Notes on the closing talks of “Divergent Voices of South Asia: Rethinking Partition, Reimagining Peace” – Mela Nordic, Filmcentrum Riks, Stockholm, 4 July 2026. First of two parts.
(Quotes are drawn from a rough live transcript and lightly edited for clarity; read them as close paraphrase rather than verbatim.)
There was something quietly apt about the calendar. On the Fourth of July, the day one republic celebrates the border it drew for itself, a room in Stockholm spent ten hours mourning a border drawn for someone else. Mela Nordic’s day-long commemoration of the 1947 Partition, Divergent Voices of South Asia: Rethinking Partition, Reimagining Peace, earned its title honestly. The programme ran from Sarah Gilley questioning the manufacture of “normalcy” in Kashmir, through Farooq Sulehria’s provocation “India as Media Subimperialism!”, to the launch of Amrita Ghosh’s India’s Imperial Formations: Race in South Asia, to Shaukat Ali Kashmiri of the United Kashmir Peoples National Party; a man whose politics manage the rare feat of being equally inconvenient to Islamabad and to Delhi. Divergent voices in the strict sense: nobody in that room agreed on everything, and the organisers plainly did not want them to.
The late afternoon saw two back-to-back talks by two of the subcontinent’s most stubborn journalists. Anuradha Bhasin, executive editor of the Kashmir Times, joined by video link for “Bridging the Noise: Media and the Art of Solidarity in South Asia.” Hers is the name on the Supreme Court petition that forced the January 2020 ruling that indefinite internet shutdowns are impermissible and that any shutdown must answer to proportionality and be published; a judgment that wrote the rules without lifting the blackout, which tells you most of what you need to know about the terrain she works. She was followed, in person, by Beena Sarwar, journalist, filmmaker, teacher, co-founder of the Southasia Peace Action Network, whose talk is the subject of Part II.
Heard in sequence, the two talks assembled themselves into something neither quite was alone: Bhasin supplied the blueprint, Sarwar the working prototype. This first part takes the blueprint, and holds it up against the graveyard of everyone who has tried to build it before.
The one story
Bhasin’s talk built to a set of concrete proposals, and the sharpest of them was a reframing so simple it is astonishing how rarely one hears it. The single most important story in South Asia right now, she argued, is the melting of the Himalayan glaciers; and it is being covered entirely through national lenses. Pakistan’s floods. India’s heatwaves. Nepal’s vanishing ice. The poisoned politics of the Indus Waters Treaty. Four national stories, four national blame games. “These are not separate stories,” she said. “They are one story“; the story of a shared ecosystem under shared threat. The meltwater, after all, does not stop to have its papers checked at Wagah.
From that reframing flowed her first proposal: well-funded, editorially independent cross-border journalism collaborations; joint investigations, joint reporting on shared rivers and shared climate data, joint coverage of health crises, literacy, and what is actually happening inside each country’s universities and laboratories. Not from the nationalist angle, not from the blame angle, but from the angle of what is actually happening.
Her second was a collaborative digital archive of the subcontinent’s shared history, culture, and artistic heritage; pre-Partition history, the region as a single civilisational space, open not just to scholars but to journalists, artists, and ordinary citizens. She was blunt about why it is needed now: every country in the region writes its history with a thumb on the scale, and the thumbs are getting heavier. In India, entire textbook chapters are being rewritten and whole periods, the Mughal era above all, erased; in Pakistan, she added, the curriculum has been doing versions of this for far longer.
Third, journalism as myth-busting. The nationalist story, she argued, is always built on myths; chiefly that the other side is uniformly hostile, even evil, and that there is nothing to gain from engagement and everything to lose. These myths will not be toppled by any single dramatic act of journalism. They erode, if at all, through a thousand small acts of accurate, humanising reporting. Journalists in South Asia have to reclaim their function from nationalism; to insist that the job is to report the world as it is, in all its complexity, and not to serve the identity politics of whoever holds power.
Fourth, and briefly, what journalism cannot do. Cinema, theatre, literature, and music create empathy in a way reportage cannot; some of the most remarkable peace-building in post-conflict societies has come through joint theatrical productions putting actors and playwrights from opposing communities in one rehearsal room. She invoked the late Madeeha Gauhar, whose Ajoka Theatre was carrying Lahore productions across the border two decades ago; adding only that such groups need to be far more deliberate about their outreach. To this she attached a South Asian literary translation fund, making it economically viable to render contemporary books and poetry into every major language of the region, and collaborative fellowships and residencies across journalism and the arts.
She did not pretend any of this would be welcomed. Such collaborations, she said plainly, will be opposed by governments who profit from the status quo, by powers who profit from the current information ecosystem, by media houses whose business model runs on nationalist outrage, and by publics so long fed the enemy-image of the neighbour that any attempt to humanise him will feel like betrayal. Her answer was endurance: if the architecture of hostility was built brick by brick, it must be demolished brick by brick, and something else built in its place. “These are not soft tools,” she insisted; in today’s South Asia they may be among the most powerful available, and the people who wield them carry a responsibility to the shared future of a region facing a choice: find a way to know itself as a whole, or keep fracturing along lines that will eventually become impossible to hold.
What the graveyard teaches
It is worth saying, because the room contained people who lived it, that almost everything Bhasin proposed has been attempted before, and the manner of each attempt’s death is the most instructive thing about it.
The grandest experiment was Aman ki Asha, launched on the first day of 2010 by the two largest media houses of the two hostile states; Pakistan’s Jang Group and the Times of India, an event without real precedent: the mainstream press of two adversaries jointly campaigning against the adversarial frame itself. The campaign’s own commissioned surveys claimed measurable movement: threat perception down by over twenty percent in both countries within a year, two-thirds of respondents believing peace attainable in their lifetimes. Then it went quiet. After 2014 the initiative slid into dormancy under a pincer; in Delhi, a new government with no appetite for it; in Pakistan, the Jang Group under sustained assault from the military establishment in the wake of the Geo–Hamid Mir affair. Nobody banned Aman ki Asha. It was simply made unaffordable to continue.
The subtler death was Himal Southasian, the Kathmandu magazine that for twenty-nine years was the region’s only genuinely pan-regional analytical publication; the closest existing thing to Bhasin’s cross-border newsroom. In 2016 the Southasia Trust announced suspension, and its explanation deserves to be studied like a pathology report: Himal was silenced, the Trust said, not by attack or overt censorship but by “the use of the arms of bureaucracy to paralyse its functioning.” Approved grants sat unreleased for seven months without explanation. Work permits for non-Nepali editors became impossible to obtain. Payments to contributors were indefinitely delayed. No censor’s pen, no midnight knock; just paperwork, withheld. (Himal has since revived in leaner, digital-only form, which is its own lesson about where survivability lives.)
Read together, the two obituaries tell you the one thing Bhasin’s phrase “well-funded, editorially independent” glides past: funded by whom, and domiciled where? The kill mechanism for cross-border media in South Asia is administrative, not editorial; the grant-approval desk, the visa counter, the foreign-funding statute. Any such venture instantly attracts the “foreign-funded, anti-national” charge; India’s FCRA regime and Pakistan’s agencies have both perfected strangulation-by-compliance. Which means survivability is not a footnote to the proposal; it is the proposal. An endowment beyond the reach of any single ministry differs categorically from renewable grants; a diaspora-membership model differs from institutional philanthropy; a multi-jurisdiction digital domicile differs from a Kathmandu office with work permits to renew. The next Himal will be designed around its enemies’ paperwork or it will not last a decade.
One refinement to the archive proposal follows the same logic. Bhasin herself observed that the region’s national histories do not reconcile; which is precisely why a shared narrative is the wrong deliverable, and would merely open a new front in the textbook wars. A shared archive of primary sources; documents, images, manuscripts, objects; the same evidence available to everyone, the arguing left intact, is both more achievable and far harder to attack. Nobody has to agree about Aurangzeb to agree that his farmans should be scanned. And this is the stronger ground for her third proposal too: “myth-busting” as a banner risks sounding like counter-propaganda, which invites symmetrical dismissal; verifiable reporting that leaves the complexity standing, her own better formulation, “report the world as it is“, cannot be waved away so easily.
So the blueprint stands, annotated: right diagnosis, right instruments, and one unanswered engineering question about how the structure survives its first winter. As it happens, the woman who followed Bhasin to the podium is the living institutional memory of that graveyard; she ran the grandest of the dead experiments, watched how it died, and built its successor on the lessons.
That is Part II.

But it is the international coaching role which has brought the itinerant New Zealander to Pakistan. He appears to have a mandate till late 2027, when the ODI World Cup will take place, one that, whichever way it goes, will likely end up shaping his legacy in this country.
What he’s rebuffing is the notion of inexorable decline within Pakistan cricket, and the contention that his arrival may have failed to sufficiently stall it. “In the Asia Cup last year, for example, we won every game except against India,” Hesson tells Cricinfo. “The reality is every single team in the world is struggling to beat India at the moment. Every team, not just Pakistan. Rightly or wrongly, Pakistan are gauged by how they perform against India. And at the moment, India is not only the best team; they’re the best team by a mile.
https://africa.espn.com/cricket/story/_/id/49238380/mike-hesson-touts-pakistan-white-ball-improvement-looks-ahead-2027-odi-world-cup