Today is 9/11 in the Muslim calendar: the 11th of Ramadan, the 9th and holiest month.

US Marine guards at the American Consulate in Karachi opened fire on Shia protesters attempting to storm the compound, killing at least 12. Pakistani police and paramilitary Rangers were also present. The Sindh chief minister has ordered a probe into the deaths.

Shia communities in Kargil are mourning the death of their leader.

Imam Khamenei was not just a leader for Iran but seemingly for Muslims around the world. The Muslims of Kashmir took to the streets upon hearing news of Seyyed Khamenei’s martyrdom.

Peter R.   ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009

[Reviewed by Teresita Schaffer; Survival 52, 5 (2010): 219-20]

This volume is required reading for anyone who wishes to understand Pakistan’s military decision-making or the half-war in Kargil in 1999, just a year after India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons. Peter Lavoy, long a scholar of South Asian military affairs, assembled a first-rate team from Pakistan, India and the United States to examine the causes, conduct and impact of the Kargil conflict, based in part on an astonishing number of interviews with high-level participants from both sides.

The resulting book does not change the basic ‘storyline’ of Kargil that has been generally accepted for a decade: that Pakistan’s tactical victory in crossing the Line of Control with India ended in tactical defeat, and that the nuclear shadow under which the fighting took place had effectively frozen the territorial status quo. But it does offer numerous surprising and important insights below that macro level. Lavoy’s introduction directs a spotlight on, among other things, the implications of Kargil for nuclear deterrence theory, noting that one of its key postulates – that a nuclear environment fosters arms control – is contradicted by Kargil; and two others – that nuclear powers do not fight and that they do not initiate or escalate crises – are at least partly refuted.

In my view, two other conclusions in this book have special importance. The first has to do with the dynamics of Pakistan’s decision-making. Several authors note that, in Pakistan’s view, the Kargil operation was intended to create a ‘fait accompli’ that would change the status quo in Kashmir, and also to avenge decades of what Pakistanis consider India’s taking advantage of them (most importantly the Indian intervention in the Bangladesh War, but also India’s occupation of the Siachen Glacier in 1984). Together with a long history of military pre-eminence in Pakistan’s decision-making and the Pakistan Army’s institutional distaste for self-criticism after its military reverses, this genesis of Kargil led the Pakistani military leadership to assume, in ways that seem quite remarkable to outside observers, that India would not mount much of a defence.

This streak of self-delusion in a military organisation that is in other respects highly professional has important consequences for the region, not to speak of Pakistan’s relations with the United States.

A second arresting analysis is the discussion of the role of surprise in military operations. James Wirtz and Surinder Rana review the literature and conclude that surprise is most valued by military leaders who face a stronger adversary and who believe that surprise can neutralise the power imbalance. They also conclude, after looking at the results of a number of surprise operations, that the result is often tactical victory but strategic failure. This is of course how Kargil turned out. It also raises questions about how both analysts and especially military leaders do and do not absorb lessons from history.

As happens in nearly every edited volume, there is a certain amount of repetition, and one chapter, by Bruce Riedel, basically condenses and reviews material he has already published elsewhere. But these are minor flaws in a book that combines many important insights and a welcome readability.

Overview:
The region of Ladakh has seen a sharp escalation in political tension and civil unrest over the past 10 days. On September 24, 2025, four civilians were killed in Leh in police firing following public protests. This marks a significant turn in the trajectory of Ladakh’s relationship with the Union government of India, which had previously promised administrative empowerment and constitutional safeguards following the region’s bifurcation from Jammu & Kashmir in 2019.

Timeline of Key Events:

• August 5, 2019: Article 370 is abrogated; Jammu & Kashmir is bifurcated into two union territories: Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh. Ladakh is granted Union Territory status without a legislature.
• Post-2019: Initial optimism among Ladakhis regarding direct governance from Delhi. Perception that Srinagar had previously marginalized the region.
• 2020–2023: Peaceful protests and coordinated civil society efforts begin, seeking Sixth Schedule protection (constitutional safeguards primarily concerning land, culture, and employment).
• 2021: The Leh Apex Body and the Kargil Democratic Alliance, traditionally divided, unite around common demands: Sixth Schedule protection, job reservations, and domicile requirements.
• June 2025: Centre promises limited concessions — 15-year domicile requirement and job reservations — but withholds Sixth Schedule and statehood.
• September 2025: Following activist Sonam Wangchuk’s hunger strike, tensions rise. On September 24, police fire on protestors in Leh. Four are killed, including a retired soldier.

Key Demands from Ladakhi Civil Society:

1. Inclusion under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution (currently operational in tribal areas of four northeastern states). This provides:
   • Protection of land rights.
   • Cultural and linguistic preservation.
   • Local self-governance.
2. Domicile protections: Job and land reservation for long-term residents (30-year demand; government offered 15).
3. Statehood: Legislative powers and elected representation.
4. Protection of environment and traditional livelihoods: Resistance to extractive industries and unregulated mining of critical minerals.

Demographic and Geopolitical Context:

• Ladakh comprises two districts: Leh (majority Buddhist) and Kargil (majority Muslim), each with roughly 150,000 residents.
• The region is strategically sensitive, bordering both Pakistan and China.
• Chinese military presence in the Depsang and Demchok sectors remains unresolved post-2020 standoff.
• Civil society perceives increasing centralization, land access to corporate actors, and declining local agency.

Constitutional & Legal Aspects:

• Sixth Schedule is part of the Constitution and has been promised by BJP in 2019.
• The removal of Article 370 and 35A eliminated prior domicile protections.
• Mining and land use reforms are being enacted without public consultation (e.g., Environment Ministry memorandum removing mandatory hearings for critical mineral projects).

Recent Escalations:

• September 24, 2025: Police open fire on protestors in Leh. 4 civilians killed.
• Post-September 24: Sonam Wangchuk detained under the National Security Act.
• Allegations from civil society that peaceful protestors are being branded as “anti-national.”

Key Voices:

• Prof. Siddiq Wahid (Scholar of Ladakh & Central Asia):
  • Criticized lack of elected representation and centralized decision-making.
  • Stressed unity between Leh and Kargil as unprecedented and critical.
  • Warned against conflating cultural assertion with anti-national activity.
  • Emphasized risks of environmental degradation and demographic shifts due to unregulated tourism and extractive projects.
• Sonam Wangchuk (Activist):
  • Leading hunger strikes and awareness campaigns.
  • Advocating for peaceful resolution and constitutional protections.

Conclusion:

The situation in Ladakh is a product of long-standing demands for dignity, representation, and protection of cultural and environmental integrity. The Centre’s response, from policy delays to use of the NSA, has inflamed tensions. Civil society remains united and largely peaceful, urging constitutional negotiation over repression.

In my last piece about Kashmir, I briefly mentioned Shia factor in Kashmir in current context and Ahmadi factor in historical context.  Many otherwise well informed individuals admitted that they had little idea about these.  Others with more direct interaction with Kashmir issue asked questions and this is in response to these exchanges.  Enjoy if you are bored of black and white narratives on the subject and interested in ‘fifty shades of grey’.

Hamid

Shia of Kashmir

Hamid Hussain

Shia of Kashmir has a unique history.  There were two groups of Shias who migrated to Kashmir from present day Iran and Iraq in fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.  One group escaped persecution and other were missionaries.  Some artisan classes also joined these groups.   Local conversion due to efforts of missionaries increased Shia numbers.  In Gilgit-Baltistan area with geographic links to Badakhshan province of Afghanistan and Tajikistan, Ismaili missionaries were successful in small pockets while mainstream Ath’na Asha’ari (followers of twelve Imams) missionaries were successful in areas that are now part of Indian Controlled Kashmir (ICK).  Separation of Gilgit-Baltistan from Pakistan Controlled Kashmir (PCK) which is ethnically and linguistically different from Kashmiris left no significant Shia population in PCK.

In ICK, there are about one million Shia out of a total Muslim population of 8.5 million.  Shia are geographically and politically separated in ICK.  Sparsely populated Ladakh which is now separated from Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) as Union territory has equal numbers of Buddhists and Muslims.  In Kargil area, ninety percent of Muslim population is Shia numbering about 125’000.  There are small numbers of Sunnis in Drass area.  Remainder Shia population is concentrated in the Valley.

Many missionaries and Sufi orders of Shia and Sunni branches made Kashmir their home.  Like other Muslims of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, Shia of Kashmir also claim foreign ancestry.  This genetic pride of belonging to a ‘blue blood’ lineage has an undercurrent tone of avoiding stigma of conversion from local low-caste Hindus.  They add to their names the name of the city from where their ancestors may or may not have migrated.  Hamadani, Kirmani, Shirazi, Qazvini, Isfahani etc. are common last names used by Kashmiri Shia. Socially, Shia society is divided along elites consisting of clerics and landed aristocracy and artisan classes.  Politically, there are few Shia families competing for influence within the community and then projecting this influence to claim larger share in state’s political and economic fortunes.  This struggle for power inevitably results in fractures within dominant families.

For over a century, two families; Safavi and Ansari have been competing for religious and political leadership of the community in the Valley.  In view of claim over religious leadership and role in running Sharia courts, both families gradually degenerated into cults or sub-sects.  This had long term negative fallout for Shia community.  The Safavi or Agha family are Syeds and descendants of an Iranian Sufi saint.  The seat of Safavi family is in Budgam.  The most influential head was Agha Syed Yusuf al-Mosavi al-Safavi who died in 1982.  After Yusuf’s death, family was divided on the issue of successor.  Yusuf’s son Agha Syed Muhammad Fazlullah (1947-2018) and nephew Agha Syed Mustafa al-Mosavi al-Safavi (1918-2002) ran parallel organizations including separate Sharia courts.  The battle invariably spread to political arena as local and national political parties cultivated prominent family members for political clout.  Congress backed Mustafa while National Conference (NC) backed Fazlullah.  Family lost significant influence due to split was well as political somersaults of prominent members of the family for personal gains.  Fazlullah left political arena to his brother Mahmud.  After twice serving minister in NC government, he joined rival People’s Democratic party (PDP).  Later, when he was denied ticket by PDP, he came back to NC.  Mustafa’s two sons played the same game.  Agha Syed Hassan unsuccessfully contested elections on the ticket of Janata Party; forerunner of Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) and later joined separatist All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC).  His brother Agha Syed Mehdi (1959-2000) joined Congress but never won elections.  He was killed by militants in 2000.  His young son Ruhullah was promptly recruited by NC and he served as minister in Omar Abdullah’s cabinet.  Ruhullah was married to his cousin and daughter of Hassan.  In 2015, relations between two deteriorated after Ruhullah divorced his wife.  It reached a point where Hassan didn’t allow Ruhullah to observe death anniversary of his father in family Imambargah and fear of violence forced government to impose significant restrictions around family properties.

The Ansari family of Srinagar traces its origin to an Iranian scholar Mullah Alam Ansari who migrated to Kashmir.  Family continued the tradition of engaging in theological arena and members of the family are usually alumni of Shia learning centers of Najaf in Iraq.  Ansaris were well off from their land holdings and held control of lucrative endowments and major Imambargahs (Shia houses of mourning).  This family split on the death of Maulvi Muhammad Jawad in 1957.  Influential members of the family supported his son Maulvi Iftikhar Hussain Ansari (1942-2014) while a smaller group followed his cousin Maulvi Muhammad Abbas Ansari (1938- ).  Iftikhar held all the family’s fortunes and religious mantle.  The political wing Shia Association supported Shaikh Abdullah’s rival Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad during Shaikh Abdullah’s estrangement from Nehru and imprisonment.  Later Iftikhar joined NC and when it was ousted from power, he joined PDP.  Abbas having a weaker hand on religious, political and economic fronts joined Shaikh Abdullah’s plebiscite plank but didn’t get along when later became Chief Minister.  He formed Anjuman-e-Ittihad-e-Muslimeen (Society for Unity of Muslims) and supported separatist APHC.  He became chairman of APHC in 2003 but when he advocated negotiations with Delhi, he was ousted and replaced by Syed Ali Geelani.

Shias of Kargil have a unique history.  In fifteenth century, disciples of Shia Sufi Syed Muhammad Nurbakhsh (1392-1464) travelled from Khorasan and via Baltistan came to Kargil.  Many local followers of Tibetan Buddhism converted to Nurbakhshi order.  A century later, they converted to Ath’na Asha’ari creed from missionary works of disciples of Mir Shamsuddin Muhammad Araki (1440-1515).  In 1947 with division of Kashmir, large Shia population consisting of Ath’na Asha’ari, Nurbakhshi and Ismaili Shia concentrated in northern areas of Gilgit and Baltistan came under Pakistani control. Traditionally, clerical establishment organized under the banner of Anjuman-e-Jamiat-ul-Ulama Asna Asharia (Society of Clerics of Twelve Imamers) of Kargil, popularly known as Islamia school.  This body of orthodox clerics controlled religious and political aspects of the community.  They had links with Shia learning centers of Najaf and Karbala in Iraq.  Najafi House in Mumbai coordinates between clerics of Najaf and Indian Shia.  After expulsion of foreign clerics from Iraq under Saddam Hussain, many students from Kargil moved to Qum and Mashhad in Iran.

After Iranian revolution in 1979, a new wave swept among younger generation of Shia of Kargil.  This group consisted of young members from lower socio-economic ladders of the society.  They were influenced by the writings of ideologues of Iranian revolution especially Ayatollah Murtaza Motaharri (1919-1979).  This breakaway group from Islamia School established Imam Khomeini Memorial Trust (IKMT).  Iranian cultural center in Delhi is the link between Qum based clerics and Indian Shia.  These two groups now compete for community’s religious and political support. Islamia school uses photographs and posters of Iraq based Ayatollah Ali Sistani (1930-) while IKMT displays Iranian clerics Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989) and Ayatollah Ali Hussain Khamenei (1939 -).

Iranian government as well as religious establishments based in Qum as well as Iraq have links with Shia power centers of Kashmir.  Iranian government has close economic and diplomatic relations with India, and it is careful when it comes to internal issues of India especially Kashmir conflict.  On the other hand, office of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei does not have diplomatic restraint and needs to be cognizant of its sympathizers in foreign countries.  Khamenei’s office has more influence among Shia of Kashmir especially Kargil therefore his office has issued statements in support of Kashmir.

In the Valley, Shia largely live in their own neighborhoods but they are socially, politically and economically linked with Sunnis (with increased insecurity, Shia from mixed neighborhoods have moved out creating a certain degree of ghettoization).  They are also facing extreme insecurity like other inhabitants of the Valley with daily humiliations therefore resentment against India is strong.  However, there are very few Shia who joined armed struggle.  In 1990s, rise of mostly foreign militants of more austere forms of Sunni Islam in Kashmir raised fear among Shia.  This apprehension was due to fact of rising sectarianism in neighboring Pakistan where Shia were targets.  Later, in competition with Iran, Saudi Arabia funded new mosques in India including Kashmir that propagated more austere version of Islam that is different from Sufi version prevalent in Kashmir. Indian security apparatus is apprehensive about this trend fearing that more extremist groups like Daesh may find fertile ground in these mosques (this problem is more serious in southern states of Kerala and Karnataka). However, Indian political leadership is confident that strong economic and diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia can be used to mitigate this threat.  Jury is still out on this strategy as small cells operating outside Kashmir can create havoc.

In Kargil, local dynamics is competition with Buddhist half of the region and efforts are focused to increase Shia representation in political and economic hub of Ladakh. There is sympathy with Kashmir self-determination and Shia of Kargil opposed separation of Ladakh from J&K and transition to a Union territory. However, being away from the most insecure areas and now more autonomy under Hill Councils, their political strategy to increase participation in local politics and development projects.  Indian government will likely use these trends to keep Shia of Kargil at least neutral in conflict with Muslims of the Valley.  However, several factors such as lower socio-economic status and more ideological bent towards Shia resistance models of Middle East make Shia of Kargil a potential trouble spot.

Shia of Kashmir are influenced by events in broader Shia world.  There have been protests in ICK when Pakistan arrested a Shia cleric in Gilgit and when Saudi Arabia executed dissident Shia cleric Shaikh Nimr al Nimr.  Iran is using this influence for ideological reasons and rallying support of Shia outside Iran for its geo-political objectives.  However, it is managing it under the banner of Muslim unity and strenuously avoids any criticism of internal policies of Indian government related to Kashmir.  On its part, Indian government using its good relations with Iran will like to see this influence being used to keep Shia of Kashmir neutral in separatist conflict. However, being a minority, Shia of Kashmir need a balancing act to avoid the charge of being traitors to the separatist cause.

In the last three decades, new generation of Shia is influenced by Shia resistance literature. Iranian and Lebanese resistance literature is translated and very popular among young Shia of Kashmir.  Essential element is the doctrine of Khamenei dividing world into two groups; mustazaf’een (oppressed) and istikhbar’een (oppressors).  This has powerful resonance among Shia and rise of power of Shia militias operating in Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq and Syria has made deep impact on Shia all over the world including Kashmir. There have been reports of some Kashmiri Shias being trained by Iran and Hezbollah for fighting in Iraq and Syria.  Young generation of Shia are angry at their own corrupt elite and influenced by the resistance Shia models of Middle East.  If this trend gains momentum, then some Shia youth may drift towards armed struggle.

Shia of Kashmir are a minority within a minority.  Shia leadership is walking a fine line.  Grievances of Kashmiris are also grievances of Shia and leadership of various groups needs to express this view.  However, on the other hand, they don’t want to cross a certain line that can seriously jeopardize physical, social and economic health of their community.

Notes:

Radhika Gupta.  Experiments with Khomeini’s Revolution in Kargil: Contemporary Shi’a networks between India and West India.  Modern Asian Studies, March 2014, Volume: 48, Issue: 2. Pp. 370-398.

Parvez Alam.  The Spread of Shi’ism in Kashmir during Chak Dynasty 1554-1586.  Islam and Modern Studies, 2015

Sajjad Haider.  Shias of Kashmir: Socio-political Dilemmas. Kashmir Observer

Abhinav Pandya.  Iran and Saudi Arabia’s Proxy Wars have a new battlefield: Indian Controlled Kashmir.  Haaretz, 21 July 2019

Hamid Hussain.  The Wild Card – Shia’s of Iraq.  Defence Journal, August 2003, Volume: 7, No. 1.

Cole, J. R. I.  Roots of North Indian Shi’ism in Iran and Iraq: Religion and State in Awadh, 1722-1859.  Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.

Hamid Hussain

coeusconsultant@optonline.net

11 October 2019

Review from Major Amin. 

NASIM ZEHRAS TOO LATE AFTER THE EVENT KARGIL BOOK ANALYSED

Agha H Amin

My first issue with this book is that analysis delayed is analysis lost and Nasim Zehra is guilty of publishing this analysis some 20 years late. Before that she was in the good books of many culprits of Kargil who 20 years later are fired cartridges with near zero nuisance value. More seriously, I take analytical as well as conceptual dispute with her in regarding characters like Lieutenant General Javed Hassan as “ courageous and conscientious”

:– A work so well researched should not have basic factual wrong, as on page 23 where our brilliant author misses the point that parts of Gurdaspur district were awarded to India and not the whole Gurdaspur district as she fallaciously claims

:– On page 33 Nasim Zehra starts making factually outrageous factually totally incorrect assertions like shifting India’s Northern Command Headquarters from Udhampur to Leh

:– On page 35 Nasim Zehra becomes more outrageous with facts:

Firstly corps headquarters don’t send military patrols which are sent by lower formations, in this case FCNA. Secondly Nasim Zehra demotes Commander FCNA Major General Imtiaz Warraich from major general to brigadier ! Thirdly Nasim Zahra’s basic facts are false and incorrect when she fallaciously claims that Major General Imtiaz Warraich was FCNA Commander from 1982 to 1984 whereas in reality Imtiaz Warraich was commander FCNA from 15 Jun 1980 to 15 Jun 1982. The Imtiaz Warraich interview that she cites as a reference was conducted by this scribe. But Nasim Zehra is supremely arrogant in not citing this scribe by name. On 1st October 2001 I had resigned from Defense Journal and proceeded to Afghanistan to evacuate some friends. The interview was published after I had left the journal and defense journal as it was miserly staffed had an old retired colonel doing proof reading who did not publish the correct dates in proof reading. But Nasim Zehra with her massive line of contacts and admirers could have been more careful with her facts.

Now our pro establishment author Nasim Zehra fails to analyse or point out that Siachen was one of the greatest intelligence failures in Pakistan’s military history where both ISI and Military Intelligence failed in doing their basic jobs. We expected more intellectual honesty from a book so much over-projected and elevated to the level of a masterpiece. On page 41 Nasim Zehra again gets her facts wrong when she claims that Operation Venus was conducted whereas in reality the operation was only planned and never conducted: — On page 42 Nasim Zehra fallaciously elevates Lt Gen Safdar to the position of Pakistan Army’s 1 Corp commander, a position that he never held. How outrageous so called researchers and analysts can get with facts is mind boggling. For this imperial blunder our brilliant author Ms. Nasim Zehra cites no reference.

On page 43 Nasim Zehra continues making false assertions like claiming that Musharraf and Ali Kuli were from post 1965 generation of officers whereas both were commissioned in 1964 and participated in 1965 war :– Both officers were clearly from pre 1965 army courses. Nasim Zehra is intellectually dishonest about circumstances of General Jahangir Karamat’s forced retirement which had massive links with his financial corruption in taking kickbacks in Ukrainian tanks deal. On page 81 again she is more than tactful when she discusses why Musharraf was made army chief :– The essential rationale was that it was stated that he belonged to the Urdu speaking minority and did not have the clout in the army to stage a coup because of his ethnicity.

A very serious flaw of this book is lack of serious research in analyzing mindset of the principal characters who launched Kargil operation. Nasim Zehra claims that she was researching the book from 2002 or so. In 17 years she could have easily discovered that Javed Hassan authored a book sponsored by Pakistan Army’s staff college which made all kind of bogus claims like claiming that “the Hindu belief system lacked commitment for sacrifice on battlefield” (page-58-India – A Study in Profile-Brigadier Javed Hassan) .That India would be unable to sustain reverses (page-208). Nasim Zehra could have related this book to Javed Hassan’s preconceived gross underestimation of India. The most dangerous part of this book was that it was sponsored by command and Staff College Quetta’s “Faculty of Research and Doctrinal Studies” and was distributed to all officers by Pakistan Army book club. This was seriously relevant to the issue as there was a widespread mass mindset in Pakistan Army in underestimating India. This I personally saw in my service in Pakistan Army in 1981-94. However Nasim Zehra does not point out any such thing. This just shows how ham-handedly she worked on the book.

All along the book if Nasim Zehra had done her homework carefully, something entirely feasible and easy to do, she could have answered many questions, like Major General Javed Hassan’s gross under estimation of the Indians like the discussion on page 119 :– All along in the book “India –Study in Profile” Javed Hassan had claimed that Indians are weak and irresolute in counter-acting. But our author had not done her basic home work at all. It is far easier to understand Kargil when it is related to Javed Hassan’s book, but our so-called brilliant Nasim Zehra is an apology of a military historian of substance. The books central idea is analyzing the motivation of launching the Kargil adventure and it falls flat on its face as Nasim Zehra miserably fails to decipher the overambitious personality of Major General Javed Hassan and his utopian fantasies about Indian weakness as rationalized in his book India a study in profile. The only consoling point of the book is an illustration of Lt Gen Mahmud’s indecisive personality on page 132:– On page 138 again Nasim Zehra fails to present a conclusive analysis of Javed Hassan’s personality as she fails to link it to Javed Hassan’s gross mental under-estimation of India as enunciated in India A Study in profile articles in COMMAND AND STAFF College Quetta FORADS sponsored study of 1987-91.

The book contains many known and repeated stories about Kargil. All along Nasim Zehra fails to analyse that Javed Hassan had served in DC embassy and acted as main catalyst of Kargil after his return. At least she could have analyzed the possibilities of US machinations in causing Kargil so that both India and Pakistan could be arm twisted ! After all there was a man named Machiavelli who discusses these matters long before Nasim Zehra was born ! Nasim Zahra’s research remains partial and incomplete. Lt General Khawaja Zia Uddin had tasked one Major Saqib from engineers to do fact finding of Kargil operations. Saqib found out that Major General Javed Hassan had recommended to the GHQ that some 65 to 80 % officers involved in Kargil operations be retired prematurely as he was not satisfied with their performance. Such was the gross intellectual dishonesty of Pakistani military commander for scapegoating his subordinates. But no, Nasim Zehra would remain supremely vague and non-committal . On page 355 she does make a passing reference but still gives Javed Hassan a clean chit !

Nasim Zahra’s analysis of Kargil decision making is utopian and being wise in hindsight. A more logical explanation which she totally misses is that (1) Major General Javed Hassan was ultra-ambitious (2) Javed Hassan grossly underestimated India since earliest days at least 1987-90 on record as proven by citadel staff college Quetta articles (3) that Pakistan Army as an institution had adopted Javed Hassan’s mad under estimation of India as its operational philosophy once Pakistan Army distributed Javed Hassan’s nonsense delusional gross under estimation of India to all officers ! Yes Musharraf bumped into over ambitious men like Javed Hassan and Mahmud and these men were the principal reason who sabotaged the decision making process. But Pakistan Army as an institution cannot be exonerated in having grossly under estimated India. To call Kargil a blunder by gang of four would be gross underestimation of a phenomenon that was collective madness.

There are serious typo errors in book like making Junejo premier in 1984 when he was nobody in reality as on page 456. The worst irony remains that the world remains in firm grip of opportunism. When this scribe critiqued Kargil as in an article published in NATION Lahore people like Nasim Zehra were having best time of their lives in living safe lives of not ever discussing Kargil when Musharraf was at the height of his power. But only after 20 years when Musharraf is totally sidelined and discredited , one Nasim Zehra analyses Kargil ! Too late !

The book lacks maps which is a serious failing of the book

Appended below is this scribes article on Kargil published in 2003:

 The Kargil Conspiracy The Nation 29 May 2003 A.H Amin

What I wrote in 2003 was when the likes of Jamshed Gulzar Kiani and Shahid Aziz were enjoying all perks and privileges of being corps commander and CGS. And one fine day these opportunists suddenly discovered that Musharraf was not a good guy ! Opportunism Pakistani Army style ! There is general consensus on the fact that military juntas are convenient agents of change employed by larger powers to bring desired policy changes in smaller countries. This is truer for Pakistan where the USA has had a record of using the military juntas as agents of change . Ayub was cultivated in the 1950s and proved his worth as USA’s collaborator par excellence in destroying democracy in Pakistan . The Zia coup was US inspired and had complete US blessings since the USA viewed Mr. Z.A Bhutto as a dangerously charismatic leader capable of uniting the Islamic/Third World ! Thus Operation Foul Play of 5th July 1977 ! When Liaquat Ali Khan the then prime minister of Pakistan warned the US Ambassador to Pakistan that the Graham Report on Kashmir must be presented in the UN by 15th October 1951 he was assassinated on 16th October 1951 ! Raja Ghazanfar Ali then Pakistan’s ambassador to Iran noted that Liaquat had planned an Islamic conference to discuss Kashmir , Anglo Iranian Oil Company and Palestine ! Keeping this background in mind the fact that a deliberate conspiracy with a design to control and manipulate Pakistan’s geopolitical future with Kargil as the key point cannot be ruled out. It is possible that Kargil may have been designed as the catalyst to create a civil-military political conflict in Pakistan and as a future launching pad of a military coup.

In 1998 Nawaz Sharif, often criticized as a man with limited IQ, took one of Pakistan’s most decisive strategic command decisions defying USA , not appeasing it as Musharraf took in September 2001 ! It is on record that Nawaz Sharif did not surrender on one telephone call from US president like General Musharraf did and defied US threats to go on with the nuclear tests despite four telephone call threats from US president Clinton and resolutely went on with Pakistan’s Nuclear blasts ! Dr Qadeer Khan speaking at a function in Karachi on 3rd April 2003 stated that Nawaz even refused an offer of bribe from Clinton wherein Clinton had offered to deposit 100 Million USD in Nawaz Sharif’s personal bank account ! All evidence proves that Nawaz Sharif’s decision to go on with the nuclear blast was a political decision and the role of the armed forces was merely that of a technocrat consultant ! It appears that from May 1998 the US policy makers came to the conclusion that Nawaz was an irresponsible man and must be taken to task.. By September 1998 it appears that the Americans had succeeded in their manipulations . The then Army chief General Karamat at this stage started pressurizing the political leadership to include the army in the political decision making . Nawaz had done his homework well. With the ISI firmly under the prime ministers command under Lieutenant General Zia Uddin one senior officer Zulfiqar, later chairman WAPDA, had been sent to Ukraine to find details of kickbacks given to General Jahangir Karamat in the Ukrainian tank deal with Pakistan. Full evidence was prepared of Jahangir’s complicity in taking kickbacks. Once Karamat asserted his political ambitions Nawaz threatened him with prosecution for taking kickbacks ! Thus Jahangir Karamat’s unceremonial exit from power ! USA’s likely agent of change had been removed ! Now comes Kargil. With the appointment of Musharraf as army chief the more Machiavellian geopolitical moves were planned ! Major general Javed Hassan Khan previously military attaché to Washington where many military attaches are successfully cultivated by US intelligence was posted as Commander FCNA in charge of the forces in Gilgit ,Northern Areas including Kargil. The readers may note that this officer presently the commandant of the Pakistan Army’s National Defense College , back in early 1990s made Mughal Emperor Humayun fight in Second Battle of Panipat in his book “India- A Study in Profile ! The fact is that Humayun was dead while Panipat was fought and Humayun had no connection with Second Battle of Panipat ! MY LETTER TO COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE QUETTA ABOUT THEN LIEUT COL JAVED HASSANS BOOK AND ITS HISTORICAL DISTORTIONS IN 1991 WHILE SERVING AS AN INSTRUCTOR AT TACTICAL WING SCHOOL OF ARMOUR NOWSHERA. NO ONE KNEW THEN HOW JAVED HASSAN AND PERVEZ MUSHARRAF WOULD PLAY HELL WITH PAKISTAN ARMY AT KARGIL

The men who planned Kargil military operation using Pakistan’s 80 Brigade to infiltrate Indian positions in Kargil Sector were instruments of a grand conspiracy to destabilize Pakistan’s political government which had defied the USA and wanted to make peace with India without US involvement ! Ambition of General Musharraf and his team while planning Kargil had infected the entire military thought process ! The Kargil plan was adventurist, superpower manipulated and its intrinsic violence penetrated and cut open the very arteries of the Pakistani state, spurting out in civil military strife and finally a military coup ! FATHERS OF THE KARGIL FAUX PAS MUSHARRAF AND JAVED HASSAN The heroes of those rocky pinnacles are all dead ! Sacrificed in vain ! Diabolically launched into the valleys of death by men who now are dead earnest to make peace with India but propelled by promiscuous and unadulterated ambition wanted to sabotage Nawaz Sharif’s Lahore Peace move in 1999 ! Once Vajpayee came to Lahore on Nawaz’s initiative in 1999 he was a vampire but once Musharraf went to Agra later Vajpayee was an angel ! At the super power level Kargil was planned with a view to ridicule Pakistan’s political leadership , embarrass the Pakistani prime minister and to create a civil military divide aimed at a military coup in Pakistan ! Why ! Someone may ask naively ! Because the USA views the military junta in Third World countries as a more reliable collaborator agent of change than a prime minister who repeatedly defies US threats of retaliation and a 100 Million USD bribery offer ! Thus Kargil operation was launched with an ulterior motive to divide Pakistan’s political and military leaderships !

It is an unfortunate fact of history that Nawaz Sharif was not aided by a good defense analyst team ! Those who were with him and supposedly considered defense experts were either in secret league with Nawaz’s handpicked military man or too naive to understand the military intricacies of Kargil ! Kargil in the final analysis stands out as the meticulously planned conspiracy catalyst employed to trigger a chain of events that led to the primacy of the military junta on 12 October 1999 ! So far the Americans have succeeded ! The Pakistani Nuclear program is in safe hands ! Pakistan , the beautiful woman in words of General Habibullah has sold herself to , not the highest bidder , but the only bidder at a relatively low price ! The military junta has divided the society ! Bought the pillars of state ! Balkanized the political parties ! Marginalized the society introducing unjust ethnic domination in the army , reduced the Sindhis into a political minority , pitched Punjab against Sindh by Machiavellian agreement to Thal Canal and is all set to strike a deal with India which would ensure that Pakistan’s military junta is given a permanent share in the political hierarchy simply because it is USA’s best and most reliable agent of change ! Life goes on !

Kargil-A Military Analysis Based on discussion with various direct participants of this faux pas in between 1999 and 2002. 15 June 2003 A.H Amin

Kargil stands as perhaps the final military effort on Pakistan’s part to settle the Kashmir dispute by military means. Analysis has mostly centered on political aspects of the operation while the military aspects have been largely left to the imagination of the public. Lately it has been claimed that Kargil was launched to bail out Mujahideen as a last resort ! This is an insult to the memory of the Pakistani armed forces “Volunteers” who died in that Himalayan wasteland without a funeral and in circumstances of unimaginable misery ! Kargil operation cannot be understood unless the personalities and motives of the principal characters are examined ! Every action in history is the final culmination of a personality’s self-perception, ambition and subconscious as well as conscious urges. In this context the Kargil operation was born out of two key factors ! One was the personality of General Pervez Musharraf and the second was the unceremonial manner in which Nawaz Sharif ousted General Jahangir Karamat Musharraf’s predecessor army chief of Pakistan Army. Musharraf as those who have served with him know which includes this scribe also has always been an intensely ambitious man ! One hallmark of his personality is that he wants to stand out as a great military commander ! Propelled by an enormous ego wherever he served he endeavored to do something extraordinary ! However fate did not allow him the glory in battle which his other course mates like shabbir sharif achieved ! In 1965 Musharraf was a subaltern in an artillery unit which saw little action apart from supporting operations by indirect fire ! The 16 SP unlike 3 SP which fired on Indian tanks with direct gunsights at Chawinda stayed in conventional artillery role ! In 1971 Musharraf’s commando company was not involved in action ! I Interviewed Musharraf’s Commanding Officer in 1971 Lt Col Iqbal Nazir Warraich in 2002 and he stated that Musharraf did not see any action under his command in 1971 contrary to prevalent myths. Nevertheless Musharraf compensated for this lack of combat laurels by achieving laurels in army courses and in various command assignments ! His final opportunity came when he ascended to the post of army chief in a situation when the army was in a subservient position vis a vis the civilian head of state , something which was regarded by the military hierarchy as worse than blasphemy ! The forced retirement of General Karamat by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was regarded as a personal defeat by the Pakistani military brass and by Musharraf who felt that he would be a far weaker army chief under a strong prime minister who had asserted civilian control over the military machine ! These two factors were the fathers of the Kargil operation ! Ambition accompanied by a perception that the Pakistani public must be convinced that the soldiers were better than politicians.

Kargil at the military level was the brainchild of three men i.e. General Musharraf the army chief ,Aziz the then army Chief of general Staff and Mahmud the then corps commander 10 Corps ! Musharraf and Mahmud were motivated by intense ambition to achieve military glory and Aziz was motivated by his Kashmiri ancestry plus military ambition. The person they selected to execute the operation was again one distinguished by out of proportion ambition i.e. Major General Javed Hassan , author of a book in 1990s that claimed that India was on its way to disintegration and in which Mughal king Humayun was resurrected from the grave to fight at Second Battle of Panipat ! In November December 1998 just one month after Musharraf’s elevation to the post of army chief volunteers were asked for at the army level for an operation in Kashmir ! Many thousand volunteered including both officers and men from various units ! At no stage did any Mujahideen enter Kargil ! This is a piece of fiction and has no veracity ! These were attached to NLI units in the 80 Brigade sector for training. The principal idea of the plan was to infiltrate four battalions of NLI (Northern light Infantry) stationed in 80 Brigade Sector into Kargil Heights overlooking and dominating the Srinagar Ladakh road the lone Indian link with the Siachen and Leh Sectors ! The idea being to cut the lifeline of Indian supplies to Leh and Siachen Sectors ! Indian held heights in Kargil were to be occupied in February 1999 while Indian infantry had abandoned these heights at the approach of winter snow as an annual routine since 1948.In occupying the heights no fighting was involved ! The real issue was that of supplying Pakistani troops holding these heights which was far more difficult from the Pakistani side than from the Indian side ! Plans were kept secret and even the Commander 10 Corps Engineers of was not allowed to enter the Operations Room in 10 Corps Pindi. The distance involved in reaching the heights varied from 15 to 35 kilometers from Pakistan side over mountains as high as 13 to 19,000 feet .To do this each battalion was divided into two parts , one acting as porters taking supplies forward and one half occupying the heights .

The heights were occupied as per the plan but the four units while doing so were severely exhausted ! In March-April the Indians discovered the Pakistani presence and reacted severely ! Severe fighting continued till July once the Indians finally re-captured the heights after Pakistani troops had been left to the mercy of Indian artillery and overwhelming troop concentrations as a result of the Blair House Accord ! A brief military examination of the plan reveals following weaknesses.(1) Failure to assess strategic repercussions of the operation at geopolitical and national strategic level .(2) Logistic failure in incorrect appreciation of supplying the troops . (3) Failure to understand that by occupying the heights the Indians were driven into a corner and had no choice but to retaliate , not for glory as was the Pakistani military’s case but for pure military survival . (4) At a more subtle level the use of the Chora-Batalik Sector as a future spring board for Pakistani operations against India was sealed since Indians heavily fortified this sector for any future war.

The Pakistani planners failed to assess that war as an instrument of policy is no longer in vogue at the international level and their temporary military success would only bring greater international censure and a negative war mongering image without any corresponding military gain at the strategic level. This scribe interviewed a former commander of FCNA and 10 Corps about logistics and General Imtiaz Warraich replied as following :– ” We initiated this operation but failed to support it with comprehensive operational planning and above all buildup for essential logistic support without which no operation can succeed”……'” the principal reason for our heavy casualties and lack of progress was unimaginative and callous logistic operations to support the units”. At one point the sepoys who had volunteered to fight and had come from many other infantry units to the NLI units refused to act as porters carrying supplies over 15 kilometers and were so exasperated that they defied Javed Hassan’s personal orders in unit durbars to carry supplies and when Javed Hassan threw his cap on the ground threatened to march over it unless they were not employed as porters ! One such volunteer told this scribe that we had volunteered to fight ,not to act as porters ! The same fact was also mentioned in ISI chief Zia Uddin Butt’s secret report to Nawaz Sharif prepared by an Engineer officer on Zia’s staff in ISI ! The failure to assess the “Enemy” factor was another strategic planning failure at the highest level .I asked General Warraich this question and he stated ” Capture of Kargil Heights would totally stop all Indian movement to Leh and Ladakh Sectors unlike Pakistan in Siachen and Indians had no option but to do and die ” !

Lust for glory and honor in battle are perfectly reasonable aspirations as long as they are accompanied by commensurate military talent in the generals who are at the helm of affairs ! This was sadly lacking in the Musharraf team who planned the operation. Their egos were many times larger than their real military talent ! By promoting an intensely ambitious man to the rank of army chief Nawaz did a favor which could only be repaid by betrayal ! The plan was based not on sound military reasoning but on burning ambition and an unrealistic desire for glory by men far away from the heat of battle ! No one above major level died , yet in a report to the military secretary’s branch Javed Hassan recommended retiring 75 % of officers involved in the operation below colonel level ! The prime minister was not fully briefed because of ulterior motives ! Had the operation succeeded it would have been projected as a proof of Musharraf’s Napoleonic brilliance and if it failed as it did Nawaz Sharif would have been made the scapegoat !

MUSHARRAF AS COMMANDER 1 CORPS The operations planners were distinguished neither by loftiness of thought, nor audacity in the conduct of battle at the operational or strategic level. Thus boldness at tactical level was sacrificed because of operational and tactical timidity at the highest level. No one appreciated that the army men who were employed , and it is a fiction that there was a single Mujahid in Kargil , had flesh and blood ! These men mourned by a few hundred families were sons, husbands, fathers and brothers ! The Kargil operation at the military level is a watershed ! Idealism that propelled many hundred to die in those Himalayan wastes is buried for good ! Now there is a new breed which dominates the army ! The ones who aim at going on lush UN secondments or to KESC,WAPDA or as well paid consultants ! Karnal Sher Khan was fighting till August 1999 as the plate below his picture at a Pakistan Army mess indicates. This means that these indomitable warriors were fighting like Lions while their shameless opportunist commander Musharraf had abandoned them in July 1999 to die fighting without ammunition and rations, what can one conclude ! It was the human heart that failed in Kargil and this heart which failed was housed in the ribcage of men sitting in the GHQ and not on the rocky pinnacles of Kargil ! Once the supply lines were closed under Indian threat of a counter attack , these brave men all Pakistan Army regulars were abandoned to die , pounded by artillery fire , bayoneted by overwhelming numbers , weakened by starvation ! Who can hear their cries ! Our ears are covered with heaps of lies ! Truth died at Kargil ! What remains is a body guard of lies!

Our Brown Pundit Zachary Latif will hopefully share his perspectives on Pakistani Psychosis soon. Tarek Fatah gives a good synopsis of Pakistani Psychosis and Islamism in the above video. I am not an expert on Pakistani Pysochosis, and cannot validate many of Tarek Fatah’s perspectives on Pakistan. However, with respect to Islam, many muslims (including prominent religious leaders) privately share many of Tarek’s views, but the vast majority are too afraid to share their views publicly. Tarek Fatah is very knowledgeable about Arabic, Islamic scripture and Islamic law. If you have the time, please watch the entire video.

What is Pakistani psychosis? I am not completely certain and look forward to evolving my views with new information. To oversimplify, it is the combination of several things:

1. A negation and rejection of:
   1. the traditional moderate Hindu influenced Islam that was common in Pakistan before 1947
   2. pan Hindustani Bharatiya Deshi Arya culture that greatly influenced the ancestors of modern Pakistanis in the 1940s. This culture still extends across and influences much of Asia now.
2. An embrace and idolization of extreme Arab Sunni Islamist or near Islamist Islam, partly inspired by Ibn Taymiyyah. Specifically extreme Sunni interpretations from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Al-Azhar University Egypt and the Ikhwan (also called Muslim Brotherhood–a Salafi soft Islamist global organization.)
   1. Note that many Pakistanis who embrace this extremist Sunni Islamist or near Islamist Islam are not Arabic, Koranic, Hadith, Sira, or law jurisprudence experts and don’t fully understand or appreciate what they are idolizing and embracing.
   2. Extreme Sunni Arabs–especially Saudis–generally look down on Pakistanis as a type of slave subhuman untermensch. Imagine how many Americans in the deep south looked down on slaves in the early 1800s. Then multiply it by a hundred and maybe you get into the ballpark.  Extreme Sunni Arabs don’t much respect Asians or Africans in general. [Not all Sunni Arabs are extreme Sunni Arabs.]
   3. Arab worship is why Pakistan embraces a type of pan global Islamism and takes great pride in her leadership over the Chechan fight against Russia, Bosnian fight against Serbia, Kosovan fight against Serbia, “Iraqi resistance” fight against Americans, Iranians, Iraqi Army, Shiites and Kurds; Libyan Jihadis, Syrian Jihadis, Kashmiri fight against India, Algerian Jihadis, Somalian Jihadis, Nigerian Jihadis, Filipino Jihadis, Thai Jihadis, Indonesian Jihadis, Afghan Jihad against Russians, Iranians, Northern Alliance, Afghan National Army, UN, NATO, US, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras. Pakistani jihadis play an important role in wars and terrorism across Africa, Asia, Europe, Australia, North America and to a lesser degree parts of Latin America. There are allegations that Pakistani Jihadis have participated in attacks against Burmese.
3. Extreme paranoia and conspiracy theories of everything Indian or Jewish for no reason other than it is Indian or Jewish. To a lesser degree this is also true of  Afghanistan, Iran (despite Pakistan’s deep cultural and religious links with Afghanistan and Iran), Israel, Europe, Russia and North America. This is not based on a calculation of Pakistani values or Pakistani interests, and is irrational.
4. A state within the state euphemistically called “Deep State” or “General Headquarters”-“GHQ” for short. They are opaque and ambiguous. Most of the people supporting it are useful idiots. Most of their leaders are confused. They see Pakistan as the nexus around which the world turns and believe that every action that foreigners take is somehow about Pakistan; reminiscent in many ways of the Ugly Americanism [we are the only influential powerful country . . . everything that happens to foreigners or that foreigners do is related to us] of the second half of the 20th century. They promote a type of confused unclear Pakistani nationalism that is fused with a type of global pan Islamic nationalism. They work hand in glove with Islamists; but many of them aren’t very religious or don’t have a deep understanding of Islamism or truly believe in Islamism. The irrational,  confused, amorphous, mostly manic bipolar, psychotic state of their brains might sometimes be called the psychosis of the Deep State.

The combination of all four of these phenomenon might collectively be called “Pakistani Psychosis”.

It is important to remember that many Pakistanis are good people. Many Pakistanis are minorities who utterly reject the Pakistani Psychosis. Many Pakistanis are good muslims. Many Pakistanis are normal. Many Pakistanis are great sources of love and light. But they are fighting an uphill battle against Pakistani Psychosis.

These are the Pakistanis the world should try to help but rarely does.

I look forward to everyone’s feedback. I am sure my views on Pakistani Psychosis will evolve with new information and feedback.

[As a clarification to what is written above, a global pan Islam nationalist isn’t necessarily a practicing or believing muslim. Tariq Ali for example.]

PS. Please also watch this interview by Husain Haqqani that comprehensively covers most of these themes:

This video by Husain Haqqani as well:

Husain Haqqani additionally emphasizes the need of Pakistan for neoliberal economic reforms and opening Pakistani tourism, student visas, work visas, business travel, trade, business development. Open up with India, China and the West. Then Pakistan could become a self reliant developed rich country.

Husain Haqqani says that he is a Pakistani but also a civilizational Indian. Husain appears to celebrate the success and rise of India. I completely agree. The rise of India is very good for Pakistan much the way the rise and success of Pakistan is very good for India.

Madiha Afzal, author of “Pakistan Under Siege: Extremism, Society, and the State” (Brookings, 2018), also covers many aspects of Pakistani narrative dysfunction:

40 minutes it Madiha’s research finds more support for extremism among Pakistani young people than older people–which she tries to explain. As an aside previous research has found support for extreme Islamism rises as education increases and as affluence increases.

Husain Haqqani is concerned that CPEC will saddle Pakistan with debt to China that Pakistan will not be able to service. [Might CPEC saddle Pakistan with about $60 billion in debt?] Husain Haqqani says that Pakistan is no longer even a semi democratic country, but a country where the military and intelligence services control decision making. And the media is under deep and strong control. The US no longer considers Pakistan and ally. It is not Imran Khan’s government. It is General Qamar Javed Bajwa’s government. No better person could have been found since Imran Khan during his Oxford days used to be called “Im the dim.” He gets to called the PM and someone else gets to call the shots. Doesn’t see Indian Pakistani relations going anywhere anytime soon.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ds5yTBafmS8

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

The following is a great summary of Lashkar e Taiba, one of the main proxies of the Pakistani Army Deep State General Headquarters establishment. They avoid attacking Pakistani minorities (including twelvers, irfan, sixers, hindus, christians, sikhs, bahai, sufis, sindhis) inside Pakistan except when ordered to by the state; while engaging in attacks against other Islamic sects and other faiths outside of Pakistan:

I would recommend watching a spectacular summary of Pakistan by Christine Fair where she describes Pakistan as massively more dangerous to the world than Iran and implies that America should collaborate with Iran to manage Pakistani psychosis:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MXJYgcaug00

Many BP articles related to Tarek Fatah and Husain Haqqani linked to below.

Article first published March 26th, 2018. Revised January 23rd, 2019.

Why do nonmuslims treat muslims so badly (b)?

Why do nonmuslims treat muslims so badly (a)?

Israelis love Indians and Indians love Israelis

Husain Haqqani

Open Letter to the Taliban

At U.S. Urging, Pakistan to Be Placed on Terrorism-Financing List – The New York Times

Why do nonmulims mistreat muslims so much?

Shahid Aziz retired from the Pakistan army after a long and successful career, reaching the rank of Lieutenant General (3 star general) and serving as DG analysis wing of the ISI, DGMO (director general military operations), CGS (chief of general staff) and corps commander (commanding 4 corps in Lahore). After retirement, he served as chairman of the powerful National Accountability Bureau (NAB), the main anti-corruption watchdog in Pakistan. In spite of having been one of General Musharraf’s closest associates (and related to him by marriage; the daughter of one of Shahid Aziz’s cousins is married to Musharraf’s son) he became increasingly critical of Musharraf after retirement and in 2013 he wrote a book that was highly critical of Musharraf and of Pakistan’s supposedly pro-US policies at that time.

In May 2018 there were several news reports claiming that General Shahid Aziz had left his home last year (or even earlier) to join the Jihad against the West and had been killed, either in Syria or in Afghanistan (General Musharraf was the one who claimed he was killed in Syria, most other reports said Afghanistan). While his family has denied these reports, they have not been able to produce any explanation about where he is if he has not actually died on Jihad. So I decided to read the book. Having read it, I think the combination of naive idealism and PMA-level Islamism found in his book makes it very likely that these reports are true. My review follows (please also read this review by Abdul Majeed Abid as a complementary piece)

The first surprising thing about the book is that it is written in Urdu. Most military autobiographies in Pakistan have been written in English, a simplified/desi version of which is the lingua franca of the Pakistani elite. This may be because General Shahid Aziz (like his mentor Musharraf) was a Mohajir, and unlike Musharraf he seems to have been well read in Urdu and comfortable with using it. While his own politics are firmly in the Islamist-PTI-PMA category, he is also a huge fan of the Marxist-Leninist poet Faiz Ahmed Faiz and quotes him un-ironically throughout the book. Whether this reflects positively on Shahid Aziz or negatively on Faiz Ahmed Faiz is up to the reader. In any case, points to General sahib for writing in Urdu, and that too, in good Urdu. Not that he did not know enough English; he even wrote poetry in English (a poem called “The Naked Deceiver” is in the book. It is not a great poem, but the vocabulary is extensive, which may be one reason he had such a great career in the Pakistani military: he could write good idiomatic English).

He describes his own motivation for writing the book in these words: “I did nothing in my military service over which I should feel eternal shame, but what I did in the last few years and where we brought the country in those years, the weight of those actions has been crushing me for the last 5 years.. what use are regrets now you may ask? ..but I wanted to write this book so that maybe some young person can learn something from my experience”.  This feeling is his main motivation for writing this book. A few years ago one may have dismissed this as the usual grandstanding where retired army officers transform into warriors of the Ummah (on TV) after retirement, but continue to hold on to green cards and foreign bank accounts. But if the story of General Shahid Aziz joining the mujahideen and dying in that effort is correct (as it appears to be) then in this case at least, the conversion was sincere.

What were these actions that he regrets to much? He was a participant in Musharraf’s coup (and as he makes clear in the book, it was no spontaneous response to Nawaz Sharif’s firing of the army chief, it was a pre-planned coup) and then in his martial law regime. Under this regime, Pakistan joined the American war on terror as a “non-NATO ally” and fought against the mujahideen in Afghanistan (and beyond). It is this betrayal of Islamic solidarity that Shahid Aziz regretted, and it is this regret that eventually drove him to write this book (and it seems, to join the mujahideen in his old age).

A military brat, Shahid Aziz grew up in cantonments all across the country, was an average to below average student and was madly in love with his cousin (who later became his wife). He joined the army, was an outstanding cadet (he got the sword of honor at PMA) and was posted as a young officer in the Chamb sector (in Kashmir) in the 1971. His memories of the war give an interesting window into war as it looks to fresh young officers (complete with the fog of war and minor atrocities; such as an Indian prisoner who was shot dead by someone the day after Shahid Aziz happened to see him bound and helpless). Shahid Aziz comes across as idealistic and honorable (e.g. he refused to vote in Gen Zia’s fake referendum, and he claims to have had a George Washington moment when Zia came to inspect his unit during a major exercise and asked about their training; Aziz answered that there was no training and this was all a fake show; a piece of information that Zia did not appreciate) but then again, he is writing the book. Whether there was another more calculating side to him is not revealed in this book, but it is hard to believe that he made Lt General in the army by always telling the truth. Some awareness of when to keep your mouth shut must have been there even in idealistic young Shahid Aziz.

He went on a course to the US and got a chance to travel through Europe, and was impressed by the honesty and friendliness of the common people in both places. He was also approached by an American officer with what Shahid Aziz took to be an effort to recruit him, though his claim that he was offered a position in the US army seems ridiculous.  By 1999 he had risen to become the director general of the analysis wing in the ISI and was at this post when Musharraf’s Kargil adventure exploded into the news. He claims that he had no idea this was in the works and was as surprised as Vajpayee when the news broke (and given the fact that Musharraf had not told other senior generals or the chiefs of the navy and the air force about his adventure, he is likely telling the truth). He is very critical of the whole operation and makes it clear that it was a tactical AND strategic disaster of epic proportions, though it appears that he did not share this opinion with Musharraf until after his retirement.

He has shared interesting details of the coup preparations and the day of the coup itself. Like most army officers, he had a low opinion of politicians (and civilians in general) and believed that a strong man with a “sincere” team was needed to clean up Pakistan and put it on the road to modern-Islamist prosperity. Unsurprisingly, he saw himself and his fellow generals as exactly the sincere people who were needed. By the end of the book he concedes that their scheme did more harm than good, but as usual he blames faulty execution, not the idea of a military coup in itself. After the coup the generals made lists of qualified people to run the country and conducted formal interviews in GHQ, but at the same time other outsiders (such as Shaukat Aziz) were mysteriously parachuted into top positions without this vetting and interviewing process. He claims to have no idea how and why this happened and seems to have been remarkably incurious about these matters, which suggests that he was either extremely naive or has conveniently forgotten some details. Readers can be forgiven for thinking the latter is more likely.

By 2001 he had been promoted to Lt General and posted as CGS (chief of general staff) at GHQ. He was there when Musharraf got the famous call from Colin Powell and joined the American war on terror. In hindsight, Shahid Aziz is very critical of this decision and its aftermath, but even in his own book he does not report that he ever dissented from this policy while in office. Musharraf, who was now related to him by marriage, seems to have trusted him and promoted him regularly. After serving as corps commander in Lahore, Shahid Aziz retired and was made head of the National Accountability Bureau. He claims he tried to go after big fish, but was stymied by Musharraf and Shaukat Aziz and their political calculations. Eventually he resigned from this post and went home to contemplate all he had done with life. If we take his book at face value (and in this matter, I see no reason not to) then Shahid Aziz comes across as a (mostly) honest man with a rather simple Islamic faith, a VERY simplistic view of society and history (Naseem Hijazi comes to mind) and a strong desire to live in a “modern country” (a combination common among educated middle class Pakistanis, and especially in army officers; what we may label “Mehran Man“, the sort of person who is a PTI supporter). As long as he was in service he managed to stay upright with just enough compromises to get ahead, but once retired he seems to have taken his Islam more seriously than the average real-estate tycoon/retired general. From within his worldview, the fact that Pakistan had sided with an infidel power against fellow Muslims was an unforgivable sin, and this weighed on his conscience (he says as much). Finally it caused him so much heartache that he decided to write this book and get it off his chest. Given that a few years later he went ahead and joined some Islamic warriors and got killed, it seems that writing this book did not assuage his conscience to the extent desired.

The book is worth reading for its picture of army life in the 1970s, its anecdotes about the Zia era and the insider (critical) view of Kargil and the Musharraf era. While one can imagine that the real-life Shahid Aziz must have been a shade more calculating and shrewd than the book implies, my impression is that the book is generally sincere and honest, and therefore is a good window into the mind of a typical “good Muslim, sincere Pakistani” officer. His anecdotes and impressions of Kargil, the 1999 coup and the Musharraf era are revealing not just because of what they tell us about these events but also because they show what pygmies are making these decisions on our behalf and what level of analysis and historical understanding they are working with. The downside is that the book is repetitive and could do with some aggressive editing.

All in all, worth a read.

First, some links with details about the operations:

1. http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/Research/StudentTheses/Acosta03.pdf an excellent summary of the Kargil war by the US Naval postgraduate school.

2. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/kargil.pdf A more recent summary focused on airpower but with a good summary of the whole affair..

3. Role of the Pakistan air force: http://kaiser-aeronaut.blogspot.com/2009/01/kargil-conflict-and-pakistan-air-force.html

Back in 1999 I thought that Musharraf should have been dismissed and prosecuted for his role in the affair, but I also bought into the propaganda that the operation was a “great tactical success but a strategic blunder”. As time went on and more details came out, it became clear that the planning at the tactical level was as bad as the stupidities and mistaken assumptions that underlay the strategic vision of General Musharraf and inner coterie and in particular the commander of Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA), General Javed Hassan.

The men (primarily Northern Light Infantry (NLI) and Special Services Group (SSG) volunteers) who did the actual fighting from the Pakistani side performed with suicidal bravery, but once the Indian army learned from its early mistakes and brought all its resources to bear on the operation, these brave men were left to literally starve and bleed to death while Javed Hassan and his boss tried to bluster their way past their disastrous mistake. Musharraf’s coup protected the plotters from facing any consequences within Pakistan and a systematic disinformation campaign was used to create (not just in Pakistan but also in some casual observers and Anatol Leiven level analysts abroad) an impression of tactical brilliance. The above reports provide a good corrective and show that Mushie and his favorite FCNA commander were foolish, short-sighted and heedless, and their actions led to hundreds of needless deaths on both sides in an operation that civilian prime minister Benazir was able to see as “crazy” at first glance. Unfortunately, Nawaz Sharif was not that sharp…

Given how long it takes most armies to learn from their mistakes during the course of a battle, the Indian commanders on the spot deserve some credit for belying stereotypes and actually thinking and adapting while the battle was on. The British Indian army was a fine fighting force, but not one known for innovation and flexible thinking. Either India got lucky in a few officers on the spot (e.g. artillery commander Brigadier Lakhwinder Singh and GOC 8 mountain div General Puri http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/kargil-a-ringside-view/0/) or it really does have a better culture of officership than its mother army did.

Anyway, take a moment to read the above reports and links for details, but the main point is that it was not even a “tactical success”. It was poorly planned and once the Indian army found its feet, leaving those men out on the peaks to die was hardly a sign of brilliant tactical execution. The basic TACTICAL assumptions that proved wrong were:

1. The heights, once occupied, could be held by small groups for at least the entire summer.

2. Those men could be resupplied under fire for several months with food, water and ammunition, using mountain trails and helicopters.

3. The Indian army was incapable of attacking from any direction except straight up the front slopes, where they would be cut down like grass.

4. And behind it all, the firm conviction that while “our boys” will exhibit the required suicidal bravery, the other side will not.

All these assumptions proved incorrect. After some early charges that failed with heavy casualties (but also showed that Indian troops were perfectly capable of suicidal bravery of their own) the Indian army figured out how to use its artillery to great effect and went up near vertical slopes at night under cover of accurate artillery fire and recaptured crucial heights. They also managed to interdict most of the resupply effort, leaving many freezing Pakistani troops exposed on the heights without food or water. There is no evidence that either Javed Hassan or Musharraf made any real effort to come up with new solutions once their original assumptions proved wrong. Musharraf seems to have focused mostly on making sure the blame could be pinned on Nawaz Sharif, and that some sort of domestic (or intra-army) propaganda victory could be salvaged from the disaster.

The status quo is indeed in India’s favor by now. The critical period for India was the early nineties. Once they got past that, they were never going to be kicked out of Kashmir by force; and by using outside Jihadis and then the regular army and failing to dislodge them, Pakistan has already played all its cards. Another attempt could set the whole subcontinent aflame, but is not likely to change that outcome.

The fact that Kashmiri Muslims (or at least, Kashmiri Muslims in the Kashmir valley proper) remain thoroughly disaffected with India provides some people with the hope that human rights and democracy campaigners can win where brute force did not. But this too seems unlikely. The same Kashmiri Muslims are almost as disaffected with Pakistan as they are with India, so that the main demand seems now to be independence. But the demographics, geography, history and international situation of Kashmir all make any smooth passage to independence inconceivable. Inconceivable in the literal sense of the world; what I mean is, try to conceive or imagine in concrete detail what this independence would look like and the steps via which it would be achieved. Enuff said.

btw, General Shahid Aziz, who used to be Musharraf’s DGMO (director general military operations), CGS (chief of general staff) and then corps commander Lahore (and is now saying he repents siding with infidels against the Afghan Mujahideen; the timing of his decision to switch sides against the new Afghan regime remains in line with past GHQ strategic coups; see Afghan election coverage for details) has decided in his retirement to announce that kargil was a disaster caused by Musharraf.

He did back away a bit after other army officers accused him of washing the army’s dirty linen in public, but the damage was done.

By now, the cat is well out of the bag though. Here is Brigadier Javed Hussain from the Pakistan army making exactly the same points..

And now we have General Asad Durrani, former ISI chief (and the SOB who said on BBC TV that the thousands of Pakistani civilians, including school children, killed by the Taliban and other Jihadists are “collateral damage” and we have to accept this damage in the larger national interest, which he believes has been well served by our Jihadist policies) writing a book with a former RAW chief and saying most of the same things..

For many other interesting links and videos, see this excellent collection from researcher Aamir Mughal.

This is former Pakistani ambassador to India (and Beijing) Ashraf Jahangir Qazi making a humorous point about Vajpayee’s phone call to Musharraf when the intruders were discovered:

#Kargil 3/ pic.twitter.com/ZvpHSodYq5

— Nilofer Afridi Qazi (@ninoqazi) May 25, 2018

Translation: Vajpayee: what is going on?

Mian Nawaz Sharif (MNS): what do you mean what is going on?

Vajpayee: your troops have crossed the LOC, etc..

MNS: I will ask the army and find out what is going on

Vajpayee: You do that. By the way, in my country, the army asks ME what is going on, but in any case, you go ahead and ask them and find out what is going on.. Because if they don’t pull out in 2 days, we will have to use the air force..

btw, there ARE jokers on the other side. We are, after all, one people:

First, some links with details about the operations:

1. http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/Research/StudentTheses/Acosta03.pdf an excellent summary of the Kargil war by the US Naval postgraduate school.

2. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/kargil.pdf A more recent summary focused on airpower but with a good summary of the whole affair..

3. Role of the Pakistan air force: http://kaiser-aeronaut.blogspot.com/2009/01/kargil-conflict-and-pakistan-air-force.html

Back in 1999 I thought that Musharraf should have been dismissed and prosecuted for his role in the affair, but I also bought into the propaganda that the operation was a “great tactical success but a strategic blunder”. As time went on and more details came out, it became clear that the planning at the tactical level was as bad as the stupidities and mistaken assumptions that underlay the strategic vision of General Musharraf and inner coterie and in particular the commander of Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA), General Javed Hassan.

The men (primarily Northern Light Infantry (NLI) and Special Services Group (SSG) volunteers) who did the actual fighting from the Pakistani side performed with suicidal bravery, but once the Indian army learned from its early mistakes and brought all its resources to bear on the operation, these brave men were left to literally starve and bleed to death while Javed Hassan and his boss tried to bluster their way past their disastrous mistake. Musharraf’s coup protected the plotters from facing any consequences within Pakistan and a systematic disinformation campaign was used to crease (not just in Pakistan but also in some casual observers and Anatol Leiven level analysts abroad) an impression of tactical brilliance. The above reports provide a good corrective and one hopes that the day may still come when Musharraf and Javed Hassan will face the music for their role in this terrible disaster…a disaster that led to hundreds of needless deaths on both sides in an operation that civilian prime minister Benazir was able to see as “crazy” at first glance. Unfortunately, Nawaz Sharif was not that sharp…

Given how long it takes most armies to learn from their mistakes during the course of a battle, the Indian commanders on the spot deserve some credit for belying stereotypes and actually thinking and adapting while the battle was on. The British Indian army was a fine fighting force, but not one known for innovation and flexible thinking. Either India got lucky in a few officers on the spot (e.g. artillery commander Brigadier Lakhwinder Singh and GOC 8 mountain div General Puri http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/kargil-a-ringside-view/0/) or it really does have a better culture of officership than its mother army did.

Anyway, take a moment to read the above reports and links for details, but the main point is that it was not even a “tactical success”. It was poorly planned and once the Indian army found its feet, leaving those men out on the peaks to die was hardly a sign of brilliant tactical execution. The basic TACTICAL assumptions that proved wrong were:

1. The heights, once occupied, could be held by small groups for at least the entire summer.

2. Those men could be resupplied under fire for several months with food, water and ammunition, using mountain trails and helicopters.

3. The Indian army was incapable of attacking from any direction except straight up the front slopes, where they would be cut down like grass.

4. And behind it all, the firm conviction that while “our boys” will exhibit the required suicidal bravery, the other side will not.

All these assumptions proved wrong. After some early charges that failed with heavy casualties (but also showed that Indian troops were perfectly capable of suicidal bravery of their own) the Indian army figured out how to use its artillery to great effect and went up near vertical slopes at night under cover of accurate artillery fire and recaptured crucial heights. They also managed to interdict most of the resupply effort, leaving many freezing Pakistani troops exposed on the heights without food or water. There is no evidence that either Javed Hassan or Musharraf made any real effort to come up with new solutions once their original assumptions proved wrong. Musharraf seems to have focused mostly on making sure the blame could be pinned on Nawaz Sharif, and that some sort of domestic (or intra-army) propaganda victory could be salvaged from the disaster.

The status quo is indeed in India’s favor by now. The critical period for India was the early nineties. Once they got past that, they were never going to be kicked out of Kashmir by force; and by using outside Jihadis and then the regular army and failing to dislodge them, Pakistan has already played all its cards. Another attempt could set the whole subcontinent aflame, but is not likely to change that outcome.

The fact that Kashmiri Muslims (or at least, Kashmiri Muslims in the Kashmir valley proper) remain thoroughly disaffected with India provides some people with the hope that human rights and democracy campaigners can win where brute force did not. But this too seems unlikely. The same Kashmiri Muslims are almost as disaffected with Pakistan as they are with India, so that the main demand seems now to be independence. But the demographics, geography, history and international situation of Kashmir all make any smooth passage to independence inconceivable. Inconceivable in the literal sense of the world; what I mean is, try to conceive or imagine in concrete detail what this independence would look like and the steps via which it would be achieved. Enuff said.

btw, General Shahid Aziz, who used to be Musharraf’s DGMO (director general military operations), CGS (chief of general staff) and then corps commander Lahore (and is now saying he repents siding with infidels against the Afghan Mujahideen; the timing of his decision to switch sides against the new Afghan regime remains in line with past GHQ strategic coups; see Afghan election coverage for details) has decided in his retirement to announce that kargil was a disaster caused by Musharraf.

He did back away a bit after other army officers accused him of washing the army’s dirty linen in public, but the damage was done.

By now, the cat is well out of the bag though. Here is Brigadier Javed Hussain from the Pakistan army making exactly the same points..

And now we have General Asad Durrani, former ISI chief (and the SOB who said on BBC TV that the thousands of Pakistani civilians, including school children, killed by the Taliban and other Jihadists are “collateral damage” and we have to accept this damage in the larger national interest, which he believes has been well served by our Jihadist policies) writing a book with a former RAW chief and saying most of the same things..

For many other interesting links and videos, see this excellent collection from researcher Aamir Mughal.

btw, there ARE jokers on the other side. We are, after all, one people: