I had been meaning to make a post regarding this for sometime but since X.T.M made his post touching on some of the points, now is as good a time as any.
Now while X.T.M does make good points from time to time (his post on the fate of Indian Muslims was very good in my opinion without any hyperbole stating the actual future paths available), his views on Balochistan and Pashtunistan (not referring to an individual polity here but Afghanistan and KPK combined as the insurgency infrastructure exists across the Durand Line) are completely divorced from reality and at times sounds like it came from a DGISPR presser.
The same misreading feeds the Saffroniate’s favourite fantasy, that Balochistan or Afghanistan can be turned into Pakistan’s Kashmir, a running wound that bleeds the state. It will not happen, and the reason is structural.
This statement makes absolutely no sense. You can debate about subjective topics like who “won” Sindoor or diplomatic “relevance”, not the fact that Balochistan and Pashtunistan is already “a running wound bleeding the state”, not something that is going to “happen” in the future. The “fantasy” is already “happening”.
In fact, there was a post regarding this bleeding last month.
And the comparison to Kashmir makes that “bleeding” even more apparent because the bleeding in Kashmir has stemmed a lot (much to the chagrin of Pakistanis).
X.T.M is right in one sense – that I love my numbers. So I will be presenting some numbers and charts and inferences. All the data is sourced from SATP. They have their sources for the individual events which can be checked on their site.
NOTE: I am not “glorifying” or “celebrating” anything but just presenting cold hard data. I will even be referring to the parties as “insurgents” instead of “terrorists” or “freedom fighters” in the interest of fairness.
Balochistan and KPK – The Data
Below I present a chart for total casualties due to insurgency in Balochistan and KPK combined.
The numbers do match known events. An increase during the “war on terror” followed by a decrease post Zarb-e-Azb followed by an increase again post Pakistan’s “diplomatic victory” in Afghanistan.
A further breakdown by nature of casualty is interesting.
There are two noticeable differences between the insurgencies of the late 2000s-early 2010s and the current one.
Firstly, civilian casualties are down while security force casualties have increased. In fact 2025 was the worst year ever in the 21st century for Pakistani security forces. This tracks with how most of the attacks now are against the security forces – Quetta, Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu are some examples from last month.
Secondly, insurgent casualties are down. While they are higher than security force casualties (as is expected from a rag tag bunch fighting an organized force), they have become more “effective” since the late 2000s. This is in no part due to modern warfare advancements like drones I assume which reduce the risk.
Jammu and Kashmir – The Data
Similar figures for Jammu and Kashmir.
A gradual decrease from the early 2000s with a “bump” during the late 2010s (coinciding with Burhan Wani) and then further decrease since revocation of Article 370.
Pulwama and Pahalgam elicited such responses from the Indian public because of how rare these events have become. In comparison, Pakistanis seem to have accepted the “new normal” of their two western states and it does not even enter their mindspace.
Interestingly, I thought to juxtapose the figures of both countries and noticed an interesting pattern.
As the old adage goes – “correlation is not causation” but one cannot help but make an inference from the trend.
As violence increased in Pakistan in the 2000s, it decreased in Kashmir. As it decreased in the late 2000s in Pakistan, there was the aforementioned “bump” in Kashmir. Post 2021 the graphs diverge once again.
It would be prudent to assume that Pakistan being occupied on its western front limits its options on the eastern front. In this case, “Dhurandharing” is a very viable solution for domestic peace in India (In fact you could extend it to the entirety of both countries and the trend will remain).
The Real World
There have been many changes in Kashmir since 2019.
Cinema halls have opened after more than thirty years.
Muharram has been held after more than thirty years.
Kashmiri Pandits are celebrating their festivals again with gusto after more than thirty years.
The stone pelting and hartals that were so common have completely stopped.
Again, I am not in the least insinuating that everything is “normal” in Kashmir (I do not have a blind spot regarding it unlike Pakistanis have about Balochistan/KPK). Most Kashmiri Muslims have not somehow become patriotic Indians without the desire for a change in their political status.
But the changes that have happened are real. They exist in the world and are not vague terms like “net security provider”.
Of course this does not mean that the insurgency does not re-ignite at a future date or for that matter the opposite with Kashmiri Muslims completely integrating into India. But that is in the future. As things stand, things are improving and the “bleeding” has lessened by a lot.
Of course critics could point out that this is all due to Indian “suppression” to which I have two points.
Same critics would also say India has been “occupying” Kashmir since time immemorial with “human rights violations”. Why should India pay any heed to such bad faith critics when steps taken by India have led to actual real decrease in violence and normalization.
Secondly, considering the “bleeding” happening in Pakistan’s western states (and unlike Kashmir, the trend is in the opposite direction), maybe said critics would do well to actually learn how to “suppress” similarly?
It’s been ten years since the Pakistan T20 league started. The Quetta and Peshawar teams are yet to play a game in Quetta or Peshawar.
Excellent article bro. I think I might post one specifically as a reply to XTM’s article posted today in a bit.
Waiting for it bro.