Killing Atheists. A Wedge Issue in Bangladesh

Yet another Bangladeshi blogger has been hacked to death. This is the third time in just the last two months that someone has been hacked to death in BD for being an “atheist blogger”.

The victims:
1. Ananta Bijoy Das

2. Avijit Roy

3. Washiqur Rahman

Two born Hindu, one Muslim, all three known to be associated with Bangladeshi rationalism and “freethought” and in particular with the freethought blog “Mukto-Mona”. 

Someone with more local knowledge can comment about them and add their tributes. I wanted to focus on a more general issue: Why kill these bloggers? As Bond noted, the first time is happenstance, the second time coincidence, but the third time, it’s enemy action. This is not just some random Muslim fanatic getting riled up and going to earn his virgins. This is a systematic campaign…and it makes a lot of sense. These killings are a near-perfect “wedge issue” for Bangladeshi Islamists. How does that work?

1. Bangladesh is a relatively liberal Islamic country. There is a significant Hindu minority (though it shrank somewhat at partition and then again, drastically, during the anti-Hindu genocide of 1971) and thanks to strong traditions of secular Bengali nationalism and old-fashioned (i.e. not Post-Marxist Western elite and University imported) Left wing activism, there is a significant Muslim Bengali secular tradition. Another factor is the fact that when the Awami League led the Bangladesh liberation movement against West Pakistan, the West Pakistani army was supported by the main Islamist party and its cadres provided the volunteers who were their eyes and ears (and in many cases, their eager executioners).
After independence, as a “right-wing” Bangladeshi political grouping developed with military (and Pakistani, Saudi and possibly CIA) assistance, it was provided crucial support by the Islamists and in return their successive regimes provided assistance to the Islamists and protected them against prosecution for war crimes. At the height of the honeymoon between Islamists, the Pakistani intelligence agencies, Saudi Arabia and the CIA, this right-of-center alternative (first as military rule, then as the BNP) established itself firmly as one half (and for much of that time, the dominant half) of Bangladeshi politics. Since then, things have changed. Saudi Arabia is now somewhat conflicted about the Islamists and at a minimum, distinguishes between “good Islamists” (who behave themselves and support the royal family) and “bad Islamists” (who prefer to go the whole hog and aim to replace the royal family with a more authentic Islamist alternative). Pakistan and the CIA are no longer BFFs (though wary cooperation and buying and selling continues). And Western powers are not entirely happy with Islamism. As a result, the playing field in BD seems to have tilted towards the Awami League and towards relatively secular Bangladeshi nationalism. In the nature of things, the BNP or some such will still be needed to provide the other half of a stable two-party electoral system, but their Islamist allies are under some pressure. There is even the possibility that the BNP will have to carry on without hardcore Islamist cadres being sheltered under its umbrella and will have to (perhaps as an “India-skeptic” critic), go along to some extent with a new “India-friendly” regional order.
2. But there is another alternative. Is there some way the Islamists can recover and even win new heights they did not possess even under BNP regimes in the past?
3. Some of them, and perhaps some of their backers in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia (in Saudia, more in the private sector than in the government? who knows) seem to think so. And they are using these killings as a wedge issue.
4. By going after atheist bloggers (many or most of them Hindus), they have found a near perfect wedge issue. The Hasina government is not happy with these blasphemers being killed, and unlike in Pakistan, the regime seems to have made some arrests. But if they take a very public stand against these killings and aggressively protect the rights of these free-thinkers, then they stand with atheists and blasphemers and risk losing the support of “moderate Muslims” who don’t go in for machete-wielding execution, but whose core beliefs include the belief that atheism and apostasy cannot be tolerated….But if the Hasina government lets this go on, then they permit the Islamists to grab the initiative and drive away atheists, secularists and Hindus…all of whom are more or less her voters and supporters (and whose friends and supporters are also the “intellectuals” of the Awami League regime). At a minimum, it is an uncomfortable position for the regime.
5. Moderate Muslims may condemn free-lance executions, but such executions also bring to light the existence of atheists, Hindus and blasphemers in what is, after all, a Muslim majority country. For the moderate Muslim the best thing would be for this conversation to just go away. The longer it goes on, the more they have to commit to options they don’t like: should they come down in favor of Hindus, atheists and blasphemers (not necessarily in that order, but all these items are uncomfortably connected in mukto-mona)? Or, when push comes to machete-shove, do they stay silent and “understand” that the blasphemers have sorely provoked their Muslim executioners? whatever they decide, the discomfort is a net plus for the Islamists. They are betting on the fact that by making this an “Islam versus atheism/Hinduism” issue they make it hard for moderate Muslims to chose atheism and Hinduism over Islam.
6. With the penetration of bullshit-postmarxism into the Bengali elite increasing as their access to expensive Western education increases, the “high-end secularists” can be split too. “Black and White” division of the world between Islamists and anti-Islamists is anathema to postmodern-postmarxism. They too would prefer to opt out of this “complex and nuanced” issue. Their discomfort is an added bonus to the Islamist cause (of relatively little practical importance, but these people have some visibility in high-end intellectual circles, so their discomfort doesn’t hurt either).

Can Bangladeshi secularism (meaning in practice, the Awami League regime, there being no other secular alternative on the horizon) defeat this rather well-chosen point of attack? Maybe they can (in which case the Islamists will have gambled and lost and the secular cause will emerge stronger than before). But it is a big if…If they lose, Bangladesh is in play again as a possible Islamist base in Eastern India. The Islamists know what they are up to…

The Pakistan China Economic Corridor

An excellent and informative post by Ali Minai on 3quarksdaily.com

Worth a read.

“The world is full of Great Projects – tall buildings, long bridges, vast highway networks – but very seldom does a single project alter the geography of the world. The Suez Canal and the Panama Canal did this spectacularly, and now another great change in the connectivity of the world is beginning to take shape in Pakistan. The question is whether it will connect more or less than it will disconnect. “

My own first thought is that the logic of “economic geography” may reassert itself in the long run, but in the short term, many “obvious” beneficial connections can be lost in the face of ideological clashes (partition comes to mind), warfare and/or the breakdown of law and order. The “Silk Road” made sense as an economic project, but was intermittently shut down by wars and the collapse of order along it’s route. (Its loss of competitiveness to seaborne trade is a separate issue and does not explain various interruptions or the prolonged inability of “Silk Road” countries to take fuller advantage of railways as a way to compete with the sea at least to some extent, until recently). So the crucial question is to what extent the ruling elite in Pakistan (and in other regional hubs) prioritize economics over other things they also hold dear. Just to take two aspects as examples to illustrate what I mean:

1. Assume the Pakistani ruling elite has sufficient control WITHIN Pakistan. They could still risk the corridor because of adventurism abroad. For example, the project of taking Kashmir from India is a project that seems unlikely to succeed without triggering a “corridor-shattering” war; or the urge to dominate Afghanistan may not lead to Pax-Pakistania. What if it just means a violent quagmire with no end in sight. Can the corridor escape that distraction? ..I am not saying it is one or the other. But how much one gets pushed versus the other can still be an issue. The geniuses have been known to get it wrong before. …will they get it all correct this time (forget the moral issues, human rights etc. , I just mean “can they keep the peace”?) … I don’t think the answer is totally clear yet.

2. The basis on which nation-states are to be stabilized in the region West of the Radcliffe line is still up in the air. Islam? Ethnic solidarity? The mandate of heaven based on better trains and washing machines for all? I don’t think the matter is settled (except maybe in Iran, where Persian identity may have roots deep enough to stay upright through storms…but I notice that my pro-Israeli friends seem to have a very real (and very irrational?) animus towards Iran for some reason. Those are powerful enemies to have…so maybe even Iran is not home free. But you see what I mean: with identity so seriously contested (as opposed to non-seriously contested as in Texas versus the US Federal Govt) things may not settle down. Shit may hit fans. That sort of thing.

I remain optimistic 🙂

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World War One Indian Soldiers Write Home

A very interesting look at the letters Indian soldiers wrote home in World War One.

Ram Prasad (Brahmin) to Manik Chand (c/o Sikander Ali, Bamba Debi Bazar, Marwari Water Tank, Bombay)
[Hindi]
Kitchener’s Indian Hospital, Brighton
2nd September 1915
And send me fourteen or fifteen tolas of charas, and understand that you must send it so that no one may know. First fill a round tin box full of pickles and then in the middle of that put a smaller round box carefully closed, so that no trace of the pickles can enter. And send a letter to me four days before you send the parcel off. [Letter withheld]

Ser Gul (Pathan, 129th Baluchis) to Barber Machu Khan (57th Rifles, serving at the front)
[Urdu]
Indian Hospital, Rouen
13th September 1915
I have no need of anything, but I have a great longing for a flute to play. What can I do? I have no flute. Can you get me one from somewhere? If you can, please do, and send it to me. Take this much trouble for me. For I have a great desire to play upon the flute, since great dejection is fallen upon me. You must, you simply must, get one from somewhere. I have no need of anything else. But this you must manage as soon as you can. Make a small wooden box, put a little cotton wool in it, and put a flute to play on in the middle of the cotton wool. Then put a little cloth over it. Get Umar Din to write the address in English and it will reach me all right. Pack it so that the flute will not shake about. I shall be very grateful. I have no need of anything else … You must arrange this as quickly as possible. [Letter passed]
Balwant Singh (Sikh) to Pandit Chet Ram (Amritsar, Punjab)
[Gurmukhi cipher]
FPO.39 [France?]
24th October 1915
The ladies are very nice and bestow their favours upon us freely. But contrary to the custom in our country they do not put their legs over the shoulders when they go with a man. [Deleted]
Maula Dad Khan (Punjabi Muslim) to his father (India)
[Urdu]
Brigade Office, Sialkot Cavalry Brigade, France
24th October 1915
Muhammad Khan’s letter dated the 27th September reached me on the 22nd October. When I read it, every hair on my body stood on end. Before that I was happy, but after I had read it I was very vexed. It is true that I wrote to Allah Lok Khan for a pair of [women’s] shoes. The fact is, father, that a young Frenchman of my acquaintance asked me to send for something from India. He asked me to get him some shoes which would fit his wife. I wrote that. Of what do you suspect me? My father, I swear in the name of God and His Prophet and declare that there is no [ground for suspicion]. Am I such a wretch and such a blackguard as to leave my noble wife and child and behave thus? … There are very strict orders against such action on the part of our people. I came from home to earn money and renown, not to put such shame upon you. [Letter passed]
Sepoy Baldar (Afridi) to Sepoy Minadar Khan (57th Rifles, France)
[Urdu]
Frontier Constabulary, NWFP, India
10th November 1915
I have married Jabar’s wife and paid him Rs. 560. I have sold my sister to Yar Baz for Rs. 560. My other wife I have sold to my father for Rs. 640. Do not be anxious. When you come back, I will find you a wife. [Letter passed]
Bir Singh (Sikh) to Jowala Singh (Ambala District, Punjab)
[Urdu]
6th Cavalry or 19th Lancers, France
28th January 1916
You say that the parcel came back from Bombay. What sort of parcel was it? If you wrote ‘opium’ on it, do not do so again, but put ‘sweets’ or ‘dainties’ on it, and send off the opium. Have no fear; parcels are not opened on the way and cannot be lost. So keep on sending the drugs. Let Indar Kaur be the sender. [Letter passed]
Dafadar Ram Nath (Jat) to Headmaster Baldav Singh (Jat School, Rohtak, Punjab)
[Urdu]
20th Deccan Horse, France
4th November 1917
My idea is that, since it is now four years since I went to my home, my wife should, if she wishes it, be allowed to have connection according to Vedic rites with some other man, in order that children may be born to my house. If this is not done, then the family dignity will suffer. Indeed, this practice should now be followed in the case of all wives whose husbands have been absent for four years or more. It is permitted by Vedic rites, if the wives are willing. Everyone knows that that article, the consumption of which is increased while the production is stopped, will in time cease to exist. If any article is allowed to decrease through ignorance, no one is to blame; but when every one knows that an article is being consumed to extinction, while at the same time they are aware of the steps available to supplement production, they are greatly to blame if they hesitate to take those steps.
Kala Khan (Punjabi Muslim) to Iltaf Hussain (Bhatinda, Patiala, Punjab States)
[Urdu]
Indian Labour Corps, France
27th December 1917
You enquire about the cold? I will tell you plainly what the cold in France is like when I meet you. At present I can only say that the earth is white, the sky is white, the trees are white, the stones are white, the mud is white, the water is white, one’s spittle freezes into a solid white lump, the water is as hard as stones or bricks, [and] the water in the rivers and canals and on the roads is like thick plate glass. What more am I to say? Our kind-hearted Sirkar has done everything possible for us to protect us from the cold. We are each provided with two pairs of strong, expensive boots. We have whale oil to rub in our feet, and for food we are provided with live Spanish sheep. In short, the Sirkar has accumulated many good and wonderful things for our use.
Khalil Ullah (Hindustani Muslim) to Ganiullah (Muttra District, UP)
[Urdu]
2nd Lancers, France
3rd March 1918
I am sending you a picture of an American lady aviator, I want you to study it and see what the women of Europe and America are doing. I want you to contrast them with our womenfolk, and to think what sort of education they can give to our children when they themselves are lacking in knowledge and training. I am hopeful that, if you pay careful attention to what I have written, you will be able to effect some improvement. The advancement of India lies in the hands of the women; until they act, India can never awake from her hare’s dream. Forgive me if I have spoken too strongly.
Extracts from Indian Voices of the Great War: Soldiers’ Letters, 1914-18, edited by David Omissi. Reproduced with the permission of Penguin Books India.

– See more at: http://www.caravanmagazine.in/vantage/what-indian-soldiers-first-world-war-wrote-home-about#sthash.VpsBK6SR.eq4m9bXn.dpuf

An Embarrassment at PEN

(Trigger warning: this post includes words and images)

PEN American Center decided to honor the French satirical weekly Charlie Hebdo with an award for the magazine’s courage in standing up for free speech. This is an award for courage in the face of censorship; a free speech award. It was meant to recognize the fact that CH was repeatedly threatened by groups of extremist Muslims who insisted that their particular theological rules must be respected by everyone and no one is allowed to cross their red lines. Even with their lives under threat (and the threats were always serious, not taken as a joke even before they were carried out) CH insisted on their right to satirize and comment on every subject, including the subject of Islam. In response their offices were attacked by armed fanatics and several CH staff were killed, as was one Muslim policeman of Algerian ethnic origin. It must be noted that Islam was not an obsession for CH and was not their main target by any means.

Anyway, the magazine insisted that they had the right to write about Islam in the same way as they wrote about other subjects, and they paid a heavy price. Then, with several colleagues lying dead, the magazine refused to back down and published an intelligent and eminently sane issue to show that they were not cowed. Courage is clearly something they do not lack and PEN American Center decided to honor them for this very straightforward exhibition of devotion to the cause of free speech. A cause that used to be a liberal and progressive cause and which is one of the few ways in which modern democratic society really is superior to other civilizations, past and present.

But everyone did not jump on this “free speech” bandwagon.  A group of writers (including a few real stars like Michael Ondaatje, Peter Carey and Junot Diaz) announced that they were boycotting the award ceremony because CH is not a fit candidate for this award. Most writers (even most liberals) refused to join the refuseniks, but there was support, especially within the postmarxist Left. Still, the affair went ahead, though with an air of needless controversy (needless, of course, in my view. Everyone is entitled to their opinion and those writers probably think the controversy was desperately needed). Now that the award has been handed out I decided to put together a few random personal observations and some interesting snippets from the internet:

1. The objectors clearly misrepresented CH by portraying it as a racist, supremacist, (practically) right wing supporter of the “war on terror”. As Justin EH Smith and others have pointed out in great detail and with solid documentation, the magazine is a LEFT wing, anti-authoritarian, anti-racist magazine that is not obsessed with Islam or Muslims and that spends most of its time skewering the French ruling class and not the disenfranchised masses on whose behalf these denizens of the first world took their not-so-brave stand. Justin also provides the clearest argument in favor of satire as a weapon in the hands of those who stand for freedom and who question absurd or unfair powers, and CH as a magazine that has consistently used it in this fashion.
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A quote from Justin’s article:

I am not a big fan of most laĂŻcitĂŠ rhetoric, and I am sensitive to how it is used for purposes of exclusion. (I am also not listening to what Salman Rushdie is saying on this topic.) This is why I’ve tried to be consistent about coupling my position on Charlie Hebdo with an equally insistent position on, e.g., the rights and dignity of regular and non-regular (‘illegal’) migrants to France. I see my position as the one that, more than that of those with whom I disagree, is most insistent that Islam must not be perceived as a monolith, that in fact there is no such thing as the Muslim community, but rather numerous disagreeing factions, by no means all of which agree with the attackers that there is something unacceptably offensive about the content of Charlie Hebdo.



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2. Joyce Carol Oates represents the confused and conflicted wing of the refuseniks. After signing the letter, she took to twitter to backtrack and make sure she satisfied all sides. A position that becomes understandable once you notice that she has PEN awards of her own and has been a guest and even a presenter at an award show that honored, among others, the American war reporter Lara Logan. If she found no difficulty there, one wonders what upset her so much about CH? Does she think CH is somehow MORE “metropole” or pro-war-on-terror than Lara Logan? Anyway, my guess is that plain-vanilla ignorance is not the primary reason she signed on to the letter (though it is surely part of it, since she seems to have no idea what CH actually promotes).  My guess (and of course, it is only a guess) is that she signed because of a combination of:
A. Vague (and very poorly informed) postmarxism that made her imagine that this was a fight between White, Western privilege and the disenfranchised masses yearning to be free, and in such a fight, it was her duty as a socially aware rich White Westerner to show that she was on the side of the angels.
B. Some people she considered friends asked her to sign. She did what had to be done. Then backtracked when she realized that other friends (and potential judges at future award events) were in the opposite camp.

Need to examine — without rancor, please!–when someone’s “freedom of expression” is someone else’s devastating & assaultive “hate speech.”

Should be kept in mind that PEN gives many awards & most for literary excellence. Current controversy disproportionate, misleading.

I have no way of knowing this is why she behaved as she did, any more than she has a way of knowing what was in the hearts of CH editors and cartoonists when they drew the cartoons. She is not taking their anti-racist, progressive statements at face value, I am not taking hers, that’s just how the world works. Though the difference remains that I am conscious I am making assumptions about her motives while doing my mind-reading, but she seems to think she just knows. In any case, her case against CH has been summarized and judged, correctly, by this German blogger. The last line is philosophical gold.

3. Francine Prose wrote a piece defending her decision to sign the letter and included this gem:
“And the idea that one is either “for us or against us” in such matters not only precludes rational and careful thinking, but also has a chilling effect on the exercise of our right to free expression and free speech that all of us – and all the people at PEN – are working so tirelessly to guarantee.”

Criticising her decision has a “chilling effect” on free speech but cartoonists getting shot for drawing cartoons does not? And her refusal to honor CH? does that have a “chilling effect” on free speech or is it only chilling if she is being criticized?

4. The cartoonist Gary Trudeau. After making some ignorant remarks, he backtracked a little, but not much. Here he is defending his stand against CH (and in his case, it clearly is a stand against CH, not some vague notion of “others I like deserved it more, so I am unhappy and wont go”)

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Transcription from Nib:

I was as outraged as the rest of the word at the time. I mourn them deeply. We’re a very small fraternity of political cartoonists around the globe… What I didn’t do is necessarily agree with the decisions they made that brought a world of pain to France.

I think that in France the wider Muslim community feels disempowered and disenfranchised in way that I’m sure is also true in this country. And that while I would imagine only a tiny fraction were sympathetic to the acts that were carried out and the killings, I think probably the vast majority shared in the outraged. Certainly that seems to be what people are hearing in the schoolyards in France now, is that they’re finding common cause at least with the issue, if not with the action.

I think that’s bad for France, it’s unfortunate, it’s a tragedy that could have been avoided. But every body has to decide where the red lines are for themselves.

Well, this cartoon sums it up.

5. Professor Amitava Kumar signed on to the protest but it seems he is not the confrontational sort, so he is not exactly reveling in the SJW mode. Instead, he says he protested because he saw into the future and “the stand I am taking is; why is so much vitriol being poured on those who are protesting (against CH)”. THIS is why he signed the letter? because he is clairvoyant and knew unfair criticism would befall those who signed? Hear it and marvel. He even complains that one reason he is upset is because Hebdo is being awarded and nobody is talking about Avijit Roy or Sabeen Mahmood..at least one of whom was killed by exactly the same ideology and for exactly the same reasons as the attack on Hebdo. One would think Hebdo’s courage creates space for people like Avijit, but the good professor does not see it that way. . he spends a lot of this interview answering every question with appeals to “complexity” and “nuance” and “raising questions” instead of answering the question he has been asked. Interestingly, he also tries to bring in the objection that awards as such are the problem. A stand to which I hope he will stick diligently in the future. Anyway, this interview is a gem and worth your time. Listen for yourself and wonder why and how he became a professor.

6. The full time social justice warriors (especially those of Latin American origin) among the refuseniks are easier to understand. For them, if it is “the power” versus someone else, then one supports someone else. Free speech per se is not a “good”. It is good if it promotes “social justice”, bad if it does not. Since the world is assumed to be divided between grown up and evil White people (White is not necessarily about color in this case; the Japanese are practically White, the Turks are not) and childlike and innocent “people of color” (this category includes chromatically White people from Latin America, whose ancestors crimes against Native Americans and Africans have long since been forgiven, it’s complicated), therefore in any conflict between good and evil, one sides with the good.  In this case, PEN American Center and Charlie Hebdo are both “White” (never mind a few race traitors who have joined the ranks of the oppressors), compared to Muslims (herein regarded as POC irrespective of skin pigmentation), the choice is not difficult.
I also have the (anecdotal) impression that SJWs who are willing to be “anti-free speech” in this case may, in other conversations, come across as very much pro-free speech. It seems they have a hierarchy of crimes in mind, with “Western hegemonism/colonialism/imperialism/racism” being at the top of the list. Between suppression of speech and (perceived) support of “the metropole” in the name of free speech, they will opt for suppression of speech.
It sort of makes sense if you buy into their premises. It is sometimes hard to imagine why anyone does buy their premises, since they are historically, anthropologically, culturally and biologically incorrect. But that is a discussion for another day.
By the way, Teju Cole is in this group but I do wonder about him a little. What if his Nigerian heritage causes him to take a more personal interest in Islamic terrorists at some point? Would he slightly adjust his SJW positions? I am not sure what (if any) connection he has with Nigeria now, but if it is more than mere nostalgia then this is at least a slight possibility. He wont change positions explicitly and openly of course, and the ultimate responsibility for all events in Nigeria will continue to be assigned to Britain or America (since I expect his own bread and butter will continue to come from the American SJW community) but a little bit of a shift may happen with him. We will have to wait and see.

7. Peter Carey managed to include the entire French nation in the list of criminals:
“All this is complicated by PEN’s seeming blindness to the cultural arrogance of the French nation, which does not recognize its moral obligation to a large and disempowered segment of their population.”
Surely we can all agree with that. Those arrogant French people have had it coming ever since Napoleon insulted Carey’s ancestors with that quip about “a nation of shopkeepers”.

6. Razib Khan has a post up about what the data says on the issue of free speech in America. As he sums it up “the consistent free speech position gets stronger as you get more liberal, and, as you get more intelligent.” So, a few noisy SJWs do not represent either liberal or intelligent opinion in the country. Not on the issue of free speech. (though some may argue that liberals just wish to appear more tolerant, not that they are more tolerant. I still think liberalism had a LOT to do with establishing the notion of free speech protection and remains one of its main defenders. The PC crowd is an aberration… I hope)

Razib also adds a caveat that i think is valid: One major caveat that needs to placed here is that traditionally the elites of this country have been more defensive about free speech than the populace as a whole. That’s probably because the elites are worried more about power plays by their rivals. Ultimately politically oriented free speech is important for those with ambition and aspirations.

7. Meanwhile, if you want more background on blasphemy-killing as a way to silence criticism, you can see my article here. 

An image of a person in a turban holding a sign “I am Charlie” with the title “all is forgiven” was removed from this part for obvious reasons.

Post Scrip: I just saw this excellent article by Pakistani journalist Kunwar Khuldune Shahid that pretty much sums it up.

What the radical Islamists and their apologists won’t discuss is the tradition of drawing Prophet Muhammad’s images as a form of tribute by many Muslim artists throughout centuries. What they won’t discuss either is the fact that an ostensibly anti-Muslim publication received glowing tributes from many Arab Muslim newspapers in the aftermath of the Paris attack, with Op-Eds in Charlie Hebdo’s support being published in Pakistan as well. An Iranian newspaper published ‘Je suis Charlie’ on its front page.
You can deem Sabeen’s talk or Charlie Hebdo’s satire as “violating the acceptable” but in either case you can’t simultaneously be a flag-bearer of free speech. For consistency’s sake, it’s better to not pay any regard to freedom of speech, than being selective in safeguarding it. If you’re Sabeen, but not Charlie, for all practical purposes you’re neither.”

By the way, I did not include Kamila Shamsie in my random examples of signatories and their contradictions because she is not one of the famous signatories. But I must say that I would have expected more of her kin to sign this protest. What happened?

I hasten to add that Pakistani writers in English include some genuine talents (Mohammed Hanif, Bapsi Sidhwa and Nadim Aslam come to mind, just off the top of my head) but you know what I mean.. there is a group who would sign almost anything supported by Teju Cole and Joyce Carol Oates, so I am a bit surprised more of them did not jump on the bandwagon. Perhaps nobody called?
PS #2: Where is Pankaj Mishra? Why was he not asked to sign? or, God forbid, did he refuse? Just curious. 

PS#3: An interesting objection: Someone objected that contrary to my claim, speech was freer in pre-modern Punjab than it is in modern America. I am not convinced, but if anyone has some argument about that, feel free to add it to the comments. 

Trust and Accountability

Excellent advice from Faisal Naqvi


http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-315585-Trust-and-accountability

“…But the soldiers of Pakistan serve the citizens of Pakistan. And it is not good for the citizens of Pakistan to fear their soldiers. Just like it is not good for Pakistanis to be riven with internal suspicions and divides. Just like it is not good if the citizens of Pakistan have no idea as to who is killing their own.

I have no reason to doubt the DG ISPR’s sincerity when he condemns the murder of Sabeen Mahmud. At a personal level, I very much doubt that our agencies had anything to do with her death. But in the absence of any independent accountability or trustworthy form of dispute resolution, all we are left with are his words. And words really don’t go that far.”

This opaque system of “rule by agencies” is the army’s most insidious and harmful gift to Pakistan. The fact that you never know who is in charge, and what they want, and why?

There are fringe conspiracy theorists in EVERY country. Even in the US there are intelligent people who think some secret cabal of trilateralists runs the country. But Pakistan is a good example of what happens when such opaque conspiracies become mainstream AND WITH GOOD CAUSE.

What is happening in Balochistan? who is responsible? in an normal country you would at least ask the CM or the governor or even the Prime Minister and expect an answer. They may lie (they probably lie) but they are the ones on top. People develop ways of interpreting what they are saying. And there really IS some transparency. Many things are exactly as they seem. But in this case, we don’t even bother to ask Dr Malik (chief minister Balochistan) or the Prime Minister…and they are not held responsible in any serious way either. “Everyone” knows the army runs Balochistan. But do they? do they run everything or some things? who decides? It is all opaque and everyone has the freedom to cook up their favorite conspiracy theory. Some of them are probably true. But which ones?
We will never know.

 Btw, my own theory of what drove us mad in the first place: http://pragati.nationalinterest.in/2013/03/pakistan-myths-and-consequences/

Middle East Musings on New Pundits

I do more writing on New Pundits now but I thought I would point to three recent posts of mine dealing with the geopolitics in the region:

The Ghost of the Persian Empire will Own the Middle EastThe ghost of geopolitics means that the only true counterweight to Iran is not Saudi Arabia, Pakistan or Israel (The Sunni-Semitic axis Egypt doesn’t even figure, as it’s geopolitically so dependent on Israel post Aswan Dam) but Turkey. However Anatolia is ultimately a bridge to the West and Turkey’s highland configuration point towards Istanbul and that land bridge.

The “Iran deal” signals Persia’s return to Geopolitical PreeminenceThe Iranians, like their closely related kin the Indians, are an Aryan people who settled on the hugely strategic Iranian plateau. Unlike the Indians upon conquest (or a few centuries after) the Iranians gave up their hugely influential native born faith, Zoroastrianism, to embrace Islam and consequently the hugely Iranian inflected Shi’ite faith. Of course Islam can properly be conceived of a fine line between the more orthodox (and less theologically innovative) Sunni practises, which adhere most closely to the original Arabian teachings, and the far more syncretic Ismaili cluster, in which 12ver Shi’ite Islam falls in the middle.

How Pakistan and Turkey must play the crisis in the Middle EastNow far more interesting, in that it is much contestable, about what is Pakistan. I would argue Pakistan is the Mughal Empire successor state reimagined (even if partially) on the Indus River Valley System. This linkage survived 1971’s breakup and to put it succinctly Pakistan looks to Akbar, its arch rival fratricidal twin India looks to Asoka.

Arab-Pakistani Security Cooperation

From Dr Hamid Hussain:

        Pakistan and
Arab World:  Security Cooperation

Hamid Hussain

 â€œThe
desire to gain an immediate selfish advantage always imperils their ultimate
interests.  If they recognize this fact, they usually recognize it too
late”.
  Reinhold Niebuhr

 There is long
history of security relations between Pakistan and several Arab
countries.  In 1970s and 80s, many Arab countries flushed with oil money
bought state of the art equipment but local population lacked technical
skills.  A number of Pakistan army and air force personnel were deputed to
several countries including Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain,
Qatar, Jordan, Syria and Iraq.  A much smaller number of naval officers
also served in UAE training local naval forces.  The numbers and duration of
deployment varied from less than a dozen to few thousand and from few weeks to
several years.  The main role of Pakistani officers was in training local
security forces although they also manned complicated equipment such as
radars. 

Pakistan
sometimes got into difficulties in view of squabbles among Arab countries as
well as internal strife in some of these countries.  Pakistani troop
presence in Saudi Arabia though very small put it at odds with Egypt. 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt were supporting opposing parties in the civil war in
Yemen.  This continued till Anwar Sadat got off the ship of Arab socialism
and took a turn towards the right side of the curve.  In 1980s, in the
context of Iran-Iraq war, presence of Pakistani troops in Saudi Arabia put
Pakistan at odds with Tehran. 

 Pakistani army
and air force personnel trained Saudi forces in 1970s and 80s.  Iran-Iraq
war changed Saudi security environment and both countries started to negotiate
about limited Pakistani troop deployment.  After prolonged negotiations it
was agreed to deploy a limited Pakistani contingent on Saudi soil.  Delay
in negotiations was partly due to differences among Saudi decision
makers.  Debate among Saudis was on the issues of a larger foreign
contingent (about two division strength), expansion of Saudi army and balance
between army and Saudi Arabian National Guards (SANG). Finally, a negotiated
middle ground agreed on a much smaller foreign contingent that consisted
of  only a reinforced brigade strength.  In 1982, a formal agreement
was signed and Saudi Pakistan Armed Forces Organization (SPAFO) headquarters
was established at Riyadh.  Pakistani troops were stationed at Tabuk and
Khamis Mushayet.  An armored brigade group was stationed at Tabuk from
1982 to 1988.  It was a complete formation deputed for three years and two
brigades rotated in 1982-85 and 1985-88.  Initially, Major General Shamsur
Rahman Kallu (later Lieutenant General) was appointed to the SPFAO headquarters
but he never took charge and the contingent was headed by a Brigadier rank
officer.  First commander was Brigadier Mehboob Alam (later Major General)
who served from 1982-85 and under him Colonel (later Brigadier) Saeed Ismat
served as GSO-1 Operations and Training.  From 1985 to 1988, Pakistani
armored brigade was commanded by Brigadier Jahangir Karamat (later General and
Pakistan army Chief).  In 1988, for a variety of reasons, the brigade was
withdrawn and only a small number of Pakistani personnel involved in training
remained (majority of foreign training personnel were from United States and
Britain). 

 In my view,
several factors such as increased confidence about Saudization process of armed
forces, modernization of forces, acquisition of surface to surface missiles and
friction with Pakistan about composition and control of the contingent
contributed to this decision.  Saudis had asked General Zia that Shia
officers and troops should be excluded from the units sent for
deployment.  Zia presented this condition during one of his meeting with
his Corps Commanders.  Several senior officers protested stating that this
may significantly damage the cohesion of Pakistani armed forces.  The
reason was that the policy could not be implemented discreetly.  They
argued that a complete formation with full cohesive battalions was to be
deputed and removing a particular group of soldiers based on their sect would
negatively affect the cohesion of the units.

 
In 1990s, need
for Pakistani troops became obsolete in view of presence of large number of
U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of First Gulf War.  In late
1990s, the key strategic issue between two countries was nuclear factor. 
There is no conclusive proof but it is generally believed that both countries
agreed in principle that in case of Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons, Pakistan
will provide nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia.  In return, Saudi Arabia
provided oil at discount rate to cash strapped and sanctioned Pakistan in the
aftermath of its 1998 nuclear tests.  This was done off the books to avoid
Pakistan’s creditors asking for more pound of the flesh.  In 2003,
revelations about Pakistani nuclear proliferation by its lead scientist Abdul
Qadeer Khan including clandestine shipments to Iran stunned the world. 
Saudis were angry and felt that Pakistanis were a bunch of cheaters trying to
milk money from all sides.  Saudis showed their displeasure by now asking
for full price for the oil supply.  Saudis have mediated between ruling
elites of Pakistan dating back to mass protest movement organized by a
coalition of opposition parties against then Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto
in 1977.  Saudi ambassador tried to negotiate a deal but eventually
military staged a coup.  Most recently, Saudis guaranteed exile of former
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to the Kingdom as well as negotiated safe passage
to former President Pervez Mussharraf.  This has severely damaged
Pakistan’s reputation among Saudis.  Saudi royal family has very little
respect for feuding Pakistani ruling elite. 

 Intelligence
agencies of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia enjoy close relationship going back over
two decades.  Currently, main focus of cooperation is Arab
extremists.  Though small in numbers but shuttling of Saudi militants
between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and Afghanistan is a major Saudi
concern.  Details of this cooperation are usually not made public and both
countries prefer to work behind the scenes.  Pakistani and Saudi
intelligence officials usually don’t leak; a nuisance that has been taken to an
art form by Americans.  One case became public when in May 2009; Pakistani
paramilitary force Frontier Corps (FC) arrested four Saudi militants in Mohmand
tribal agency.  These four Saudi militants along with a Libyan and an
Afghan national were arrested at Khapakh check post.  FC troops were
escorting them to FC camp in Ghalanai when they came under attack.  Over
60 militants attacked FC escort and gunfight lasted for over two hours with
many casualties. 

 
Looking from
Riyadh point of view, the security dilemma has mushroomed into a
nightmare.  Externally, Shia dominated government in a fragile Iraq,
unrest in Bahrain with potential rise of another Shia entity on the border,
unraveling of Yemen, increasing voices of demand of constitutional monarchy in
Jordan, exit of Mubarak in one of the most historic change in Egypt are enough
to cause many sleepless nights for Saudi decision makers.  Internally,
presence of a small but lethal extremist fringe and undercurrents of discontent
in Saudi society and much more alienation of small Shia minority in the Kingdom
are additional worries.  Traditionally, Saudi Arabia carefully balanced
its security structure to prevent a coup.  Army doctrine was more static
in orientation and ‘jointness’ was carefully avoided to prevent cohesion of armed
forces to a level where they could easily overthrow the rulers.  In
addition, SANG was used as a check against army.  SANG operates
independent of Ministry of Defence running its own recruitment, training and
retention.  SANG is also structured in a way to prevent it from posing a
threat to the government.  Out of total strength of over 50’000 personnel
of SANG only about 10’000 are on active duty.   Remainder is divided
into regular reserve and part time tribal irregulars.  

 

In case of
massive protests though less likely in Saudi Arabia, there is always the
question of how much force local security apparatus will be willing to use
against their own countrymen.  Potential requirement of foreign troops
forced Saudis to work with current Pakistani civilian government for whom they
had nothing but utter contempt until very recently.  President and Prime
Minister of Pakistan faced with grim economic situation of the country and army
brass uncertain about continued U.S. funding are too delighted at the potential
of cash windfall from Saudi patrons.  Secretary General of Saudi National
Security Council Prince Bandar bin Sultan made too quite trips to Pakistan in
the aftermath of protests.  Main subject was getting Pakistani support for
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) action to send Saudi troops to Bahrain,
encourage Pakistan to send retired personnel for Bahrain security forces and in
case of mass unrest in Saudi Arabia possibility of deployment of Pakistani
security personnel.  Presently, Saudi security apparatus is able to handle
most internal security problems and use of any foreign troops is more a
contingency plan and will be used as a last measure if things spiral down out
of control. 

 

In 1969, Pakistan sent a military training mission
to Jordan.  The mission’s primary task was to assess state of Jordanian
forces in the aftermath of 1967 defeat at the hands of Israelis and recommend
overhaul.  Officers from different arms (Infantry, Armor and Artillery) of
army and air force were part of this mission.  Main objective of the
mission was survey of Jordanian armed forces, find deficiencies, recommend
solutions and guide in training.  Pakistanis got entangled in Jordan’s
clash with Palestinians.  The simmering tensions between Jordanians and
Palestinians resulted in September 1970 showdown when King Hussain
ordered  Jordanian forces  to quell an attempt by Palestinian groups
based in Jordan to overthrow the Hashemite kingdom.  There were
exaggerated reports circulated by Palestinian sympathizers that Pakistani
troops helped Jordanian forces in combat.  Later, after General Zia-ul
Haq’s coup, those opposing him continued these unsubstantiated reports as Zia
was in Amman during that time period. 

 Pakistani training mission consisted of only about
two dozen army and air force officers and no combat troops (only exception was
an Anti-Air Craft detachment sent in June 1970 at King Hussain’s request as he
was worried that Syrian and Iraqi air forces may intervene in support of
Palestinians).  Pakistan military mission was headed by Major General
Nawazish Ali while Air Commodore Anwar Shamim (later Air Chief Marshal and
Pakistan air force chief) was in charge of air force officers.  
During main Jordanian offensive in September, Pakistani ambassador in Amman
Nawab Rahat Ali Chattari as well as head of military mission Major General
Nawazish were not in the country.  Brigadier Zia ul Haq was in charge of
the military mission.  King Hussain asked Brigadier Zia to take over the
command of a Jordanian division.  Pakistan’s charge de affairs got
approval of this move from Ministry of Defence.  

In Amman, 4th Mechanized Division commanded by Brigadier
Kasab al-Jazy operated and 60th Armored
Brigade of the division commanded by Colonel Alawi Jarrad was at the
forefront.  After 1967 war, 3rd Iraqi
Armored Division had stayed back in Jordan and was deployed in Zarqa. 
King Hussain was suspicious about the motives of Iraqis and he deployed 99th Brigade commanded by Colonel Khalil Hajhuj of
3rd Jordanian Armored Division near Iraqis to keep
them in check.  However, young Saddam Hussain emerging from his own recent
successful power struggle inside Iraq shrewdly pulled Iraqi troops away from
conflict area and finally removed them from Jordan to avoid getting
entangled. 

 
2nd Jordanian
Infantry Division was based in Irbid near the Syrian border.  Palestinian
guerrillas had taken control of the town.  Syria entered the fray in
support of Palestinians by sending 5th Division
commanded by Brigadier Ahmed al-Amir.  This was a reinforced division
consisting of 67th Mechanized, 88th Armored and 91st Armored Brigades of Syrian army and Hittin
Brigade consisting of Palestinians.  Commanding officer of 2nd Jordanian Infantry Division Brigadier Bahjat
al-Muhaisen (he was married to a woman from a prominent Palestinian family)
went AWOL and Brigadier Zia took command of the division at the request of King
Hussain.  2nd Jordanian Infantry Division was shaky after
desertion of Jordanian commander and Zia helped to keep the formation
intact.  This division helped to take back control of Irbid.  Syrian
armored thrust near Irbid was tackled by 40th Armored Brigade commanded by Colonel Atallah
Ghasib of 3rd Jordanian Armored Division. Major damage to
Syrian armor was done by Royal Jordanian Air Force.  Inside Syria, a power
struggle between Saleh Jadid and Defence Minister and Air Force commander Hafiz
al-Asad was at its peak and Asad decided to keep Syrian Air Force out of
conflict.  In the absence of air cover, Syrian forces were mauled by
Jordanian air force and within two days, battered Syrian troops retreated
back.  Two months later, Asad took control of the affairs of the country
sending Jadid to prison.  In 1970, Nawazish gave a bad Annual Confidential
Report (ACR) to Zia although details of it are not available.  It is not
clear whether report was written before or after September 1970. 
Apparently, report was bad enough to possibly end Zia’s career at the rank of
Brigadier.  Zia asked his former Commanding Officer (CO) of Guides Cavalry
Colonel (R) Pir Abdullah Shah for help.  Abdullah asked then Chief of
General Staff (CGS) Major General Gul Hassan Khan (Zia had also served under
Gul Hassan) and report was quashed by army chief General Yahya Khan on Gul’s
recommendation.   

 

Traditionally,
Oman recruits from specific Baluch communities to man its state security
forces.  This is not new and the practice goes back to several
decades.  Pakistan is not the sole source of manpower for security
services but citizens of a number of other countries also serve in Omani
security forces.  Oman was facing a rebellion in southern region in 1960s
and 70s.  In 1960s, two Southern Regiments consisting of Baluchis were
raised.  In 1971, a Frontier Force battalion consisting of Baluchis was
also raised. 

 

Many Pakistanis along
with other foreigners serve in Bahrain’s police, National Guard and armed
forces.  This fact has been highlighted recently in view of protests in
many Arab states and additional requirement of personnel for riot
control.  Bahrain saw large scale protests recently against ruling
dynasty.  Government needed more man power to control the situation. 
GCC under the leadership of Saudi Arabia sent about 4000 soldiers mostly Saudi
troops to Bahrain.  Bahrain’s foreign minister Khalid Bin Ahmed al Khalifa
visited Islamabad in March 2011 and Commander of Bahrain’s National Guards
Lieutenant General Sheikh Mohammad bin Isa bin Salman al-Khalifa visited
Pakistan in December 2010 and June 2011.  Defence cooperation between two
countries was the main subject during the talks, however Pakistan army knowing
the potential political fallout stayed in the background and let the President
and Prime Minister handle the issue.  No exact data is available but some
estimate that few thousand Pakistanis serve in Bahrain’s police, National
Guards and armed forces.  A small Pakistani contingent of about a
battalion strength has been serving mainly in training capacity long before the
start of protests.  There is no evidence that these Pakistani soldiers
were used in crackdown on protesters.  In the last few months, about 1000
additional retired military personnel from Pakistan have been recruited for
Bahrain by welfare foundations run by Pakistan army and navy. 

 

In Bahrain the
negative fallout is for a large number of Pakistani workers and there have been
instances of violence against them.  Several Pakistanis were killed and
many wounded by angry mobs of Bahrainis.  Many Pakistanis left their homes
for fear of their safety.  Some of these Pakistanis families are now
living in facilities run by Bahraini government as well as Pakistan Club run by
Pakistani embassy.  Bahraini protesters obviously object to presence of
foreigners in security apparatus but there is also a sectarian angle. 
Majority of population is Shia while ruling family is Sunni.  They view
recruitment of foreign Sunnis as an attempt to suppress Shia.   Iran
obviously sympathizing with Shia kin of Bahrain has strongly objected to
recruitment of Pakistanis in Bahrain’s forces.  Pakistan’s charge de
affairs in Tehran was summoned by Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister and warned
about negative fallout on Pakistan-Iran relations.  In addition, Shia
organizations in Pakistan also protested this action of Pakistani
government.  As expected Pakistani Sunni clerics came out supporting Saudi
Arabia and Gulf sheikhdoms. 

 The best course
for Bahrain is to use minimal force, deploy mainly indigenous forces for law
and order and institute constitutional reforms to satisfy its own
citizens.  Heavy handedness will surely radicalize some in the opposition
resulting in a self-fulfilled prophecy.  If there is any proof of foreign
involvement in unrest, they should make it public.  On part of opposition
forces, it will be suicidal for their cause to get direct help from Iran. 
This will simply confirm the ruling dynasty’s narrative that Shia are not loyal
citizens of the state thus justifying continued denial of their rights. 
Leaders of opposition movement have great responsibility to keep protests
peaceful. 

 
Saudi Arabia and
Iran are engaged in a sectarian war for the last three decades.  The
battlefields are scattered everywhere including Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan and
Pakistan.  New battle lines are being drawn where Saudi Arabia is trying
to scare Iran by threat of overwhelming Sunni numbers.  Riyadh is lining
up Sunni countries including almost all Arab countries, Pakistan, Malaysia and
Indonesia.   Iran is left with a smaller team of ruling Alawi Syrian
regime and Hezbollah.  The prospect of a new potential ally in case of
overthrow of minority Sunni ruling dynasty in Bahrain is quite a welcome
thought for Iran.  To counter enormous numbers Tehran is also trying to
work with Sunni schools of thought at variance with Saudi puritanical version
as well as trying to take control of the ‘emotional push button’ issue of
Palestinian cause by supporting almost exclusively Sunni Hamas in occupied
territories. 

 

Iran is very
nervous at losing its only Arab ally Syria.  Tehran is vocally supporting
opposition movements in all Arab countries but totally silent about
Syria.  The reason is quite obvious that in case of a democratic change in
Syria, the power hold of minority Alawi regime will disappear.  Thought of
a Sunni government in Damascus is quite discomforting to Tehran.  If new
government aligns with Saudi Arabia, it can cut off the lifeline of Tehran’s
support to its proxies in Lebanon.  Tehran can potentially loose one
important ally (Syria) and left with a much weaker proxy (Hezbollah) in one
stroke.  If recently concluded Egypt mediated reconciliation between Fatah
and Hamas results in weaning of Hamas from Tehran, then Iran will be left only
with a weak Hezbollah on Middle Eastern chessboard.  The case of Bahrain
is opposite where Shia majority is ruled by a Sunni dynasty.  In case of
democratic change, a Shia dominated government more friendly with Tehran can
come to power.  It was this fear that sent shock waves in Riyadh forcing
dispatch of Saudi troops to Bahrain.  Riyadh is trying to rally Arab as
well as non-Arab countries to its cause.  GCC welcomed Jordan and
Morocco’s request to join GCC.  Saudis are also negotiating with Indonesia
and Malaysia for possible troop commitment in Gulf. 

 

Saudi Arabia and
Iran are actively involved in Afghanistan and Pakistan through their proxies. 
Recently, Director General of Inter Services Intelligence (DGISI) Lieutenant
General Ahmad Shuja Pasha disclosed during in-camera briefing to Parliament
that some Pakistani clerics were receiving funds from Saudi Arabia.  It is
an open secret that a large number of madrassahs in Pakistan receive funds from
government and non-government sources from Gulf and Saudi Arabia.  Iran on
its part is trying to counter this by supporting its own proxies inside
Pakistan. 

 
Tehran and
Riyadh are embarking on a very dangerous course and both countries are equally
guilty of stoking the sectarian fires all over the Muslim world.  Every
effort should be made by citizens of both countries to put pressure on their
respective governments to focus on internal problems and avoid proxy war. 
Citizens of both countries deserve a peaceful and prosperous future and not to
be used as instruments of another round of fratricidal war.  Tehran should
remember that the ‘spring’ is not going to be restricted to Arab world. 
Young Iranians are as disappointed from their own cleric cum politicians. 
Large scale protests in the aftermath of President Ahmadinejad’s elections were
the first warning shots.  The pressure from below is gradually building
and in the next 2-3 years, it is very likely that streets of major Iranian
cities will see large scale protests.  It is in Iranian interest to focus
more on internal problems and avoid stoking the sectarian fires.

 
Increased
involvement of Pakistan in the security affairs of Arab countries can have some
negative fallout.  It will increase the sectarian gulf inside Pakistan and
first shots were recently fired.  In Karachi, there was wall chalking
against recruitment of Pakistanis in Bahrain’s security forces and Shia
organizations staged protests.  In response, clerics of Ahl Hadith (group
close to Saudi school of thought) and Deobandi school of thought gathered and
raised concerns about criticism of Sunni ruling houses of Arab world. 
There was a grenade attack on Saudi Consulate in Karachi and few days later a
Saudi diplomat was assassinated in Karachi. A large number of Pakistanis work
in Gulf states and Saudi Arabia.  Pakistan’s involvement in security
affairs in the context of protests entails the risk that all Pakistanis will be
linked with the state’s oppression thus coming under attack from opposition
forces of these countries.  Recently, there were attacks on Pakistani
workers in Bahrain causing fear among all Pakistanis. 

 
Pakistan’s main
problem is its economy.  Pakistan’s increased engagement in security
affairs of Gulf is transactional in nature.  In view of deteriorating
relations with U.S. and potential drying up of economic resources from
Washington is forcing Pakistani civilian and military leaders to look towards
newer and greener pastures.   Oil prices running over $100 a barrel
means that new checks will come from Arab patrons.  No one hands money
freely and in return Pakistan will be asked to do some heavy lifting. 
Poor countries like Pakistan are now caught in the fratricidal war in the house
of Islam.  Pakistan can diminish the fallout for its own country by
following the example of Bangladesh.  Bangladesh has so far kept its
forces out of the Middle East fires.  Instead it gets economic benefits
from increasing troop contribution to more acceptable and less risky United
Nations peace keeping missions.  If Pakistan can strictly limit military
missions to training in Gulf then it can mitigate some of the side effects of
such ventures.
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
Some more tidbits from Arab Air-Force historian “Crowbat”
Here some additional ‘bits and pieces’ that might be useful to enhance Mr.
Hussain’s write-up. It’s based on interviews with several Jordanian, Egyptian,
and one of Bangladeshi (ex-Pakistani) pilots that served during those fateful
times (entire story can be found in books Arab MiGs, Volume 3, and Arab MiGs, Volume 4):

– Pakistani Air Force was
posting two of its pilots to the RJAF already since early 1960s. One of them,
Hamid Anwar, barely survived a crash with a two-seat Hunter flown by RJAF pilot
1st Lt Amer Zaza, in 1964 (Anwar ejected on time, Zaza too late: he descended
with the parachute right into the burning wrecakge of their aircraft…).

– Two PAF officers served with No. 1 Squadron RJAF (flying Hunters),
during the June 1967 Arab Israeli War, and were granted permission to fly combat
sorties over Jordan. Flt Lt Saif-ul-Azam flew two sorties on 6 June 1967, then
evacuated to Iraq with rest of RJAF fighter-pilots, and flew another sortie with
Iraqi Hunters over H-3 airfield, two days later. He was credited with three
confirmed kills and highly decorated (by Jordanians, Iraqis, and Pakistanis),
before quitting the PAF and joining the newly-established Bangladesh Air Force,
following the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. Flt Lt Sarwar Shad fell ill and was
hospitalized, on 5 June 1967, and did not fly during that war.

– After
the June 1967 War, Azam and Shad were replaced by two unknown pilots. For most
of the next two years, they served with the RJAF contingent in Iraq (based there
because nearly all of Jordanian Hunters were destroyed and airfields had to be
repaired). In March 1969, these were replaced by Flt Lts Noor Khan (future Air
Marshal) and Akmal: immediately on arrival in Amman, Noor Khan and Akmal were
sent to Dmeyr AB in Syria, where they joined the rest of reorganized No.1
Squadron RJAF. Within few weeks, they were reinforced by a bigger group of
advisers, including Muhammad Mahmood Alam (probably the most famous PAF pilot of
the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War), Arif Manzoor, Atique Sufi, Shahid Foozi and
Sarafaz…. (there would be a lot to say about what kind of training they run in
Syria, but that’s ‘a different story’…).

– As soon as Mafraq AB was
completely rebuilt and extended, they moved back to Jordan and then the RJAF
began receiving F-104 Starfighters from the USA. During the summer 1969,
Pakistanis assisted in conversion of about 15 Jordanian pilots to that
type…

…that said, it seems at least a few Pakistanis did remain in
Syria until at least 1972, when they were met there by the CO of an Egyptian
MiG-17-squadron deployed in that country…

A big delegation from
Pakistani Army visited Jordan immediately after the June 1967 War. I don’t know
much about it though. Jordanians only told me that the Pakistanis were
instrumental for reorganization of the Jordanian Army and introduction of
divisional structure.

– In regards of Saudi Arabia… it was around the
same time – i.e. between 1967 and 1970 – that another group of PAF pilots was
seconded to the RSAF. They flew six Hunters acquired to support introduction to
service of Lightning interceptors purchased by Saudi Arabia from the UK, and did
so together with a small group of contracted British personnel. It was them that
saw the ‘standoff’ with Egyptian forces involved in Yemen War ofthe 1960s,
mentioned by Mr. Hussein. I do not know any of their names, though…

 
———————————————————————————————————————
and from Pakistani Air-Force writer Group Capt. M. Kaisar Tufail (PAF)
Post-haste summons for volunteers found an eager band of sixteen Pakistan Air Force (PAF) fighter-pilots on their way to the Middle East, in the midst of the 1973 Arab-Israeli ‘Ramadhan’ War. After a gruelling Peshawar-Karachi-Baghdad flight on a PAF Fokker F-27, they were whisked off to Damascus in a Syrian jet. Upon arrival, half the batch was told to stay back in Syria while the rest were earmarked for Egypt. By the time the PAF batch reached Cairo, Egypt had agreed to a cease-fire; it was therefore decided that they would continue as instructors. But in Syria it was another story.

The batch in Syria was made up of pilots who were already serving there on deputation (except one), but had been repatriated before the war. Now they were back in familiar surroundings as well as familiar aircraft, the venerable MiG-21. They were posted to No. 67 Squadron, ‘Alpha’ Detachment (all PAF). Hasty checkouts were immediately followed by serious business of Air Defence Alert scrambles and Combat Air Patrols from the air base at Dumayr.

Syria had not agreed to a ceasefire, since Israeli operations in Golan were continuing at a threatening pace. Israeli Air Force missions included interdiction under top cover, well supported by intense radio jamming as the PAF pilots discovered. The PAF formation using the call-sign “Shahbaz” was formidable in size – all of eight aircraft. Shahbaz soon came to stand out as one that couldn’t be messed with, in part because its tactics were innovative and bold. Survival, however, in a jammed-radio environment was concern number one. As a precaution, the Pakistanis decided to switch to Urdu for fear of being monitored in English. Suspicions were confirmed during one patrol, when healthy Punjabi invectives hurled on radio got them wondering if Mossad had recruited a few Khalsas for the job!

After several months of sporadic activity, it seemed that hostilities were petering out. While the Shahbaz patrols over Lebanon and Syria had diminished in frequency, routine training sorties started to register a rise. Under these conditions it was a surprise when on the afternoon of 26th April 1974, the siren blasted from the air-shafts of the underground bunker. Backgammon boards were pushed aside and the “qehva” session was interrupted as all eight pilots rushed to their MiGs; they were airborne within minutes. From Dumayr to Beirut, then along the Mediterranean coast till Sidon, and a final leg eastwards, skirting Damascus and back to base – this was the usual patrol, flown at an altitude of 6 km.

The limited fuel of their early model MiG-21F permitted just a 30 minutes sortie; this was almost over when ground radar blurted out on the radio that two bogeys (unidentified aircraft) were approaching from the southerly direction ie Israel. At this stage fuel was low and an engagement was the least preferred option. Presented with a fait accompli, the leader of the formation called a defensive turn into the bogeys. Just then heavy radio jamming started, sounding somewhat similar to the “takka tak” at our meat joints, only more shrill. While the formation was gathering itself after the turn, two Israeli F-4E Phantoms sped past almost head-on, seemingly unwilling to engage. Was it a bait?

Flt. Lt. Sattar Alvi, now the rear-most in the formation, was still adjusting after the hard turn when he caught sight of two Mirage-IIICJ zooming into them from far below. With no way of warning the formation of the impending disaster, he instinctively decided to handle them alone. Peeling away from his formation, he turned hard into the Mirages so that one of them overshot. Against the other, he did a steep reversal dropping his speed literally to zero. (it takes some guts to let eight tons of metal hang up in unfriendly air!) The result was that within a few seconds the second Mirage filled his gun-sight, the star of David and all. While Sattar worried about having to concentrate for precious seconds in aiming and shooting, the lead Mirage started to turn around to get Sattar. Thinking that help was at hand, the target Mirage decided to accelerate away. A quick-witted Sattar reckoned that a missile shot would be just right for the range his target had opened up to. A pip of a button later, a K-13 heat-seeker sped off towards the tail of the escaping Mirage. Sattar recollects that it wasn’t as much an Israeli aircraft as a myth that seemed to explode in front of him. (The letter ‘J’ in Mirage-IIICJ stood for ‘Jewish’, it may be noted.) He was tempted to watch the flaming metal rain down, but with the other Mirage lurking around and fuel down to a few hundred litres, he decided to exit. Diving down with careless abandon, he allowed a couple of Sonic bangs over Damascus. (word has it that the Presidential Palace wasn’t amused). His fuel tanks bone dry, Sattar made it to Dumayr on the vapours that remained.

As the other formation members started to trickle in, the leader, Sqn. Ldr. Arif Manzoor anxiously called out for Sattar to check if he was safe. All had thought that Sattar, a bit of a maverick that he was, had landed himself in trouble. Shouts of joy went up on the radio, however, when they learnt that he had been busy shooting down a Mirage.

The Syrians were overwhelmed when they learnt that the impunity and daring of the Pakistani pilots had paid off. Sattar was declared a blood brother by the Syrians, for he had shared in shedding the blood of a common enemy, they explained.

Sattar’s victim Captain M. Lutz of No. 5 Air Wing, Israeli Air Force (IAF), based at Hatzor, ejected out of his disintegrating aircraft. It has been learnt that the Mirages were on a reconnaissance mission, escorted by Phantoms of No. 1 Air Wing, IAF operating out of Ramat David Air base. The Phantoms were to trap any interceptors while the Mirages carried out the recce. Timely warning by the radar controller (also from the PAF) had turned the tables on the escorts, allowing Sattar to sort out the Mirages.

The dogfight over Golan is testimony to the skills of all PAF pilots, insists Sattar, as he thinks anyone could have got the kill had he been “Shahbaz-8” on that fateful day. Sattar and his leader Sqn. Ldr. Arif Manzoor, were awarded two of Syria’s highest decorations for gallantry, the Wisaam Faris and Wisaam Shuja’at. The Government of Pakistan awarded them a Sitara-e-Jurat each. Sattar, an epitome of a fighter pilot, befittingly went on to command PAF’s elite Combat Commanders’ School (CCS) and the premier PAF Base Rafiqui (Shorkot). He retired recently as an Air Commodore. 

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Slouching Towards Mecca?

Mark Lilla has a review of Michel Houellbecq’s new book at the New York Review of Books.

Final paragraph:
For all Houellebecq’s knowingness about contemporary culture—the way we love, the way we work, the way we die—the focus in his novels is always on the historical longue durĂŠe. He appears genuinely to believe that France has, regrettably and irretrievably, lost its sense of self, but not because of immigration or the European Union or globalization. Those are just symptoms of a crisis that was set off two centuries ago when Europeans made a wager on history: that the more they extended human freedom, the happier they would be. For him, that wager has been lost. And so the continent is adrift and susceptible to a much older temptation, to submit to those claiming to speak for God. Who remains as remote and as silent as ever.”

Michel Houellbecq’s own interview about his book was good
Why did you do it?
For several reasons, I’d say. First of all, I think, it’s my job, though I don’t care for that word. I noticed some big changes when I moved back to France, though these changes are not specifically French, but rather Western. As an exile you don’t take much of an interest in anything, really, neither your society of origin nor the place you live—and besides, Ireland is a slightly odd case. I think the second reason is that my atheism hasn’t quite survived all the deaths I’ve had to deal with. In fact, it came to seem unsustainable to me.
 
Personally, I think it doesnt matter. In fact, I have a cheerfuly optimistic pessimistic alternative: Whatever happens, some people will understand the technology and use it better> They will be the ones on top (even if they themselves are consumed by loneliness and unhappiness)…precariously and viciously balanced on top of vast mountains of bodies and civil wars… and masses of unhappy struggling infighting desperately envious Muslims who have no clue they are the ones that are supposed to be so close to submission and true happiness.
So there…
 
Photo by Sylvain Bourmeau

Empower women; let them marry out of their clan & race

I have excerpted several paragraphs (after the jump) of this excellent article where black women need to follow the footsteps of Asian women and start intermarrying at much higher levels.

Of course intermarriage rates vary by region. White men in California in 1990 were more than six times as likely as Midwestern white men to marry outside their race. Overall, interracial marriages are more than twice as common in California (1 in 10 new couples) as in the rest of the country (1 in 25). According to the magazine Interrace, San Jose, San Diego and Oakland are among the Top 10 cities for interracial couples. America’s racial complexion, then, will change more quickly on the coasts than in the heartland.
Nevertheless, the overall increase in intermarriage means that both multicultural liberals and nativist conservatives have misunderstood the major demographic trends in this country. There is not going to be a nonwhite majority in the 21st century. Rather, there is going to be a mostly white mixed-race majority. The only way to stop this is to force all Hispanic and Asian-Americans from now on to marry within their officially defined groups. And that is not going to happen.
Thus, the old duality between whites and nonwhites is finally breaking down. But don’t cheer just yet. For what seems to be emerging in the United States is a new dichotomy between blacks and nonblacks. Increasingly, whites, Asians and Hispanics are creating a broad community from which black Americans may be excluded.
Disparities in interracial marriages underline this problem. Black-white marriages have risen from a reported 51,000 in 1960 (when they were still illegal in many states) to 311,000 in 1997. Marriages between white men and black women, though still uncommon, rose from 27,000 in 1980 to 122,000 in 1995. Although black out-marriage rates have risen, they remain much lower than out-marriage rates for Hispanics, Asians and American Indians. For the 25-34 age group, only 8 percent of black men marry outside their race. Less than 4 percent of black women do so.
While many blacks frown upon marriage by blacks to members of other groups — such relationships are viewed by some as disloyal — it seems very unlikely that such conservative attitudes are more pronounced among black Americans than among whites or Hispanic or Asian immigrants. The major cause of low black out-marriage rates may well be anti-black prejudice — the most enduring feature of the eroding American caste system. Furthermore, antiblack prejudice is often picked up by immigrants, when it is not brought with them from their countries of origin.

In the past, the existence of an untouchable caste of blacks may have made it easier for Anglo-Americans to fuse with more recent European immigrants in an all-encompassing white community. Without blacks as a common other, the differences between Anglo-Americans, German-Americans, Irish-Americans and Italian-Americans might have seemed much more important. Could this be occurring again? A Knight-Ridder poll taken in May 1997 showed that while respondents were generally comfortable with intermarriage, a full 3 in 10 respondents opposed marriage between blacks and whites.
According to the 1990 census, white men 25-34 in the U.S. military were 2.3 times as likely to marry nonwhite women as civilians. And white women in the same age group who served in the military in the 1980’s were seven times as likely as their civilian counterparts to have black husbands. Indeed, for all groups except for Asian men, military service makes out-marriage much more likely. The reason for this is clear: the U.S. military is the most integrated institution in American society because it is the most egalitarian and meritocratic. It is also — not coincidentally — the least libertarian and least tolerant of subcultural diversity. It may be that in the nation as a whole, as in the military, the integration of individuals can be achieved only at the price of the sacrifice of lesser differences to a powerful common identity.
In the end, racial intermarriage is a result, not a cause, of racial integration. Racial integration, in turn, is a result of social equality. The civil rights revolution abolished racial segregation by law, but not racial segregation by class. Ending racial segregation by class might — just might — bring about an end to race itself in America. It is certainly worth a try.

The Beige And The Black

New Pundits- Asians can never be upper-class?

My friend, Shoaib, and I have started a new blog called New Pundits. The main advantage of NP is that it’s WordPress, which I prefer much more to Blogger. At any rate NP is still very much in it’s infancy. I believe we started BP around Christmas time 2010 so it’s almost years on and still going strong. I’m a very big fan of the UNZ review, which is really becoming a staple of the alternative media scene and there is no reason in my mind why the fledgling Desi Diaspora shouldn’t have something similar to that.

Last night at dinner I was mentioning to some friends that London was now becoming so Asian that segregation is now an entrenched phenomenon. It’s best seen in social groupings of the prime demographic (20’s & 30’s); very few of them are mixed in any real sense. Class has always been a huge determiner in Britain (which school did you go to?) and a friend of mine once told me “Asians can never be upper class.”

Now I remember this statement very distinctly as it was said in a mixture of remorse & bitterness. At the moment I deeply disagreed with the statement but now that I think of it, it is true that the British Asian (Sikh & Hindu community especially) is merging into the middle classes (just as the Muslim community, for the large part the Mirpuri & Tower Hamlet contingents, are floating between the working and reckless classes).

However I’ll end this slight meandering on this note. I know of a Sindhi lady who fell in love with an Englishman in the 40’s and as a result of familial disapproval, eschewed her love and stayed single. She did mention that in those days many Indian girls liked Englishmen because they were so dapper and looked good (obviously in a subcontinent that venerates fairness, Northwest Europeans would have some advantages). However what was interesting to me is that apart from the early generations of the East India Company (mixtures which created the Anglo-Indians) we don’t really think of Europeans and Indians mixing (especially after the British disbarred royal intermarriage in the fear that the Indian Royalty would go the way of the Aga Khan and be fully Europeanised in a few generations).

Perhaps the reason why British Asians stand apart from the class structure is simply because the culture of intermarriage is so weak compared to any other global culture (East Asians embrace it with alacrity and even black population mix in Europe).

Brown Pundits