FlyDie left some excellent comments on the “Tamil” CMs post. I’m reposting them to increase the sabzi and reduce the masala.
The Nayak inheritance. Why does so much of Tamil Nadu’s elite traces to Telugu country? Vijayanagara’s military system let new men rise, and it minted the Nayaks. After Talikota they carved out autonomous states in Tamil lands as “Vadaka-rajahs” and assimilated over generations. The Thanjavur Marathas kept the pattern going. Ethnicity as the three L’s: Land, Lineage, Language.
Against “colonization.” Pre-colonial empires ran on a shared elite culture. Incoming rulers assimilated and left local custom alone. Krishnadevaraya is remembered above all for a Telugu work on the Tamil saint Andal. Telugu in Carnatic music is no stranger than Braj in Hindustani.
The reading list. Heirs of the Vijayanagara, the Nayaka chapter in The Architecture of Sovereignty, Joseph Martin on Telugu Catholic migration in Madras Presidency, and Cynthia Talbot’s Precolonial India in Practice.
India and China. India accepts foreign rulers without demanding assimilation, but never remakes itself for them. China resists outsiders, then lets them rule for centuries once established. The Yuan are a footnote. The Mughals define India’s monuments.
Kerala, the clingy. Onam began in Madurai. Vijayanagara’s caste consolidation passed Kerala by, and Bhakti arrived late. Nestorius was once a revered saint among its Christians, and the Mappilas follow the Shafi school. An ancient land holds on to what everyone else abandoned, communism included.
I am very interesting in Dravidian culture and South India.
It’s really obvious to me the Chennai-Colombo axis is just superlative.
#India accepts foreign rulers without demanding assimilation, #
I had written this earlier
Is it because in the Hindu mind a ruler is a Kshatriya, and has to do his job.
The Hindus would petition starting from ghori to Akbar to Shivaji’s to krishnadevaraya to Hastings and Nehru.
Don’t the Hindus prefer integration over assimilation. Assimilation would be what the Americans demand ( the melting pot )..while integration would be live and let live, which is what the Hindus seem to prefer?
Accommodation might be the right word.
+1
From my basic readings of legal literature and close observations, I think it boils down to one main aspect of caste that transcends sectarian and racial divides in South Asia. The first personal observation that’s worth mentioning would be the odd characteristics that specifically exist in the caste system that make it a lot more different from race in the West and Class in the East. Generally, with most social hierarchical systems like race, there is a rapid convergence of social, economic, and political privileges onto one dominant group, while the remaining groups have access to these privileges wary based on the degrees of association.
For example, in the racial system of the West, the “White” category of people generally enjoys economic, social, and political privileges, while the “Black” category on the other side of the spectrum lacks all these privileges across the different spheres of influence. Other groups like Hispanic, East Asian, South Asian, Middle Eastern, etc act as a middle group with degrees of privilege based on their distance from and integration into the “White” category.
Even though people generally assume that the system of caste adheres to this dynamic, with a dominant “Brahmanical” category contrasted with a “Dalit” category and every other group falling into the middle group based on their degree of association with the “Brahmanical” category, I would argue that it doesn’t follow this pattern. Rather, based on my observations over the years and reading a social/historic analystical studies, the economic, social, and political privileges don’t converge perfectly onto a singular varna caste category; rather, it is split. The literati (Brahmin varna) enjoy social privileges; the merchants (Vaishya varna) enjoy economic privileges, and the agriculturalist (Shudra varna) enjoys political privileges.
Scribal groups have historically focused their energy on activities that placed a deeper emphasis on education and learning. For example, the “ideal” Brahmin that appears in traditional literature is one who lives in relative poverty and far away from the political environment of the court in an isolated hermitage, focused on learning important texts like the Vedas. The learned Brahmin is often seen as a socially respectable position and one that figures in power turn to obtain social legitimization in the eyes of the ordinary public. Even today, the most common places where one would find scribal groups like kayasthas and other generic brahmins are often in higher academia, cinema, literary authorship, respectable bureaucratic positions, etc. There is a form of social privilege that often stems from extensive connections to education at an earlier age. Nonetheless, this doesn’t mean that Brahmanical groups have economic or political dominance; instead, they often leverage their social privileges to obtain economic and political influence.
The second major group of note here would be the Merchant position in the varnic hierarchy, which generally dominates the economic sphere of society. Many modern leaders of industry in India today come from mercantile caste backgrounds; Ambani (Modh Bania), Adani (Jain), Tata(Parsi), etc. Historically, these caste groups tended to redirect their resources from an early period to entrepreneurial efforts, and oftentimes they are part tight kind communities that pitch in to provide financial support. Many of them have deep connections to historical merchant networks and often have access to additional financial services like the Hundi system that aid in the dominance of their economic sphere. However, just like the brahmins, they enjoy economic dominance of financial capital, but that doesn’t translate into outright social and political capital. Oftentimes, they leverage their financial privileges to obtain political and social authority; think of how Ambani and Adani finance Modi.
The third player that shapes the final sphere of influence (political) is the agricultural caste group, or Shudras. They form the biggest population groups in many of the regions across India, from the Yadavs of UP, the Vokkaligas of Karnataka, Ezhavas of Kerala, and Jats of Punjab. They often form the biggest groups with sheer numerical superiority, which gives them a large amount of political dominance over their respective regions. Kings in olden times needed their numbers to staff their armies, while politicians today often use them as a vote bank to stabilize their political positions. Both people fell from power when these groups stopped supporting them. However, like the other two, they enjoy political capital but not social or economic capital, which they try to obtain using their political authority that comes from their numbers. You can see that with groups like Kapus or Reddys, who saw an elevation in their social and economic positions over time.
Another element added on top of this system would be the addition of the “Jaati” system, i.e., endogamous grouping. Based on my readings of the work “Land and Society in Early South Asia,” which specifically examined 5th to 12th century Bengal (the conclusions may not perfectly align with other regions; keep that in mind), the Indian feudal practices of land grants that became common in the post-Gupta empire lead to the expansion of the agrarian economy in the rural regions and the eventual consolidation of different groups working in the same occuptation into endogenous groups that we would call Jati.
Due to a complex political situation, these Jati groups were gradually placed into varna positions based on their socioeconomic influence in the late Pala to early Sena period. This brings me to my second observation that Jati formed due to shared occupations, but over time they seem to have shifted into being a distinct identity of their own, detached from their original functional markers signifying occupations. These Jati were then placed within the system of varna based on their economic, political, and social influence. However, these attempts to integrate them into this varna system don’t always work perfectly, as different groups can retain influence in other spheres outside of the caste positions. For example, the Lingayats (who are functionally a Jati) of Karnataka have subgroups that are OBC and others that are General.
This brings me back to the degrees of privilege from the talk about the race system of the West. Caste has three main pillars: a social one represented by Brahmin varna, a political one represented by Shudra varna, and an economic one represented by Vaishya varna. The proximity of a Jati/endogomous groups to each pillar influences their social, economic, and political position in the hierarchy, often times producing hybrid Jatis like the Lingayats. If a Jati is close to all three pillars, then they are elevated to the position of Kshatriya; if they are completely distant from these pillars (they lost every position they had), then they become Dalits.
Now, the trivarnas (Shudras, Brahmins, Vaishyas) positions actively exist in opposition to one another since they are trying to steal the privileges that each other has. That’s where the Kshatriya varna comes in, who are basically wanted by everyone, but not particularly needed. Kshatriyas give Brahmanical Jati economic and political authority by giving them powerful positions as well as land grants that yield economic surpluses. They can give power to Vaishyas by enabling them to influence key political decisions, and they can also receive titles and bureaucratic positions that produce social prestige. Shudras can obtain social elevation and economic status via similar means. The Kshatriyas are taking what one varna offers and exchanging it for something that another group offers. Using the merchants’ money to build the temples for the priests, then using the temples to distribute necessities to agriculturists, while diverting some money for themselves, they gain social recognition via temple sponsorship and power by gaining the favor of agriculturists. Fundamentally, this setup produces a ruling elite (and by extension) that acts as a mediator between groups rather than as an interventionist that can directly make groups work in the way that you (the state) want. Fundamentally, anyone can play mediator as long as you don’t try to forcibly shift things.
The Mughals understood this the best. They removed the Jizya and reduced anti-Shia bias, gaining the favor of non-Sunni merchant communities, who gladly funded the state treasury. The removal of the Jizya reduced the tax burden on the agriculturists (who were primarily Hindu), and the economic reforms stabilized the taxation system for the general population. Furthermore, the Mughals gave land grants to Vaishnavite Brahmins in Braj and gave many scribal groups like Kayasthas, Brahmins, etc institutional positions like secretary. The agriculturalists didn’t try to rebel as much, and they even joined the Mughal armies, while the scribes made propaganda for the emperor in support of their military conquest. The empire eventually fell apart when they introduced the Jizya, stripped non-Sunnis of their positions, and overtaxed the agriculturalists, while turning back on the merchant communities that financed them.
Loving this comment; so much to disentangle, you & girmit really pushing the signal quotient up
1) the ritual bar on non mixing of varna power(responsibilty), is the defining feature of this system. The phala Shruti at the end of vishnu sahasranama makes it very clear as to the fruits each varna individual gets for chanting this.
2) The kshatriyas in South india were essentially shudras who got into positions of power, which was sanctified by Brahmins.
A similar case is that of rajputs being accepted as rulers after the decline of Gupta period.
3) I have read elsewhere that vaishyas were land holding farmers to begin with and then moved up the chain to become traders. Shudras to begin with had no property.
4) the exceptions are stark. Brahmins fighting in Mahabharata war ( drona), pushyamitra Sunga taking over maghadha, Mayura varma starting the Kadamba dynasty, etc.
5) nanda and maurya were probably not from the pure Kshatriya clans.
6) we’re some laterday guptas traders??
Given the genetic data, I think we can be pretty clear that the hereditary Varna system arose only after substantial amount of mixing.
Which came first, Jati or Varna?
Varna, as it is based on professions. Jatis consolidated inside each varna.
Sure, but it is a chicken and egg issue.
You can have Varnas without Jati, just based on profession.
I’ve noticed a lot of Hindu commentators fall back on this, harkening to it as the original stance and thereby justifying non-hereditary Varnas as a benign classification with full mobility and no gatekeeping features.
The current system in India is pretty much Jati with degraded Varna overlap. Reservations ossify Jati lines, but theoretically erase Varna distinctions. (As usual in practice it is far messier)
Jati however is a very often repeated concept worldwide.
The Japanese have their clans, the entire middle east is a patchwork of tribal alliances. Europe was effectively warring clans until the Romans (themselves a smallish clan) decided to open up the clan structure after crushing the Etruscans facilitating the massive expansion of the empire.
Basically every pre-civ society is full of Jati/hereditary clans.
Hard to think that Varna came first.
one theory as to why varna solidified into jati, was that to learn a skill, one had to go to a teacher’s house, stay there and learn. ideally this would be kinsman, a friend in the same trade. obviously there were no general schools, even in takshashila.
the same was the case of brahmins also to learn vedas and shastras.
so entry into these ‘kulas’ or ‘cohorts’ became restricted so that the knowledge does not spread uncontrolled.
for example, in the pre modern age, a boy from a weaver’s household, who saw their traditional trade practised in his surrounding, was easy to join there, rather than become a cobbler or a iron smith. all these kulas maintained their jatis in a broad shudra varna.
even in brahmins, not every body was full scale vedic scholars or teachers. many were purohits for a specific purpose,
Most of your points have caveats that kinda go against your point. Firstly, Brahmanical law doesn’t forbid the intermixing of the varnas; rather, it forbids a specific form of intermarriage: patrilocality. More specifically, there are two forms of intercaste union that appear quite extensively in the text: Patriloma and Anuloma. Patriloma basically involves the intermarriage between an upper caste women with an upper-caste man, while Anuloma is the intermarriage between a upper caste man with lower caste women. Patriloma was considered to be a taboo topic and was outright rejected by Early brahmanical writer like Manu, but Anuloma (though not encouraged) was accepted within these legal texts.
Another aspect worth mentioning, the main point of the ritualistic aspects of marriages is simply an attempt to explain why different Jatis existed in the first place and establish the position in the social hierarchy. For example, in the book Land and Society, the Sena dynasty gave Brahmanical land grants to Kulin Brahmins in the Bengal region. As they established themselves within the region, a significant portion of texts from that period attempt to categorize the different jatis within the varna framework by discussing the Anuloma vs Patriloma argument. They would say that Caste A came from the intermarriage between a Kshatriya and a Vaishya woman; hence, they became mercenaries, even though such a thing didn’t happen, as varna identity was vague. The Kulin brahmins mostly did this to justify their own socioeconomic position as landlords, since a conflict was emerging between these new brahamnical landlords and the preexisting local community and local magnates. Ritual mixing of varnas was objectively quite flexible and based on the needs of the writer.
Secondly, what exactly is “pure” Kshatriya or Shudra in this situation? Both of these terms (and all the varnas, for that matter) are artificial categories created to justify a system of feudalism that prevailed in the land. So, the purity of lineage doesn’t even make sense since most of it could have clearly been made up by people over time. Most of the kingdoms and clans of the Vedic period, when I presume that some form of pure lineage existed, wouldn’t have survived into the post-Vedic period. Most of these Kshatriya “lineages” would have been made up of people, since it literally would be impossible to make such a connection to begin with.
A king is a king and a warrior is a warrior because they have both the power given by the common masses (i.e., Shudras) and the money given to them by the merchants (vaishyas). He claims to be “Kshatriya” because he wants to justify his actions and cement his progeny’s right to the throne. If any Tom, Dick, or Larry could simply sit on the throne, you need to spice things up with the claim that god gave me this throne, and you don’t deserve it. The Nanda, unlike the Rajputs, didn’t last long enough since they were weak and couldn’t hide their past well enough. Even Ashoka had an unflattering past that later sources washed over.
Also, historically, Brahmanical communities have literally called everyone the sun Shudras, that not really new. I remember there being a purana that stated that every king after Rama or Kosala. Even the Bengali Brahmins from before made the same claim. The point of saying kings are Shudra was more about establishing their own position in the caste hierarchy and reminding the ruling class that they played a role in making them reach that position; hence, they remember to return the favor.
Additionally, people breaking their varna position and filling an empty position isn’t always an issue, since most Brahmanical legal texts recognize the fact that periods of political instability would require a reshuffling of people. So, it wouldn’t be out of place for Pushyamitra to simply take the throne during the assassination he caused, but then again, his dynasty was quite short-lived and was even overthrown in another assassination scheme. Make of that what you will. Also, Drona is represented as someone who broke the rules of his own caste to try to follow a way of life that was his by birth. He was killed by the hands of his pupils and was on the side that tried to fight against the literal incarnation, so it kinda feels like the author kinda disapproves. Also, most indian kingdoms kinda developed a system of meritocracy over time, where if you provide meaningful contributions on the battlefield, you are elevated into the status of a warrior. The Vijayanagara Empire and the Kaketiyas before them did this.
My basic point is quite simple. Varna manifests differently based on which part of society you examine. Politically, one varna is dominant; economically, another varna is dominant, and socially, another is dominant. Jatis are usually placed into these Varna positions based on whether they have influence politically, socially, and economically. The position of Jatis within these varna categories could shift over time, as they may change their occupation or do something that shifts their general position in society. A bunch of farmers started to make pottery, and they gradually became merchants over time, shifting away from agriculture, which has happened before. Or a jati of priests gradually transitioned over time to become merchants, which has happened with groups like the lord of Aihole. Caste is a deeply hierarchical and discriminatory system similar to others like Race or class, etc. However, this system clearly has a lot of grey areas that restrict some of the discrimination and allow some mobility. There is a clear reason why the system of caste survived for 3000 years, which is mostly due to these grey areas. Mind you, I am not suggesting that it is an acceptable system, considering the endless issues it causes to this day, but it was an ever-changing system. These grey areas are kinda the reason external groups could be somewhat smoothly integrated into this society.
Small observation :
1) Pratilouma – man lower jati +woman upper Jati.
2) Anulouma-man upper Jati + woman lower Jati.
2) The mobility is between the bounds of Brahmin and panchama (dalit ).
3) there are many vaisya communities on south India, who have not become arya vaishyas. These aryavaishyas have become sanskritised, wear janeu, and are vegetarians.
The left behind ones, still have ‘setti’ as their sir name, and are meat eaters. (is public historian Anirudh kanisetti on which? ). There are many such groups which have “moved up” by becoming lingayats (Jagadish shettar).
4) shudras becoming Kshatriyas is all around.
5) Brahmin becoming shudra, rare but bhumihar might be a case in point.
6) anybody becoming Brahmin is rare.
7) Cases of others becoming dalit were rare, but has become more due to reservations.
banjaras, bhovis, in karnataka is a case in point. They are called “touchable schedule castes ”
2
Razib had previously presented data from UP Brahmins and one particular sub caste of Brahmins had plurality of indigenous y-dna.
“The phala Shruti at the end of vishnu sahasranama makes it very clear as to the fruits each varna individual gets for chanting this”
Chathur Varnam Maya shristi Guna karma Vibagasya
What is this Varna as specifically referred to by Sri Krishna in the Bhagavad Gita? Does it mean the divine divided human beings?
Questions regarding dilution of varna, Jati, inter mingling, mixing etc come much later. Fundamentally, what is this Varna that Sri Krishna refers to?
No, it is the third slokas in phala shruti.
” Vedantago brahmanah syat ,kshtriyo vijaee bhavet, vaishyo dhanasamruddaha, syatchudrah sukhamavaapnuyaat “
Not asking where this shruti came from.
Asked about the shloka in the Gita and asked what varna is as referred there and also asked if the divine divided human beings based on varna.
my understanding is division into varnas done by paramatma, based on guna and karma.
1) satva major – brahmins (learning, teaching etc).
2) Rajas major and satva minor-Khastriyas (protection)
3) Rajas major and tamas minor- Vaishyas (trade)
4) tamas major-shudras.(service)
the gunas and professions are mutually complimentary.
Sorry if I missed but imo the major distinguishing feature of jati/varna is it imposes obligations or more precisely restrictions on social betters. Be it vegetarianism, restriction on cross varna business/trade, no outright or sanctified access to any female of choice for nobility etc.
A lot of RW engages in mental gymnastics in trying to retro fit caste system in to modern notions of equality while some of the more traditional minded shankaracharyas put paid to this effort.
I think a more plausible/defensible line is that upward mobility is a multi generational journey for both the family and wider Jati. Individuals within lower Jatis who achieve individual success have an obligation to work towards uplifting their brethren etc regardless of out group marriage.
I think the reality is a lot more complex than these 3-4 sentences portray it to be. The Chinese have themselves been conquered and assimilated into foreign rule a couple times themselves. The primary example would be Qing China which was a Manchu dominated state. It is considered a predecessor to the current CCP China. However, the Manchu were always considered outsiders who settled into the Chinese territories and enforced their culture onto the Chinese. The Han Chinese were forced to wear their hair as Queues as a sign of their submission to the Manchu. The Han have tried to convince the world that the now assimilated Manchu were Han Chinese all along but that isn’t completely true.
Actually, it is somewhat more complicated than that. See, the modern “Han” identity, as we talk about it today, wasn’t the ethnic identity it is in the present. Historically, for a person to identify as “Han,” you had to live by a certain set of practices; for example, being sedentary and owning a lot of land was a crucial aspect, as was engaging in a specific form of ancestral worship. This is kinda why, historically, many groups outside of the Chinese fold were often accepted as part of the group irrespective of their origin. Kinda similar to how you could become American if you follow proper legal procedures and follow certain rules. You could just as easily be not counted as “Han” if you didn’t adhere to specific practices. It is only more recently that the “Han” kinda became a full-fledged identity irrespective of practice.
For example, the founder of the Republic of China, Sun Yat-sen, identified as a “Han” and strongly talked about ethnonationalism centred around this ethnic identity. However, he was actually a “Hakka”, who were a somewhat historically distinct group and technically shouldn’t fall under the “Han” identity. By this point, people re-alter their identity and shift it from a distinct thing outside the old “Han” category into a subset of the Han identity. The same thing happened with the Cantonese as well. So trying to integrate the Manchu identity into the “Han” one would be out of place.
Mind you, the Manchu were kinda weird in some sense since they originally came from a collection of Jurchen tribes that settled in, well, Manchuria during the Ming dynasty. The “Han” rulers had already tried to partially Sinicize these tribes as well, and they kinda had complex relationships with periods of antagonism as well as alliances. When the Manchu established the Qing dynasty, they adapted a lot of Confucianism to present themselves as more acceptable to the Han, and they adapted Tibetan Buddhist elements to make themselves more acceptable to the Mongolians, Tibetans, and other groups. Even after losing a lot of distinction between the Manchus and the Han, the Manchus still tried to forcefully maintain a difference from the Han legally. Later on, closer to the Republican period, there was a lot of anti-Manchu sentiment in the air that stemmed from this forceful distinction.
To put it in a way, the Manchu are to China what the Mughals are to India. Some think they are foreign; others think they are native. At the end of the day, a lot of this is based on one’s own conception of national identity and political views.
My original comment was trying to compare the Mongol Yuan and Manchu Qing dynasties. The basic point was that the Yuans didn’t really assimilate into broader Han society and forever had internal division between those who wanted to maintain the steppe Mongol way of life and the Sinicized groups that wanted a sedentary life. The inability to assimilate seems to have resulted in the Yuan being banished by the Han Ming dynasty. The Qing, on the other hand, did sinicize to a much greater degree over time, to the extent that they had to forcefully maintain original Manchu identity via legal practices. Their more extensive assimilation seemed to have worked since they ruled China for around 5 centuries, while the Yuans barely held on for one. Mind you, that was with the Qing still trying to impose their values on their subjects, who seemed to go along with things for a while. Contrast them with, say, the Mughals, who still retained a lot of their Turkic and Persianate identity initially without fully assimialting completely into the local culture, but lost it over time and fully merged into the local culture.
I think the manchu were already confucian before becoming the rulers of china right?
But kept some cultural differences with other groups for political and social reasons? Most likely to be able to maintain power within themselves?
How are they considered outsiders in china if they were the same culturally with many others?
There are two aspects to the “assimilation” of the Mughals. They intermarried with local royalty to cement their place as rulers.
The assimilation into the Mughals was done by the Hindu side which gave up all their religious customs, rituals (Bollywood glorifying how Jodhabai staying Hindu nothwithstanding). This continues till the present day. In interfaith couples, despite being “liberal”, I am yet to see Hindu names being given to interfaith couples progeny.
To sum it up, the Mughals therefore did not really integrate with the local populace despite intermarriage and certainly actively prevented themselves from being Hinduized despite racially being more Hindu blooded than not.
This is possibly the reason they are not seen as native to the land even today.
Surely not all Mughals. People keep writing alternate histories with Dara Shikoh.
I’m not sure it would be fair to call those figures Muslims. Almost all forms of syncretic Islam turn into quasi-Hindu faiths. The reality is that figures like Bulleh Shah, Sai Baba, and even Dara Shikoh are primarily remembered and celebrated by Hindus. Syncretism with a polytheistic religion to such a strict monotheistic religion like Islam just leads to that sect being declared non-momin or even as Kafir. Bulleh Shah is perhaps the most famous for pointing this out “Ouh Tenu Kafir Kafir Aakh De Tu Aho Aho Aakh”.
Bulleh shah’s urs is widely celebrated in Pakistan
https://www.dawn.com/news/2025568
Sai Baba is still.respected and remembered as a saint among muslims.
Bulleh Shah’s head was also chopped off by Muslims. It isn’t as clean as you would think. Hindus wouldn’t even consider it a question if Bulleh Shah was a Baba worth praying to, while a Muslim depending on their interpretation of Islam can go from wanting to chop his head off to revering him. These dynamics lead him to becoming a quasi-Hindu figure rather than a syncretic figure. Sai Baba has become a primarily Hindu figure at this point it isn’t up for debate in my mind if you ever happen to visit Shirdi like I did last year.
These subtleties often get overlooked while making broad generalizations on Ganga Jamuna sensibilities. The asymmetry of syncreticism has always rested more on Hindu shoulders as your examples prove beyond doubt.
The urdufication of language along with the arabization of clothing, culture just widens the chasm between the same people across religion.
This is the person you might be confusing Bulleh Shah with.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarmad_Kashani
AI generated but nonetheless very intersting:
The confusion between the death of Bulleh Shah and Sarmad Kashani stems from shared themes of religious heresy, clashes with the orthodox clergy (Mullahs), and extreme pushback from the religious establishment during their burials/executions.While their deaths occurred in completely different time periods and manners, their defiance of orthodox norms has caused folk history and oral traditions to sometimes blend their final days together.The Core Reasons for the Confusion1. Rejection by the Religious ClergyBulleh Shah (d. 1757): He died of natural causes. However, because his Punjabi Sufi poetry fiercely criticized the hypocrisy of religious scholars, local Mullahs declared him a non-Muslim and blasphemer. They refused to lead his funeral prayers (Namaz-e-Janaza) or allow him to be buried in the communal Muslim cemetery of Kasur. He had to be buried outside the city limits.Sarmad Kashani (d. 1661): An Armenian-Jewish convert to Islam and a naked mystic, Sarmad openly defied orthodox laws. He was arrested for heresy, stripped of his rights, and sentenced to death under the orders of Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb.Because both men faced the ultimate rejection by orthodox religious authorities at the time of their deaths, oral narratives frequently blur who was executed versus who was denied a holy burial.2. The Radical Concept of “Negation”Both mystics are famous for refusing to submit to standard Islamic declarations if it meant violating their inner truth:Sarmad was executed because he refused to say the full Shahada (declaration of faith). He would only say “La ilaha” (There is no God), arguing he was still absorbed in negating false idols and could not honestly affirm the rest until his spiritual journey was complete.Bulleh Shah similarly wrote poetry mocking rigid religious mechanics (“Burn the prayer mat and lota…”), choosing internal divine love over rituals. This identical theological stance against the state-sponsored religion links them deeply in Sufi lore.3. Misattributions in Poetry and QawwalisIn South Asian Sufi culture, the concept of Mansooriyat (martyrdom for divine love, named after Mansur Al-Hallaj) is a common poetic trope. Songs, Qawwalis, and folklore frequently group “martyred” or persecuted Sufis like Al-Hallaj, Shah Hussain, Sarmad Kashani, and Bulleh Shah into the same verses to symbolize rebellion against tyranny. Over generations, this thematic blending has caused casual listeners to assume Bulleh Shah met a violent, executed end like Sarmad.
Interesting. I did not know of Sarmad Kashani.
//Bulleh Shah’s head was also chopped off by Muslims. It isn’t as clean as you would think//
Except he was not. He died of old age.You must be confusing him with someone else. His burial was denied and prayers to him wete opposed but this is par for the course for figures like tha who were opposed in their time and gained popularity later on.
You can go and look into how bhakti saints were treated in their lifetime by orthodox authorities only for th view to change after their death
Because of the hinduiszation of sai baba you may not find many muslims in his shrine. Go to where his disciples are buried and you will see the muslim followers of sai baba.
Indian islam is heavily syncretic as the multiple hybrid traditions in many dargah like Haji Malang and many others show.
used to be heavily syncretic. This has changed quite a bit over the last few decades.
It still is, lesser than before but many traditions do continue in dargah throughout India.
Religious identities have hardened for everyone due to greater ease of communication, greater resources for orthodox sections to impose their will and the lack of adaption to the social, cultural and political realities on part of the syncretic traditions.
Modernisation also unravel syncretism.
For instance folk Catholic traditions will give way to more formalised one thence to secularism and atheism
+wealth has a keeping up with the social betters effect
Indonesia and Malaysian muslims turn more religious as they move up class ladders, adopting hijabs.
Hindu Indians used to turn more vegetarian, I suspect urbanisation & protein fads have provided a counterflow nowadays.
de-syncretism accelerates when you have lower dependence on social networks, aspirational aesthetics & penalty of exclusionism drops.
It’s quite counter intuitive. People normally associate modernisation with cultural westernisation.
Also good old social coercion 😀 something no one tends to wear a t-shirt about.
https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/people/article/3187793/indonesian-schoolgirls-face-harassment-amid-growing-pressure-wear
If anything catholic folk tradtions are in more danger from pentecostal or other forms of christianity calling them non christian than anything modernity or secularity can do to them.
In parts of the world where catholicism is widely practised syncretism is the dominant form of practise, with church leaders either looking the other way or their warnings falling on deaf ears, as seen in the rise of Santa Muerte and other narco saints in the americas for instance.
https://www.instagram.com/p/ChrYK66vkyp/
hope this opens.
attached are photos of st.joseph church in bangalore. this church and convent are dominated by kannada catholics.
the blue board says- sri christa yesuve namaha.
i have seen boards in some buildings belonging to catholic child having names such as ‘ satchidaananda’.
interesting. let us see how all this will pan out.
Christianity feels like THE minority faith in the South & North East and tribal zones..
Cool, I guess
No, the point is that, the converts, not necessarily first generation ones, are still following their old faiths. The becoming of new man after conversion is not fully accomplished.
Hence the pull of Pentecost etc.
The Catholic church looks too establishment, not agile, full of rituals, and pomp (not representing christ).
The main reason why the catholic church loses out, is not that it lacks authenticity, it is that it barely does even the basic necessary to retain people, since for so long it is the default, and never had to compete. Once the state backing stopped, the church in many places could not manage to retain the attention even among those who are partial to christianity, in places where it has had to do some work in creating an existence without backing of the state like Mexico, its losses to other religions are less severe, but it is losing to modernity instead.
//No, the point is that, the converts, not necessarily first generation ones, are still following their old faiths. The becoming of new man after conversion is not fully accomplished.//
If I am understanding you correctly I think you are trying to say that most of the conversion under catholicism are incomplete, and under a christian veneer many are following their pre conversion faiths? And pentecostals succeed because they give the authenticity that catholicism cant?
If yes I think you are being too charitable to the pentcostals as far as authenticity goes. The next thing is that people religious ideas irrevocably change after conversion to christianity, the culture they retain is largely dependent on how much of the practise of culture is seen as separate from practise of religion, this varies from sect to sect with no clear criteria as to what would make one sect more tolerable to one cultural practise and less tolerant to another.
Spot on observation.
A few things worth considering. (1) India being incorporated into the persianate cosmopolis predates Babar and (2) mughals were interacting with an incumbent persianate politcal culture in India. In many cases hindu kings were corresponding in persian, if not solely but in combination with other languages. (3) The islamicate conquerers were just too dominant trans-regionally for there to be any incentive to hinduize completely. Their power came not from the ability to be hyper-dominant on the ground level, but to maintain a highly mobile cavalry with siege expertise and orchestrate state control across several regions by deploying innovative administrative and fiscal policies. (4) The Akbar, Dara Shikoh examples along with Ibrahim Adil Shah II (aka “Jagatguru” who wrote hymns to Saraswati), the oddly syncretic rituals of the Bahamani court, and the later existence of Urdu, are examples of the “pull” force of hinduification that existed despite the political dominance of muslims and the high penalties for apostasy in islam.
All great points. The loss of Dara Shikoh at that critical juncture is in my opinion the biggest loss to Hindustan, the repercussions of which are still felt till date.
Except for his interest in hinduism, dara shikoh was a typical mughal prince, cruel ET. Al.
Oh really. Why do you say that? I am not aware of his cruel side. So had he been at the throne instead of Aurangzeb, how much of a difference would that have made in the wider scheme of things?
May be bit more relaxed that Aurangzeb.
After all nothing prevented immediate post Aurangzeb mughals to be more tolerant.
Probably very little. The religious mess wasn’t the actual cause of why the empire went to shite; rather, it was Aurangzeb’s military intervention in the Deccan and how his destruction of the Deccani sultanates left a vacuum that the Marathas filled. Even then, the underlying motivation to conquer the Deccan came from an ever-mounting economic crisis happening within the empire, and he thought that this violent conquest would provide sufficient funds to fill the treasury. A lot of religious riots, like the shoemaker riots of 1714, can be traced back to economic problems like rising inequality and unemployment. Aurangzeb was a bad economist, and I doubt Dara, a man who literally spent his life sealed within the court, would have found a solution here. The empire would have continued its decline either way.
Its also noteworthy, the ruthlessness by which the Bijapur and Golconda nobility were eliminated root and branch, after the protracted war with the Mughals. One wonders if the hindu Maratha sardars were seen as more important for future governance than rival fellow muslims.
There is a simple explanation, actually. In the Deccan, the Muslim nobility governed the urban regions, while the Marathas governed the rural regions. For a centralized state like the Mughal Empire, it would have been easier to kill and replace the urban muslim nobility with their own, as was the case with the Nizam. However, the rural regions were generally never under their control, and it would be hard to replace the Maratha nobility that lived there.
They probably wouldn’t even want to, if that was an option; it was easier to integrate the Marathas into their bureaucracy, since these rural nobles would simply be switching from one overlord to the next, as they did between one Deccani sultan and another before the Mughals came to the scene. Frankly, if Aurangzeb had tried to conquer the region in a piecemeal style and reformed, then gradually integrated the Sardars alongside some of the urban nobles, there wouldn’t have been a vacuum. That whole conquest was probably the dumbest thing that Aurangzeb did; he could have just avoided that. Then again, Aurangzeb was a great general, but a bad politician and leader overall, considering all the dumb decisions.
Yes, probably because they were not considered threats unlike Muslim sardars.
Yes no doubt on that front. My question was more from the angle of religious tolerance and subsequent syncreticism. Or even political stability overall without the constant internecine wars.
The entire Maratha fracas with Shivaji and Sambhaji was amplified in part due to the religious intolerance displayed by Aurangzeb. Or even the execution of Guru Tegh Bahadur. The fault lines were more stark with Aurangzeb.
This is a conjecture, but with Dara Shikoh it would have been more like the Marathas pupeteering the monarch not unlike with Bahadur Shah Jafar.
I would argue that even there it wouldn’t have made much of a difference. See, the openness and conservatism of a given leader is a broader reflection of the underlying society. Akbar was a tolerant ruler, but he was neither an outlier nor unique for his time period, since you have other figures like Ibrahim II of Bijapur doing similar things. This was a time period of openness, coexistence, and syncretism that built up over time due to complex political and economic restructuring of society.
However, this open environment gradually started to close up due to the rise of a conservative backlash around the middle of Shah Jahan’s reign. Mind you, there were always more orthodox conservatives even during Akbar’s reign, but they became louder as time passed. Aurangzeb simply rode this conservative wave to rise to power. Like Dara, who published multiple works that tried to compare Vedanta and Ibn Arabi’s interpretation of Wahdat al-wujud (unity of existence). His first work was dismissed, as he was not seen as a well-educated scholar, and his discussion points was incorrectly interpreting Islamic scripture hence it is heresy. He eventually wrote a second work trying to clarify his position, but that went nowhere since he was killed.
Aurangzeb used his works against him and justified the violent murder of his brother for his “questionable” religious views, which is ironic since Dara still believed that Islam was the “true” religion, but he was a lot less annoying about it and took an interest in other religions. Dara was always going to lose here since if it wasn’t Aurangzeb, then someone else would have taken that place. The issue isn’t the person; rather, it is the environment and social reality of the time, which influences different leaders.
May be I am complaining too much!!
1) when the female is muslim and has a lesser profile, the couple appear to be Hindu outwards. The man might have had a conversion for name sake.
Examples :
1) Sunil Dutt family.
2) Farah khan.
3) Kushboo Sundar.
4) sameer wankhade’s parents.
5) zohra sehegal (?)
6) sabha naqvi bowmick.
7) chunky Pandey (??)
i have two separate examples of guys in my own neighbourhood who are hindu dad + muslim mom, both were raised unequivocally hindu.
Probably because not all the people on the list had Hindu-Muslim parents to begin with, I am pretty sure Sameer Wankhade’s parents were of the Mahar caste and were Hindu. Sunil Dutt came from a Hussaini Brahmin family, a Brahmin community with strong connections to the Shia community, and his mother, as expected, was a Shia woman. I remember him supporting a hospital or something in Pakistan that was closely related to the Shia-Hussaini Brahmin community. Kushbhoo Sundar seems to have a poor relationship with her Islamic community since her abusive father abandoned her family.
Interreligious marriage is a rare thing; even then, Hindu-Muslim ones are outright rare. Often, the woman is kicked out of her own family and religious community for interfaith marriages unless both families are progressive. So, the children are raised on the father’s side rather than the maternal side. As grandma used to say, whichever side raises the child for 12 years gets to claim them as part of their family or community.
Actually, they integrated a lot more than you think. The Hindu side didn’t change any of their customs during the Mughal period; in fact, many Hindu sects saw an expansion during this time period. Before the 12th century, even though Bhakti was rising in South Asia, the most dominant forms of religious worship were heavily centred around Shiva-Shakta Tantra and sects like the Kaula. In fact, the Khajuraho temple from this period was built in conjunction with the Kaula sect.
However, the Ghurid invasions changed things, as the major shrines that were raided came from Tantric sects, and this pushed them into decline. Eventually, the sultanate consolidated its hold over the land, and they spent the remaining time murdering one another, causing excessive instability until they eventually fragmented. In the later sultanate period, devotional Vaishnavism saw a massive rise as new-age mercantile devotional sects started appearing with warrior ascetics. The religious ascetics cleared out the high of bandits and made it safe for merchants, who then would translate and spread the scripture to other places to gain converts. Some of the original Tantra kinda made a comeback with the rise of the Nath Yogi sect. The Mughal Empire ended up patronizing many of these groups, eventually leading to their further spread.
Vaishnavism is the dominant sect of North India because of the patronage provided by the Mughal Empire. Many Vaishnavite settlements were made in Braj, many of which included the Gaudiya Vaishnavites, whose children include ISKCON. Hell, Ajay Bisth, your yogi Adityanatha’s sect exists today because of the complex patronage networks that spread that sect across Uttar Pradesh during the Mughal period.
Even Mughal architecture turns out to be an external influence, as was once thought. In fact, most of the architecture’s origin is in the city of Bayana in Bharatpur, Rajasthan. During the Sultanate period, a bunch of people settled in Bayana, and they started to build a number of structures in the region. They initially used temple ruins and local architects to build their new structures, which indirectly shaped the architectural style of the Sultanate, as the original temple architectural elements were combined with central asian and Persian elements. For example, the Chatri that dominates edieval indian architecture was actually created by the fusion of the Mandapa of Nagara temples and Persian canopies during the Sultanate period. Ironically, most of the persian/central asian elements they loved to use didn’t even survive in those regions. For example, the early mosques used an old Arabian design that fell out of popularity in Iran and Central Asia. The Mughal Empire simply used this pre-existing style and more or less copy pasted with some modifications to suit their needs. Their architecture kinda predated them by a long margin.
Even linguistically, the Mughals assimilated an extensive amount on this front more than people think. Firstly, they were Turkic people who spoke a Turkic language related to Chagatai, but they mainly shifted to persian overtime since it was already common spoken lingua Franca in India at the time. Mind you, they sponsored a lot of vernacular languages like Braj; in fact, many important Hindavi poets, Bhari Lal and Vrind, came into existence within the structures that the Mughal Empire created.
One of the most foundational theories of Indian aesthetics was Rasa theory, which dates back to the Natya Shastra. The Mughals really liked that theory, and they often employed it in their works all the time. Additionally, many of the tropes and character archetypes that shaped Mughal-era works, even modern Urdu, come from the older models of the Nayaka and Nayaki from the older Natya shastra and Kamashastra tradition.
I could go on, but there are a lot of things that they had, which originated from the land they assimilated into.
Also, I got the Bayana stuff from: “Bayana – The Sources of Mughal Architecture” by Mehrdad Shokoohy, and Natalie H. Shokoohy, 2022, Edinburgh University.