appetites. He also grasps that masses of the world are only capable to receive through symbols and regulatory laws rather than being receptive to unstained and plain truth. Both men eventually return back to their isolated world but this time Hayy as the teacher and Absal as his disciple. They continue searching their ecstasies until they met their ends.

Ibn Tufayl’s singularly survived legacy extends in diverse dimensions and its canvas is vast. Its theological and philosophical themes were employed and transformed throughout the various phases of European enlightenment.

It isn’t just one curious aspect that many centuries later, the metaphysically preoccupied Hayy Ibn Yaqzan is transformed into a shipwrecked sailor, predominantly occupying himself with inventions and utilitarian exploration of nature. As Malik Bennabi – an acute observer of modern condition – observes, the genius of both the narratives lies in characterizing the solitude of their respective protagonists. In this respect, time for Robinson Crusoe is essentially a concrete cyclic happening of acts, such as work, food, sleep and work again.

Nov. 4. This morning I began to order my times of work, of going out with my gun, time of diversion, viz., every morning I walked out with my gun for two or three hours, if it did not rain; then employed myself to work till about eleven o’clock; then eat what I had to live on; and from twelve to two I lay down to sleep, the weather being excessive hot; and then in the evening to work again. The working parts of this day and of the next were wholly employed in making my table; for I was yet but a complete natural mechanic soon after, as I believe it would do anyone else.[1]

This is pretty much the condition of a modern individual where the void of solitude is filled with work, each of us occupied mechanically with the object at the centre of our world of ideas, diligently busy in constructing our own proverbial tables.

On the other hand, what fills Hayy’s solitude is an overwhelming amazement, the adventure starting by experiencing wonder in the ultimate nature of life and death of his beloved foster-mother, the gazelle.

When she (the gazelle) grew old and feeble, he used to lead her where there was the best pasture, and pluck the sweetest fruits for her, and give her them to eat. Notwithstanding this, she grew lean and continued a while in a languishing condition, till at last she died, and then all her motions and actions ceased. When the boy perceived her in this condition, he was ready to die for grief He called her with the same voice, which she used to answer to, and made what noise he could, but there was no motion, no alteration. Then he began to peep into her ears and eyes, but could perceive no visible defect in either; in like manner he examined all the parts of her body, and found nothing amiss, but everything as it should be. He had a vehement desire to find that part where the defect was, that he may remove it, and she return to her former state. But he was altogether at a loss how to compass his design, nor could he possibly bring it about.[2]

Thus, it is ultimately in the nature of failure to identify this defective part where Ibn Tufayl tries to locate an ineffable reality beyond the material.  

Ibn Tufayl’s philosophical romance has been regarded as one of the pioneer autodidactic works surviving from medieval scholastic tradition [3]. But besides being an influential narrative  — with rich literary possibilities and themes such as those transformed by a modernist like Dafoe — it was a precursor to important medieval interactions between the schools of Thomas Aquinas and Averroists, and invited modern appraisals from mathematician rationalists like Gottfried Leibniz [4].

Voltaire and Quakers admired it for its appeal to reason, and Bacon, Newton and Locke were possibly influenced by it to various degrees too. Traces of Ibn Tufayl’s original literary pointers are also found in Rousseau’s Emile, Kant’s Ground of Proof for a Demonstration of God’s Existence, Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels and Darwin’s Origin of Species among others.

Especially in the context of Muslim tradition, its contemporary value lies in rich possibilities to bridge gaps between reason and revelation. It lays down a perpetually self evolving construct where reason and reflection are the essential keys to the doors of  timeless revelation. Ibn Tufayl’s voice still echoes loud, struggling to tell us that rejecting either would imply rejecting a part of truth.

_________________________________________

1. Daniel Dafoe, Robinson Crusoe, Penguin Classics 2003
2. Lenn Evan Goodman, Ibn Tufayl’s Hayy ibn Yaqzan: a philosophical tale, 1972.
3. There have been attributions to an earlier work involving similar but limited themes to Avicenna.
4. Samar Attar, The Vital Roots of European Enlightenment: Ibn Tufayl’s Influence on Modern Western Thought, 2010

In this episode (split into two parts) we talk to Tim Mackintosh Smith, author of “Arabs; a three thousand year history of peoples, tribes and empires“. We talk about his book and about Arab history and contemporary reality. Check it out..

You can also support the podcast as a patron. The primary benefit now is that you get the podcasts considerably earlier than everyone else. This website isn’t about shaking the cup, but I have noticed that the number of patrons plateaued a long time ago.

This episode features Akshar and Mukunda talking to Cliff Smith and Sam Westrop of the Middle East Forum. We get into topics surrounding the relevance of the Deobandi movement, how Islamism percolates between South Asia and the West, and the political ramifications of Islamism in the US and the UK.

But I’ll make a comment here. I am of the school that thinks facts matter a lot. Many of you trade in standard Hindu nationalist tropes and generalities about Islam. As someone who told Shadi Hamid on our interview, I am not a big personal fan of Islam, I don’t really mind people fearing Islam. I have personal experience of the religion after all.

But, facts matter. And a lot of the “facts” that get bandied about here are false.  I won’t tolerate that. There are two general categories I will point to:

1. First, people take traditional Muslim historiography at face value. You shouldn’t. This is like taking Christians at face value when they talk about the Four Gospels are pure positive history, when they were finally compiled and redacted decades later. Whether Muhammad exists is an empirical question in the same way that whether Jesus exists is an empirical question. As it happens, I’m modestly confident both figures existed in some form but were quite different from what Christians and Muslims depict them as (I do suspect that Josephus was a later interpolation).

The broader issue here is that Muslims on the whole have not gone through the modernist transition in regards to a critical-rationalist take on their religion. In Christianity, traditionalist-fundamentalists exist, but they have to take dialogue with modernists as a given. They exist in large part as reactions to modernism. This is not the case with Islam. Muslims accept that non-Muslims reject their religion, but within Islam, there is not a strong rationalist engagement with their texts that applies the sort of criticism than the Germans pioneered within Protestantism in the 19th century. That means they present a “unified face” about their early history which too many non-Muslims take for granted. Islam with all of its constitutive elements is not truly recognizable to us until about 850 A.D.*

2. Because this is a blog with a South Asian focus a lot of Hindu nationalist tropes and facts get presented at face value. I don’t really mind them as mythologies that give people succor or create their identity, but a lot of them have as much factual basis as a pagan Mecca: not much.

Most of the Hindu nationalist commenters do reflect a reality of “lived experience.” As someone who grew up around South Asian Muslims, I can admit they have total contempt on the whole (there are exceptions) for Hindus and their “bizarre” beliefs. But, as someone who is personally anti-Islam and literally tolerant of diverse views, many people from Hindu backgrounds of all ideologies have told me what they really think of Muslims, and the contempt is returned.

My issue is always when people turn their personal experiences into deep historical insights. Do not do that if you don’t enjoy me jumping down your throat, because if I’m not busy, I will do so.

More broadly, lots of Indian readers would benefit from reading more history. Especially non-Indian history. A broad cross-cultural perspective is essential, so do more!

For the curious here are a few books:

– China: A New History
– History of Rome
– A History of the Byzantine State and Society
– A History of the Arab Peoples: Updated Edition

* The Shia-Sunni split starts to become discernible in a way we’d recognize, Hadith culture is already on track to marginalize the “philosophers” and Hellenists, and the ulema centered around madrassas spread from the east to the west.

Need book recommendations. What are some great books on history of Islam and history of Persian Empire and Central Asia?

– Empires of the Silk Road: A History of Central Eurasia from the Bronze Age to the Present
– Lost Enlightenment: Central Asia’s Golden Age from the Arab Conquest to Tamerlane
– The Silk Road: A New History
– A History of Iran: Empire of the Mind
– The Great Arab Conquests: How the Spread of Islam Changed the World We Live In
– When Baghdad Ruled the Muslim World: The Rise and Fall of Islam’s Greatest Dynasty
– In God’s Path: The Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire

Overview of challenges faced by Saudi Arabia and role of Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman (MBS). His meteoric rise from obscurity in an interesting phenomenon.

“Men in great fortunes are strangers to themselves, and while they are in the puzzle of business they have no time to tend to their health either of body or mind”.  Francis Bacon’s Of Great Place

Enjoy

Hamid

Kingdom at Crossroads

Hamid Hussain

“We always take criticism from our friends.  If we are wrong, we need to hear that we are wrong.  But if we are not wrong, we need to hear support from our friends.  What I request is that the thing you actually believe, to say it”.  Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman interview with The Economist, January 6, 2016

External environment of Saudi Arabia changed dramatically in the aftermath of murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Saudi consulate in Turkey in October 2018.  It made international headlines and many started to ask questions about Saudi Arabia and the royal family.  This event also strained relationship of Saudi Arabia with its western allies as governments came under increasing pressure to raise this issue.

Saudi Arabia operates in a zone of opacity and not much is known about royal family dynamics and Saudi public opinion.  Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman (nick named MBS) moved rapidly to consolidate all power centers under his own personal command since the ascension of his father King Salman Bin Abdul Aziz to the throne in 2015.  Very little is known about how MBS consolidated his power inside the Kingdom.  He also broke with the tradition of family consensus and removed many powerful royal family members and their sympathizers from important centers of power.

MBS was first appointed Defence Minister and in this capacity, he gradually took control of all branches of the military. Defence procurement and defense construction contracts are a major source of patronage and in June 2017, MBS took control of this cash cow of patronage.  He established Saudi Arabia Military Industries (SAMI) and made it a defense subsidiary of Public Investment Fund (PIF).  PIF is country’s sovereign wealth fund under direct control of MBS. In August 2017, General Authority Military Industries (GAMI) was established and made responsible for all defense procurement.  SAMI and GAMI are controlled by an inter-ministerial committee headed by MBS.  In July 2017, commander of Royal Guard was removed, and six months later Chief of Staff of land forces and air force and air defense commanders were also removed.  Within few months of becoming heir apparent, MBS was in full control of operational and economic aspects of all defense establishments.

Parallel to these developments, interior ministry; a potential rival power center that had become a behemoth patronage center of deposed Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Nayef was gradually neutralized. In July 2017, a new ministerial level agency named Presidency of State Security (PSS) was established that reported to Crown Prince.  Counter-terrorism, internal surveillance, cyber-intelligence and national information center functions of interior ministry were transferred to PSS. MBS also took control of all economic activities as Chairman of Council of Economic and Development Affairs.  In this capacity, he cancelled and revised many previous civilian contracts most likely creating new networks of patronage loyal to him.His agenda of reform in social and economic sectors was welcomed by Saudi youth and international community. His high-profile visits to London and Washington in early 2018 portrayed him as the reformer that Middle East had been waiting for a long time.  However, these positive developments were quickly eclipsed by the negative fallout from his actions in other arenas. Flashy slogans like Vision 2030 and National Transformation Program (NTP) 2016-2020 were high on rhetoric but very low on substance. Few examples will show that no serious thought was given before policies were announced.  When King Salman ascended to the throne in 2015, he decreed a cash bonus of two months’ salary for all government employees costing national exchequer $32 billion.  In 2016, bonus payments (usually 15-20 percent of the salary) of public service workers (two thirds of Saudi work force are employed by the government) were cut but when widespread grumbling was echoed in Saudi Arabia, decision was hastily reversed.  In the fall of 2016, subsidies on gas, power and water were slashed.  When irate public looking at their new utility bills took to social media, government fired its water and electricity minister.  It was announced that five percent of Aramco will be put up for public offering but later the idea was quietly dropped.  One important goal of Vision 2030 is to double foreign investment by 2020.  There are no specific plans for how it will be done?  Compare it with reality on ground.  Foreign investment in Kingdom dramatically dropped to mere $1.7 billion in 2017 from previous year of about $8 billion.  Jordan and Egypt attracted more foreign investment than Saudi Arabia in 2017.

A decade ago, King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz inaugurated plan for King Abdullah Financial District (KAFD) announcing that this will be the pillar of non-oil economy.  That block after an estimated cost of $ 8 billion and many delays due to funding issues stands as a ghost town today.

Anti-corruption drive against the powerful Saudi elite was the right move but done so clumsily that it looked like a mafia style shakedown. No institutional mechanisms were put in place to encourage transparency and accountability of corrupt practices.  One day Saudi billionaire Prince Walid Bin Talal was put in the gilded cage of Ritz Carlton on charges of massive corruption.  Few months later and few billion dollars poor at the same glitzy hotel, he was sitting next to MBS for an investment extravaganza in the desert. Such measures do not instill confidence among international investors.

MBS departed from well-established norms of the royal family in handling internal and foreign affairs issues. Al Saud royal family has used the instrument of patronage and co-option to keep family united and relied on ‘checkbook diplomacy’ to handle foreign affairs problems.  It avoided severe punishment of errant royal family members and avoided direct military involvement in conflict zones.  Internally, al Saud had usually co-opted dissenting voices rather than severely punishing them.  During King Abdullah’s reign many such reconciliation efforts were initiated towards disgruntled clerics, youth, females and Shia and Ismaili minorities.  MBS embarked on the reign of fear to keep everyone in line rather than consensus. He has opened several internal fronts by arresting clerics, female activists and Shia.  In January 2016, execution of Shia cleric Nimr Baqir al Nimr has widened the sectarian gulf inside Saudi Arabia that will be very difficult to bridge.

On the foreign policy fronts, military intervention in Yemen, clash with Qatar and direct involvement in internal fractious affairs of Lebanon and Palestine has rattled even close allies of Saudi Arabia.  Boycott of Qatar, clumsy handling of inviting Lebanese Prime Minister to Riyadh and having him announce his resignation on Saudi television, insulting pressure on Mahmud Abbas to sign on Trump’s Middle East plan, undermining King Abdullah of Jordan’s authority in Jerusalem and rude treatment of Kuwait in dealing with disputed territory is making everyone nervous. Oman is trying to keep its distance from Saudi foreign policy in the region and Kuwait is quietly working with Turkey to address its security concerns vis a vis Saudi Arabia.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has used Khashoggi’s brutal murder for his own gains.  Erdogan is no boy scout and after the failed coup of 2016, thousands have been put behind bars without any trial.  Turkey has the distinction of being the largest jailer of journalists. Saudi Arabia sent Prince Khalid Bin Feisal al Saud as emissary.  He met Erdogan that was not reported in the press and allegedly offered a financial package and promise of lifting blockade of Qatar in return for dropping the murder investigation.  Erdogan rejected the deal that suggests that Erdogan has bigger ambitions in using this opportunity to his advantage.

Erdogan has used the incident to rehabilitate himself in Europe and America. He is now working overtime to change the balance of power in the Middle East.  He is partially successful in taking the steam out of Washington’s efforts to align all Sunni countries behind Saudi Arabia.  Erdogan now wants to convince the world that MBS is a ‘fake reformer’. He is trying to portray himself as ‘true reformer’ and worthy of leadership of Sunni world.  Thanks to rash foreign policy decisions of MBS, in a fractured Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Turkey has been able to build close relationship with Qatar and working quietly with others such as Kuwait to penetrate flank of Saudi Arabia.

American and Western interests include a steady flow of oil, Saudi market for its arms and consumer goods and Saudi Arabia acting as counter balance to increasing Iranian influence in the region.  American defense industries have many lucrative contracts with Saudi defense sectors.  Contrary to widespread belief, it was during Obama presidency that major arms deals were signed.  According to Congressional Research Service (CRS) figures, the proposed major defense sales to Saudi Arabia from year 2009 to 2016 were around $138 billion.  The contract with Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) alone is worth about $4 billion. Saudis have steadily increased investment in American financial sector and pumped $20 billion into a new investment fund managed by American Blackstone Group.

Britain’s economic interest in Saudi Arabia has become important in view of looming Brexit. British defense industries have a good share of Saudi market, but it is now looking for new markets for its service industries. During MBS visit to England in February 2018, an ambitious $90 billion target was set by both countries.  In addition, both countries signed a letter of intent of buying 48 Typhoon jets worth $ 7 billion.  France has sold to Saudi Arabia arms worth one billion Euros per year for the last decade.  French oil giant Total has signed a nine billion Euro petro-chemical deal with Saudi Arabia. Saudis have pledged $45 billion investment in the technology sector in Japan.

A cursory look at these numbers is enough to show that no country will be willing to sever these lucrative ties for the murder of a journalist. These crucial foreign policy and economic interests will trump all other consideration.  However, public opinion will have impact on policy towards Saudi Arabia.  After Khashoggi’s murder, European Union parliament voted 25-1 to ban all dual use surveillance systems that could be used to suppress local population.  Similarly, public anger forced change in U.S. Congress and many Republican law makers supported the bill rebuking MBS.  Using an old law, Senate also ordered a federal investigation that will force administration to report to Congress if MBS was involved in Khashoggi murder. However, domestic political and economic problems of Western European countries and United States will dominate news cycle of 2019 and Saudi Arabia will likely recede into the background.

Concerns about modus operandi of MBS will necessitate a two-pronged approach.  First, London and Washington will like to have some modification of behavior of MBS and later coming under harsh international criticism may decide to modify his approach.  The other piece of the puzzle is that if MBS faces a serious leadership challenge or unnatural death, then Washington wants a seat at the table of house of Saud to make sure that knives don’t come out and that new leadership is in line with their priorities.  Human and electronic and signal penetration in all major security establishments of Saudi Arabia in training, support and advisory capacity allows Washington to gauge the pulse of the Kingdom.

MBS missed some important sign posts in pursue of his policies.  Clash with Qatar cost him Arab public opinion as Al Jazeera beamed embarrassing reports about the kingdom to every Arab home. Arab public opinion about MBS is very negative.  Public demonstrations against MBS during his visit to Argentina and Tunisia were unprecedented.  Friction with Turkey resulted in Erdogan ambushing him. Public embrace of President Trump and close personal relationship with Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner entangled him into the toxic environment of American politics.  Saudi Arabia also misread many signals from Washington.  In 2016, Congress passed Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism (JASTA) with bi-partisan support that could hold Saudi Arabia responsible for financial damages.  President Obama vetoed the bill, but Congress overturned Obama’s veto and it was the first time that Congress took this extraordinary measure during Obama’s presidency.  This should have got Saudi Arabia’s attention.  There are many more land mines of American legislative process in American-Saudi relations.

MBS needs an innovative approach to cover internal and external fronts.  First step is to get out of the news cycle as quickly as possible.  On domestic front, bringing estranged uncle Ahmad bin Abdul Aziz is a step in the right direction where he can mediate with royal family members and rally all members of al Saud around the wagons. He needs to mend fences with moderate clerics as well as youth.  Releasing popular clerics and especially females as well as allowing some outlets of expression will calm that front. This will give him some room to address real problem of his country and that is alarmingly rising unemployment of Saudi youth. To date, no one has questioned the legitimacy of al Saud family, but this cannot be taken fore granted.

On regional issues, cessation of air airstrikes in Yemen and signing on UN brokered peace negotiations will help in rehabilitation of public opinion.  Even a modest humanitarian aid package to starving Yemen population will also generate some good will.  Fast track negotiations with Qatar to end the blockade will ease regional pressure.

Saudi Arabia has strategic relations with Washington and while continued efforts are needed to work with the administration on critical issues, Saudi Arabia needs to keep a safe distance from Trump.  The last thing Saudi Arabia needs is to be dragged in domestic American political fight.   Democratic control of House of representatives in mid-term elections means that starting from January 2019, democrats will beat President Trump with Saudi Arabian cane.  There are already signs that Congress will not be kind to Saudi Arabia.  In March 2018, Senator Bernie Sanders vote in senate failed 55-44.  In November, administration was concerned enough that it sent Secretaries of State and Defence to brief senators.  However, senators were not impressed and in a bipartisan move approved a bill curtailing US cooperation with Saudi Arabia in Yemen.  Senators were also angry at the absence of CIA director Gina Haspel.  She finally met some senators and gave them a classified briefing.  Two senior Republican senators told reporters after the briefing that they had no doubt that MBS ordered the killing.  In November, Republican leadership of the house defeated the Saudi chastisement bill by 201-187.  Next year, results will be different.  In my view, from initial investigations, special counsel Robert Mueller has gathered enough material and I’ll be not surprised if he has opened investigation into Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner’s dealing with MBS.

  Lobbying efforts to curtail hostile attitude of legislatures on the hill may help limit the fall out but it will be an uphill battle.  Saudi Arabia does not have an effective ambassador and it relies mainly on influential United Arab Emirates (UAE) ambassador to Washington Yusuf al Utaiba who is doing most of the fire fighting.

MBS needs time for self-reflection; a rare commodity among rulers especially monarchs.  During their whole life they are surrounded by people who are there to fulfill wishes of the master.  Native and foreign advisors simply nod at royal wishes rather than challenge assumptions or give honest opinion if it is contrary to the master’s wishes.  He needs to mend fences inside as well as outside the kingdom. In the absence of it, he as well as his country will suffer.

“We must be clear sighted in beginning, for, as in their budding we discern not the danger, soon in their full growth we perceive not the remedy.”    Montaigne

Hamid Hussain

coeusconsultant@optonline.net

December 25, 2018