His true heirs are:

• Zia-ul-Haq
• Asim Munir and the modern Pakistan Army
• Ayub Khan
• And Narendra Modi

This is not provocation. It is structural observation.

I. Jinnah Created a Logic That Outlived His Liberal Aesthetics

Jinnah was a pork-eating, whisky-drinking Edwardian barrister. But when history forced his hand, he chose a tool he could not control: communal mobilization. His argument became simple and unforgettable:

Muslims cannot be secure in a Hindu-majority polity.

The moment he anchored Muslim politics to that premise, he guaranteed three outcomes:

1. A state defined by permanent insecurity
2. A state requiring a guardian class
3. A state where legitimacy flows from Islamic identity, not liberal law

These are the core pillars of Pakistan’s military-Islamic order. Not an aberration. Not a “betrayal of Jinnah.” Its fulfillment. Jinnah provided the ideological software. Zia and Asim Munir merely ran it to completion.

II. Zia Is Not a Deviation. He Is the Logical End of Two-Nation Theory.

Liberals in Pakistan treat Jinnah’s 11 August speech as scripture. But states are not built on one speech. States are built on:

• The coalitions that create them
• The fears they mobilize
• The enemies they define

Zia understood the raw material Jinnah left behind. If the core claim is: Muslims need a separate state for protection. Then the next steps follow naturally:

• Islamic law
• Islamic identity
• Islamic legitimacy
• A praetorian military to “protect” this identity
• A governing elite that speaks in the idiom of religion, not rights

Zia did not deform Pakistan. He completed Jinnah’s argument.

III. Asim Munir Is the Administrative Jinnah

If Jinnah provided the logic and Zia the blueprint, Asim Munir and GHQ provide the machinery. The Army preserves the doctrine that:

• Pakistan exists to defend Islam
• Islam is under threat
• Therefore the Army must rule

This is the terminal form of the argument Jinnah launched in the 1940s. You cannot summon communal nationalism in 1946 and expect Scandinavian secularism in 2024. States do not grow in the direction of their founder’s lifestyle. They grow in the direction of their founding logic.

IV. Why Modi Also Belongs in Jinnah’s Family Tree

Modi’s Hindutva is often seen as Jinnah’s opposite. This is false. Hindutva and the Muslim League were co-parents of communal sovereignty. Their leaders cooperated in the 1930s when Congress boycotted institutions. Both movements agreed on one thing:

Communal identity is the primary political unit.

They differed only on which community would define the state. Modi, in a dark mirror, is also Jinnah’s heir:

• Majoritarian logic
• Essentialized identity
• A state built on civilizational self-assertion
• The belief that coexistence requires hierarchy, not parity

Partition did not end the argument. It duplicated it. Modi is Hindu Pakistan. Pakistan is Muslim Pakistan. Both descend from the same 1940s grammar.

V. Nehru Delayed the Reckoning; He Did Not Prevent It

Congress’s secular vision bought India time, not resolution. Nehru’s universalism—profound in speech, thin in political design—pushed back the communal reckoning for half a century. But he could not uninstall the firmware of 1947:

• Identity as destiny
• Demography as risk
• Majorities as sovereign
• Minorities as negotiable

Modi did not invent this. He activated it. Jinnah made the argument. Savarkar articulated the parallel Hindu form. Nehru tried to bury it under poetry. Modi simply removed the lid.

VI. Jinnah Under-Imagined Pakistan; His Successors Completed It

Jinnah built a state without:

• A constitutional theory
• A governing philosophy
• A cultural program
• A mass political base
• A civic identity

All he built was a justifying claim:

Muslims must rule themselves because Hindus cannot be trusted.

Everything else—law, ideology, coercive power—was delegated to whoever came next. That vacuum produced:

• Ayub’s praetorian modernism
• Bhutto’s populist Islam
• Zia’s theocratic engineering
• Musharraf’s cosmetic liberalism
• Imran Khan’s civilizational rhetoric
• Asim Munir’s clerical militarism

They did not sabotage Jinnah. They implemented him.

VII. The Pattern Is Global, Not Subcontinental

Founders seldom control the trajectory they unleash:

• Ben-Gurion created Israel; Netanyahu rules its logic
• De Valera created Ireland; the institutional machine outlasted him
• Anti-colonial movements radicalize once moderates win

Revolutionary ideals rarely survive the first decade. Structures survive. Security imperatives survive. Founding fears survive. Jinnah’s founding fear was Hindu domination. Pakistan is built on materializing that fear every decade.

VIII. The Straight Answer

Why are Zia, Munir, Ayub, and even Modi Jinnah’s children? Because Jinnah built the world they inherited:

• Identity as political destiny
• Majoritarian security as the state’s purpose
• Communal fear as mobilization
• Legitimacy flowing from religious identity
• Politics defined by civilization, not citizenship

Take away Jinnah’s personal habits and his liberal veneer. Look only at the political argument he chose. That argument produced:

• An Islamic republic
• A praetorian army
• A clerical-military state
• And a Hindu-majoritarian counterstate next door

This is not the betrayal of Jinnah. This is the fulfillment of Jinnah.

Conclusion

Jinnah imagined a Muslim homeland. He built a logic of identity, fear, and sovereignty. Zia and Munir turned that logic into doctrine. Ayub turned it into structure. Modi turned it into a mirror. Founders do not choose their heirs. Their ideas choose them. Jinnah’s idea chose Zia. Jinnah’s fear chose Munir. And Jinnah’s grammar chose Modi. That is the real story of South Asia’s modern history.

Kabir removed three of Dave’s comments, and while I felt it was over-moderation, I’ve kept my promise not to interfere unnecessarily in his threads.

The excerpt above, though, is interesting — the comparison between Zia’s Pakistan and Modi’s India. What’s striking about both is the twin emphasis on capitalism and cultural conservatism: the promise of economic growth wrapped in moral revival. It raises a deeper question — whether right-wing politics are, paradoxically, the only antidote societies find to extreme inequality.

Class, even more than caste or creed, is the fundamental distinction in any society. The bottom half ultimately has more in common with each other than with the top half. Yet society endures only when that bottom half is so compromised that it cannot mount effective resistance. When the Establishment promise uplift but depend on the passivity of the lower half, then the “distribution of prosperity”, twinned with ideology, itself becomes the subtlest form of control.

False Flags, Fragile Ideologies, and the Weight of History

I don’t want to take away from Omar’s excellent piece, India and Pakistan: Back to the Future—he nailed it on the trajectory of Pakistan’s self-conception and the road ahead for India.

But what began as a comment evolved into something more. I wanted to briefly address the misinformed murmurings online about the attack on Pahalgam being a false flag.

Caesar’s Wife

There’s an old line: Caesar’s wife must be above suspicion. If you want to be taken seriously on the world stage, perception is half the battle. India has a clear civilizational and national narrative. Despite its contradictions, it’s attempting—seriously—to join the ranks of the U.S. and China. And it’s making real progress.

Pakistan, by contrast, seems increasingly defined by what it opposes rather than what it builds. Its civilizational narrative has, over time, narrowed into a single impulse: block India at any cost. There are dozens of Muslim-majority nations. But there is only one India. That asymmetry matters—culturally, strategically, metaphysically.

Zia’s Logic: Annihilation as Strategy

One quote making the rounds—attributed to General Zia-ul-Haq—offers a glimpse into a mindset that’s still disturbingly prevalent:

“Pakistan may suffer annihilation, but Muslims will survive. There is only one India. I shall wipe out Hinduism from the face of the earth.”

I can’t vouch for its authenticity. But the fact that it circulates so widely in Pakistani nationalist circles is telling. It reveals a logic where mutual destruction isn’t feared, but fantasised. Where nuclear brinkmanship becomes doctrine. Where religious identity trumps civilizational continuity. If your ideology accepts the annihilation of your own state as the cost of harming your neighbour—you’re not a nation. You’re a martyr complex with missiles.

The Asymmetry That Matters

India, for all its flaws, is building. Its democracy is messy, but resilient. Its economy is growing. Its institutions—however imperfect—are evolving. Pakistan, too often, is interrupting. And history rarely remembers the spoilers kindly. The tragedy is that the real cost is paid by ordinary people: the victims, the Punjabi farmers, the families in Pahalgam, Fawad Khan. The artists and workers and worshippers who simply want peace, and instead become collateral to a state’s obsession.

Ayesha Siddiqa covered the sudden rise of anti-Shia extremism in Pakistan, in a recent article. In it she gave a short history on the provenance of anti-Shia, Sunni extremism in the country that’s worth reading:

Though the first instance of Sunni-Shia tension erupted around 1951 in Sindh, it built up more decisively during the 1980s. General Zia-ul-Haq’s regime looked away while the Anjuman-e-Sipah-e-Sahaba (ASS) took birth in Jhang, South Punjab in 1986. It later turned into the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) that became the mothership of all Deobandi militancy. It gave birth to Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) during the early 1990s, and also the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Ansar, and later Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM).

During counter-terrorism operations by Pakistan, segments from the SSP, LeJ and JeM went into making the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Some members of this even went on to join Daesh. The SSP was also one of the first organisations to fight in Afghanistan. Besides militancy, the organisation also engaged in politics. Its leader, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, initially contested elections in 1988 from a Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam–Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F) ticket, and later formed his own party. Around the time Haq was killed in 1990 outside Islamabad, Pakistan saw a lot of bloodshed, including sectarian violence, through the decade of the 1980s, 1990s, and the 2000s. Like the evolution of its militant wings, the SSP’s political face also evolved. One of its current forms is the group Ahle Sunnat-Wal-Jamaat (ASWJ), which is visible in electoral politics. The SSP and other militant groups are part of the Deobandi network that comprises militant outfits, political groups, and welfare institutions.

The network is so well spread out in the largest province of Punjab that there are over 20,000 staunch Deobandi voters in every constituency, which makes the group important for all political parties and builds their influence. The JUI-F, headed by Maulana Fazlur Rehman, is one of the most prominent faces of the network. It is instrumental in partnering with the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and spreading the influence of Rehman’s network in Sindh and Baluchistan.

I think that’s a good enough bite-size history by Dr Siddiqa on the rise of sectarian extremism in Pakistan.

Below is an election poster of anti-Shia candidates, with my opinion on them.

https://twitter.com/TheseLongWars/status/1314616671018024960

Anyway, here is an interview that Major Amin conducted with Gen Tajammal in 2001 (a couple of years before Gen Tajammal passed away). I am posting it here both as an important historical document and as a window into the mind of someone who was NOT the median Pakistani army officer, but is probably representative of what we may call the “PMA ideal”: an officer who combined professional competence with a Nasim Hijazi level view of history, a PMA-level view of Pakistani politics and a naive but intensely sincere faith in what can only be described as the Chakwal version of Islam. Comments welcome. (I put Major Amin’s words in red, the rest is Gen Tajammal speaking)

Postscript: I have added the full text of an article Abdul Majeed Abid wrote about General Tajammal in the Pakistani newspaper “The Nation” at the end of this interview.. it add more detail to the picture of Gen Tajammal.

Major General Tajammul Hussain Malik

Agha H Amins Note:—

This is the man who was praised by Indians and they established a commission to study his masterpiece Battle of Hilli .He was praised by his Indian battle opponent in his book “Indian Sword penetrates East Pakistan” as a singularly brave man .

He was miles above pygmies like Zia , Ayub and Musharraf. When we joined the army, we were inspired by his battalion 3rd Baloch’s attempted coup of 23 March 1980 to wipe out despicable clown Zia and his dirty clique !

We had to wait till glorious 17th August 1988 when that plane finally crashed right into the Hindu Shamshan Ghat on Basti Lal Kamal !

One good thing that General Beg did immediately after that glorious crash in 1988 was to restore Tajammuls complete military honours and privileges. Tajammul was serving a sentence of 14 years RI for planning to liquidate all army generals and Zia on 23 March 1980, a brilliant scheme indeed !

Tajammul has thrown light on Zias shallow personality in this interview !

May God Bless His Soul !

Major Agha H Amin (Retired)

Maj Gen (Retd) Tajammal Hussain Malik

A.H Amin

September 2001

Please tell us something about your early life, parents?

I was born on 13th June 1924, in village Thanil Kamal, Tehsil Chakwal, then District Jhelum (now District Chakwal). I spent my childhood in rural atmosphere, which at that time was quite primitive. There was no electricity, no roads, no telephones and as far as I remember no one owned even a bicycle. Radio came much later. Men, women and children wore the same dress as their ancestors put on centuries ago. There was not much difference between the rich and the poor. There were no social barriers and the living style of all the inhabitants was almost alike. A village was a self-sustained compact unit. They produced their own wheat, meat, vegetable, rice, ghee, eggs and almost everything one needs for ones simple living. The village shopkeepers were Hindus or Sikhs. Almost all purchases from the shops were on barter system. The prices of agricultural and dairy products were very low: -Wheat was sold at 1 1/4 rupees a maund. (40 Kilo) Meat 1/4 rupee a seer ( Kilo) Milk – 10 seers for one rupee. Pure desi ghee – 1 1/4 seer for one rupee. Chicken weighing one seer for about four annas (1/4 rupee). These rates compared favourably with the rates laid down in “Aaeen-i- Akbari” during the Mughal Emperor Jalal ud Din Akbar’s rule, more than four hundred years ago. Both my father and mother were highly religious. I inherited my religious convictions from my parents.

Please tell us about your school / college days and any decisive influences on your personality formation / development of convictions ?

A common village boy living in rural atmosphere, as mentioned above, could not conceive any high ambitions. I had many relatives in the Army but the highest rank held by any one of them was that of a Subedar, (which was then called Viceroy Commission). In fact, as far as I remember, there was not even a single King’s Commission Officer in the whole of Tehsil Chakwal at that time.  (First IMA course passed out in 1934/35). From village school, I moved to Government High School Chakwal. Lieut General Abdul Majeed Malik and Maj General Nazar Hussain Shah were a class ahead of me. Brig Amir Gulistan Janjua, whose last appointment was Governor of NWFP, was my class fellow. I think if statistics are taken, that rural area High School produced more Brigadiers and Generals than Aitchison College and Burn Hall combined.

What were your perceptions as young man in pre-1947 India about the prevalent political conditions — Muslim League, Congress etc?

The British Indian army was a mercenary Army. Although occasionally we used to read about the political developments then taking place, yet at that time it never occurred to us that the Indian Army would be divided so soon and a new state of Pakistan would come into being as a homeland for the Muslims. It looked a fantasy.

I vividly remember when I was a cadet, I had read an article in one of the magazines, perhaps the Military Digest, wherein, the then Commander-in-Chief Indian Army, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auckinleck, while addressing army personal at some station had said, “In ten years time, you would have all Indian Battalion Commanders, in fifteen years time you would have all Indian Division Commanders, and in twenty years time you would have an Indian Commander-in- Chief.” From this statement it would become evident that the division of Army was never visualised even at the highest level of military hierarchy, nor did the British officers ever thought of vacating their biggest colony so soon. At the most one could say that India might get dominion status in due course of time, but complete independence was still being regarded as a dream

Any memorable incidents, which left an indelible impression on your personality?

I cannot think of any particular instance, which left an indelible impression on my mind. However, by the time I was a Platoon Commander at PMA in 1954/55, my experiences, observations in life, extensive study of books of history, philosophy and religion particularly Iqbal’s book “Reconstruction of religious thought in Islam” and his Urdu poetry had convinced me of existence of God and all that is laid down in Quran. From then onwards I became a dedicated practicing Muslim and started praying regularly which continues till today. Islam is the guiding force for all my actions and reactions. Whether in peace or in war, I drew my aspirations from Islam. I pray to Almighty Allah that may He continue to guide me for the rest of my life.

Motivation for joining the Army?

I joined the Army to earn my living. When I grew up, Second World War was continuing and Army was the best profession at that time. There was no other consideration.

Please tell us something about your life as a cadet?

In 1945, I was selected for pre-cadet College Belgram (Southern India) and after the termination of Second World War in Sept 1945, all the cadets were put through another Selection Board.

In April 1946 I joined Officers Training School at Bangalore (Southern India) and on 16th Feb 1947 I was commissioned in the Rajput Regiment of the British Indian Army. (Late) General Akhtar Abdur Rehman (DG ISI) and Lieut General Jahanzeb Arbab were my course mates, though I passed out senior to both of them in the Order of Merit.

Any seniors, contemporaries who impressed you or were a decisive formative influence during cadetship?None. Experiences as a young Commissioned Officer from the date of Commission till partition?

The training at Officers Training School was aimed at moulding the very outlook on life of the cadets and not just imparting professional military training. After Commissioning, the Indian Officers were expected to behave like their masters in all aspects of their day-to-day life. The result was that in order to become a good officer, one was expected to drink, dance and even speak the Urdu language with English accent. The sooner one adjusted oneself to complete European way of life, the better one’s chances were to be regarded as a good officer.

Good annual confidential reports (ACRs) and even course reports were generally based on the outer personality of the individual concerned and seldom any superior reporting officer tried to find out the real worth of the man. That is why when partition took place, the outlook of most of our senior officers was more British than the British themselves.

Anyone who talked about religion was considered to be a backward type and sometimes even ridiculed in public. There were no doubt some exceptions like General Sher Ali, who took pride in calling himself Muslim and openly preached Islam, but even their way of life was generally very aristocratic and Europeanised.

They could more appropriately be called, “Muslim Elites”.

The best regiments of the British Indian Army were those which had played the most treacherous part against their own countrymen particularly during the war of Independence in 1857 (which was called ‘Mutiny’ by the British and their henchmen) or those which had committed the most savage acts against unarmed Indian masses who had risen in revolt against their foreign rulers from time to time.

Items such as Sultan Tipu’s sword, captured copy of Quran from Ali Masjid during fighting against the Afghans, Regimental flags and various types of weapons belonging to the defeated armies of the Muslim rulers were displayed with pride as trophies in the Unit messes, which perhaps continues till today. A Junior Officer on joining the unit was expected to know all about the history of his unit, which in fact, was the history of treachery and savagery against his own countrymen or that of the fighting against the Ottoman or Afghan Muslim rulers. It never occurred to the young mind, at that time, what a poisonous effect it was likely to have on the development of his real personality.

Please tell us about your service profile from partition till 1958?

At the time partition took place, I was serving as a second lieutenant at the Rajput Training Centre at Fatehgarh in the United Province (UP) of India. In October 1947, a contingent of Muslim soldiers, comprised of four officers and about five hundred other ranks were repatriated to Pakistan. At first we all reported at the Frontier Force Training Centre at Abbottabad. In December 1947, I and another officer were posted to 3/8 Punjab Regiment (now 3rd Baluch Regiment) at Peshawar which was earmarked to proceed to East Pakistan.

In the first week of Jan 1948, we landed at Chittagong by the sea route. I stayed in East Pakistan up till June 1950. It was a wonderful experience. The East Pakistanis treated us with love and affection. I had developed great liking for those people. I wish those feeling had continued but it was our own fault. We treated them as Negroes were treated in the United States of America. We considered East Pakistan as our colony. We had to pay dearly for our follies twenty-five years later.In June 1950, I was posted as GSO-3 in Military Intelligence Directorate, General Headquarters Rawalpindi. About a year later, the Indians threatened to go to war unless we vacated Kashmir.

Liaquat Ali Khan, the then Prime Minister, accepted the Indian Challenge to go to war and showed his famous “Mukka” (fist) declaring “we will break your nose if you dare to cross our borders”. Consequently both the Armies were deployed on the border and occupied their defensive positions. It was a great feeling. The entire nation was emotionally charged and every soldier took pride in being in uniform. We were prepared to revive the traditions of Muslim Armies of early period of Islam. Charged with such feeling I volunteered to go to the front line. I was posted as GSO-3 in 10 Division where I spent about 6 months or so. In early 1952 I was posted back to my unit 3/8 Punjab Regiment, now 3rd Baluch which was still deployed in their battle positions at Gujranwala. I was appointed Adjutant of the Battalion. A few months later, both the countries agreed to withdraw their armies to their peace locations and my Battalion moved to Abbottabad.

In October 1954 I was posted as Platoon Commander at PMA. Towards the end of 1955, I passed my Staff College examination and in 1956 I attended the Staff Course at Staff College, Quetta. After the termination of Staff Course I was posted as GSO-2 to the Commandant, where I stayed upto the end of 1958.

You served in former East Pakistan as a young officer in early 1950s and saw Ayub as a GOC. How would you describe Ayub at that time as a professional, a person and a senior?

General Ayub of 1948 was quite different to what he became after proclaiming Martial Law in 1958. In those days, his living style was very simple. Most of the time he used to be attired in Khaki bush-shirt and trousers at all functions, formal or informal. He had only one grey suit, which he wore in summers and winters. He used to get his uniform stitched from our unit tailor. I never saw him wearing blue patrols or any other expensive suit other than what I have said before. I had developed great liking for him. In those days I had considered him an ideal soldier.

I changed my opinion about him completely when he became the President of Pakistan or even a few years earlier when he started indulging in politics and accumulation of wealth and property.

He had known me personally and soon after he became Commander-in-Chief in 1951 he had accepted my invitation to attend a private tea party. At another occasion in 1952, when I was a company commander at Chakdara, he accepted my invitation for a lunch when he was on his way to Dir with an entourage of about 8-10 other officers.

I still have his autographed photograph, which was sent to me framed in a silver frame through his Military Secretary, when I was a Military Attache in Turkey. I passed on that framed photograph to my elder son Naveed Tajammal who still likes him whereas I had changed my opinion about him after he became the President of Pakistan.

What are your impressions about the British Officers who served in the Pakistan Army after partition?

I carried good impression about them. Major General Hill, who was our Adjutant General and Brigadier Rhodom, who was Director of Infantry used to go to their offices on bicycle and so did some other British officers, who were holding key appointments in General Headquarters.

The then Commander in Chief, General Gracy used to go to his office in a small Hillman car and from C-in-C House to General Headquarters if he saw any soldier in uniform going on foot on his way to GHQ he used to stop his car and tell him to “Hop in” and carry him up to the gates of GHQ.

Most of British Officers could be trusted for their word and standard of integrity. No doubt they had social values of their own but that was part of their own culture. On the whole they conducted themselves as good ambassadors of British Nation.

Please tell us more about your tenure as an instructor at PMA and the standard of training at PMA as you saw it in the 1950s.

When I joined PMA, Brigadier Pigot was the Commandant of the Academy. He had been the Commanding Officer of General Ayub, when the latter was a junior officer in one of the Punjab Regiments, perhaps old 1st/14 Punjab. His living style was very austere and was a highly dedicated soldier. He expected the same standard from the Platoon Commanders and the cadets. Since he had been Ayub Khan’s Commanding Officer, no PSO (Principal Staff Officer) or any other Pakistani senior officer, could dare interfere in his training programmes nor he was prepared to accept any dictation from General Headquarters. He had his own style of training the cadets and he continued to do so up to the time he left the Command sometime in the middle of 1955 and returned to England. Even on the day he was leaving he inspected the unit lines and the classes and sent a note to the Adjutant to send instructions to the officers concerned to put the things right wherever he found anything wrong.

Almost every platoon commander judged his cadets by his own standard of integrity, honesty and moral values. Some of the very good cadets were thrown out because they could not be judged properly by their platoon commanders. Whereas some of the low grade cadets were brought to high position by their platoon commanders on the basis of sycophancy and deceitfulness thus laying the framework for the future.

I generally found most of the West Pakistani Platoon Commanders rather biased towards the East Pakistani Cadets. I personally had very sympathetic feelings for them, perhaps because of my early stay in East Pakistan. After their repatriation to Bangladesh out of the six East Pakistani Cadets in my Platoon, four became General Officers.

How was regimental life like in the period 1947-1965.

When Pakistan came into being, we had no industry which could provide material for soldiers’ uniform or other military equipment. Even socks, boots and cloth for uniform used to be imported from England. Kikar thorn was provided in packs from the stationary depot in place of common pin. Paper, pencils and every item of stationary had to be imported from abroad.

Indo-Pak war of 1948 in Kashmir was fought under these conditions. The present day Azad Kashmir was due to the sacrifices of those unknown heroes who had to carry on the fight under most difficult conditions. When the ceasefire was ordered in 1948 they were thoroughly disappointed. For, they were convinced that had they been allowed to continue to fight they would have captured Srinagar within a few months.

The old theory that it is the man behind the gun and not the gun that matters literally proved true in the Indo-Pak war of 1948 fought on the soil of Kashmir.After a few years, the conditions had slightly improved, in that, indigenous industry was installed to meet our partial requirement of arms and equipment. Towards the end of nineteen fifties, under mutual agreements and pacts, American Aid started pouring in, which provided free arms, heavy weapons and equipments to all the three services; Army, Navy and Air Force.

By 1965, Pakistan Armed Forces had become a hard hitting force capable of destroying any army twice its size at any place and at any time.Regimental life for the first ten years or so was still preferred over staff appointments. In all other aspects it remained more or less the same as it is today. I personally found it fascinating. We all lived like family members and the relationships developed during that period continue till today. Most of officers were dedicated soldiers. They served in the Army more for honour than for monetary benefits. With the passage of time, gradually standard of integrity, honesty and moral values degenerated.

Please tell us something about the standard of training in the Army in the period 1947-58 and 1958-65 i.e. how would you compare both the periods in terms of improvement or decline, standards set or achieved and level of professionalism?

From 1947 up till 1958, Pakistan Army was a small Army but highly competent and dedicated to the profession. We had very simple living but took pride in the profession and being men in uniform. Therefore, all its efforts were concentrated on professional training and loyalty to the Constitutional Government. However, after the proclamation of Martial Law in 1958, its priorities changed. Martial law changes the very outlook of a soldier towards his profession or his duty to the state. Loyalty to Ayub Khan and the ruling junta was given the top priority whereas training in the Army and its obligation to the State were relegated to the second position. Our senior officers started indulging in accumulation of wealth and building palatial houses. The higher leadership was mostly incompetent.

Thus the seed for the disintegration of Pakistan was sown. And after about ten years or so it resulted in the break-up of Pakistan in the 1971 war. Had we not lived under martial law from 1958 onwards and remained a professional army, as in the past, I have no doubt that we would have decisively defeated the Indian Army both in 1965 and 71 wars.

Please tell us about the political perceptions that you formed in the Pakistan of 1947-58?

In 1948, my unit 3rd Baluch was in East Pakistan. Then Major General Ayub Khan was the local Log Area Commander. Another unit of that formation was a battalion of the Frontier Force Regiment, perhaps the 8th FF Regiment. That was the total force under the Command of General Ayub. He very frequently used to visit the combined Unit Officers Mess and informally spend the evenings with the officers like our Commanding Officer. One day during informal conversation he said, “Before partition anyone who had a bit of brain preferred to join the services. They either got commission in the Army or joined Class One Civil Services. Only junk was left behind.

When partition came, Quaid-i-Azam couldn’t find better people and he had to pick up political leaders from amongst the available junk and dished out high appointments to anyone who came in the way.” That showed General Ayub’s contempt for the politicians even at that time. And to some extent this impression had its effect on other officers also. I, as a young officer at that time, also thought that perhaps he was right but with the passage of time I realised that even if he felt that way it was not proper for him to say so in the presence of junior officers. For, it amounts to spreading hatred against the constitutional government. And, Pakistan then being a new state could not afford such criticism to prevail.

In fact, one of the main reason why democracy could not take roots in Pakistan was that the Army had started indulging in Politics in the very early stages of its creation. The first Martial Law was proclaimed at Lahore in 1953. And the first constitutional government of Khawaja Nazim ud Din was dismissed by Governor General Ghulam Mohammad in 1954 with the connivance of General Ayub Khan, then C-in-C Pakistan Army.

On the other hand in India, General Cariappa, the first C-in-C Indian Army, when on completion of 3 years term, was offered an extension refused to accept such an offer, saying, “If the Indian Army cannot produce a Commander-in-Chief to replace me, it is not worth its salt”. Consequently, India remained safe from Martial Laws.

It is worth mentioning here that Mr Winston Churchill, British wartime Prime Minister who apart from being a great statesman and a National Hero was also a great intellectual and a great historian, had once said, “Democracy is not the best form of Government but no better system has yet been evolved.”

Please tell us something about your experiences as a student at the Staff College Quetta, the standard of instruction, any instructor who particularly impressed you etc?

This course forms an essential part of an army officer’s career. The standard of training at Staff College, Quetta compares favourably with any other Staff College in the world. It has a very fine library and instructions imparted are of a very high standard. The course I attended had about 20 foreign students and about 60 Pakistanis. It no doubt serves as a foundation for further promotion to higher command. I have nothing more to add.

Please tell us about your service profile from 1958-65?

After completion of my staff course in 1956, I was posted as GSO-2 to the Commandant where I stayed up till the end of 1958. In early 1959, I was sent to the United States for a course at the Infantry School Fort Benning. In July 1959, I returned from United States and was posted as company commander to my unit 3rd Baluch. In Oct 1960, I was posted as Brigade Major 104 Brigade at Sialkot.

In Jan 1963, I was selected for Turkish language Course and after undergoing preliminary training for about 4 months at Karachi I was sent to Turkey for advanced Language training where I stayed till the end of 1963. In early 1964 I was posted as 2nd in Command 21 Baluch where I stayed for nearly a year and a half and was then posted as CO 3rd Baluch in July 1965.

How was the experience in Turkey?

I went to Turkey, for the first time, in 1963 to attend the Turkish language course wherein I got First Class Interpretership. In October 1966 I was posted as Military Attache and stayed there for three years. Since I knew the language very well, it became easy for me to study their history and the reasons for the rise and fall of Turkish Empire. It was a fascinating study for me. For, since its foundation in 1288, the Turkish rulers had carried the banner of Islam for more than seven hundred years. Instead of fighting against the Muslim rulers in the East, they had expanded their empire towards Europe in the West and Russia in the North.

By the end of 17th Century almost the whole of Eastern Europe, major portion of southern Russia and entire middle-eastern Muslim countries formed part of the Ottoman Empire which continued to remain under their influence upto the beginning of First World War in 1914. During the First World War the Arabs had betrayed the Turks and Istanbul was occupied by the Allied Armies. Consequently, the Turks developed a hatred towards the Arabs. After 1918, the Turks carried out War of Independence under the leadership of Attaturk Mustafa Kamal Pasha and established present day Turkey as an independent state.

Though as a Nation, they carried out the War of Independence as a Jihad against the Christians, yet Mustafa Kamal and his close associates harboured hatred against the Arabs. By 1928, in the name of reforms he tried to obliterate the influence of Islam from the Turkish State and changed the written Arabic script into Latin and compelled everyone to put on European dress. Even Azzan in Arabic was banned and translated into Turkish.

The Army became the custodians of the reforms and that conflict still continues. A vast majority of Turks are dedicated Muslims and have very good feelings towards Pakistan. In 1965 war, the Prime Minister of Turkey had ordered all the resources of Turkish Armed Forces be placed at the disposal of Pakistan and anything they need must be immediately provided. Since both the armies were equipped with American equipment, planeloads of ammunition and equipment were sent to Pakistan to meet our requirement.

Throughout my stay in Turkey, I felt as if I was at home. I with my family travelled throughout the country, and at no stage I ever felt that I was in a foreign land.

Please tell us something about your experiences as CO 3rd Baluch in 1965?

On 17 July 1965, I took over the command of 3rd Baluch, the Battalion I had joined as a second lieutenant after repatriation from India where I was serving in the Rajput regiment since my commissioning on 16th February 1947. Immediately after assumption of command I started intensive training. In about a month and a half the battalion was fully trained for war. Chamb operation had started on the 1st of September 1965 but the troops at Lahore were carrying out normal peacetime training till 4th of September.

On 4th of September, I held my battalion ceremonial parade and in the afternoon there was a basketball competition. On 5th morning a TEWT (tactical exercise without troops) was to be held and instead of going to the exercise we were suddenly called to the Brigade Headquarters and ordered to move to our allotted defensive positions astride GT road on Wagha Sector.

We were specifically ordered not to leave the unit lines before midnight 5/6 September. From my unit lines to Batapur bridge was about 14 miles, which my Battalion had to cover on foot. At about 6 o’ clock on 6th September, my companies had reached their allocated position extended over a distance of about 5 miles astride the GT Road. My right forward company had just reached its position on both sides of the BRBL canal when the Indian Army attack started. I had hardly taken off my pack when I received a message from the Brigade Major 114 Brigade that India had attacked Pakistan and captured Wagha and Gawindi post on Burki Sector and was advancing towards Lahore.

It was my first experience of war and it is a fact that I felt highly thrilled. A little later, about half a dozen Indian planes flew past towards Lahore. The Indians had started their advance with 15th Indian Division consisting of 4 brigades on Wagha Sector and 7th Division less one Brigade on Burki Sector. Obviously Wagha sector was comparatively more important from the Indian point of view because the Grand Trunk passes through it and after reaching Shalimar gardens they could get on Mahmood Booti Road and capture Ravi bridge without going through the built up area of Lahore City. This would have sealed off Army reinforcements to the beleaguered troops in Lahore Cantonment who were, in any case, not yet ready to go into battle.

Most of the divisional artillery units and 22 Brigade, which was in reserve, were doing their normal PT parade on the morning of 6th September when the leading Indian troops had started their attack on our positions on BRBL canal. A major portion of Lahore garrison officers heard the news about the Indian attack when they were having their breakfast in the messes or in their houses. This was the state of preparedness of 10th Division, who were responsible for the defence of Lahore, on the morning of 6th September, I called up my depth companies to fill up the gaps in the defensive area.

We fought that battle without trenches, without defensive minefield and without barbed wire in the defensive positions when the Battalion was pitched against a division of 4 brigades. If I go into the details of the narrative of the battle of 6th September, it would become very lengthy. The area between the BRBL canal upto Ravi bridge was all empty. The two leading enemy tanks were destroyed by one of our anti-tank guns firing from behind a bullock cart. Both sides were surprised in this battle. We were not expecting enemy attack because we were moved only as a precautionary measure with only the pouch ammunition and not allowed to even dig our trenches till the time the positions were visited by the Brigade Commander or the GOC.

The Indians were surprised to find the BRBL occupied by Pakistani troops who had started firing on the Indian advancing troops. They were expecting that the canal would be empty, whereas on reaching there they were confronted by every type of fire. In those days, our defensive battle concept was in three layers; the first layer, the second layer and the resistance zone each 2000 yards apart. They perhaps thought that they had reached the first layer positions and they had yet to face the second layer and resistance zone.

Instead of pressing their attack to capture the bridges across the canal they decided to halt the advance with sporadic firing and carry out proper canal crossing operation at night. By the evening we had considerably strengthened our positions and were ready to face the challenge.

Till today I call it a miracle. For, had the Indians succeeded in capturing the Batapur Bridge that morning, Lahore would have fallen latest by 11 o’clock that morning and General Chaudry, the then C-in-C Indian Army would have celebrated their victory in Gymkhana Club over a peg of whisky, as promised to his officers, on the eve of the battle.

The narrative of the battle for the next seventeen days is a long story. By 10th September, we were ready to resume the advance on the Indian soil, but because of the incompetence and cowardice of the higher command we could not do so and when the war ended the Indians were in occupation of about 240 square miles of our territory beyond the far bank of the BRBL canal.

Our armoured division offensive on Khem Karan sector had also got bogged down. Indian war correspondent Kuldip Nayar in his book “India’s Critical years” has described a very interesting account of Indo-Pak battle in Lahore-Khem Karan sector wherein he states that when our Armoured Division offensive started in Khem Karan sector, the Indian C-in-C General Chaudry ordered General Harbash Singh, Commander Western Command to withdraw his troops behind Bias river. General Harbash Singh refused to comply with the order saying he would not withdraw his troops but would instead fight the battle from his existing defensive positions. General Chaudry retorted, “You do not know the capabilities of Armour” implying that he could not comprehend the power of an Armoured Division. The Sikh General replied saying that “In war it is the courage that matters and not the technical knowledge”. By doing so, the Sikh General saved India.

Had our attack succeeded, the Indian Army would have suffered the same defeat as Arab Army had suffered at the hands of Israelis in 1967 war. Here again our higher leadership failed to carry the battle to a successful conclusion.After the end of the war, in order to hide their weaknesses and the public criticism, instructions were issued by the General Headquarters to destroy the war diaries so that, at some later stage, if any commission of inquiry was appointed to examine the conduct of war, no record of their incompetency could be produced as evidence.

You have asserted in your book that many gallantry awards were awarded in 1965 on the basis of citations and personal reasons rather than on actual ground realities. What is the basis of this viewpoint?

My personal experience of both the Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971, has convinced me that it is very difficult to draw a distinction between the fighting capabilities of individuals while engaged in a collective action by giving awards to some and leaving others who had done equally well. In fact this creates more discontentment than fostering harmony amongst comrades in arms.

For example, award of Nishan-i-Haider to Aziz Bhatti on Burki Sector was based on a completely fictitious citation.

And I can say with confidence that at least eighty percent of the awards in both the wars were completely bogus. In 1971 war I had commanded 205 Brigade in Hilli Bogra Sector. Major Akram, Nishan-i-Haider was in my brigade. That brigade received more than 50 SJs & TJs, the highest number of awards in that war.

No one knows better than I do, that those awards were just dished out at random only because I was continuously being pressed from Eastern Command to send the list of gallantry awards. For, my brigade was the only brigade which continued to hold its position to the last days before the ceasefire and when the war ended the fighting was still going on in the streets of Bogra and I had refused to surrender.

Please tell us something about your service profile from 1965 to 1971?

After 1965 war, I was selected for posting abroad as a Military Attache in Turkey where I stayed from Oct 1966 to Oct 1969.

In November 1969 I returned to Pakistan and took over the Command of 54 Brigade at Sialkot. I remained in Command of 54 Brigade for about 2 years and in October 1971, I was posted to General Headquarters as Director of Staff Duties. In November 1971, I volunteered for service in East Pakistan and was posted to East Pakistan as Commander 205 Brigade at Bogra.

How was the standard of training in the Army in the period 1965-71? Was there any improvement as compared to the pre-1965 period.

I cannot comment much upon it for the period 1966-69 because in that period I was away in Turkey but on return to Pakistan in October 1969 and assumption of Command of 54 Brigade, I put the entire Brigade through tests as laid down in training Directive by GHQ and on completion of the tests I sent a report to the GOC 15 Division saying, “The entire Brigade units are unfit for war”.

The then GOC, General Abdul Hameed, called me in his office and said, “I have seen your report. My Division is as well or as badly trained as any other Division of the Pakistan Army”. Instead of appreciating it, he appeared to be a little sarcastic. I told him that I meant no aspersions on his Command and that I had sent him the report so that he should know the correct position about the operational fitness of my Brigade. Anyway that did not bother me and I started the training as I wanted to. It had been my practice throughout my career that I always did what I thought was right irrespective of the fact whether it was liked or disliked by my superiors. I was quite used to such rebuffs.

I have always maintained that only those officers who have learnt to command with confidence and obey with self-respect can bear the heavy strains of war.

You volunteered for service in the East Pakistan when many people already thought that it had been lost. What were your reasons for doing so?

In Oct / Nov 1971, I was holding the appointment of Director Staff Duties at GS Branch, General Headquarters. I used to see reports of at least 30 to 40 own troops being killed everyday. One got the impression that if that state of affairs continued, East Pakistan would slip into Indian hands.

I am a devoted Muslim and I became very emotional. I sent a personal letter to Brigadier Baqar Saddiqi, Chief of Staff Eastern Command, who was an old friend, saying we would not let East Pakistan become Spain in the History of Islam. In those days, officers posted to East Pakistan often used to remain on “Sick Report” or got themselves admitted in Hospitals. The MS had to issue a letter throughout the Army saying that in future posting to East Pakistan would not be cancelled on the grounds of admission in hospitals. The officer would have to move to East Pakistan even on stretcher and if it was a genuine case he would be admitted in hospital in Dacca.

Regardless of the prevailing situation I asked for interview with General Hameed, then Chief of the Army Staff and requested him for posting to East Pakistan for command of a Brigade. He highly appreciated my volunteering for service in East Pakistan and in a few hours my posting order was issued by the Military Secretary to take over the command of 205 Brigade at Bogra.

Please tell us something about your experiences as a brigade commander in the East Pakistan in 1971?

The battle of Hilli Bogra sector in 1971 war can rightfully be regarded as a classic example of defence in the history of warfare. Against my one brigade, Indians had deployed four infantry brigades i.e 202 Brigade, 66 Brigade, 165 Brigade and 340 Brigade, one armoured bridge i.e 3 Armoured Brigade, 471 Engineer Brigade and two artillery brigades augmented by 33 Corps Artillery, yet when the war ended on 16th December, the battle was still going on in the streets of Bogra. The Indians could not succeed in breaking through that sector till the very end.

If I go into the details of the battle, it would become very lengthy. The Indian General, Major General Lachman Singh in his book, “The Indian Sword Strikes in East Pakistan” described this battle in detail. He has devoted at least two chapters on it. After the war the Indians had sent a team of experts to study the battle on the ground and determine reasons why such a heavy force as described above could not break through that sector till the end.

You have stated in your book that atrocities were committed by many units / individuals in East Pakistan. You have also stated that you tried to curb these. What was the extent / magnitude of the alleged atrocities vis-a-vis alleged atrocities committed by the Mukti Bahini.

I took over the command of 205 Brigade on 17th of November 1971 and about 4 days later the Indians had started the attack on our positions. During the period of my command, on one occasion, it was reported to me that one of my units 8 Baluch had captured about 8 civilians. The brigade headquarter was informed for their disposal. I was told that as a routine all such persons who were captured were to be shot without any investigation. I passed orders that in future no such shooting would take place unless I had seen them myself. When I visited the unit, they produced them before me. As I was meeting them, one of them fainted. The CO of that unit said, he is malingering. On further inquiry I found out that they were not in fact ‘muktis’ but were the local people working in the fields, grazing cattle. I ordered that they be released.

I learnt through many other officers that during the earlier operations against the Mukti Bahinis thousands of innocent people were killed.

In one of my defensive position at Santahar, large number of people were massacred. General Tikka Khan & Lieutenant General Jahanzeb Arbab had earned their reputation of being Butchers of East Pakistan. So were many other Brigadiers and Generals. Mukti Bahinis too, may also have done so in retaliation but it was very negligible as compared to the atrocities committed by the West Pakistani troops against the East Pakistanis.

Despite the fact what we had done to them, I personally found the local people very sympathetic towards us. In fact after the war, when I was moving from Bogra to Naogaon to link up with 13 FF of my brigade, I and a team of another officer with 17 other ranks were captured by Mukti Bahinis and the locals who not only saved our life but put bandages on the wounds I had sustained during the process of my capture.

How would you sum up the root cause of the failure in East Pakistan from the pure military point of view?

We had enough resources in way of equipment and manpower to continue the war at least for six months. There was absolutely no justification for surrender. It was, perhaps, the guilty conscience weighing heavy on the minds of the Commanders, who had committed atrocities during the cleaning up operations. Had General Niazi and his team of Generals and Brigadiers decided to stand and fight, the Indian Army would never have succeeded in reaching even the fringes of Dacca. Even in the Hamood ur Rahman Commission it has been brought out that there was no justification for surrender. I do not consider it necessary to go into further details. For, it will become very lengthy.

We understand that you refused to surrender in East Pakistan. Please tell in detail what you felt about the whole issue.

Hilli Bogra sector was the only sector where Indians used an Armoured Brigade. For, in December the terrain represented the plains of Punjab. As I said before in this sector the Indians used 4 Infantry Brigade, one Armoured Brigade, one Engineer Brigade, one Mukti Brigade and yet could not break through this sector to the end and when the war ended the fighting was still going on in the streets of Bogra.

The Battle of Hilli Bogra received the maximum publicity through the world media. I was mentally attuned to resist the Indians in the same manner as I had done on Wagha Sector in 1965 War. I could not conceive of surrender. On 15th and 16th December, when Bogra was surrounded from all sides, I was moving about in the battle area in my jeep, with the flag and stars uncovered, and announcing on the loud speaker, “We shall fight from the rooftops, the windows and in the streets but we shall not surrender.”

SPECIAL NOTE FOR THE READER FROM MAJOR A.H AMIN (RETIRED)

The reader should not form fallacious conclusions here and also compare the above battle with another battle below in 1971 where Indian Armys three battalions repulsed and held four Pakistani infantry brigades :–

THE POWER OF DEFENCE IN WAR

ALTHOUGH 66 BRIGADE FORMED A LODGEMENT OF 3000 YARDS THE INDIAN 191 BRIGADE FRONT REMAINED INTACT Battle of Chamb 1971 THREE BATTALIONS STOP FOUR INFANTRY BRIGADES- PAKISTANS 111 BRIGADE INFAMOUS IN REMOVING MICKEY MOUSE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENTS WAS TOTAL FAILURE ONLY LATER IN THE BREAKTHROUGH IN CHAMB- SIMILAR LAURELS WERE ACHIEVED BY 66 BRIGADE AND 20 BRIGADE-THE INDIANS LOST CHAMB ONLY BECAUSE OF THEIR OWN INEFFICIENCY IN NOT HAVING THE MINEFIELD BETWEEN JHANDA AND BARSALA BECAUSE OF INDIAN GHQs FAILURE IN NOT PASSING TIMELY INTEL

(The power of defence in war January 1999)

I was inspiring them with the Quranic Ayat that a Muslim soldier does not surrender on the battlefield. Anyone who turns his back will go to hell. I could see that almost everyone whom I addressed was prepared to die. They responded to my speech with slogans of Allah Ho Akbar. It was most thrilling scene.

These words, which I have uttered, were later confirmed in the Indian Books published after the war. Some of the excerpts I would like to quote here. General Palit, in his book, “The Lightening Campaign” had said, “In Hilli Bogra sector the Pakistani troops fought for every inch of ground.”

Dr Monkakar in his book “Pakistan cut to size” had said, “the Battle of Hilli was the toughest battle of Indo-Pak War”, General Aurora, GOC-in-C Indian Eastern Command, in his interview with the Illustrated Weekly of India, published in 1973 had said, “The battle of Bhaduria (which was fought within Hilli Bogra sector) was the bloodiest battle fought in East Pakistan”.

General Lachman Singh in his Book, “The Indian sword strikes in East Pakistan” described the battle in this sector in great detail. He was a brave general, who had the courage to praise his opponents. He admired my fighting capabilities and went to the extent of saying, “Most of the senior officers preferred to surrender as soon as a threat developed to their Headquarters or their lives. Brigadier Tajammal was the only exception in my sector. He showed fanatical will to fight even at the cost of his life. I was happy to take him prisoner. I was glad to learn that he was the first senior officer to be promoted by the Pakistanis out of those who had surrendered in Bangladesh.”

He almost wrote my ACR, wherein he said, “when in all other sectors, Pakistani troops were laying down arms, a group of officers and JCOs came to him and advised him to surrender. He refused to do so. He was no doubt a very brave and capable commander. He was in fact, prepared to die rather than surrender on the battlefield. His troops followed his example and resisted till the end.”

In fact he said much more than what I have said. I have only given a brief gist of it. Imbued with such a spirit how could I possibly think of surrender. The examples of Muslim commanders in the history of Islam who had fought against overwhelming Christian armies were ringing in my ears. At that critical moment those examples became a source of strength for me to continue to fight till the end.

Was the failure in East Pakistan related to Niazi’s incompetence or also to the Pakistani GHQ’s poor initial planning and assessments which dated to the period before the 1971 war broke out?

General Niazi had a brave record of service. In the past, whether during the Second World War as a company commander or in the 1965 War as a Brigade Commander, he had fought for mundane gains as a mercenary soldier.

He is not the type who was guided by spiritual or moral convictions. In East Pakistan had he decided to stand and fight, he would have created example of bravery and dedication to the cause of Islam surpassing many Muslim commanders of the past.

He would have been compared favourably with Musa Bin Ghasam who had refused to surrender in the last Battle of Granada (Spain), wherein at the time King Abdullah and his cabinet were laying down arms against the enemy forces of King Fernandez and Queen Isabella, he mounted his horse, drew his sword and broke through the enemy lines who had surrounded the palace. In this process he was so heavily wounded that his dead body was found on the riverbank about 20 miles away.

I do not entirely blame him. Most of the senior Brigadiers and General Officers at that time were brought up in mercenary traditions and they were fighting for mundane gains. At the time when final surrender took place on 16th December, there were about 4 other Generals, one Admiral and about 30 Brigadiers. They could have forced him not to surrender, had anyone of them had the courage to do so.

In all armies of the world, it is the inherent right of a soldier to refuse to lay down arms on the battlefield. Field Marshal Manstein in his book, “The Lost Victories” had said “No General can vindicate his loss of a battle by claiming that he was compelled against his better judgement to execute an order that led to defeat. In this case the only course open to him is that of disobedience for which he is answerable with his head. Success will usually decide whether he was right or not.”

Any Pakistani field commander who impressed you in the 1971 War?

To be frank, none, both in East and West Pakistan. I have the greatest regards and respect for some of the soldiers in the lower ranks who refused to surrender at the risk of their lives. The two examples I have quoted in my book, “The Story of My Struggle” that of Naik Sarwar Shaheed and Havildar Hukumdad who fought till the end and when their ammunition was exhausted they were called upon by the enemy to lay down arms but they refused to do so. Naik Sarwar Shaheed died on the last day of the Battle, when I had ordered my Brigade to break out to Naogong in small groups.

The Indians had given him a ceremonial burial as a mark of respect for his bravery. Naik Humkumdad had become Shaheed on the 13th or 14th of December when about 80 men of his company had already become shaheed and his own company commander, Maj Sajid, been taken prisoner by the enemy. The Indian Major putting pistol on the chest of Maj Sajid ordered him to tell Hukumdad to stop firing. Complying with the orders of the Indian officer, Maj Sajid told Hukumdad to stop firing. In reply Hukumdad said, “Sahib, Apna ammunition mukai bathi ho, meray pass abhi doo magazine baki hein” (You have apparently exhausted your ammunition, I am still left with two magazines full of ammunition.)

Brigadier Sadiq Salik in his book, “Witness to Surrender” has described this action in detail. I cannot think of any such example from amongst the senior officers, both in East and West Pakistan, who risked their life to such an extent. For, after the fall of Dacca, our Senior Commanders in West Pakistan had the option to continue the war had they so desired. In the past in all our operational planning for the defence of East Pakistan, we had been saying, “If Indians Capture Dacca we will capture Delhi and that the defence of East Pakistan lies in West Pakistan.” When the time came and East Pakistan was occupied by the Indian troops, Pakistan Army in West Pakistan could not capture even Amritsar or Jammu. In fact they very eagerly accepted the Indian offer of ceasefire. At that critical moment, none of them had the courage to stand up and say, “No we will not accept ceasefire. We will fight till such time we capture a big chunk of Indian territory, at least, the size of East Pakistan” Had they done so there would have been no need for our 96,000 prisoners of war to remain in Indian camps for about 2 1/2 years.

How was the PW experience in India?

For an honourable soldier, becoming a prisoner of war is most humiliating. After the war when we were being gathered in a camp at Bogra, I had the opportunity to address my officers. I said to them, “Sometimes a tiger can also be trapped in a cage. Now that, unfortunately, you have become prisoners of war you should behave like a tiger in the cage.”

There must be many officers who though have retired from service can bear testimony to my last address to them uttering these words. At one occasion when we were being brought to the Prisoner of War Camp at Barelli, and we were passing through the Bazars of Barelli city, which was predominantly a Muslim town, I could see from their faces that they were looking very morose. I, too, felt very humiliated on seeing such a scene. I said to myself that perhaps, it would have been better if all of us had died on the battlefield fighting the enemy rather than face such humiliation.

I am sure many other junior officers and other ranks must have felt the same way but I could not see such impressions on the faces of senior officers of my own rank.

Please tell us something about your service profile from repatriation till retirement in 1975-76?

We returned from the Indian prison of war camp in April 1974. All POWs had to be thoroughly screened before sending them back to their units. A committee of Inquiry headed by Lieutenant General Aftab had already been formed to examine each case. We were told to submit reports on our experiences during the war and for the period we stayed as prisoners of war.

I gave a very candid report guided purely by the dictates of my own conscience. As a result of the finding of the committee of inquiry, a considerable number of officers of rank of Generals, Brigadiers, Colonels and below were retired / dismissed from service. All those who were cleared by committee of inquiry as fit for retention in service were posted to various units / formations at different stations. I took over the Command of 22 Brigade at Lahore in June 1974.

A few months later, a special selection board for promotion was held at GHQ and I was lucky enough to be the only one out of 32 Brigadiers from the entire Eastern Command, who was approved for promotion to the rank of Major General. On 25th November 1974, I assumed the Command of 23 Division at Jhelum.

What actually happened when you were GOC 23 Division and allegedly made a draft plan to overthrow Mr Bhutto’s Government?

When General Zia ul Haq’s name was announced as the new Chief of Army Staff towards the end of February 1976, it came as a very big surprise throughout the country. He was the junior most Corps Commander and had not shown any extraordinary brilliance either in peace or in war. In fact, his past was quite obscure and not many people in the Army had known him.

On the other hand most of others who had been superseded such as Late Lieutenant General Akbar Khan, Lieutenant General Azmat Baksh Awan, Lieutenant General A.I. Akram, Lieutenant General Aftab Ahmad Khan and Lieutenant General Abdul Majid Malik all had distinguished service.

Even Lieutenant General Mohammad Sharif, though promoted to the rank of a General and made Chief of Joint Staff was in a way superseded because that post carried almost the same constitutional powers as late Chaudry Fazal Elahi had as President during Mr Bhutto’s regime, perhaps, even less than that because Chaudry Fazal Elahi was at least the constitutional head whereas Chief of the Joint Staff was not even the Constitutional head of the Armed Forces.

The three Services Chiefs came directly under the Minister of Defence who was the Prime Minister himself.General Zia had hardly been in command of the Army for about a month when on 24th March 1976 he suddenly appointed a team of five new Corps Commanders and their names were announced on the radio.

On that evening, there was a social function in the garrison officer club. I came back to my residence at about 2200 hrs and after saying my prayers went to bed. An hour or so later, I received a telephone call. I picked up the phone and the Chief of Army Staff, General Zia ul Haq was on the line. He said, “Have you heard the news”. I said “No Sir”. He said, “You stand superseded”. I said, ‘Who has been promoted’. He named Iqbal, Sawar Khan, Chisti, Ghulam Hassan and Jahanzeb Arbab. I said, ‘I would like to have an interview with the Prime Minister’. He said, ‘You can do that’. If I correctly remember, he said that I would be required to come to Pindi on 30th of March to attend a conference and during that period I could also see the Prime Minister. That was the end of our conversation.

I must be frank in saying that I felt very upset about it. I had not expected that. I never claimed to be a genius nor had any misconception about myself but I knew the capabilities of my contemporaries, particularly those who had been promoted. After all we belonged to the same Army and I had by then put in about 30 years service. It is a long time to get to know each other very well.

The peculiarity about these promotions was that except for Jahanzeb Arbab, who had been superseded earlier because of having been found guilty of embezzlement of huge amount of money while in East Pakistan by a Court of Inquiry, headed by Major General M H Ansari but continued to remain in an officiating Command of a Division with the rank of a Brigadier for nearly two years upto as late as February 1976 when he was promoted to the rank of a Major General, all others were those who were on staff in GHQ.

Major General Iqbal was doing as Chief of General Staff, Major General Sawar Khan was Adjutant General, Major General Chisti was Military Secretary and Major General Ghulam Hassan was Director General Military Training. The Division Commanders that is to say myself, Major General Akhtar Abdur Rehman, Major General Fazal e Raziq, Major General Mateen, Major General Ch Abdur Rehman, Major General Jamal Said Mian, Major General Amir Hamza (DG Civil Armed Forces), Major General Wajahat Hussain (Commadant Staff College) were all superseded.

After the appointment of Chief of Army Staff, about a month earlier, this was the second big jolt in the Army.It is a part of my character that I do not accept defeat so easily particularly when I feel that I have a right cause. I had followed this practice throughout my career. Therefore, on 25th March when I went to my office I started drafting my representation.

It is also true that it came to my mind that in case the Prime Minister did not do Justice I would use force to get Justice done. Somebody had to stand up and say, ‘Enough is Enough. Don’t make Pakistan Army a private Army. There ought to be some Justice’.

I was, perhaps, the only Division Commander who was in position to do that quite easily. Rawalpindi was only about 70 miles away and I could complete the entire operation of taking over the Government in a couple of hours on any night. I did not have to discuss the matter with anyone else.

My method of Command was such that whereas I allowed complete freedom to my subordinates to point out any weakness in my personal conduct both official and private, I knew that no one could question the authenticity of my orders if I had so decided. However, so far this idea was only in my mind and I had not taken any practical steps in that direction.

On 25th or 26th March, I called my Colonel Staff (retired as Major General) Mohammad Aslam Zuberi to my office. He had been a cadet in my platoon when I was a platoon commander in the Pakistan Military Academy in 1954/55.

He was in upper term when I took over the platoon. To me he appeared to be quite sensible and a good person. I thought he was being unduly victimised and that if properly guided he had the making of a good officer. In September or October 1955 he got his commission and I never met him, thereafter, till he was posted as my Colonel Staff in 1975.

I was very pleased to see him on that post. He used to say, “I tell others I owe my existence in the Army to General Tajammal, otherwise I would have been on the streets” which in fact to a large extent was true. It was primarily because of my support that he was given commission in the Army. Quite naturally I had complete confidence in him.

I started telling him that I had such a good record of service both in peace and war that it could never cross my mind that I would be superseded and that I intended to put up a representation to the Prime Minister. I also gave him an inkling of my intentions. I told him that I had dedicated my life for the cause of Islam and that I had no desire for the accumulation of wealth and property or even for higher promotion except with the ultimate aim of establishing a truly Islamic State on the pattern of Khulfai Rashideen.

I think I gave him the example of China and said that if an athiestic state could create an almost classless society why could not a truly Islamic state provide, at least, same kind of socio-economic justice to its people if not better. As he was from the Corps of Signals, I asked him if he could provide me with the necessary information on the communication set up in the country.

I did not discuss any other details with him as to how and when I intended to carry out my plan. I could never imagine that my Colonel Staff would betray me. The same evening he went to Rawalpindi and reported to Corps Commander and then perhaps to Chief of Army Staff, General Zia ul Haq that I was planning to overthrow the Government.

The next morning I was informed that I was required to attend a conference at Corps Headquarters / General Headquarters on 28th March. Accordingly I went to Rawalpindi that morning and occupied a room reserved for me in Apprentice School at the Mall.

If I go into more details about what happened during the inquiry which lasted for five days, it would become very lengthy. The detailed account of that interview is given in my book, “The story of my struggle”.

In conclusion, I would say that on 3rd April 1976 I was told to come to Chief of Army Staff’s office. As I entered that office General Zia ul Haq, flanked by four Lieutenant Generals, Sawar Khan, Ghulam Hassan, Chisti and Ghulam Jilani donned in their ceremonial dresses were all sitting in a manner as if my trial was going to start. In their peculiar way they put to me almost the same questions, which had been put to me during the inquiry, and they got the same answers, which I had given them earlier.

What was the need for the big five to assemble in such a manner, I still do not understand. It was certainly not in keeping with normal procedure known in the Army. This drama lasted for a short time and then General Zia ul Haq said to me, “I have decided to retire you. The higher one goes the harder one falls. You are a fanatic.” Legally there was no justification to retire me from service.

During the inquiry, which I have already mentioned, nothing incriminating was found against me. However, after announcing his decision about my retirement, General Zia said to me that I would be given about 5 days to bid farewell to the units and formations of my Division and that my retirement would become effective from 8th April 1976.

Immediately after my retirement orders were issued, a letter was sent by General Headquarter from the Chief of the Army staff to the Formation Commanders to be read out to the Garrison Army Officers at various stations throughout the country stating that General Tajammal had been retired from service because he was planning to overthrow the Government and create an Islamic State.

On 8th April my Divisional Officers arranged a farewell lunch for me at the Divisional Officers Mess. That was the last day I wore the uniform.

How is that many officers including you, Amir Hamza, Saadullah etc who were praised by Indian Military Commanders like Lachman Singh were not promoted to Lieutenant General rank in the Pakistan?

It is not proper for me to say so, but the fact remains that to the best of my knowledge the Indians have not praised any other senior Pakistani commander except myself in their books or otherwise in a manner as I have been. As regards my own promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, it was mainly because General Zia ul Haq had seen my conduct during the Division Commanders conferences expressing my view very candidly. He, therefore, thought that he would not be able to control me. He selected a team of ‘yes men’ who were more docile and prepared to accept his command without any hesitation.

My record of service at that time showed that I was the only one in the Pakistan Army who had been graded “OUTSTANDING”, as a Brigadier, in his last Annual Confidential Report. My last ACR as a Division Commander was graded “Above Average” by the then Corps Commander Lieutenant General Aftab Ahmad Khan, whereas from amongst my contemporaries Lieutenant General Faiz Ali Chisti and Late General Akhtar Abdur Rehman were adjudged on the lower side of the “Average” grade.

What do you have to say about the assertion that sycophancy and timidity plays a major role in promotion to higher ranks in the Army?

To a certain extent promotion through sycophancy has been experienced in almost all armies of the world. That is why Field Marshal Rommel of the German Army had to say, “Those who do no more than supinely pass on the opinion of the seniors are placed on the top whereas many others with high merits are placed on the shelf”. In our Army, Field Marshal Ayub Khan since he became Commander-in-Chief in 1951, made sure that only those people were promoted to higher ranks, who proved their personal loyalty to him rather than loyalty to the state.

He did so because he had the ambitions of becoming the Head of State from the very beginning. As I said before, he had a contempt for the politicians and with the passage of time he went on getting extension of his tenure till he finally took over in Oct 1958.

From amongst the senior officers anyone who expressed his opinion against the Army indulging in politics was immediately retired. Some of the very capable generals who had passed out from Sandhurst were superseded when General Musa was appointed Commander-in-Chief. Now that he is dead, it is not proper for me to pass any remarks against him but I have no hesitation in saying that he was a typical Gorkha Soldier, who had learnt to obey the command of their superiors whether right or wrong. The junior officers following examples of the seniors, had also learnt that perhaps sycophancy, rather than professional capabilities, was the only criteria for attaining the higher command.

Exceptions are always there, but as a general practice many good officers who would have become very good Generals could not go beyond the rank of Lieutenant Colonel because they were intellectually and professionally far superior to their seniors and always expressed their views without any hesitation whenever and wherever required.

Commanders who attain the higher ranks through following the path of sycophancy soon crumble in the face of danger and cannot stand the test of battle fatigue. That has been an inherent weakness in our Army, which perhaps continues till today.

• What were your impressions about Zia as you saw him in the Army tenure?

I had not intimately known him before he became the Chief of the Army Staff but from his conduct during the Divisional Commanders Conferences, he appeared to me an incompetent and low grade officer.

In one of the Division Commanders promotion conferences, I even saw him sleeping with his mouth open.

He surpassed all limits of sycophancy when meeting the Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. While in uniform, he used to bow when shaking hands with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

I remember my old Brigade Commander, Brigadier Hayat, with whom I served as his Brigade Major, once told me that he had written in Major Zia ul Haq’s ACR when he served under his command, “Not fit to go beyond the rank of a Major”. It is an irony of fate that a person of such a calibre had ruled Pakistan for a long period of eleven years till he was finally killed in an air crash.

Please tell us something about your retired life from 1976 till you were arrested for conspiring to overthrow Zia’s Government?

At the time I was retired from service on 8th April 1976, I had not acquired even a residential plot to build my house. At the farewell lunch on that day addressing the divisional officers, I had said, “I made you work very hard during the period of my command but you all know that I underwent almost equal amount of hardship myself. As far as possible I always tried to practice what I preached. I did not recommend your applications for acquiring residential plots or getting loans for building houses. Now that I am retiring I can tell you that I have so far neither acquired a residential plot nor built a house to live in. I can also tell you that I will not seek a job and I have no doubt that my Creator would provide me with sustenance as He has done in the past. I then read a Quranic Ayat from Surah Hood for which translation is, ‘There is no moving creature on Earth but its sustenance dependth on God. He knowth the time and place of its definite abode and its temporary deposit. All is in a clear record.’ I can look into your eyes and say that I am leaving with a clear conscience, God be with you”. With these words I bade them goodbye and that was end of my army career and I started preparing for new struggle in life.

Sometimes it is easy to make such like emotional speeches but later on it becomes difficult to live upto it when confronted with the ground realities of life. I had decided in my mind to adopt a political career. Being a devoted Muslim, I made my first contact with Maulana Madoudi who was a great Muslim Scholar and the founder of an Islamic religious movement. After frequent meetings with him when I had gained his confidence, I discussed my plans for an Islamic revolution with him. He assured me his full personal support. In Early 1977 General Elections were held and during that period I developed good working relationship with Air Marshal Asghar Khan and Maulana Mufti Mahmood who was then Chairman of the National Alliance Movement. In July 1977, when General Zia ul Haq proclaimed Martial Law, I tried to convince these top class political leaders not to co-operate with Zia Ul Haq, for, I knew that he was a deceitful person. However, though outwardly some of them agreed with me yet inwardly they continued to establish contacts with Zia ul Haq for grabbing their share of power. In Oct 1979, when General Zia ul Haq postponed the elections for an indefinite period, I formed my own Islami Inqalab Party and issued a comprehensive manifesto for it. Formation of local government at District level, abolition of Commissionaires and Provinces was part of my manifesto.

What actually happened in 1980 as a result of which you were arrested along with many officers of 3rd Baluch including your son and nephews?

As I said before, soon after my retirement from service I started working for an Islamic Revolution. I tried to gain the support of major religious parties such as Jamaat-i- Islami, JUI, Khaksar movement and many other small religious groups. In March 1980, 3rd Baluch, the unit which I had joined as a second lieutenant and had the honour to command in 1965 war, was moved to Rawalpindi for 23rd March ceremonial parade. My son Naveed Tajammal was the Adjutant of the Battalion. My nephew Zafar Iqbal, who had been my ADC, was a company commander. My wife’s nephew Mansoor Saeed, was Adjutant of 1st Punjab Regiment, the battalion employed for guarding the President House. I thought it was an opportune moment to organise a coup d’etat. Unfortunately, about 24 hours before the H-hour, one of the officers, Lieutenant Colonel Gillani, who formed part of the team leaked out the information to Lieutenant General Mujeeb ur Rahman, who was then Secretary Information and very close to Zia ul Haq. Consequently, on night 5/6 March 1980 I was arrested and confined at the State Guest House on Mall Road Rawalpindi under very heavy Army guard. If I go into details it would become very lengthy. I have explained this episode in detail in my book, “The Story of my Struggle”.

What was the influence of Zia’s one man rule on the Pakistan Army in the period 1977-88?

As I said earlier on, according to his record of service as a junior officer, he was not considered fit to go beyond the rank of a major. However, as the saying goes, when fortune begins to smile there is no end to it. He attained those heights, which perhaps he had never dreamt of. There is no doubt that he was highly deceitful and cunning. He exploited Islam to perpetuate his rule. He always selected team of generals who were very loyal to him. He succeeded in prolonging his rule for eleven years mainly because of Russo-Afghan war. The Western powers, especially United States, gave him everything that he wanted, in way of financial support and military equipment. The Army requirement was fully met. Quite naturally they remained contended. He used the Army to suppress the political opposition wherever it occurred. The senior commanders, who served under him, were intoxicated with power and were not bothered for restoration of democratic institutions. Consequently, in August 1988 when he died in Air Crash he took away a team of about 30 Brigadiers and Generals who were most loyal to him, along with him. And the country had to make a new start for restoration of democracy and fundamental rights.

During his eleven years rule his main concern was how to prolong the rule. Preparing the Army for war was of secondary importance to him. Most of the senior officers took advantage of his military rule and accumulated wealth and property as much as they possibly could. During his period of rule, corruption in the Army was at its peak. As a matter of fact it always happens when there is prolonged military rule.

In conclusion I would say that during General Zia ul Haq’s rule, the general opinion of the people was that Pakistan Army behaved more like an “Occupation Army” rather than a “National Army” which, perhaps, to a large extent was true.

Please tell us something about your life after release from prison in 1988.

Immediately after my release from prison in Oct 1988, I took part in the general elections then being held for a National Assembly seat from Chakwal District. Many political parties offered me a ticket, but I decided to go alone on the basis of my own manifesto for Tehrik-i- Inqalab-e-Islam. Though I could not win the elections, yet I left a very good impression on the minds of the people for a change in the existing colonial system. For a new idea, it always takes time to take roots and I thought I had succeeded in making my limited contribution for bringing about a change and abolishing the colonial heritage.

How would you compare the Pakistan Army of 1965 with that of 1971 and that of 2001?

The test of an Army is the battlefield. In 1965 war Pakistan Army, as a whole, did extremely well upto Lieutenant Colonel level. Most of the senior officers, in the higher command proved to be utter failure. I have always maintained that the Pakistan Army can defeat the Indian Army, twice its size, at any time and any place provided it is led by dedicated and professionally competent commanders. This factor was lacking during 1965 war. At that time we had achieved Air superiority, our tanks, artillery guns and other military equipment was far superior to that of the Indian Army. What we were lacking was good leadership at higher level. I am convinced that if we had taken bold action at Lahore and Khem Karan Sectors, we could have trapped entire western command in the same manner as the Israelis did to the Arabs in 1967 war. In 1971 war we had done badly both in East and West Pakistan. I have already described that despite adverse conditions in East Pakistan we could continue to fight for at least six months and in West Pakistan there was no justification for a ceasefire. The Indians captured Dacca but we could not take Delhi as we had been boasting before the war started. The standard of Army during 1965 war was much superior to that prevailed during 1971 war. For the past 30 years, Pakistan has not gone to war. I am, therefore, not in a position to comment on how they would fight if a war is thrust upon us.

What do you have to say about the theory that Pakistan should have a people’s army on the model of PLA of China.

I have always advocated that the entire nation should be armed and there should be regional territorial armies. But that is possible only, if our rulers come out of their palaces and start living in three bedroom houses and travel in small cars. There should be very little difference between rich and poor. Jagirdari system should be abolished and no single family be allowed to keep more than two or three squares of land. All the industry be nationalised and employees become the shareholders. There should be only one syllabus for education so that rich and poor have equal chances in the field of competition for all type of services. We should have a comparatively small army but highly proficient and hard hitting. They should be kept away from politics and concentrate on professional training. If Pakistani nation can be organised on these lines, I have no doubt that they can take Kashmir in a short span of time and can occupy a very honourable position among the comity of nations. This is not an empty dream. It is possible to achieve if we can find dedicated higher leadership to do so.

What in your opinion damaged Pakistan the most in terms of political leadership in the entire history of Pakistan from 1947 to date?

From the very beginning, Pakistan was ruled by the landed aristocracy and rich business class. Consequently, though technically Pakistan had become independent, British colonial ruling system continued to prevail. The common man drew very little benefit from it. After eleven years of democratic experience, Army took over the control of running the country’s administration. It is a lesson of history that military rule does more harm than good to the country. It destroys all the progressive institutions and runs the country like a unit on yearly training programme basis. Had Field Marshal Ayub Khan not proclaimed Martial Law in 1958, perhaps with the passage of time, the political forces would have reconciled and both East and West Pakistan would have continued to exist as one country.

How would you describe your political life?

I have already described my political activities in detail since the day I retired from service on 8th April 1976. I still remain committed for an Islamic Revolution through constitutional process by moulding the public opinion. It is a slow process but I have no doubt that sooner or later Pakistani nation will realise that its salvation lies in following the path of democracy and implementation of Islamic values in every walk of life. God forbid, if at any stage anyone tried to make it a secular state, it would amount to disintegration of Pakistan.

What is the future of the religious parties in Pakistan?

I have very closely studied the working of almost all religious parties and in my view they are neither likely to unite nor produce any tangible results in winning elections. The main reason being that unlike Iran they remain divided for selfish reasons. However, there is a ray of hope if the existing political conditions prevail for the next 5 -10 years there is a possibility that a Taliban type movement based in Afghanistan may take over the government through force of arms. About 80% of the common people of this country will welcome such a move. For, they have yet not been able to free themselves from the shackles of slavery of landed aristocracy and the bureaucratic elite.

What is the likelihood of an extremist coup in Pakistan?

I do not visualise any military coup d’etat from any quarter of Armed forces. For, Pakistani nation is “fed up” of military rule, be it in benevolent form. In any case, military coup d’etat cannot carry out revolutionary changes because of its inherent weakness of not lowering their own standard of living to the level of a common man.

What is the solution to Pakistan’s political problems?

Ever since the inception of Pakistan, British colonial system of administration continues to prevail till today. There is a need to abolish the provinces and make the whole of Pakistan one unit and completely eliminate the feudal influence in the rural areas throughout the country. Only then real democracy can take roots and flourish. The present military Government’s attempt to establish local governments at District level is a splendid idea but it is not likely to produce any tangible results mainly for the reason that those employed at the National Reconstruction Bureau are either not aware of the ground realities or not competent enough to implement the decisions taken at Federal Government level. General Patton had said, “Issuance of orders and devising plans is 5% of command responsibility, 95% is to ensure that these are implemented correctly.” Consequently, throughout the country, corrupt and incompetent candidates mostly from the landed aristocracy and rich business class have succeeded in securing the post of District and Tehsil Nazim. As and when the Provincial and National Assembly elections are held only those candidates will succeed who have the support of these Nazims. Having closely witnessed the local bodies elections in a district of Southern Punjab and read reports on the elections in other parts of the country I can say with confidence that unless remedial steps are immediately taken, the grand scheme of reforms widely publicised through the official media of building up democracy at grass-root level will ultimately end up in a fiasco.

What is the future of Indo- Pakistan in the geo-political sense.

Because of its ideological commitments, the future of Pakistan will have to be considered in isolation from India. The two countries cannot possibly adopt a joint policy for defence and foreign affairs. The inherent ideological differences between the two nations cannot be removed. At the most we can live peacefully as good neighbours if Kashmir problem is resolved but there are remote chances for it. Consequently, our relations with foreign powers will have to be on one to one basis, governed by self-interests. I, personally, cannot think of any other solution to it. Had there been any possibility of living together, there was no need for partition of Indo-Pak subcontinent and creation of independent Muslim state.

Any message that you would like to deliver to the  readers of this interview

I have already conveyed my candid views through this interview. I do hope that the readers will be able to draw some useful lessons from my personal observations and experiences for a period covering more than 50 years or so.

Post Script: The General we Deserved (by Abdul Majeed Abid)

This article first appeared in “The Nation” Pakistan in 2015. 

The trajectory of nations hinges upon particular moments, moments of wonder, or madness, or bravery, foolishness, missed chances and fulfilment of Dreams. Pakistan was dreamt up as a unique country with Muslim majority in the subcontinent where Islamic laws and practices could be implemented without any untoward impediments and where Muslims could live happily ever after. Objectives Resolution was a landmark development but it was criticised and kept out of the body of Constitution by conniving secularists. A ray of hope emerged in the late 1970s in the form of General Zia. He was an honest man, intent upon providing an Islamic legal framework to the country. There was however, another military man who could have done an even better job, only if he had succeeded in his plans.

Major General (Retired) Tajammul Hussain Malik was a distinguished soldier of the Pakistan Army and his name has unfortunately been wiped clean from the slate of our history. For the sake of posterity, General Tajammul penned a book of his impressions and thoughts, titled ‘The Story of My Struggle’. Browsing through the pages of his book, one marvels at the thought process of the author and is dismayed at the failure of his plans. Gen. Tajammul let it be known at the outset that “The declared aim of the founder of Pakistan was to make the country an ideological ‘Islamic State’ but ever since its inception, every successive government followed a colonial system inherited from our British masters. Consequently democracy, autocracy, socialism and Islam, all were exploited by the privileged classes to perpetuate their rule in one form or the other. Our real destination for an Islamic state which could provide socio-economic justice to everyone still remains a cherished dream.”

He joined the Indian Army in 1946 as a Cadet and was involved in Pakistan’s wars against India in 1965 and 1971. Apart from being an excellent soldier, he was a practicing Muslim (a rarity in army of that era). During his stint as Military Attaché in Turkey, he found Maulana Maudoodi’s books and was highly impressed by them.

In March 1976, he was superseded for the post of Lieutenant General. He described the incident in the following words: “It is a part of my character that I do not accept defeat so easily particularly when I feel convinced that I have a right cause. On 25th March, I started drafting my representation to the Prime Minister. It is also true that it came to my mind that in case the Prime Minister did not do justice, I would use force to get justice done. Somebody had to stand up and say, enough is enough. Don’t make Pakistan Army a Private Army. There ought to be some justice. Rawalpindi was only 70 miles away and I could complete the entire operation of taking over the Government in a couple of hours on any night.

I knew no one would question the authenticity of my orders, if I had so decided.”

The impulse to seize the reins of power in times of adversity highlights the bravery and leader-like quality in the General. But like most successful generals and rulers in Islamic history, he was betrayed by a trusted friend. He narrated the incident thus: “On 26th March 1976, I called my Colonel Staff to my office. I started telling him that I had such a good record of service both in peace and in war that it could never cross my mind that I would be superseded, and that I intended to put up a representation to the Prime Minister. I told him that I had dedicated my life for the cause of Islam and that I had no desire for accumulation of wealth and property or even for higher promotion except with the ultimate aim of establishing a truly Islamic state on the pattern of Khulafai Rashideen. I gave him the example of China and said that if an atheist state could create an almost classless society, why could not a truly Islamic State.” His Colonel Staff informed military’s top brass about this conversation.

Major General Tajammul was summoned by General Zia to his office. During his stay at the Officers Mess in Rawalpindi, Gen. Tajammaul made another mistake that perhaps sealed his fate. During a conversation with Major General Akhtar Abdul Rehman (who had also been superseded), he jokingly made a remark about a coup d’état to sort this out. Following an internal enquiry, he was forcibly retired from service. He wanted to take part in active politics but he had to wait two years for that. He initially talked to Jamaat-e-Islami but they were not enthusiastic about giving him the control that he wanted for a separate wing of the party. He then joined Asghar Khan’s Tehrik-e-Isteklal.  He was soon fed up with the party because it didn’t conform to his ideas of an Islamic State.

In August 1979, he published the outlines of the Manifesto of ‘Islami Inqalab Party’. He was “convinced that the socio-economic reforms I had suggested would be highly welcomed by the poor masses, and a vast majority of middle class from every walk of life.” He only needed some time to “visit the slums and rural areas all over the country to personally contact the people and explain my views to them”.

Unfortunately, the elections in which he planned to take part, never happened, courtesy his old boss, Zia-ul-Haq. He decided to stage a coup against Zia’s ‘Illegal and Un-Islamic Military Dictatorship’. The plan was “to strike on night of 5/6 March 1980, when all Corps Commanders were scheduled to be present in Rawalpindi. Zia was to be taken alive and made to record a message at the pistol point. The gist of the message was to be that General Zia was handing over power to the Revolutionary Command. The message was to be put on the air first thing the next morning. This message was supposed to be followed by Chairman of the Revolutionary Council [Gen. Tajammul].” The plan reached the ears of Gen. Mujib-ur-Rehman, Zia’s Secretary Information, leading to arrest of all people involved in the plot. Gen. Tajammul was charged by Court Martial and sentenced to ten years rigorous imprisonment in 1980.  He was released in 1988 though.

Being the genius revolutionary that he was, he ended his book with a diagnosis and solution to Pakistan’s current problems: Implementation of ‘True’ Islam. He wrote “Islamic system can’t be enforced unless the existing Colonial system which we inherited from our British masters is completely abolished. To achieve that, there must be a movement for an Islamic Revolution at the national level preferably through the election process after every two years or with clearly defined manifesto.” Unfortunately, this prescription hasn’t been followed till now. He was the General we deserved, not the General we got.

LG Asad Durrani views and my two cents in red.

Regards,

Hamid 

The Same Page Saga

Lt Gen ® Asad Durrani

The Chief of Army Staff in Pakistan is not just another head of service, nor is he, strictly speaking, a “chief of staff”; the designation that the late Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto believed would deny the man on the horseback the clout to take over the Country. His assumption went ruefully wrong when Zia-ul-Haq, his handpicked COAS, not only putsched but also hanged him. In ‘Pakistan Adrift’, an account of my journey through the corridors of power, I have tried to assess the military’s role in the Country’s polity and an army chief’s special status in the power matrix – in which he often played the ultimate arbiter. For people like me therefore the commotion over the present incumbent’s service extension in the last week of November came as no surprise. The following chronicle however is not about any technicalities of the issue at hand, but about the algorithm of this game of thrones.

The three-year tenure for a four-star general, and for his naval and air-force equivalents, was Zia’s idea. And, it had its Machiavellian logic. Since he intended to hang on for a long time; to provide some consolation to those waiting in line, he created another four-star office, that of the Vice Chief Of Army Staff – to be rotated every three years. Musharraf also found this arrangement helpful and promoted a few to this exalted office to keep the promotion ladder moving. The problem was that unless a COAS took over political power, he too was restricted to this limited stint

Aslam Beg, Zia’s successor, knew that President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, known to be a stickler for rules, would grant him no extension. He therefore sounded out a few quarters if he could be kicked upstairs, preferably as the Chief of Defence Staff: a concept that was considered sound but could not be implemented since the Army would not accept any impediment to its powers. GIK however was not impressed. Beg’s successor, Waheed Kakar, (? Beg’s successor was General Asif Nawaz Janjua) was beseeched by Benazir Bhutto in her second incarnation to continue after his three-years in office. Kakar refused as it would have deprived the next man of his chance.  (Kakar’s this action and fading completely out of public view after hanging his boots elevated his respect.  This was despite his direct involvement in a high profile ‘food fight’ between Prime Minister and President.  Kakar was below average cadet and was relegated a term at Military Academy Kakul.  He worked hard during his professional career as well as had less inclination for intrigue.  He would have retired at LG rank but for divine intervention in 1993 with sudden death of COAS.)

KAKAR WAS A MIDGET IN EVERY WAY, PHYSICALLY AND IN CHARACTER.HE WAS ON RECORD ACCUSED OF BEING PARTY BAAZ AND PAROCHIAL BY GENERAL MUSHARRAF IN HIS BOOK . BIASED AND A SMALL MAN HE MOST UNJUSTLY PREMATURELY RETIRED THIS SCRIBES COMMANDING OFFICER AS HE HAD SHOWN CHARACTER AND REFUSED TO DOWNGRADE THIS SCRIBES ANNUAL REPORT AS THE MIDGET WAS PRESSURISING. THIS SCRIBE IN TURN HAD REPRESENTED AND GENERAL ASLAM BAIG HAD GIVEN A SEVERE DRESSING DOWN TO THE MIDGET. CANT CALL THIS MIDGET A MAN WHO HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH PRINCIPLES.

ITS HARD TO RATIONALISE THAT MIDGET RETIRES AN OUTSTANDING COLONEL STAFFOF 41 DIVISION JUST BECAUSE HE HAD SHOWN CHARACTER IN 1987 AND THIS OUTSTANDING OFFICER SERVES AS COLONEL STAFF IN ISI FOR 6 MORE YEARS !

Jehangir Karamat who followed him resigned (I think correct term will be early retirement.  As I understand, if an officer resigns his commission, he forfeits his pension and other post-retirement benefits.  If he takes early retirement, he keeps all these benefits.) a few months before his term was to end, but before that I had a little exchange with him. My view was that since the Country had only recently gone overtly nuclear, someone like JK with his deep understanding of the new complexities was best suited to head the Joint Staff Headquarters to put the nuclear doctrines in place. Karamat however was not interested. The next Army Chief who had to get his stint extended by an elected chief executive was Ashfaq Pervez Kyani. He secured a full second term because Zardari and Gillani, the President and the Prime Minister respectively, never cared for any institutional restraints. What did Imran Khan have in mind when he granted a three-years extension to the present incumbent?

Let me reminisce a bit.

When heading the ISI in the early 1990s, I got a message from Imran the cricketer that he needed help to take some foreigners (all housewives as it read), to our Northern Areas. After consulting the local commander, I agreed. He didn’t avail of this opportunity nor did I hear from him – till he came over to my house in early 1998 to invite me to join his party. I had to politely decline, but offered advice if it was ever needed on matters I had dealt with. Soon thereafter, India exploded a few nuclear devices and IK sent some members of his team to seek my views. He personally was against our responding in kind but accepted my suggestion that we had to carry out a few tests of our own. What persuaded me to attend some of his subsequent council meetings was that he publicly stated that his change of heart on the nuclear issue was because of an “expert’s opinion” (no one had heard of U-turns at that time, which in any case would have been the wrong description). Of course, I could not continue for long because Khan hardly listened to anyone even in his core group.

But then I was not the only military man who was taken-in by IK. Hamid Gul once told me that he intended to groom Imran for politics. No idea why the project was abandoned, but I do recall that Pervez Musharraf too once suggested that Khan could become a brand to market Pakistan.

i am surprised at this extremely naieve manner in which durrani has analysed Imran- as early as 1990s , i would say 1991-93 articles were published in pakistan army journal idolising imran khan as pakistans future leader and possibly prime minister.

now pakistan army journal is pakistan armys official journal and nothing is published in it without clearance from all levels including military intelligence. (A.H Amin)
Since the ISI at the time had only heard of branding herds in the Wild West, I could not follow-up. Musharraf however got a chance after he became the Chief Executive, but soon jettisoned Imran in favour of the Chaudhries. Khan thereafter went all guns blazing against Musharraf and called him a fake (doe numberia in our lingo).

Imran thus comes across as a person who may pander to the high and mighty for his interest, but would drop them as hot potato when they had served their purpose, or turn his guns against them if they could not. Benevolently, he could be described as pragmatic: taking U-turns, like granting extension to an army chief, an act that he was once opposed to, as a policy; being honest – he does not even posture to be the Prime Minister; and indeed for having no qualms about following the Military page by page.

When the pro and contra arguments on the extension business were at their peak in the Supreme Court, there were a few anxious voices, also from some of the ex-servicemen—who had earlier celebrated the government’s extension decision with such gusto that one suspected the alternative was a civilian as the next army chief—that now the honorable course for Bajwa was to make an exit. Not knowing him, I do not know why he didn’t, but I do know there are serious implications in accepting extensions. Some are known: denying someone else his rightful turn; and sending an unhelpful message that no one else in the queue was up to the job. Others, lesser known, are more serious: the beneficiary loses respect within the institution; and it tempts some others to suck up to their political bosses to get selected or extended – say as army chief. (This is correct assessment and in my own interactions with many officers, most hold the same view.  Power has its own dynamics and ethos.  Senior officers are not monks but fallible human beings.  Un-restrained power has a very corrosive effect.  Contrary to the traditions left by British as well as common practice of most professional armies, there is too much pomp and show and quite lavish modus operandi practiced by COAS.  Hundreds of souls at GHQ, COAS secretariat and army house fulfilling every wish, sycophant attitude of even senior officers and a private jet to fly around. This invariably goes straight to the head.  Ambitious lower middle class chap’s start to think that they were destined to be put in temples and worshipped.  It may not be a bad idea to just look how Israeli Chief of Staff works and live.  Some senior officers play their own little Byzantine intrigues and that is matter of bed time stories for another time.)

Maybe a word or two about the laws that might be made as ordered by the Apex Court. Whatever would be decided regarding the tenure or a possible future structure—creation of a Chief of Defence post, for example—was better put in practice for the coming generations. If the present office holders were to become the beneficiaries, the exercise would be seen to have been influenced by the powers that be.  (we already have Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) foe higher direction of war.  The post has become a consolation prize for a senior army officer who missed on COAS slot.  This is causing a lot of resentment among sister services.  Any way the post is purely ceremonial in its present set up.  I recall a joke when General Muhammad Sharif was appointed first CJCSC by Z. A. Bhutto.  One old JCO came to congratulate him and said: “Mubarak ho sir.   Aaap Pakistani fauj key sadar Chaudhry Fazal Elahi ban gai hein”.)

And lastly about a chance encounter I had a few months back with the man at the center stage of the High Noon Drama in the Supreme Court. I asked the Chief Justice if the Judiciary and the Military were now on one page—as the late highly regarded Sahibzada Yakub Khan used to suggest could be the best remedy for Pakistan. “No, we’re trying to do our bit all on our own”; adjudicated the Honourable Mr. Khosa. And, so it turned out to be.

(Annoyed mule gave a parting kick.  It was not to the head causing a fatal injury but has hit the knee very hard.  General Bajwa will be lame for the rest of his career; whether 6 months, one or three years.  However, it is not the person but fall out for the army that I’m concerned.  When General Bajwa accepted extension in August 2019, I wrote that with this decision, he has taken the institution into a rabbit hole.  This is the first act.  Now, a slippery slope as far as army is concerned.  With well-intentioned but completely in-disciplined Prime Minister house means that army must do everything.  It must rope in allies as well as cajole, bribe & threaten all opposition parties and that will not be a pretty site.  More importantly, it finally dawned on the army that Chief Justice chair does not preside over only cases showing doors to Prime Ministers but can topple the biggest god in the temple of Somnath at Rawalpindi.  This means adding another portfolio to ISI and MI workload.   If a mild-mannered Chief Justice can deliver such a kick, just imagine what an angry Qazi F. Isa can do in 2023?  Looking at the optics of just first week, where General Bajwa attended the cabinet meeting, one wonders whether he is not listening to some saner advice or no one daring to utter even few words of common sense.  He was standing in a pile of mud with only boots soiled. Rather than carefully moving, he decided to march left-right splashing it all over the uniform.

“As far being a General; at the age of four with paper hats and wooden swords we were all generals.  Only some of us never grow out of it”.   Romeo & Juliet by Peter Ustinov

Warm Regards,

Hamid) 

Major Amin: my father was CC Engrs 4 Corps and on 4 July 1977 iqbal khan gathered all officers and congratulated them that an agreement had been reached

I interviewed brig imtiaz warraich —-

You were Commander 111 Brigade in 1977. Please describe in detail all that you saw, and all the actions connected with Zia’s military takeover on 5th July 1977?

Brig Warraich: 111 Brigade is located in West Ridge Rawalpindi and was under command Headquarter 10 Corps. Lieutenant General F.A Chishti was the Corps Commander. This operation took place on the night of July 5, 1977 resulting into the imposition of martial law.General Mohammad Zia ul Haq the then COAS became the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Normally a question is asked as to how early were you as Commander 111 Brigade taken into confidence. My answer is only a few hours prior to the commencement of the operation on night July 5, 1977.

I recall that about fifteen days earlier I had requested for one month leave to prepare for my war course. Initially the leave was sanctioned but after three to four days I was recalled. In retrospect, gives an impression that at higher level this contingency might have been considered much earlier. I also recall that two three days prior to this operation Zia remarked that negotiations between the government and PNA are reaching a dead end and the situation is likely to worsen .I spontaneously remarked “Sir, if they are given some more time Sihala Parleys might see some tangible results”.On my uncalled for remarks the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) was startled and uneasy. Later I learnt that due to an element of uncertainty a major general was called and the impending operation was not changed. It appeared that the new incumbent was either not considered exuberant enough for the task in hand or due to shortage of time status quo was accepted.

On the fateful night at about 11:30 P.M, Chief of Staff 10 Corps personally came and conveyed the orders to me. There was a danger of civil war situation emerging, therefore, army had decided to intervene and take the higher political leadership both of Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) into custody. Names of eleven leaders from PPP mostly Federal Ministers and nine senior leaders from PNA were identified who were to be brought to Officers Mess, Headquarters 10 Corps Chaklala.

Within half an hour on receipt of the orders I held my orders group (O Group).On night July 5, 1977 I had six infantry battalions under command, four of my own and two ex 23 Division Jhelum, which were already there on Internal Security Duties in Rawalpindi. The principal task that we were required to perform was to constitute about twenty parties each headed by an officer with six other ranks, each to escort one VIP/Leaders from their residences to Chaklala. Guard Battalion 6 Baluch at PM House was to remain in location without any task. There were many other duties for which units were earmarked but these were not of great consequence.

We discovered that most of the ministers were living in Islamabad. Officers and men who had gone to escort them found it very difficult to locate their residences. Luckily within the stipulated time we were able to bring all the leaders of both parties to Chaklala.I may point out that all junior officers and men were given explicit orders to remain very respectful and courteous to the senior politicians and ministers, hence, no untoward incident took place.

When the task was accomplished by 0330 hours and all leaders had assembled in Headquarters 10 Corps, the army chief General Zia spoke to the ex Prime Minister on telephone that he had imposed Martial Law in the country therefore,Prime Minister would be escorted to Murree at seven O’clock in the morning. I may point out that during the whole operation no officer or troops entered the PM House and no disturbance was caused.

When I recall the events I find that when the morning came bigger people took over the charge and we once again were absorbed in our humble daily routine. During the subsequent years as we observed that a grand political manipulation commenced. Self- aggrandisement efforts to acquire most powerful jobs became the order of the day on part of most senior generals, some eminent politicians and technocrats. National interest as usual took the rear seat and was of secondary importance.

Zahid Zaman Brig: I am following the very interesting discussion about the imposition of martial law. I was acting gso1 16 div since Jan 1977 and involved in Balochistan operations. On April 26 we were ordered to move to Karachi where a local ML had been imposed. I moved with a small party from Temple Dera now Dera Murad Jamali reaching Karachi early morning 28 April.  Through a court order,these MLs were lifted in May 77. The GOC Late Lt Gen SM Abassi was called to GHQ we moved to Quetta in early June. On morning 5th July I was told that a Top Secret document has arrived to be collected by an officer from the signal centre and it was done. The document was the agreement likely between the govt and PNA. While still studying and reading the agreement,I was told to personally go and receive a flash signal. I got it, and it was the order imposing martial law. The rest, as they say, is history. 

Major Shahid Rahman: Zahid Zaman, Sir,  it was decided much earlier by the then COAS, Gen Zia, that he wanted to remove Bhutto. The Late Maj Gen Abdullah Malik, who had been our Bde Comd in East Pakistan, and was CGS in 1977, used to live close to my place in Islamabad after retirement. I had also joined the company he had raised with  Brig Mian Mahmud in the 1980s. 

He used to tell us, that from April, 1977 onwards in every meeting the Chief would be ridiculing  PM Bhutto, and making gestures to see how many of his generals are of the same mindset as himself. 

If I remember correctly, he told me, a meeting in April, 1977 in GHQ was the defining moment, when the Chief indicated, ‘we should be ready ‘..

We still don’t know,  what really happened which made Gen Zia  make a Uturn on Bhutto…

[11:24, 7/18/2019] Zahid Zaman Brig: I agree with. In May77, there was a naval cadets passing out parade in their academy. Gen Tikka Khan,who was the defence minister was to be the chief guest. The GOC asked me if I had been invited and gave an affirmative to that. He told me to accompany him along with my wife. I had been allowed to bring my wife to Karachi. We were to leave early as the GOC said the bridge connecting the mainland will be removed after 0800 hrs. In the evening while discussing the days happenings,Gen Abassi said let us skip the passing out and let Gen Tikka take his last salute. This was a clear indication to me of things to come. Any way once ML in Karachi was lifted, the GOC asked me to make list of all files and hand them over to HQ 5 Corps. . the GOC asked me to make list of all files and hand them over to HQ 5 Corps. He said after that I could leave for Quetta while he will go to GHQ Pindi. He said the chief has tasked him to prepare plan for holding elections under army supervision. Later after imposition of Martial Law throughout the country,Gen Abassi told me ,told me it was not for election but ML that he was called to plan.

An interesting snippet from Major Agha Amin

FROM MY MARCH 2001 INTERVIEW WITH MAJ GEN NUK BABAR SJ AND BAR —-Why did Mr Bhutto select Zia as a coas?

There were a number of reasons and these were discussed with me personally by Mr Bhutto, while in detention at Murree. One was the pretended humility and this disarmed Mr Bhutto into the belief that he would pose no threat to the nascent democracy. Secondly, his performance when he invited Mr Bhutto to the centenary celebrations of 11 cavalry at Kharian. He took pains to ascertain Mr Bhutto’s tailor in Karachi (Hamid Khan) and had a Blue Patrols as Colonel-in-Chief of Armoured Corps. On entering the room, Mr Bhutto found a suitcase on his bed and on inquiry was told that it contained the Blue Patrol. The next day, Mr Bhutto was requested to climb a tank and engage a target. Quite obviously the target was hit. Then was his performance while on deputation in Jordan, where he killed a large number of Palestinians (Black September), Mr Bhutto was led to the belief that if he was so loyal to Jordan, he would be even more loyal to Pakistan. His prime performance came at Multan, where he invited Mr Bhutto as Colonel-in-Chief. After the function, when Mr Bhutto had barely returned to Mr Sadiq Qureshi’s house, when he was informed that General Zia requested to meet him. Mr Bhutto was surprised, having met him in the mess a little earlier. However, he called him into Mr Sadiq Qureshi’s study/library. Gen Zia on entrance went round the Almirah, looking for something and on inquiry he revealed that he was looking for a copy of the Holy Quran. On finding a copy he placed his hand on and addressing Mr Bhutto he said, “You are the saviour of Pakistan and we owe it to you to be totally loyal to you”. Then was the fact that there was little to pick and choose amongst the other aspirants. The only other suitable candidate was General Majeed Malik who was Mr Bhutto’s favourite as a sound professional. Unfortunately was involved in the International Hotel Scandal where he was caught with Mustafa Khar. He was sent as Ambassador to Libya. Finally, of course was the American angle. They had picked Zia as suitable material at Fort Leavenworth, followed his career progress and possibly lobbied in his favour. They made it known to friends months in advance that he would be appointed coas. Zia’s obsequeous behaviour made Mr Bhutto think that he was a non-political man. Pakistani democracy was at an infant stage and could not afford an Army Chief with political ambitions. Then there was not much choice. Gen Sharif was considered politically unreliable since he had been very close to Ayub Khan. Jillani had no command experience and was the head of isi. Akbar Khan had not performed well as a goc 12 Division in Kashmir in 1971 war. Gen Aftab and AB Awan had no command potential and were not suitable.

1. While talking about General Zia, an Islamist dictator who ruled Pakistan for eleven years (1977-88), many people refer to his role in the ‘Black September’ events from 1970. If you try to look this up on the internet, there are conflicting stories about his involvement. What we know for sure is that he was stationed in Jordan as part of a military training mission (Read here) sent by Pakistan in the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israel war. The Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) in Amman at the time was Mr. Tayyab Siddiqui. According to an article he wrote in 2010, (Read here)

“Following the June 1967 military debacle, the Arabs requested Pakistan for military training. Pakistan sent training contingents to Syria, Jordan and Iraq.”

In August-September 1970, the Palestinians, aided by the Syrians, revolted against the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. During the battle, the Commanding Officer (CO) of a Jordanian infantry unit deserted. King Hussain asked Brigadier Zia to take charge of that unit temporarily. Zia sought permission from the embassy where Mr. Siddiqui established contact with Secretary Defence, Mr. Ghiasuddin. Ghias’s comments are the most cringe-worthy issue in this whole affair. He cabled Amman that

“We had [performed] Istikhara, Hashmite Kingdom’s star is ascendant. Go ahead. Follow king’s commands.”

In Ambassador Siddiqui’s words:

“That the foreign and defence policy of Pakistan was formulated not on a dispassionate analysis of the situation but on the dubious religious invocation still amazes me”.

Zia took temporary charge of the unit but before any fighting could take place, the Syrians withdrew and the offensive ended. Later on, Zia developed contacts with Palestinian leadership and was not accused of being the ‘Butcher of Palestinians’ by any Palestinian fighter. In fact, Yasser Arafat visited Pakistan three times during Zia’s regime.

2. You might have seen a picture of a soldier inspecting a Bengali man’s Dhoti, from 1971. That is provided as a proof that Army folks there used to inspect Bengali men’s genitals to decide if they were Muslim or not (based on circumcision status). While the Pakistan Army indulged in some of the worst atrocities against the Bengalis, this picture is not a valid evidence.

This picture was taken by Indian photographer Kishor Parekh. In an interview, his son Swapan Parekh mentioned that it was a photograph of Indian army personnel checking the [Bengali] collaborators for weapons. The caption in Kishor Parekh’s book validates this backstory.