Gandhi built the nation, not the state

From lawyers’ club to mass movement

Before 1915 the Indian National Congress was a debating society for lawyers. By 1920 it was a mass movement of peasants who had learned to resist together. That is Gandhi’s work more than anyone else’s.

It is the Hindu belief that a mind with supreme self control attains the capability of changing reality. Gandhiji is the physical embodiment of that. The metaphor made real.

Indosaurus, on the Gandhi Jayanti thread

Nehru’s design, Patel’s map, Ambedkar’s constitution

The state is somebody else’s. Modern India is a centralised parliamentary republic, run in English, with a standing army, a civil service and a district collector. It is Nehru’s design, Patel’s map and Ambedkar’s constitution.

Village republics, reduced to Article 40

Gandhi wanted village republics and a minimal state. The Constituent Assembly gave the panchayat one line among the directive principles, Article 40, and built everything else on the opposite plan. Then it put his face on the money.

Why no party can hold Gandhi

• The BJP cannot claim the man whose last fast, in January 1948, was for the safety of Delhi’s Muslims.
• Congress cannot claim him, because it built Nehru’s state, not his.
• The left cannot, because he defended varna.
• The Ambedkarites cannot, because of the 1932 Poona Pact, where his fast against separate electorates forced Ambedkar’s hand.

That last objection is the serious one. It says moral coercion is still coercion, and the Depressed Classes paid for it. The opposite view holds that no party has dropped Gandhi, his portraits stay up whoever governs, he is simply no longer the only god in the state’s pantheon.

The colonial state was inherited, not overthrown

What was never settled

France and America settled their internal balance of power through real conflict. India put moral pressure in its place, so the colonial state’s machinery passed intact to native elites. Partition was a different kind of rupture. The question is whose interests nationalism never touched.

That is right about the inheritance. The republic of 1950 kept the Police Act of 1861, sedition, preventive detention and the collector. None of it was discarded. It was debated, kept and transferred. The redistribution never happened.

Would a revolution have done better?

Revolutions usually hand the machinery to whoever wins them, sharpened. What Gandhi did redistribute was the habit of refusal: peasants, women and the poor learned they could say no to a government and be counted.

A hard state in Gandhian cover

That habit did not settle the balance of power. It made the state feel it had to pretend to be good. Shekhar Gupta calls India a hard state in Gandhian cover.

The masses follow the earnest reading of gandhism and the state runs it’s own playbook with the earned legitimacy from that narrative.

girmit, on the Gandhi Jayanti thread

Pakistan bombs Afghanistan: the Raj’s frontier policy

Kunar and Helmand, 30 September

Pakistani jets hit Kunar and Helmand on the night of 30 September, another round in a conflict both sides have called open war since February. The Taliban say nine civilians died; the UN mission says at least ten, most of them children. Islamabad says it hit 22 militants; the UN mission counts over 1,100 civilian deaths and injuries in Afghanistan from cross-border violence this year. Pakistan’s foreign minister warned Kabul on 3 October not to let its territory be used for attacks, and took the dispute to the Moscow-format meeting on 5 October. No talks between the two governments are scheduled. Naam de Guerre asked what the strategy is; 0M-3 answered that it is the British one.

The same playbook since 1919

When the ground war failed in 1919, the British bombed the tribes, and few Pashtuns have accepted the Durand Line since. Pakistan inherited the line, the method and the problem. It is now fighting, in slow motion, a government it spent decades helping into power. What is the exit?

Governor’s rule in the Frontier, 11 October

On 11 October President Zardari, on the prime minister’s advice, declared a state of emergency in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and imposed governor’s rule, citing the provincial government’s failure to ensure security. Chief Minister Sohail Afridi, the assembly speaker and several ministers were taken into what the interior ministry calls preventive custody, a week into PTI’s long march. Governor Faisal Karim Kundi now runs the province with an eleven-member advisory council. Direct rule over the Frontier from the centre is older than Pakistan.

Delhi bans protest in the capital

The Cockroach rally and the lockdown, 10 to 13 October

The Cockroach Janta Party called a rally in Delhi for 10 October to demand that the chief election commissioner, Gyanesh Kumar, resign over the Special Intensive Revision of the voter rolls, which has removed more than 130 million names. The government sealed the capital with thousands of police, suspended travel and telecom links, detained the party’s founder at the airport and, by the party’s count, thousands of supporters. Some 600 were arrested in Mumbai. Former chief ministers Mamata Banerjee, Arvind Kejriwal and Pinarayi Vijayan were detained for a time. The leaders were released on 11 October and on 12 October the opposition marched to the Supreme Court with a petition against the Election Commission. On 13 October the prime minister called India the mother of democracy; the UN human rights office raised the mass detentions, and Germany’s finance minister cancelled the India leg of his Asia trip, citing current developments. The rule now is the one Islamabad has long kept: protest all you like in the provinces, but not in the capital.

The Raj’s machinery against the Mahatma’s method

Here the two halves meet. Dharna is Gandhi’s own method. Its critics say it has become a way to hold the country to ransom.

…dharnabaazi has become a playbook for those wanting to cause mischief.

Agni, on the Gandhi Jayanti thread

A country whose characteristic political excess is sitting down and refusing to eat has been lucky in its founder. A government that bans the sitting down in its capital is afraid of something. However, a party built on mocking the prime minister is not yet a party.

The flydubai FZ1073 attack: vetting, not suspicion

What happened on the flight

On 30 September the Omani co-pilot of flydubai FZ1073, Dubai to Tel Aviv, attacked the Indian captain, Smit Machchhar, with the crash axe. Investigators say he tried to bring the aircraft down. The captain, with crew and passengers, stopped him, and the flight landed at Tabuk. The UAE attorney general now says it was a premeditated plot to fly the aircraft into the passenger terminal at Ben Gurion. Oman had reportedly barred the co-pilot, Hamam Al-Hammami, from flying over extremist views; flydubai’s own checks showed nothing. The captain is recovering in hospital in Abu Dhabi. Trump has suggested an Iranian link without giving details, Iran calls the incident staged, and the UAE has not linked Iran to it.

Should passengers know a pilot’s religion?

Archer raised the question on the thread after friends began ringing airlines to ask. Disclosure would put every Muslim pilot on trial to catch one man the system should have caught.

The RBI raises rates: paying for other people’s wars

On 7 October the Reserve Bank of India raised the repo rate by 25 basis points, to 5.50%, its first rise since 2023, and changed its stance to calibrated tightening. It points to tighter money in the US and to food and fuel prices pushed up by the war in West Asia. On 12 October the September figures came in: inflation 5.54%, the highest since October 2024, with food at 7.74%. Core inflation was 4.2% in August. ICRA expects another rise in December.

Most of this is imported inflation, not overheating, though the core number says some of it is home-grown. India is paying for other people’s wars at the petrol pump, and the RBI has chosen to pay early.

Will India’s engineers come home?

US visa limits, led by the $100,000 fee on new H-1B petitions, have revived the old question; formerly brown asked it on the thread. India needs deep tech; what it will get first is what pays, and what pays in India is still logistics and payments. Deep tech follows capital, and capital follows the first exits.

The state can build the roads, the ports and the digital rails. It cannot decree a Bell Labs.

Smaller items

Why Gandhi is still worth having

Kabir made the case on the thread: whatever his faults, Gandhi led the non-cooperation movement, went to jail for it, and much of the goodwill India had abroad came from him; Martin Luther King and Nelson Mandela claimed him as an inspiration. Nobody governs by the Sermon on the Mount either. The point of Gandhi is not that South Asia follows him. It is that its states still feel they have to pretend to, and the pretence is the only check some of them have.

Judge him as a man of Dharma, not a man of state.

This round of AfPak hostilities kicked off with a ‘surgical airstrike’ by Pakistan into Afghanistan that resulted in multiple civilian deaths. The Taliban retaliated by attacking Pakistani border outposts on the Durand Line, and claim to have captured more than a dozen of them, with Pakistani POWs and KIA. In response, the PAF has now bombed Kabul and Kandahar.

The Taliban, the erstwhile creation of the ISI, is now at war with Pakistan. Where does this go from here?

This is not gossip. It is a field report. In 2013, Peshawar and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas were among the most volatile zones in the world. Polio workers were being assassinated. After the CIA’s fake vaccination campaign during the Bin Laden operation, vaccination drives had become politically radioactive. Negotiating access required tribal intermediaries, security assurances, and tacit accommodation with insurgent actors.

A “hedge fund manager” does not casually insert himself into that ecosystem.

Busy in Peshawar

The most important detail is not the Taliban reference. It is the structure of activity: He meets tribal representatives. He meets provincial officials. He tracks post-election timelines. He discusses international funding agreements. He speaks of security monitoring hotel lobbies. He refers to a fixer organizing logistics. This is someone moving in a semi-diplomatic capacity.

Helping Bill with Polio Efforts

The header exchange mentions Bill raising money for polio. The recipient, Boris Nikolic, was closely associated with Bill Gates. That matters. Polio eradication in Pakistan was one of the flagship global health initiatives of the Gates Foundation. If Epstein was involved, it would most plausibly have been as a connector; a broker of introductions, a facilitator of funding conversations, or an informal envoy.

A “New York Financier”

It does make the “New York financier” label misleading. The email suggests Epstein operated as an access broker in politically sensitive environments. He was comfortable gathering political information. He was comfortable dealing with tribal power structures. He was comfortable in insurgency conditions. That is a very specific skill set. The public story reduces Epstein to a predator who moved in wealthy social circles. That story is true, but incomplete.

A Predator James Bond?

This document shows he also moved in fragile-state negotiations involving tribal authorities, provincial governments, and international donors. That combination is rare. The email does not prove espionage. It does not prove a state sponsor. It does not reveal a grand geopolitical plot. It reveals something more subtle and more plausible: Epstein’s value lay in his ability to operate across boundaries; finance, philanthropy, politics, and informal power networks. He was not simply rich. He was useful. And that is far more interesting.

Pakistan, obviously enjoys a military supremacy over Afghanistan in multiple orders of magnitude. But as we have seen in Ukraine, or even in Afghanistan over the last few decades, the underdog can inflict some serious costs. And keep it going.

Question is, where does Pakistan go from here? With the growing reported rapprochement between the Taliban and New Delhi, there’s every chance that the Afghan air defenses may be quickly ramped up from non-existent, to at least some level of deterrent.  Rumors are rife on the internet about Indian supply planes landing at Bagram.  And simply bombing Afghan border posts has diminishing returns.  The Taliban do not appear to be in any conciliatory mood.

In many ways, this has many parallels to India’s experience with Pakistan backed jihadi groups in the 30+ years starting from the late 1980s.  Its almost impossible to deter and defend against insurgency in mountainous terrain.  Especially when the insurgents find succor in the local populace.

So, what next for “Khyber Pakhtunkhwa” and Pakistan? How realistic is the possibility that the Pakistani military will be able to succeed “this time” when it has already ‘failed’ a few times post-9/11, and had to make repeated ‘peace’ deals with the TTP or its predecessors in the past?

The shooting war seems to have gone a bit quiet for now, but the war of words is quickly escalating.  It seems like the Taliban are being ‘good students’ of the ISI and have adopted the tactic of releasing catchy music videos to make propaganda points.

Afghanistan’s powerful and truthful song about
ghadar and dalal army of . 🔥 pic.twitter.com/CLyFAnA17z

—
Fazal Afghan (@fhzadran) November
1, 2025

Questions from a senior Pakistani army officer and my response to them. First segment carries his views and the second segment mine.
…………………………………………………………………………
Dear Hamid, AOA.

Thank you for sharing your usual rational and pragmatic analysis.

The reasons put forward by former intelligence officer about rapprochement with TTP are both concocted and devoid of logic. In the past also there have been many abortive deals with TTP, which have never worked.

TTA (Afghan Taliban) & TTP (Pakistani Taliban) have always collaborated with each other, at least, in sharing intelligence . Both are Deobandis and have elements in each, which have come from the other. The public opinion in Pakistan resents this deal because of the loss of thousands of lives and APS (Public School), Peshawar tragedy. There is definite proof of RAW & Afghan intelligence masterminding most incidents in Pakistan (for sure Kamra & Mehran bases). Pakistan has even presented these evidence dossiers to UN Secy Gen. What moral justification or credibility we have then to strike a deal with a terrorist organisation both from international and domestic perspectives?

Even if there is a deal, what stops TTP or even Taliban to launch a terrorist attack inside Pakistan and blame it on a splinter group of TTP? The critical question is of funding . TTP were foreign funded for the acts at the behest of sponsors. If they are unable to undertake these terrorist acts, how would they be sustained, recruited and pay to the members?

If you link the TTP deal with TLP (Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan), for a temporary truce we have lost the war.

Best Regards, Army Officer

…………………………………………………………………………………….
24 December 2021

Thanks, Sir, for your insight.  Sorry for the delayed response as I am busy with many chores and some hectic travels.

TTA & TTP:  You have highlighted the ideological, infrastructure, recruitment and financial relationships between two entities.  The problem for the Pakistan army was perception management for both domestic & foreign audiences.  It was supporting TTA but fighting TTP, therefore, it tried to convince the Pakistani public that the two entities were different although privately there were concerns about symbiotic relationship between the two. Hope was that with TTA having a major say in running Afghanistan (no one expected that Taliban will walk over after making a deal with US) will be able to rein in TTP.  My view was that it was a wrong assumption and lack of grasp of recent Afghan history despite deep involvement.

It created a difficult situation in dealing with Americans.  Pakistan was telling Americans to bring TTA inside the tent while asking them to help Pakistan take out TTP not only in Afghanistan sanctuaries but even inside FATA.

The U.S. kept telling army brass at highest levels about the risks long before TTP emerged on the scene, and I tended to agree with U.S. concerns as I saw support of TTA as a high-risk gambit for Pakistan. Once TTP came on the stage with a big bang, it shocked the Pakistan army.  For a variety of reasons, initial mishandling complicated the situation.  Later, heavy lifting and sacrifices by the Pakistan army helped to severely degrade TTP and rout them from entrenched areas. However, in early stages, U.S. drone strikes to take out TTP leadership saved many Pakistani lives. I supported this action as I saw benefits in the short term outweighing risks as re-orientation of the army in doctrine, training etc. needed some time.

TTP, NDS (Afghan intelligence) & India:  Outsiders cannot create monsters.  They simply take advantage of an internal problem as they see it suitable for their own interests. Internal and external factors are then intertwined in the web of deceits. Each side then peddles its own narrative. Looking from an Indian perspective, Pakistani support to Kashmiri and Sikh militants fell into the same category.  This has  a long history and there is no way out except engagement and reaching minimum consensus about a détente on this issue.  Each side has to look at this as not a favor to the other but as a sane policy option. Unfortunately, entrenchment of hardliners on both sides of the border will make this a daunting task.

Non-Talib Afghans saw the Taliban simply as tools of Pakistan and blamed Pakistan for all the violence.  There was already a trust deficit involving almost all segments of Afghan society and rising violence inside Afghanistan upped anti-Pakistan sentiment that resulted in policy change. TTP, NDS & India is a late phenomenon. NDS decided to pay back Pakistan in the same coin and only India could help in this venture (this later expanded to supporting Baloch militants). Afghans wanted to use this as a bargaining chip to negotiate with Pakistan. “You stop supporting my terrorist, and I will stop supporting your terrorist.” Washington was caught in the middle.  In the early part of the game when violence was not high paced on both sides, Washington kept Afghans on a tight leash as everything was being routed through General Musharraf.  I’m aware of the fact that when Akbar Bugti got into a fight with General Musharraf, before moving to the hills where he was finally killed by the Pakistan army, he asked the Kabul government for safe passage. Karzai ran this request by the Americans who vetoed the idea. Same was true for Pakistani militants.

Later, when Americans got angry with Pakistan, they made no objection to NDS supporting Baloch militants with the help of Indians.  TTP was a different animal and Americans actively supported Pakistan by taking out TTP leadership both in FATA and inside Afghanistan. First and second tier TTP leadership was eliminated by Americans. They hoped that Pakistan may return this favor by at least curtailing support of TTA as they were realistic enough to know that Pakistan could not and will not take any strong action against TTA.  Pakistan only tightened screws on those elements of TTA who were trying to directly make a deal with the Afghan government or Washington behind Pakistan’s back.  Here came the complicated issue where some American military and intelligence issues came in conflict with NDS projects who decided to actively use the TTP card.

One such case was of Latifullah Mahsud (a close confidant of Baitullah & Hakimullah Mahsud and close liaison with different militant outfits). In 2013, U.S. Special Forces snatched Latifullah from Afghan intelligence custody in Logar.  Details are a bit murky, but my own assessment is that he went to Afghanistan on invitation of Afghan intelligence for negotiations and was traveling in a security/intelligence convoy on his way to Kabul.  Part of this version came from Logar governor Arsala Jamal (later killed in a suicide bombing) and confirmation that he was snatched by Americans from Muhammad Agha district of Logar bordering Kabul.  In 2014, Americans handed Laftifullah to Pakistan and after a death sentence by a military court, he was executed in 2016). Karzai wanted to use it as a bargaining chip in his negotiations with Pakistan but there is another angle that not too many people are aware of.  Karzai wanted to use TTP leaders to help jump start direct negotiations with Haqqanis.  The closest relationship of TTP with any Afghan group is that with Haqqanis.  Both parties had different outlook on the operational side, but they shared facilities and used the same networks and economic channels. There was direct relationship & contact between leadership (I’m aware of cases where the Pakistan army used Haqqanis to lift sieges of Pakistani troops by TTP and negotiate release of abducted security personnel).  This was the reason that Karzai wanted to use the TTP channel.  After Pakistan army operations, a number of militants crossed over into Afghanistan creating equilibrium in ‘nuisance’. Now, when Pakistan asked Afghans and Americans to stop TTP from using Afghan sanctuary, prompt came the reply that Pakistanis should do the same in case of TTA.  Mutual mistrust, anger and outright hatred provided adequate material for all sides to engage in Byzantine intrigues. There were no innocent bystanders in this game but active players.

TTP & Funding: Prior to military operations on the Pakistan side, TTP was the de facto authority holding a large swath of territory covering several thousand square miles. A territory that is a major trade route of legal and illegal trades running in hundreds of millions of dollars. In addition, they generated income from levying taxes on all business activities, high ticket bank robberies and ransom payments from high profile kidnappings (payments from only three high profile kidnappings of son of a business tycoon also son-in-law of a former four star general, sons of a former prime minister and a former governor run into over $100 million.) Of course, funding from hostile agencies contributed but in my view that is only a fraction of homegrown resources.  Currently, with Pakistan taking back control of the territory has changed the dynamics and drying up of most of the local resources.  However, the problem has also evolved. Now, TTP is not running a de facto emirate and its operations are low cost hit and run of remote security posts, planting an IED on the road or target killing of local opponents or security personnel.  These are low-cost operations and do not need huge funding.  TTP can carry out these operations from local resources even in the absence of foreign funding.  In my view, Pakistan is in a much better position now and proactive and robust posture not allowing entrenchment of TTP cadres in former FATA or small cells in urban centers can be achieved.  Tackling TTP presence in Afghanistan needs a multifaceted approach.

Continued engagement with Taliban emirate and nudging them to prevent expansion of TTP sanctuaries. In view of the historical relationship of TTP with TTA and especially Haqqanis, it is not likely that they will take direct military action against TTP.  Using local Afghan assets outside of Taliban circles for intelligence gathering and selective elimination discreetly and without fingerprints needs more skills and less bravado.  Public berating of Taliban emirate or botched attempts inside Afghanistan (see exhibit A: throwing a dud from a drone on Maulvi Faqir house) carry the risk of adding friction.

TTP & Negotiations: For starters, Pakistan cannot afford to permanently deploy more than half of its army in forward posture with no end in sight. Negotiations is not a stand alone question but closely linked with thorny issues of forced disappearances, internment centers and extra-judicial killings (this has markedly decreased after completion of large scale kinetic operations but still an issue that needs to be addressed). This is a tricky question and, in my view, needs a little more public debate.  Any policy no matter how good will not bear any fruit if the Pakistan army cannot sell it to its own public.  The major flaw in this exercise was going alone and only in a clandestine way resulting in scathing criticism from a large segment of the population and in the end a hasty retreat. In the early stage, discreet and secret negotiations are essential but after groundwork, windows need to be opened.  Optics play an important role therefore the army needs to take a long view and not get carried away with the rhetoric.  One day, a Corp Commander is garlanding the militant leader calling him brother in faith, next day he is a misguided fellow, then agent of India, Afghanistan, United States & Israel, then a disgrace to Islam and almost an apostate and then turn around declaring that the chap has repented and again our brother. It looks more like a comic opera. This is not only the fault of the army as confusion in the society about religiously motivated militancy is at play and the army must work in the same society.

At a fundamental level, it is important to understand the difference between a foreign force operating in an alien territory and a national army operating in its own internationally recognized boundaries. In the latter case, one can not simply fire or bomb itself to victory. Kinetic operations have an important role in the initial phase to take back the territory, but then other instruments are needed for disarmament, re-integration etc. In this phase, civilian partners no matter how imperfect are essential.  In the case of Pakistan, the majority of the population fully supported the army in its war against TTP.  This included all major political forces, ethnic groups, minorities & even large segments of religious groups.  In my view, two missteps by the army brass; the political engineering project with unintended consequence of putting diverse groups of population against the army and mishandling of Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement – PTM (despite warning from some well-informed Pushtun army officers with firsthand experience about the issues) had negative impact on the whole exercise.  A certain amount of buy in especially from local communities is essential for two reasons.  First, reconciliation and then re-integration.  In the absence of first, locals will be bystanders in a vital process as well as revenge killings and in case of later deep mistrust of local population about the whole project and state will need to spend huge intelligence resources to monitor those who come back to their communities.

In my view, use of local traditional instruments of reconciliation where aggrieved parties are satisfied and especially foot soldiers get pardon from their own communities is the first step. Reintegration where local and tribal elders take responsibility for supervision of those who have laid arms.  Even these measures will be effective only in case of foot soldiers. Luckily, most high profile TTP leaders whose faces and names were associated with terrible atrocities have left this world to meet their Lord and second and third tier leaders are not well known.  If they renounce militancy, they can be re-integrated in their own communities. These are not easy tasks and need patient and sustained work. Trust deficit is the major handicap.  There is no quick fix or a perfect solution.  It is trying to learn from errors, shed some hubris and aim for an end state that can be managed by available resources.  Violence will always be present in various forms but the goal is to keep it below a certain threshold where it does not impede daily life of the majority of the citizens.

Note: My views are based on my own work about the region and interactions with a large number of folks from different backgrounds including Pakistanis, Americans, Afghans, Indians.  This helps me to understand their perspectives and as always, the case, agreement as well as disagreement with certain aspects.

“Neither to laugh; nor cry
Just to understand”.    Spinoza

Last time we interviewed Major Amin just after the fiasco of the American withdrawal from Afghanistan. That was a relatively substantive interviey w (you can listen to it at this link: Major Amin on the age of strategic anarchy) and proved extremely popular, so there was a lot of demand to invite Major Amin back for an update. I caught up with the Major in a less than sober mood initially (some of you may have heard that recording) when he expressed his disappointment with how badly things are going in his homeland in somewhat colorful language, but at his request we have now redone this interview (the exact same questions) in a more sober tone. Enjoy.

17 October 2021

Following was part of conversations with many with first hand knowledge about the region.  This gentleman had front row seat to many changes in the region and he was kind enough to candidly share his views with me & my response. It may be of interest to some.

Hamid

Thanks Sir.  I think you got it right about potential risks for the region.  I know that in polite conversations, these topics are not discussed but in the real and cruel world people talk about their dreams and delusions and it is directly proportional to the level of their knowledge or ignorance. This has been at least my experience of dealing with many from different countries who have front row seat to this blood sport.

Here are my two cents.  In my view, there is no agreement yet about the policy going forward but there are conversations about what is called ‘controlled chaos’.  Some see huge opportunities in current situation where all potential trouble makers in Washington’s eyes can be paid back in the same coin.  Keeping Russia busy defending its southern borders by spending more military and diplomatic capital, highlighting human rights violations of Uighurs on diplomatic front and limited support to do some fireworks in Xinjiang by using Wakhan corridor, destabilize Iran’s eastern border thus almost completely encircling Iran as currently, Israel is using Iraqi Kurdistan and Azerbaijan to cause troubles.  Igniting another border and more involvement in Afghanistan will waste more Iranian intelligence resources.  Turkey under neo-Ottoman dreamer Erdogan has gone from ‘zero trouble with neighbors’ foreign policy of decades to ‘100 % trouble with every neighbor’ quagmire.  He is arrogant and ignorant enough to be easily enticed into putting his hand in the snake pit of Afghanistan.  There have been reports of increasing Turkish parleys with Pakistan and several mysterious military flights from Istanbul to Chaklala air base have landed.  We don’t know the details yet but I’m suspicious that the cargo has something to do with Afghanistan and it is not humanitarian aid.

Everyone and his cousin in Washington is very angry at Pakistan.  The dangerous part is that now Afghanistan is not seen as a separate entity for management purposes.  The talk is about region and it is now ‘Pak-Af’ that means support of anti-Taliban groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan mainly on political front at this stage and if needed in future a military front can also come into play.  Goal is to create a ‘cordon sanitaire’ around Talib country of southern and eastern Afghanistan that is traditional Loy Kandahar and Loy Paktiya regions.  This means strengthening both Pushtun and Baloch nationalist forces in Baluchistan.  In Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (KPK), if Pushtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM) is converted into a political party and moribund Awami National Party (ANP) wakes up and revamps its structure, it can create a political barrier to Taliban narrative.  In addition to these ethnic forces, two major political parties; Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz and Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) have no love lost for Afghan Taliban.  During their respective tenures (2008-2018), they have tried desperately to get rid of flea infested Afghan blanket but army came in the way. Even limited retreat of the army in current scenario provides the room for push back for all anti-Taliban forces.

Afghan Taliban leadership will try a hand at ‘reverse strategic depth’ by supporting religious segment especially fellow Pushtun Deobandi lot of KPK, Baluchistan and metropolis of Karachi.  This will be their attempt at political front.  In future, if circumstances force a military front then their natural allies will be Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

For the northern part of the region, there is talk about the Kurdish model that was adopted for Iraq.  A de facto independent region although Afghan scene is quite different as there is no history of separatism among non-Pushtuns and also it is not one single ethnic entity in the north.  If somehow, this time around non-Pushtuns come to the conclusion that Taliban are a dominant military force in control of Kabul for forseeable future who are not willing to share and they don’t have strong Pushtun partners to wrest control back and run as a joint venture, then other options come to the table.  Even in that case, this model will require some modification.  One possibility is the ‘canton model’ attempted in Syria for different ethnic and sectarian groups.  The base for northern plan will likely be Tajikistan.  Contrary to popular belief, it will be Afghan players that will determine the future course, outsiders will be simply enablers.

In my view ‘controlled chaos’ is a misnomer as chaos takes its own course and apprentice sorcerers can not even comprehend let alone control it. My personal view is that like every government change (although we may not agree with the method of taking control), Taliban should be given a chance of at least three years to prove what they mean?  Formal recognition can be kept at back burner for now while channels kept open at different levels.  In the meantime humanitarian aid channeling directly to the people to prevent famine and further dislocations while gently pushing Taliban to modify their stance on some issues especially inclusion of other groups and female education.  On part of Talib, if he can keep violence below a certain threshold where it does not hamper daily activities for the next few years, that will be an achievement.  In my view patience is needed but alas patience has never been an American virtue.

“The everlasting battle stripped from us care of our own lives or of others”.  T. E. Lawrence

Warm Regards,

Hamid

Spoils of War

 Chaotic United States withdrawal from Afghanistan and consequent vacuum rapidly filled by Taliban surprised everyone.  Large amounts of weapons, especially aircraft falling into the hands of the Taliban raised some concerns. However, these fears are exaggerated.  Taliban were an insurgent force engaging in a protracted warfare focused on hit and run, small scale engagements, ambushes, Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks and assassinations in rural and urban areas.  It used motorcycles and civilian trucks for mobility and small arms, Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs), mortars and explosives for its operations.

The United States developed the Afghan Air Force (AAF) with the primary aim of supporting Afghan security forces with aerial reconnaissance and intelligence, logistic support to troops deployed in operational areas and use of rotary wing and light fixed wing attack planes to attack insurgent deployments.

Russian MI-17 was the nucleus as Afghan pilots and maintenance crew have long experience with these helicopters. Many Afghans living in Russia and Eastern European countries with experience with MI-17 and newly trained pilots and crew managed these helicopters. However, the MI-17 workhorse was downgraded in favor of new shiny American aerial toys. Many factors were at play.  Russian trained officers including pilots were eased out and when sanctions were placed on Russia, Afghan government funds could not be used for Russian equipment. This issue was circumvented to some extent by routing MI-17s and its parts through India.  American regulations require that U.S. finding should be used to buy American made equipment. The U.S. government was planning to phase out MI-17 by 2022 and no further funding was planned for this category.

Russian planes are simple to operate and manuals don’t need Russian language.  Afghanistan already had long experience with Russian aircraft and there was an available pool that could be easily expanded.  Maintenance crew with limited education can be trained without mastering Russian language. On the other hand, American planes are complex and the English language is essential.  Pilots and maintenance crew had to first learn the English language before training on American planes. Some training programs were in the United States that required a lengthy process of vetting and visa requirements.  In 2020, with COVID pandemic, Afghan pilots who came back from basic training in the United States could not start flying with their trainers and mentors. There was always a deficiency of qualified Afghan pilots and maintenance crew. Private contractors were operating and maintaining AAF planes. When the security situation deteriorated, some of the training was moved to third countries especially Gulf sheikhdoms.

With the announcement of withdrawal, contractors started to leave Afghanistan.  Planes could not be maintained in the cities where they were based like Kandahar, Herat, Mazar Sharif and Jalalabad. They had to be brought to Kabul for regular maintenance. This factor contributed to marked reduction in efficient operation of AAF.

AAF operated seven air platforms including four fixed wing and three types of rotary wing aircrafts. By the time of U.S. withdrawal in August 2021, only a limited number were available inside Afghanistan.  Thirty seven UH-60s purchased for AAF were held in strategic reserves in the United States. At the end of June 2021 following aircrafts were inside Afghanistan: Forty three MD-530, thirty three UH-60, thirty two Russian MI-17, twenty three A-29, twenty three C-208, ten AC-208 and three C-130.  A-29 is a Brazilian turboprop light attack plane and C-208 and AC-208 are cargo Cessna planes converted into light attack aircraft.  MD-530 is a light scout attack helicopter and UH-60 is a medium lift utility helicopter.

For the years 2019-21, $1.7 billion were spent on AAF. Cost of training programs contracts was around $500 million. Of the ten most costly training program contracts for Afghan security forces, eight were for AAF.

The U.S. handed over airfields of Heart, Kandahar, Jalalabad and Mazar Sharif to Afghan government troops in preparation for withdrawal and aircraft at these airfields were operational.  By the time of final withdrawal from Kabul, Taliban had taken over the city. Before departure, U.S. soldiers removed critical parts from all aircraft parked at Kabul airport making them unserviceable.  In one of the videos in the immediate aftermath of withdrawal from Kabul airport, I have seen at least six fixed wing and many rotary wing aircraft damaged in two hangars.

Many AAF aircraft flew out of the country when the Taliban took over major cities.  Three planes and two helicopters carrying around 150 Afghan soldiers escaped to Tajikistan and landed at Bokhtar airfield. Around two dozen military planes and two dozen helicopters carrying several hundred Afghan soldiers landed at Termez airport in Uzbekistan. This was confirmed by unclassified satellite images.

Taliban were aware of the danger that air force could pose to their advance on major cities therefore they targeted air force pilots.  To my knowledge, at least seven Afghan pilots were assassinated.  Most others have already escaped the country while those remaining in Afghanistan are hiding.  Some MI-17 pilots who had already lost their jobs several years ago are in Moscow.

Taliban have no use of an air force as they are not planning to convert their killing machine into a regular army and air force.  They will only need utility and transport helicopters to move political and military leadership to cities that they now control.  MI-17 serves this purpose well.  If they can streamline their regular salary, many Afghan pilots and maintenance crew trained on MI-17 still in the country can go back to work.  They need to feed their families and they will go back to the job that provides a regular salary.

If in the next few months, Taliban get tacit support from Russia and China, helicopters can come from these sources and Russia can send Afghan pilots residing in Russia to fly these helicopters.  Pakistan can also provide a helping hand in this field.  However, Pakistan will not get involved in this project until Russia and China commit first. This will not be a novel idea and has happened before.  During their first rule in 1998-2001, their helicopters were flown by former leftist pilots who had grown beards.  Then Pakistan interior minister Major General ® Naseerulah Khan Babar told me that during one of his trips to Afghanistan, he was flown in a helicopter to another city.  He was curious how a bearded Talib was flying MI-17 and started a conversation with him.  Pilot told him that he was a leftist officer who had grown a beard and was flying Taliban MI-17 to feed his family.

Acknowledgements: Author thanks many with knowledge about the subject matter who were kind enough to share their views with me.  U.S. watchdog, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) is an excellent source for details of all aspects of the Afghanistan project. It circulates both unclassified and classified reports about Afghanistan.

Hamid Hussain

coeusconsultant@optonline.net

05 September 2021

  P.S. The Taliban had asked the Uzbekistan government to return 46 aircraft and Afghan pilots and their families who escaped.  The United States made an agreement with Uzbekistan for transfer of about five hundred Afghans who were pilots and their families to Qatar and from there to settlement in different countries.  The fate of the aircraft is not yet decided.  Uzbekistan will likely ask Russian help in this regard to send a message of no to Taliban.  Russia does not want any increase in Taliban military capacity while everything is up in the air. 

Some informed individuals asked for my two cents worth opinion about a conversation about the Afghan National Army (ANA) in a changed scenario.  One concern is that a large number of unemployed soldiers can join any faction of the war economy. It invariably resulted in comparison with the disbandment of the Iraqi army after the second Gulf war.

Hamid

Afghan National Army (ANA)

Thanks Sir for your email.  You raise an important point and following is my take;

“Blood cannot be washed out with blood”.   Pashto proverb

ANA had disintegrated in the aftermath of Soviet withdrawal and subsequent civil war.  New ANA post American occupation is a more recent phenomenon and has an interesting history. In the first few years after the U.S. arrival in late 2001, security was provided by militias of local warlords.  The U.S. had no initial plan for the nation building project and the Department of Defense (DOD) under Donald Rumsfeld was allergic to the whole idea. Constitution of the new Afghan government was a highly centralized template and deft Hamid Karzai had great influence on the process.  Once this centralized project was adopted, then it dawned that this will need an effective national army.  This also neatly fitted into the idea of sidelining local powerful warlords and shedding militias.  However, when the nascent structure for ANA was put in place in 2005-6, insurgency had started in Pashtun south and east.  This meant dominance of non-Pashtuns for a variety of reasons.

These non-Pashtuns had joined the U.S. quite early and had influence due to direct contact with American handlers.  As insurgency was mainly in Pashtun areas therefore there was hesitancy to recruit Pashtuns.  However, one could not do away with Pashtuns therefore Soviet era leftist officers were brought back and urban educated as well some tribal rural Pashtuns resenting Taliban dominance were recruited. Later, some of these officers were eased out again due to the influence of non-Pashtuns power brokers.  Every power player used ANA and police to fill ranks with his partisans.  This was a favor providing a secure job. During the Obama administration, ANA was expanded but rapid expansion simply provided more avenues of corruption including pocketing salaries of ‘ghost soldiers’ that only existed on army payroll.  Despite these handicaps, ANA had a reasonable structure and more importantly in view of rampant corruption in police and other government departments. ANA was held in high esteem by the general public.  More money was spent on Special Operations Forces (SOF) that were better trained, equipped & supported. Disproportionately, a large number of SOF was Uzbek, Tajik & Hazara.

In Afghanistan, there are fifty shades of grey and in view of sustained multi-generational violence; survival depends on keeping channels open with all parties. Same extended family had members among Taliban, local militia, police and ANA. In operations, such contacts helped in survival.  One example will show this complex dynamic. In Takhar, Taliban surrounded a local army garrison. They sent messages to local elders promising safe passage to local soldiers (many were ethnic kin & extended family members). At night local soldiers left the base and went home.  Taliban overran the base and beheaded the defending garrison consisting of soldiers who were from other regions and displayed their severed heads along the road.

Once the U.S. decided to withdraw, in the traditional Afghan way, local deal making rather than fighting determined the outcome. Soldiers went home taking personal weapons with them. In the north & west, a secret deal between Taliban and Tehran was crucial (I’ll write about it in detail soon as information is now trickling in).  The Taliban promised no harm to the Shia minority and Tehran asked Hazara soldiers as well as men loyal to strong man of Herat Ismail Khan to take personal weapons and go home and wait to see how things unfold.

This is the brief background and now the question whether ANA can be resurrected even to a limited extent. The first question is what will be the raison d’être of this force.  Is it simply to pay trained soldiers as a bribe so that he does not join someone else or they will have any role in the larger security setup of the country? There are several issues and I’ll go over the view of major players on the subject.

Non-Pashtun officers and soldiers may come back simply as a secure job if the government can guarantee the regular salary. However, he loathes the Taliban and will not be a committed soldier.  If the goal is to prevent his defection to a hostile force then regular salary may do but he will be of no other use. This is also not a guarantee and in case of active hostilities he will have sympathy with his ethnic kin.  If someone can pay him more, he will defect on the first opportunity. Modern Afghan history provides ample examples of this phenomenon.

When the government unexpectedly melted in Kabul, a surprised Taliban got concerned.  Original deal with the U.S. was that the Taliban will remain outside Kabul until transition occurs in an orderly fashion and during this time, the U.S. will withdraw.  Time frame was around 4-8 weeks.  The sudden change needed a new response.  First, the Taliban sent a message to their contacts in government in Kabul to tell ANA soldiers & police to remain on their posts. This did not work out as senior government officials including military commanders have gone AWOL in haste and soldiers changed to civilian clothes and went home. Now, the Taliban asked the Americans if their troops will take control of the city until modalities are worked out.  Americans told the Taliban that they were heading for the exit and had no plans for taking over security of Kabul with possible risks.  Taliban then told the Americans in that case they would have no choice but to enter the city and take control to prevent chaos (Pretty soon we will see details of the last chapter of this saga as direct participants will try to give their versions). This was the narrow window where at least some ANA could have been kept under arms but now under Taliban control if original deal had worked out.

Taliban don’t need any additional armed men for security.  Security is their forte and they pride themselves on that.  Second, meager current and potential significant future resources available to the central government will be used to pay Taliban foot soldiers and commanders first.  Second on the list of recipients will be civil bureaucrats, technocrats; doctors etc. and ANA soldiers are not on that list.

For these reasons, Taliban have no incentive to rehire ANA soldiers. Taliban will counter the argument that if a disgruntled ANA soldier wants to join any opposition, we are fully capable of handling him.  One argument will be to re-hire some uniformed ANA for public relations but Taliban have already distributed army uniforms to its own foot soldiers and it looks good enough for public relations purposes.  For this ceremonial duty, Talib has exchanged his sandals for boots, turban for helmet and a brand new American assault rifle for old AK-47.  This advertisement model is complete with a wrap around eyeglasses. This is all courtesy of American taxpayers.

The United States has left the scene lock, stock and barrel. I have not seen any sign that anyone in Washington is willing to spend a single penny let alone any political capital on a venture that seems like supporting the Taliban government. Currently, there are no takers in Washington.  The most anybody will be willing in the near term will be some humanitarian aid.  Even a secret agreement with the Taliban is not on the table as any leak will have devastating political effects. Current policy is to let the Taliban feel the heat and no plans for throwing them any rope.

The Pakistan army had serious reservations about ANA right from the start.  I remember Pakistan army Chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani’s views about ANA during one of his interactions with Americans. General Kayani met with President Obama’s personal emissaries in 2012 in Abu Dhabi and told them that ‘you are spending billions training the Afghan military and police. Should Afghanistan collapse in the near future – not an unlikely scenario – it would leave an armed, angry force just across the Pakistani border, many of them enemies of Pashtuns’.

Over the years, countless numbers of senior Pakistani officers complained to me that the U.S. was wasting money on ANA.  One reason was resentment about the fact that Washington was spending billions on ANA with doubtful future but not willing to strengthen the Pakistan army with two hundred years of history. Somehow psychologically, they don’t like the idea.  Now, with a changed situation, one will need persuasion and an organizational shift of thought process.  Senior brass has some concern based on recent examples of Iraqi army where unemployed soldiers joined sectarian militias and Daesh.  From Pakistan’s point of view, I don’t see how Pakistan can convince others to take this road.

In summary, the idea has some potential benefits but unfortunately, currently there are no takers. The role of some of the trained soldiers of ANA will be if Afghanistan stumbles into another round of civil war.  Afghan as well as all foreigners who have a dog in the fight will use them in their proxy wars. In that unfortunate case, the most valuable cannon fodder will be ANA Special Forces personnel, tribal and clan militias and members of border tribes trained by CIA in their Counter Terrorist Pursue Teams (CTPT) program.

Comparison with Iraqi army disbandment is interesting but needs a separate whole discussion. Everybody says that was a big mistake but there are many nuances.  Two major players, Kurds and Shia vetoed the idea.  Kurds told Americans point blank that they were not risking their lives to remove Saddam Hussain and then allow resurrection of the hated army responsible for committing genocide of Kurds (at that time I spent few years doing detailed research on Kurds that was an education and a peek into their tragic history). Shia politicians and theologians promised neutrality in the conflict with the condition that post-Saddam Iraq will have no semblance with the old order. Shia memory that remembers tragedies of fourteen hundred years ago like it was yesterday was still bleeding from the wounds inflicted by the Iraqi army in the aftermath of the First Gulf War of the 1990s.  Shia were not willing to even hear the name let alone allow resurrection of an army that had laid waste to Najaf, Karbala & Basra in front of their eyes.

“The Iraqi and Afghan wars have not ‘ended.’ Only America’s involvement has ‘ended.’ … When a country leaves a war before achieving victory it is not called leaving. It is called defeat”.     Dennis Prager

Hamid Hussain

coeusconsultant@optonline.net

20 September 2021