Origins of the British East India Company Army

From our regular contributor, Dr Hamid Hussain.
Several questions came my way regarding origins of Indian army and that resulted in following piece. Only for military history interested parties.
Origins of Indian Army – Early Days of East India Company Army
Hamid Hussain
Mughal central authority was rapidly evaporating in eighteenth century India. Many local governors became de facto independent and many soldiers of fortunes were busy carving out their own fiefdoms. In this anarchy, foreign invaders as well as local robber bands frequently descended on helpless population for loot and depart as quickly as possible. East India Company (EIC) expanded its control of large swaths of India only due to superior military organization compared to the military organizations of its opponents. EIC, French, Portuguese, Mughal, Marhattas, Rohillas, Nawab of Arcot, Nizam of Hyderabad, Hyder Ali and his son Tipu Sultan of Mysore and Nawab of Bengal were competing for the spoils and each party was competing and cooperating depending on local circumstances. Many soldiers of fortunes found eighteenth century India a fertile ground. French, English, Dutch, Portuguese, German, Swiss, Pathans, Afghans, Arabs and Africans found ready employment with power brokers. They frequently changed sides depending on the prevailing situation. For example, in 1761, commander of Chittapet garrison Captain Coulson deserted to Hyder Ali taking with him his garrison and guns. EIC military establishments finally evolved into three presidential armies of Madras, Bombay and Bengal.

East India Company (EIC) recruited few European soldiers and native peons called chaprassis to guard their factories. EIC was a trading company and directors were hesitant to embark on any military adventure as it was a costly business. In 1744, war broke out between Great Britain and France, and their trading companies in India also got entangled in the conflict. French captured Madras in 1746 and EIC was forced to organize a military establishment. They raised European infantry, artillery and cavalry and native infantry. This was the foundation of Madras army also known as Coast Army. Bodies of sepoys of various strengths were under the command of their own chiefs. Sepoys brought their own arms consisting of matchlock, sword, spears, dagger etc. Chief was given the pay of the men under his command which he distributed. If he owned the arms and loaned it to his sepoy, he charged one rupee a month from the sepoy for the use of his arms. When two or more bodies of sepoys were employed together a European non-commissioned or commissioned officer was sent with the party. Early European soldiers of EIC were soldiers of fortune of different nationalities including English, French, German, Swiss and Dutch. Native sepoys included Rajputs, Hindustanis (mainly from Bombay), Arabs (mainly from their settlements in Bombay), Topasses (Christian offspring of Portuguese and native women) and Coffrees (natives of East Africa and Madagascar brought as slaves). Locals made a very small proportion of the contingent until 1756 when circumstances necessitated local recruitment. When most of the Madras troops were in Bengal, French captured Madras. After this setback company realized the need for a more disciplined force to defend its territories.
Major Stringer Lawrence is considered father of the Indian army. He laid the foundations of what was to become the Indian Army. In January 1748, Major Stringer Lawrence landed at Fort St. David to take charge of the fort when French had defeated the British. Later, Lawrence was appointed Commander-in-Chief of company’s army in India. A very able soldier Muhammad Yusuf was appointed commandant of all native sepoys and a Brahman Poniapa served as Lawrence’s interpreter.
Lawrence organized Europeans and native peons (chaprassis) into companies. They were organized into a regiment of two battalions; one European and one Sepoy (Indian). Both battalions were similar in structure and included seven companies each. A company had three Europeans officers and seventy privates. This regiment was involved in all the battles against the French forces in India. European cavalry was never more than a squadron strength and only maintained during a conflict and broken up during peace. The main reason was cost. In rare cases, native horsemen in the employ of a local ruler were borrowed but they were not effective due to poor discipline.
In 1759, sepoys were organized into five battalions that increased to sixteen by 1767. However, practically they worked in small parties of wings and companies as their duties included garrisoning small forts, escorting convoys or native chiefs and collecting revenues. It was the genius of two worthy adversaries of the company Hyder Ali and his son Tipu Sultan that helped to transform Madras army. In the fight against a well organized and professional adversary, Madras army also evolved into a professional army. Native cavalry and artillery establishments were raised much later. Native cavalry was raised in 1784 and native artillery in 1805. Early recruitment for EIC army was from a wide social base. A number of sepoys were from “untouchable” Paraiya community. All sepoys served together in composite companies with no consideration for caste sensibilities. Bengal army was an exception where high caste Brahmins dominated.
In western India, EIC only had control over Bombay and few islands near the harbor. In 1741, Bombay military establishment consisted of seven companies of Europeans with total number of 1500 (this included 900 Topasses). There were 700 chaprassis working for civil servants. By 1746, about 2000 natives had been enrolled in the Bombay military establishment. In 1748, one company of artillery was added. Major Goodyear was made commander of Bombay army. After defeat of French and Marhattas, Bombay army became the smallest establishment of three armies. After the conquest of Sindh in 1843, new regiments were raised to patrol the new border of Sindh and Baluchistan.
In Bengal few hundred natives, four companies of Europeans and one company of artillery were employed to guard factories. In January 1757, when Calcutta was retaken from Siraj-ud-Daula, a battalion of native sepoys was raised with three officers (one captain, one lieutenant and one ensign) from Madras detachment. In early organization of sepoy battalions, European officers were assisted by a Sergeant Major and few Sergeants. A native commandant and native adjutant also assisted commanding officer. Each battalion consisted of ten companies of which two companies were grenadier companies. Each company had a subedar, three jamadars, five havaldars, four naiks, two drummers, one trumpeter and seventy sepoys. Each company had its own standard of the same color as facings of the men with the badge of the subedar at the center. Grenadier companies had Union Jack in upper corner. By 1764, there were nineteen sepoy battalions of the Bengal establishment and they were numbered according to the rank of their captains. The senior most Captain was Giles Stibbert and his battalion was numbered 1. The Captains commanding battalions regulated the uniform of their men. However, once fixed, it could not be altered without the permission from the board.
17th battalion was one of the first battalion clothed in regular red uniform and called ‘Lal Paltan’. 26th battalion was raised in Cawnpore by John Byrne and called Dhobie Ki Paltan as a large number of washer men were recruited in this battalion. In 1765, army was organized into three brigades of seven battalions each. Each brigade also had one European regiment of nine companies, one troop (Rassalah) of cavalry and one company of artillery. When brigades were formed, Lord Clive fixed the uniforms for the brigades. First brigade blue, second brigade black and third brigade green (the latter was changed to yellow in 1779).
When EIC obtained the management of revenues of Bengal province, three regular battalions of sepoys were assigned to Revenue department and six purgunnah (provincial) battalions were also raised for the revenue board. In 1773, purgunnah battalions were used in operations against the robber bands of saniassis. These battalions suffered heavily and routed by saniassis. Three commandants Captain Thomas, Lieutenant Keith and Captain Timothy Edwards were killed. The disgraceful conduct of many sepoys resulted in breaking up of purgunnah establishment. Three regular battalions were returned to their brigades while remainder new purgunnah battalions were disbanded with the exception of 24th (two years later this battalion was brought into the line and numbered 14th). In 1775, standards of companies were replaced with only two standards for the battalion. In 1778, nine battalions trained by British officers for Nawab Vizier were transferred to EIC. In 1795, Native Militia was raised for judicial and commercial duties and regular battalions were removed from these unpleasant duties.
In 1781 regulations, articles relating to desertion and mutiny were translated in Hindustani and Persian and read and explained to sepoys every month. In 1801, ten sepoys from each company were trained as light infantry and marksmen. In 1803, three companies of pioneers were raised for the first time for EIC army. In 1808, this was converted into a regular Corps of Pioneers or Sappers and now had the strength of eight companies.
Civil servants had the sole authority over the military establishment. All orders of the council passed through civil servants to the military. In 1796 re-organization was carried out with a view of creating avenues of promotions for European officers. New establishment consisted of twelve regiments of two battalions each and each battalion consisted of ten companies. Each regiment had one colonel, two lieutenant colonels, two majors, seven captains, twenty two lieutenants and ten ensigns. The principle of regimental rank and promotion up to the rank of major was also adopted. Whenever officers went on home leave they resigned their commission and when employed on staff duties, they were struck off the strength of the corps. This opened the positions for officers.
Lieutenant Colonel commanding the battalion was responsible for the recruitment and maintenance of discipline. A sepoy enlisted for three years and on completion of three years, he could obtain his discharge on two months notice except in the time of war. Each recruit took an oath of fidelity. The pay for sepoy was seven rupees per month when in station and eight and a half rupees per month when marching or on field service. Soldiers had to construct their huts of accommodations in cantonments at their own expense. Punishment varied according to the crime. Mutiny was punished with death penalty while minor crimes punished by dismissal from service, corporal punishment or removal of privileges. In one case, when two subedars tried to dissuade sepoys not to volunteer for service requiring sea voyage, they were dismissed from service. They were paraded in front of the battalion, their commissions were torn, their swords broken and they were forbidden forever to enter any military station.
Early officers of EIC army were soldiers of fortune and discontent was mainly over salary and prize money. If a town resisted then normal procedure was to allow soldiers to loot the place for a specific period of time and this loot was later distributed among all according to their station in life. Many officers accumulated reasonable amount of wealth and went back to England. There were many cases of indiscipline due to disputes over prize money. Captain Alexander Delavaux was appointed Chief Engineer and Commandant of Artillery of Madras establishment in 1748. Next year he deserted and joined French at Pondicherry. His desertion was ironic as artillery was a special preserve and even Roman Catholics were strictly prohibited from recruitment in artillery. Even if an officer married a Roman Catholic girl, he was to be immediately dismissed from artillery. In 1751, there was discontent among European officers of Madras over money and thirteen officers sent a letter to council for redress. Three ring leaders; Captain William Richards, Murray and James Kilpatrick were put under arrest. Richards died soon after arrest, Murray escaped and deserted to French at Pondicherry where he was given a commission and Kilpatrick repented and was pardoned. In 1766, there was widespread discontent among European officers of Bengal establishment. A contingent from Madras was sent to prevent an outright mutiny.
A King’s Commissioned Officer when serving in India took precedence over a company’s officer. This meant that a junior most King’s commissioned Captain superseded senior most Captain in company’s service and this was a source of agitation among company officers. In 1758, Captain Gowen of Bombay establishment came to Bengal and Colonel Robert Clive gave him seniority in Bengal establishment. This resulted in disaffection among Bengal officers and eight Captains resigned their commission in a single day.
Main reason of discontent among sepoys was also related to money while in other cases poor handling by a commanding officer caused resentment among sepoys. In 1776, 10th battalion (Matthew Ki Paltan) showed discontent due to improper conduct of their commanding officer Captain Delafield. He faced a court martial and dismissed from service. In another case, native officers petitioned against their commanding officer Captain McLean and he was removed from the command. In 1781, 20th battalion mutinied at Midnapore due to dispute between Captain Grant and his men about the distribution of prize money. Battalion was disbanded, Grant was tried and cashiered and some of the men of the battalion drafted into other regiments.
There has been some confusion among historian about reluctance of sepoys about sea voyage.
In 1769, two Grenadier companies of the 3rd battalion were coming back from Madras via sea. They perished in a shipwreck and nothing was heard about them. This had a negative impact on the minds of native sepoys who already had serious reservations about sea travel. When EIC needed troops for its settlement in Sumatra in 1788, it asked for sepoy volunteers for service. Four companies were organized from these volunteers. EIC went out of its way to ease apprehensions of the sepoys regarding sea travel. A bounty of ten rupees was given to each man and special arrangements were made for sepoys during sea voyage. The sepoys observed the filling of water casks and each carefully marked and ample supply of each dietary item was provided. On return, the payment of duties was waived for Hindu sepoys for performance of their religious rites at Gyah. EIC sepoys volunteered for services requiring sea voyage when handled properly. In 1810, they served in expedition against Isle of France, conquest of Island of Java and occupation of many islands of Phillipines archipelago. In 1811 alone, seven battalions (7,000 sepoys) volunteered for service beyond sea.
In 1782, 4th, 15th and 17th battalions stationed at Barrackpore refused service when rumor spread that they were to proceed by sea. Later, 35th also refused the order. These four battalions were broken, a court martial was held and two subedars were blown from the cannon. In 1795, 15th battalion mutinied when it was ordered to go by sea to the settlement of Malacca. Instead of asking for volunteers, to save money and logistical inconvenience of collecting volunteers from different battalions, whole battalion was ordered for service without first confirming the wishes of sepoys. Soldiers reacted violently and suffered in the consequence. Battalion was disbanded, it’s colors burned and number fifteen was left vacant. These events show that sepoys participated in many expeditions travelling be sea when handled with care. However, whenever EIC cut corners for cost or officers were not careful, then sepoys showed hesitation about sea voyage. In view of hesitation of sepoys of Bengal establishment for sea voyage, a Marine battalion of twelve companies was raised for duties on islands.
EIC started as a trading company but quickly got entangled in local intrigues and power play. EIC needed a strong muscle to compete in the power arena that required establishment of an organized military machine. Native peons were transformed into professional soldiers. The impact of EIC army was not limited to military but had a broader social impact on natives. Illiterate villagers were exposed to modern ideas and native lives were changed for generations to come. Subedar Major Shaikh Hussain of Madras Infantry served a long career in EIC army. His son Mohammad Abdur Rahman was educated, became a doctor, joined Indian Medical Service in 1909, served in Great War and retired at Lieutenant Colonel rank. Sheikh Hussain’s two grandsons attended St. Paul school in England and later both joined Indian army. Atiqur Rahman nick named Turk was winner of sword of honor at Indian Military Academy. He joined 4th Battalion of 12th Frontier Force regiment (FFR), opted for Pakistan army in 1947 and retired as Lieutenant General of Pakistan army. The second grandson, Attaur Rahman nick named Ishi also joined a Frontier Force battalion. In 1947, he opted for India and later joined Foreign Service. He served as India’s ambassador to several countries.
1- Lieutenant Colonel W. J. Wilson. A History of the Madras Army (Madras: Government Press), 1882
2- Colonel S. Rivett-Carnac. The Presidential Armies of India (London: W. H. Allen & Co.), 1890
3- Captain John Williams. An Historical Account of the Rise and Progress of the Bengal Native Infantry 1757-1796 (London: John Murray), 1817
4- Colonel John Biddulph. Stringer Lawrence: The Father of the Indian Army (London: John Murray), 1901
5- A Bengal Officer. Remarks on the Dress and Discipline of Bengal Army (London: Dean & Scott: Reprint of 1793 Edition), 1809
6- Edmund C. Cox. A Short History of the Bombay Presidency (Bombay: Thacker & Co. Ltd.), 1887
7- Manas Dutta. Revisiting the historiography of the Madras Presidency Army, 1801-1858. Journal of Humanities and Social Science. Volume 13, Issue 4 (Jul. – Aug. 2013), PP 46-49.
Hamid Hussain
June 29, 2016


I continue to see almost universal condemnation or hilarity or schadenfreude about Brexit in my social media circle. Literally NO ONE is in favor it (except those who hate Britain and like Brexit in the sense of “this shit couldnt have happened to a more deserving lot”. I don’t know much about the actual mechanics and consequences and my current view is more or less “if all these intelligent people think it is a disaster, it is probably not going to be a good thing”, but I do feel that 50% plus of the British electorate (and a much higher percentage of the working class and the older citizens) voted for this thing, maybe we should also try to figure out why they voted the way they did? The easy answer is racism, but then, I am sure ALL these people are not just motivated by racism (how does that even work?) and I am sure there are lots of racists who voted for “remain” too (all the bankers can’t be suddenly free of racism 🙂 ). So here, in no particular order, are some comments I had on Facebook and I hope someone will let me know why I am wrong or where I may be right…Random thoughts on Brexit:

Xenophobia is part of this…but is it entirely foolish?
The Western super-elite (and their super-elite friends from other countries, including us, of course) are (at least materially) winners in this globalization until now and may feel great about it. But there are some other aspects to this love of complete and borderless globalization.

1. Obviously the Western proletariat are not happy and to think that they are just stupid people so their fears should not count, may be morally cloudy. It is likely (and perhaps even desirable) that neo-liberal globalization should continue, but those being expected to be swept aside may react..that too should be expected. Also, it is not just the proletariat. There is a substantial number of people who are attached to their own culture and cultural mores who are not comfortable with the new cultural rules of the postmodern Western elite (whether this is good or bad is a separate discussion). They do not want to become (and maybe cannot become) arugula eating, world-culture sampling, atomized, metrosexual individuals with fancy carbon footprints and anti-carbon-footprint posters on the wall. Their wishes may seem archaic and stupid to some of us, but they do exist. What is to be done about them? Have they been sold a bill of goods and are they feeling rebellious?

2.History has not ended. Organized groups (nations, religions, ideologies) control territory, try to expand their control and monopolize resources .. . It is possible that the nature of these boundaries and their defense will change as a connected world divides not on national or religious lines but between the new transnational super-elite and the underclass of all nations, but even that has not happened yet, not completely… Until then, the idea that we can just erase the border and let everyone go where they please seems unworkable and utopian. . The current system is based on certain cultures and their boundaries (which are always fluid, but DO exist) and how and by whom they are erased and replaced is important to many people. No?.

3.Some friends who live in Western countries (even in Britain) seem to be saying “you colonized us, now its your turn and you are complaining. Well, lump it”. But think about it…isnt this the xenophobes argument? that “these outsiders” hate us and our culture, and are only here to destroy us? We may feel we have a “right” to do that, but is it then very surprising if some of the older inhabitants don’t want to be destroyed? (this is NOT a majority view among my friends, but it does pop up. I am just saying, it is an interesting attitude when you think about it 🙂

I certainly do not have a clear position on this… I am still trying to learn. I could be converted 🙂 But I admit that I now tend to be skeptical of some of the elite-postmarxist eurocentric left-wing positions that are popular in my social circle. I am not convinced by the Right wing positions either, but they are so vanishingly rare in my group that I rarely have to bother arguing against them.

Finally, an exchange between me and a commentator (Mr Prasad) on sort of touches on these issues:

From Mr Prasad, talking about the above video:

This is grimly amusing to watch. Yeah, that convergence with Eastern Europe really is coming whether you vote remain or leave, because EE’s catchup growth is intrinsically easier than Britain’s. (Well, I suppose you can unwittingly try to speed it up, as today. Prediction: not much will change in that direction either.) They won’t merely be markets, they’ll also make products and do telemedicine and whatnot. You can’t expect Brits to perpetually make more than Poles for no earthly reason, simply because they are Brits. This globalization genie isn’t going to be squeezed back into the bottle, and the Chinese aren’t going back to starving in farms. Oh, meanwhile it’s more than just econ, those lorry drivers really are going to have job trouble when automatic cars become safer than regular ones.

The Trumpist / Sandersist solution is basically a collective stamping of feet angrily, denying trends instead of adapting to them. They rage (and how fashionably in the one case) about the evils of neoliberalism and the actually awful 1% and “the Establishment,” but fact is they have nothing half as good to offer as policy that’s growth-promoting and encourages measured global integration, together with redistributive taxation, retraining and moving up the value chain where at least you have comparative advantages.

What they offer is mood affiliation and folksy “real talk” masquerading as plain dealing. Real plain dealing would be “stop living in the past” and even (a variant on) that old chestnut “the rest of the world does not owe you a living.”

Next they can build a wall, or mine the English channel or something. Perhaps Farage can be deputized to whip the Hellespont, heck all of the Mediterranean why not.

My reply:
By the way, on The topic of “You can’t expect Brits to perpetually make more than Poles for no earthly reason, simply because they are Brits..” is a can of worms (as you well know). Leaving aside the issue of whether the Brits are (marginally) biologically smarter than the Poles (possible, but not very likely?), there is the issue of culture. If we assume that Danes and Gorkhas are equally intrinsically smart i.e. there is no biological constraint, then the remarkable difference in living standards and intellectual achievement (another can of worms, but lets go with it for now) has to be down to culture. If there is really something about British culture (nothing eternal, just what it has evolved to be at this particular stage in history) that makes it more successful (defined, for moment, in the way all my leftist friends would like to define it), then it is possible that this edge will persist for a few decades (which is about as far as we are really concerned with here). And the Brexiters would say that is exactly why they brexited, to keep it that way. Though it may be that Nirad babu was right..and whatever edge the English had is already gone. Which may mean that this particular vote was a tragic error.

Mr Prasad:
Oh I certainly don’t mean to predict equal wages or productivity or innovation around the globe. Institutions, culture, and a head start all matter enormously, and I don’t buy the idea that all cultures and value systems are equivalently good or productive of progress and excellence. You knock on an open door with all that. [And the brexiters are right to notice that the replacement of melting pot strategies with multiculti isn’t working]. And why leave aside biology tout court, that’s just more theology. Especially going forward when there’s every reason to expect the Chinese will use CRISPR v10.0 to make their citizens more smart and healthy and what have you, and have a head start doing it.

What I think is simply:
a) that there will be a move in the direction of leveling, not that the outcome will be an absence of cross national disparity, and 
b) that the expectation in the normative sense, absent earthly reasons, that British *should* make more will seem less plausible with every additional corporation whose shareholders don’t care where the workers or customers are. Frankly they are more internationalist than the good comrades ever were. (Unlike the comrades they don’t feel more sympathy with Brits than Poles from across the Atlantic. Bully for them.)

And further that this trend cannot be stopped (at least without something drastic like large scale war – you can always hurt others by being willing to hurt yourself.) Western liberal states can mitigate downward pressures for working classes, try to move up the value chain, and should put in place something like a UBI (not that this is a panacea either, but it’s better than not having it).

Actual plain talk sounds like Lee Kuan Yew, not Jeremy Corbyn. But the chattering classes have revolution in their hearts. Bougies tend to find such dreams exciting, at least till their world starts to bern.

The exchange continues at 3qd:

Meanwhile, some people want a redo. In Islamic law, if you divorce your wife, then realize you were drunk and stupid, you can have her back, but she has to have sex with someone else first (she has to marry them too, but she really has to have sex). The Germans may demand some such humiliation if the Brits want a redo 🙂

Indian History, Brexit, Trump and the Bombay Fornicator

Continuing with the
random thoughts theme:
1. Indian History: I think this short piece is a reasonably good summary of our
current state of knowledge about the Aryans and India. ..except for the wholly
unnecessary waffle on “out of India” theory (the weight of evidence
against that seems overwhelming), this is a good place to start. I posted this
on twitter and got several reactions that seem to indicate that Pakistanis
(even educated and reasonable ones) tend to repeat 1950s textbook cliches on
this subject even more than I expected. I think we should all read more about
this topic 🙂

You can start here
with this summary by a rather extreme Hindu-nationalist (I don’t
know if the author would approve of this title, but i use it loosely and
without any pejorative intent; he can correct  me if he happens to
disagree). This author has consistently displayed a vast knowledge of ancient
India and is worth reading for that reason, whether you agree or not with his overall interpretation of history and culture.

From the same guy,  This description of an ancient indo-european feast is worth a
read as well.. 

And of course, you can
always start with Razib Khan’s blog posts about this topic including this, or this.… or this (with the caveat this his conclusions are likely to change
as more information comes should the conclusions of anyone who is trying
to “seek truth from facts”, as comrade Deng would say 🙂

3. Brexit. I took no interest in this until it was over,
but it is apparently going to be a very big deal. Anyway, it does look like the credibility of both the left-liberal elite AND the finance-capital elite is at a new low among the proletariat. More to come on this topic I am sure..

I asked on twitter and
got this from @Sam_Schulman as an example of a good article about what happens
next: The Norway Model …

My first thought is that
this is likely not a useful comparison because there are too many differences
between Norway and Britain..and between the context in which they ask for deals
with the EU. but again, I don’t know much about this. Reading suggestions
3. Trump. I had written in March that his worthless team will sink him. I still
hopeful that his personal ignorance, superficiality and general lunacy, in
addition to his weak team, will cause him to lose big time in November, even
though there are real trends (as indicated by Brexit) that would be expected to
empower a candidate who opposes (or pretends to oppose) the globalist Left as
well as the globalist finance-capital Right…
But I think we do have
to keep fingers crossed. He is a conman and will disappoint everyone, including
those voting for him on nativist or proto-fascist grounds, but that does not
mean he cannot win. If Hillary goes too far into super-elite SJW territory and
Jihadi terrorists manage a serious atrocity very close to elections, then even
this Queens casino-operator could have a chance. I say this because I have a feeling that Hillary is something of a super-elite SJW at heart (though she is willing to sell out). There is a backlash against that ideology in the US these days (and as Brexit partially indicates, in other Western countries as well) and if she lets too much of that emerge, Trump may still have a chance, in spite of his obvious weaknesses and problems. 

Fingers crossed. And
hoping that the FBI does a good job of keeping the jihadis at bay.
4. The inimitable
Salman Rashid
writes about the Bombay Fornicator. A piece of furniture and a piece of history..

5. Orlando. Nothing new to say. As Loretta Lynch said, we don’t know for sure what his motives were. Well, we know for sure he claimed to be killing for Islam/Islamic-state, but it cannot be denied that there are possible sub-conscious motivations at work here in addition to the obvious “spirit of Jihad” thing. (gays, latinos, paranoid-schizophrenia?). Perhaps we can say: “Jihadist Islam that encourages “spontaneous lone-wolf jihad” and endorses violence against gays led a psychologically disturbed and culturally confused Afghan-American to make use of lax gun laws to kill random gay people” .
About the spirit of Jihad thing, I wrote in some detail after the San Bernardino attacks. I am copying and pasting the last few paragraphs here:
Can any Muslim become radicalized and fall victim to spontaneous jihad syndrome at any time?
This is the right-wing fringe’s mirror-image of the liberal belief that Islam never causes jihad and all of it can be explained by “inequality” or “Sykes-Picot” or some such story.  Both mirror-images are clearly false. The real situation is that we can look at the Muslims of the world and see several disparate groups; Shias, Ismailis and Ahmedis are outside the Sunni Jihadist universe and so are not going to spontaneously take up arms in the war between shariah-based Islam and other civilizations.  They are all relatively small minorities, but they are the most obvious examples of “Muslims who will not get radicalized and join the Sunni Jihad, foreign policy, Israel, Sykes-Picot and Picketty notwithstanding. These supposedly powerful motives for hating America will not cause these groups to go postal. There is a lesson in there somewhere.
 Coming to Sunni Muslims, we have a very large number are “moderate Muslims”, which is shorthand for Muslims who were not brought up in shariah-compliant households and who do not practice that kind of Islam. Their numbers vary from country to country, but one can say with a lot of confidence that they are not spontaneous jihad material either. They can covert, but it is a slow process, it is observable and even preventable (if they are kept away from hardline preachers). Then there are the shariah-compliant Muslims who believe that the Shariah’s orders for Jihad are meant for very specific situations where a Sunni state has declared Jihad and those situations (fortunately) do not exist. So they get on with life in all parts of the world. Many of them are model citizens because they avoid intoxicants, deal honestly and follow the law. A very tiny fraction of them may “radicalize” but most will not. The same applies to converts. So yes, about these (small) groups one may say “they can radicalize” , but very rarely. And even then, there are warning signs and it is never an overnight process. Finally, there are the true-believer Jihadists. They have obvious links with Jihadist schools, groups and teachers. They are small in number and they are not hard for the community to identify, if is so chooses. And they are indeed high risk. Liberals see none of them, right-wingers see too many. Both are wrong.
I guess what I am saying is that notions of Muslim hordes just waiting for a chance to attack are far outside the bounds of reality. Common sense can actually be a guide here. There is no need to throw the baby out with the bathwater and equally there is no need to be willfully blind to warning signs. Biased agenda pushers on BOTH sides of this debate have obscured common sense options. And while Liberals may underestimate or misrepresent the threat from radical Muslims, conservatives frequently generalize the threat to all Muslims.
Last but not the least, all nutcases cannot be stopped beforehand. Some surprises will always happen in a large and complex society . There is no risk-free society, with or without Muslims. But this is not World-War Three. Not in the United States. In parts of Europe the proportion of jihadists is likely higher (for various reasons, including racism and multiculturalist liberalism). Meanwhile, in the core of the Muslim world itself, all bets are off. There is no well-articulated theology of liberal Sunnism. Other organizing ideologies (like Marxism and pan-Arab nationalism) have manifestly failed. The authoritarian regimes that exist are (for now) the only game in town. These authoritarian elites, who disproportionately  benefit from the modern world,  impose their will using a combination of force, persuasion and foreign support. But they lack a deep legitimating ideology. This crisis of ideology is extremely serious, and it may devour some of those countries (though the survival of Jordan is a good example of the fact that even the most arbitrary modern states have more strength than we sometimes imagine). Those Muslim states that are further away from the Arab heartland (and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) may do better. They can frequently rely on other identities to maintain the legitimacy of their states and new Islams can arise in them with time. But even they will not be compltely free of Jihadist conflict. No state is completely free of conflict of course, and many conflicts unrelated to Islam or Jihad could easily kill millions and destroy whole countries. But predominantly Islamic countries do have the added burden of the conflict of Classical Islamic ideals with modern civilization (not justWestern civilization), and it will take time to resolve this conflict.
Hold on tight.
– See more at:

Afghanistan, and some hints from Machiavelli

Comments from Dr Hamid Hussain on an article from Khalid Aziz (first posted at this site, Khalid Aziz original is here). Dr Hamid’s comments are in red. At the end is a comment from Major Amin (in fuchsia) and a couple of completely tangential comments from me (in green) (Omar Ali)

From Dr Hamid Hussain:

A well informed friend wrote a detailed piece about Afghanistan and my comments.  
Thanks Sir for an insightful and detailed review of the ‘snake pit’.  Old chap Machiavelli is the right person to read when trying to understand the region. I don’t know whether you are still engaged in Track II on this matter and on such forums discourse is more polite.  I’ll be a bit frank in my comments as I think we need to open more windows to let some fresh air. My own limited perspective is based on my own work and interaction with various players. I listen to every narrative and more interested in what ‘real’ thinking process is rather than national narrative which is mostly for public consumption.  National narratives have moved from comic now to the realm of absurd.  My comments in red and bold in your main text. 
“A great majority of mankind are satisfied with appearances, as though they are realities and are often even more influenced by the things that seem than by those that are’.  Machiavelli 

Warm Regards,


Significance of Stability in Afghanistan for Pakistan By  Khalid Aziz 

(Pakistan’s Afghan policy can be summed by Machiavelli’s quote “The people often deceived by an elusive good, desire their own ruin, and unless they are made sensible of the evil of the one and the benefit of the other course by someone in whom they have confidence, they will expose the republic to infinite peril and damage”.)


The world‟s best armies, composed of US and NATO forces, have battled in Afghanistan against the Taliban since December 2001 and by the end of 2014, the US had spent more than $ 1 trillion and the allies had lost numerous soldiers killed and many more injured. (On U.S. part, Afghan war started as revenge.  There was neither any planning nor a medium and long term war gaming.  It was an ad hoc project run by dysfunctional civil and military bureaucracies and evolved over the years depending on the ‘attention span’ at highest level.  Machiavelli said that ‘it is an infallible rule that a prince who is not wise himself cannot be well advised’.  Afghan project very quickly got on the back burner when U.S. forces marched towards Baghdad.  A broken Afghanistan has benefited a lot from the charity of U.S. tax payers but if I have to do it again, I wouldn’t waste even a biweekly paycheck on the project. U.S. is a net loser in this adventure.  We fought two wars with about two trillion dollar price tag on credit card.  Reminds me Machiavelli “whoever impoverishes himself by war acquires no power, even though he be victorious.  For his conquests cost him more than they are worth’.  I think it was Stephen Biddle who remarked about Iraq adventure that “American officials in Baghdad resemble apprentice sorcerers who had let loose forces they could barely understand, much less fully control”. Same applies to Afghanistan. There are many genuine national security aspects as far as U.S. is concerned but there are many cheap options.)

Pakistan has suffered considerably during this war; its financial losses amount to $ 107 billion and more than 21,500 civilians died during the war and the related wave of terrorism. Yet the Taliban remain resilient in Afghanistan. The region has suffered immensely and the war prevents economic growth and development. At the same time misgovernance and corruption adds to its risks. Although there is a draw-down of foreign forces in Afghanistan after December 2014, and US forces reportedly will be limited to about 10,000 troops who will provide capacity building to the ANSF and also support it in operations when necessary. Thus notwithstanding President Obama‟s claims, that he is ending the presence of the US troops in Afghanistan, for all practical purposes the Afghan war goes on – but in a different mode. (I partly agree with the policy but will even go further and suggest the number around 2-3 thousand.  Let Afghans decide what they want for their children. Local power elites always take foreigners for a ride for their own interests and play on their fears and ambitions.  It was Czarist Russia, British Empire, Communist Soviet Union, U.S.A. and Taliban yesterday and Daesh tomorrow.  It is a never ending game.  In fact, even a cursory look at history of Afghanistan proves this point.  During Raj, some Afghans regained their throne with British and Indian bayonets while those Afghan elite who lost on the buzkushi power playing field of Afghanistan enjoyed their pension at Ludhiana, Dehra Dun and Karachi. Read the special branch files of the Raj and you will be amused. Their fortunes have been upgraded. Today, some are enjoying comforts of power in Kabul while others living in luxurious estates in Dubai.  Both are paid by either money generated from lucrative drug trade or American taxpayers. No wonder that in 2009, Vice President of Afghanistan Ahmad Zia Masud landed at Dubai airport with $52 million cash in suit cases. Go figure it out how many suite cases you need to stuff 52 million dollars. Today one doesn’t have to wait 10 years for de-classification and Wiki Leaks cables provide good entertainment during free time. Sometimes prospect of hanging from the nearest lamp post spur a lazy person into action.)

It must also be said that it was the success of the Taliban on the battlefield that forced this revision in the withdrawal of troops scenario. The Taliban‟s ability to launch shaping operations, like the one that led to the capture of the Afghan city of Kunduz for fifteen days in October 2015 was a shock to the Afghans and the international community; the New York Times reported, “The insurgents held Kunduz for just 15 days, but during that time they destroyed government offices and facilities, seized military hardware, hunted down opponents, and freed prisoners from the city‟s two prisons”. 1 Why the Taliban targeted Kunduz and not any other city points to ancient rivalries that are at play in this war; the Ghiljai were settled in this region in 1885-86 when Alam Khan Nasher, a Kharoti who had rebelled against Amir Abdur Rehman, the Durrani King. (You bring an interesting point to the table but it needs a little more clarification. Pushtun settlements in north developed in the context of centralization of the state by Amir Abdur Rahman.  He was suppressing the rebellions in Pushtun and non-Pushtun areas.  In fact, he beheaded so many Shinwari Pushtuns when they rebelled that many crossed over and came under British protection.  For many years, Shinwaris on Afghan side used to come to British side to find young Shinwari men for their girls.  Same thing happened to Hazaras.  After pacifying north, he settled many Pushtun clans with twin objectives of having Pushtun elite dominance of the north and to remove troublesome Pushtuns from their ancestral lands thus diluting their strength.  After pacification of the north in late nineteenth century, the Pushtun settlements were established in northern areas especially Badakshan, Kunduz, Jauzjan, Faryab and Badghis provinces. Amir Abdur Rahman cleverly used his rival Ghilzai Pushtuns in the east and settled them in north thus cutting them off from their power base and diminishing their ability to threaten his rule. Durranis were settled there to utilize the fertile lands of the north as insurance to keep their loyalty and also act as guardians of northern frontiers. Certain tribes and clans are more represented in north. Ishaqzai (various clans), Barakzai, Popalzai, Alizai and Nurzai of Durrani stock and Hotaki, Tukhi, Taraki of Ghilzai stock as well as some Mohmand and Wardak are the main groups settled in north. In the civil war of 1990s, there were many rounds of ethnic cleansing in many areas and it will be interesting to know what the current census of Pushtuns in northern areas is? Taliban have made some inroads in these settlements and that is a bad omen for future.  If they kill non-Pushtuns or create enough instability to hinder trade then non-Pushtun backlash on Pushtun settlements will be inevitable.  This may result in punishment from government or non-Pushtun militias with aim of making life for these Pushtuns difficult enough to make them move out.  More important and relevant point in 2016 is that non-Pushtuns are in no mood to accept Pushtun dominance indefinitely.  Future is either for mutual respect and sharing in local resources or in the next cycle of civil war, we may see more displacement of Pushtun settlements in north. Ethnic pride among Pushtuns is no problem but chauvinistic and dominance themes will not take them very far in Afghanistan in 21st century.) 

While it is simpler for the US and NATO to have an easy to understand narrative of the war as, “War on Terror,” actually misleads analysis and hides the real drivers that are at play. However, due to an erroneous aggregation of causes can lead to the execution of ineffective policies; David Kilcullen an expert on insurgencies has identified this problem and has put it eloquently in his new book, “Dozens of local movements, grievances and issues have been aggregated…..into a global jihad against the West.”2 1 Rod Norland, Taliban End Takeover of Kunduz After 15 Days, The New York Times, 13th October 2015, accessed on 20.5.16; 2 David Kilcullen, “BLOOD YEAR: THE UNRAVELING OF WESTERN TERRORISM,” Chapter 2, Oxford University Press, New York, 2016. 2
The advent of ISIS in Nangarhar and cross-border raids into Pakistan by the escaped TTP elements, with safe-havens in Afghanistan, has caused further regional insecurity. While the failure of re-conciliation with the Taliban so far places a big question mark regarding the chances of peace in the region, we must not forget that other spoilers who can be best defined as criminal entrepreneurs, will avail themselves of any opportunity that they can find to make money by reducing the ability of the states to guard its people and interdict criminal activities like drug trafficking or gun-running that are the sources of employment and fulfillment of their ambitions that are unrequited due to lack of economic growth for a majority of people in certain parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan. (This is the political economy of war and state has to eliminate physically as much as it can and then increase the cost of participating in this enterprise high enough to make people think twice. This is then integrated with inclusive political economy to channel discontent via non-violent means.  In view of its history and continuous civil war over three generations, Afghanistan is in a state which Machiavelli described a ‘divided country’ and in a divided country, when a man is injured he approaches his patron for redress and patron to keep his own influence has every incentive to use violence to redress the grievance.  This is the pattern followed by various ethnic groups, tribes and clans. One thoughtful Afghan once told me that unless our people understand what belongs to the individual and what to the nation, they will never see a good day. Reminded me an episode when long after the last Soviet soldier had left, in the free for all fight, one group of ‘holy warriors’ over ran a town and looted the local school and cleaned everything.  In the end some wooden chairs and tables were left.  They couldn’t agree on what to do as they had no use at home for these items.  Finally they decided to chop the furniture and distributed it among the warriors to take home to use as fire wood.)

3 Geostrategic Considerations
Throughout history, the heavily populated regions of what now constitute Central Asia, Afghanistan and Iran had growing populations with limited resources to sustain them and were thus unable to generate incomes from trading or agriculture. On the other hand, to the South of this region lay the rich lands of the Indian sub-continent that was home to a very rich and diversified civilization and the Genetic plain alone, generated more than 25% of the world‟s GDP in the 16th and 17th centuries – roughly equivalent to China‟s position today. Kings of the region only knew of two ways to accumulate resources; either through taxes or by war and appropriating resources of weaker neighbors. Mahmud of Ghazni, a ruler of Turkish descent in Ghazni, that lies in today‟s Afghanistan invaded India 17 times in 27 years between 1000-1027 AD. There were other invaders like Babur, the Lodhis, and Khiljis, who came to India and established dynasties there. Another Afghan ruler Ahmed Shah Abdali, who ruled Afghanistan raided India nine times between 1747 to 1769. (Steppes and Afghanistan were sparsely populated countries. Paucity of resources forced them to become soldiers of fortune and predators.  They inhabited resource sparse regions and like any other highlander, descended on their richer and weak neighbors for loot and slaves. They were following the norms of their times.  The one who held power in his native land distributed the booty to his followers and when all the money was spent then he had to lead them again for the next installment; hence repeated invasions every few years –i.e. Mahmud and Ahmad Shah.  If he didn’t do that, he risked losing his own head.  Those who lost in their own land in the power struggle and lucky enough to keep their heads on their shoulder, headed to new pastures and established new fiefdoms and dynasties far away from their lands i.e. Lodhi, Babar.  They are worshiped as heroes today and it tells a lot about what is taught in history classes.)

After the East India Company defeated the Sikhs in the 2nd Sikh War of 1849 the Sikh Empire was dissolved. This brought the British close to what latter became Afghanistan and Central Asia. Britain‟s primary worry was to prevent Russia from threatening their „Jewel in the Crown,‟ that was India. It led to the following boundary creation in the region:  Demarcation of Afghanistan‟s Northern Boundary with Russia in 1885-• 1888  The Durand Line defining the boundary with India 1893-1895•  The Afghan boundary with Russia in the Pamir was delineated in 1895• settling the border between the protectorate of Bokhara and Kashmir, Chitral, Gilgit and Afghan regions of Badakshan and Wakhan. Guarding the North-Western Borderland 3 Khalid Aziz, “Country Paper on, “Drivers of Radicalism and Extremism in Pakistan,” published by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Islamabad, Pp. 21-23,, accessed on 20.5.16. 3
British India was very active and concerned in protecting its North-West frontier from any interference from the North; being a world power she had the resources to undertake the guardianship of the North-West. However, when it decided to grant independence to the sub-continent by dividing it into Pakistan and India; Britain for some reason did not make adequate arrangements for the future of this tricky region. Was it thoughtlessness or was there any other reason for this strategic forgetfulness? Did Britain suffer from strategic amnesia or was it a typical Imperial maneuver to keep the successor states dependent upon it for the provision of security? One answer to the mystery is available in the 6th February 1946 letter of the Governor General Lord Wavell addressed to the Secretary of State for India in London, recommended that a part of India comprising of NWFP, Baluchistan, West Punjab and Sindh may be created as another state to protect Britain‟s interest in this part of Asia.4 As we disaggregate the causes that have led to a continuation of hostilities in Afghanistan, we must not forget to underline the important geo-strategic feature of this region. Afghanistan, lies at an extremely important geographic location; to its East lies Pakistan, and a fifty miles long tongue of land in the Afghan Wakhan region acts as an entrant into the strategic Chinese Xinjiang province. To Afghanistan‟s North, lie the former Soviet Republics of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, that can become the source for future regional prosperity by exporting their abundant energy and mineral resources to Pakistan, India or Westward to the Middle-East and Europe. To its West, Afghanistan is bordered by the regional power-house of Iran, that is now emerging from years of isolation due to the sanctions imposed on it by the West. Further to Afghanistan‟s North lies Russia. As the withdrawal of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan began in 2014, two events put the world back into a familiar Cold War pattern. These events were connected to Russia‟s pre-emptive annexation of Crimea a part of Ukraine and its attempt to shape events in Eastern Ukraine to prevent an expansion of NATO, that was looking eminent. Some have suggested that the US may even be happy to remain in Afghanistan to apply pressure upon Russia and on China. If the US war goal in Afghanistan was the elimination of Al Qaeda as a threat in Afghanistan this was achieved in May 2011 with the death of Osama Bin Laden. Currently the US forces are presumably following a new goal to protect the Afghan state. It is speculated that the presence of US troops in Afghanistan provides her with a pivot to influence the Chinese bid to reshape the region by making it a hub of interconnectivity to other parts of the world based on „One Belt One Road,‟ (OBOR) concept. Ethnic Tensions and Alignments in Afghanistan Dalrymple while identifying the drivers of conflict in Afghanistan has highlighted the tribal conflict that is always simmering below the surface between two of 4 Khalid Aziz, Policy Report, “Causes of Rebellion in Waziristan,” (2007), RIPORT, Peshawar, P. 11, accessed on 21.5.16, URL: 4 Afghanistan‟s largest tribal confederacies.  (For a smart chap strategic significance can be a boon but for a dumb chap it can be a curse.  In a divided country, groups and factions can be bought by interested parties and this exactly happened in Afghanistan.  Everyone now has a dog in the fight in Afghanistan. For the un-initiated understanding Byzantine intrigues on Afghan chessboard can be a very dizzying experience.  Look at only one example; Gulbadin Hikmatyar.  For years he ate from the hands of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.  He was quite explicit in his anti-Shia rantings. He had no qualms in accepting Israeli weapons that they had captured from Palestinians when later were routed from Lebanon.  In First Gulf War, he somersaulted and started to cheer for Saddam Hussain. When Pakistan put its money on a different horse i.e. Taliban, and he was shunned by his former patrons, he took a residence in Tehran where he comfortably lived.  When Taliban started to creep into his power base in Kunduz and eastern Afghanistan, he had no qualms in passing intelligence to Americans so that his turf was protected from Taliban encroachment.  He was travelling on both tracks of the gravy train extracting resources from Afghan government read U.S.A. by cooperating in some areas and advancing his political and non-violent factions while at the same time taking handsome handouts from Tehran and others via factions who were shooting.  His son was in lucrative business partnership with governors. Kabul is a place where everyone is selling some information to someone.  In some cases, one person is selling different pieces of information to different patrons. Once you understand this basic point then you know why late Mullah Akhtar Mansur who was recently kicked upstairs to meet his 72 virgins (few young boys thrown as a bonus) held a Pakistani passport with valid Iranian visa. This chap like a busy executive was shuttling between Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan and Dubai. Outsiders can play their own little dirty games as they wish but they should fear the day when some really interested parties put their hands on the heads of some really pissed off Afghans and thoroughly alienated Baluchs in Pakistan and Iran.  I recall as early as 2001-2 when some nationalist Afghans swore that if neighbors don’t behave in the next round, they will make sure that Afghanistan doesn’t burn alone in this fire. Machiavelli told us long time ago that “once the people have taken arms against you, there will never be lacking of foreigners to assist them”.)

The Ghiljai are the largest confederacy in the country and ruled territories of what later became Afghanistan from 1000 AD to 1747, when they were supplanted by the competing confederacy of the Durranis in 1747. The Ghiljai number about 13 million of whom 9 million dwell in Afghanistan; Paktia in Afghanistan is the home of the tribe but they are also found in Jalalabad, Paktika, and Khost. Its largest tribe is the Suleman Khel while the next largest are the Kharotis. The Ghiljais are mostly herdsmen and thus nomadic in their life-style, as they are in search of pasture. Some 4 million Ghiljai live in Quetta, KP and the Punjab in Pakistan. The Niazi branch of Ghiljai in Pakistan live in Bannu and Mianwali. The Ghiljai, Tanoli live in the Tanawal region of Hazara mountains. Based on long term hydrological data available for Afghanistan and the dry Central Asian region indicates dwindling grass land commons for the last many decades. In some cases, in parts of Afghanistan, especially in the dry South, the water table has gone down, drying up the underground water channels forcing the land owners, who belong to the Durrani tribal confederacy to enclose the commons and prevent the Ghiljais from pasturing their herds. This has marginalized them economically and led many of them to find alternate livelihoods; many joined the Afghan armed forces. It has been argued that these dire circumstances pushed the Ghiljai to launch the communist coup against Sardar Daud in 1979 in order to wrest the state‟s control from the Durrani-Tajik clique to improve their livelihoods. Those in the lead of the take-over of power were Ghiljais associated with the Khalqi wing of the Afghan People‟s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). It is argued that when the „Mujahedeen‟ reaction organized by West and managed through Pakistan succeeded, the Ghiljai came back in the garb of the Taliban to control the Afghan state. 5  (It is interesting from historical and anthropological point of view but I’m not sure about its significance and impact on current scenario. Definitions are too broad to draw any conclusion.  Technically, an Ahmadzai in Afghanistan and a Tanoli in Pakistan come under the Ghiljai umbrella but I don’t see any connection.  They have no common interest in any area. Tanoli has even lost his Pushtu language and speaks Hindko. Having said that, this conflict inside a particular region where interests clash may be significant.)

General Stanley McChrystal Commander of US/ISAF forces in Afghanistan in 2009-2010, has argued in his report to President Obama in the „Commander‟s Initial Assessment,‟ (2009) that the ISAF commanders must understand the social and political dynamics prevailing in Afghanistan. Tribal unhappiness generates support for the insurgents and defeats the goals of the coalition.6 This refers to the issue discussed above of the need to disaggregating the problem. And this is something that we don‟t hear much about except as a periodic reference to it by some insightful writer. Within Afghanistan the 9/11 War, was diagnosed as a Pashtun rebellion against President Karzai‟s regime, which supported the empowerment of three ethnic groups – the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras of the North. This situation prevailed from December 2001 to the middle of 2006, when his Popalzai tribe became powerful in its own right as 5 Khalid Aziz, “Need for a Pak-Afghan Treaty on Management of Joint Water Courses,” Published by the Regional Institute of Policy Research & Training, Peshawar, (2007), see Pp 1-6, accessed on 21.5.16, URL: 6 Stanley McChrystal, Commander‟s Initial Assessment (2009), Pp 2-4, accessed on 20.5.16, URL: 5 the US surged its forces in the South and it made the Southern tribes very rich and powerful as the Karzai clan spread its patronage widely in the South through President Karzai‟s brother Ahmed Wali Karzai. His death at the hands of his own body-guard prompted Britain‟s Guardian newspaper to state, “[His death], was the personification of modern-day Afghanistan – corrupt, treacherous, lawless, paradoxical, subservient and charming. Now with his violent death Karzai has also come to symbolize Afghanistan’s enduring tragedy.” 7 The ascendency of the non-Pashtuns prior to 2006-2007, was resented by them and helped spiral the insurgency. (Pushtun and non-Puhstun tensions in Afghanistan need a broader perspective.  In the civil war of 1990s, both communities perpetrated horrendous atrocities.  Rape was used systematically and civilians were indiscriminately slaughtered.  No foreign troops had ever committed such atrocities on Afghans.  This is the collective shame of Afghans but no one will talk about it.  If Pushtuns resented rise of non-Pushtuns in post 2001 then what about pre 2001?  Non-Pushtuns resented the control of the most retrograde movement ever seen even in Pushtun areas to control their lives.  Imagine what an educated Herati and Kabuli felt when a village Pushtun boy with scraggy beard and dirty clothes was beating his educated wife on the city streets with leather lash.  Her crime being that while covered from head to toe with Burqa had the audacity to show her ankles.  This treatment was given to anyone regardless of the ethnicity but the anger and hatred of non-Pushtuns was quadrupled. When the tide turned, non-Pushtuns tried to keep their hold on lever of powers and who would blame them. In peaceful areas in central and northern Afghanistan local communities have reaped the benefits of reconstruction and education and racing forward.  Male and female education among Hazaras is quite impressive.  These traditionally underdogs are excelling in many fields and winning large number of foreign scholarships of higher education.  Insecurity in south and east means that Pushtun is lagging behind.  In near future, how you are going to replace a well qualified non-Pushtun with an unqualified Pushtun? This is the question for Pushtun intelligentsia to ponder over?)

Although there is a counter argument to this finding that says that Karzai may have been beholden to the Tajik prior to the arrival of US troops into the South of the country when the influence of the Pashtuns re-emerged. It may be noted that once institutional changes are ushered it takes a long time to neutralize their effects. For instance, the Tajiks who constitute only 27% of the Afghan population, obtained 70% of the officer Corp jobs in the Afghan army. (I don’t know the source of these numbers but it is quite natural that initially non-Pushtuns fully cooperated to overthrow Taliban and were rewarded.  Just like during Durrani rule, all high posts in military and civil bureaucracy went to Psuhtuns. My own work on Afghan army evolution in the last ten years suggest that this has dramatically changed although I admit that real statistics are hard to get. As far as I recall, last time when I checked Afghan National Army was about 45% Pushtun including many mid and high level Pushtun officers.) 

Although Karzai is himself a Pashtun, yet as William Dalrymple comments, his presence then was seen not more than window-dressing.8 It is true that the power sharing agreement brought the national unity government of President Ashraf Ghani and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah on January 12th 2015 brought to power a new team. Thus far, real power in Afghanistan, still lies with the dominant tribal allegiances within the institutions that occurred from 2001 to 2015. President Ashraf Ghani is an Ahmedzai, Ghiljai, who belongs to the larger Ghiljai confederation. He has begun the process of modifying the leadership in important ministries and has begun to bring in former Khalqis belonging to his tribe. He has been able to do so in the Afghan Ministries of Defence, the National Directorate of Security and the Afghan National Security Council. More changes on these lines are expected in the future. Reaction has not been long in coming from the Durrani-Tajik combine when President Ghani‟s brilliant move to mend bridges with Pakistan, took shape during his visit to Islamabad in November 2014. President Ashraf Ghani took the initiative to bring about cooperation between Pakistan‟s premier intelligence agency the ISI and its Afghan counterpart the NDS, who signed an MoU of cooperation in May 2015. After its signing three things happened in quick succession in Kabul. In the back-drop of stringent criticism in public quarters against the MoU including criticism of the President by his subordinate Director of NDS, Mr Nabil.9 He shortly there-after resigned in protest. The MoU was also condemned in the Afghan parliament and Mr. Karzai, the former Afghan President stated in India, Pakistan‟s obstreperous neighbor, that the MoU was an embarrassment and will not be 7 Guardian 12th July 2011, Simon Tisdall, “Ahmed Wali Karzai, the corrupt and lawless face of modern Afghanistan,”, accessed on 21.5.16 8 William Dalrymple, “A Deadly Triangle,” Brooking Essay, March 2013, see section 2, URL, accessed on 20.5.16 9 Afghan Analysts Network, Thomas Ruttig, “Political Cleavages over Pakistan: The NDS chief‟s farewell”, accessed on 21.5.16 URL: 6 allowed to remain.10 A statement that would be meaningful coming from someone who still wielded power. To embarrass Pakistan further, the NDS leaked that Mullah Omar, the recluse leader of the Taliban had died earlier but that Pakistan had kept it as a secret.11 This led to an enormous back-lash against President Ashraf Ghani, who in order to retain hold over power and be relevant in Afghan politics criticized Pakistan for terrorist bombings in Kabul in August 2015. (Ashraf Ghani made a genuine effort to placate Pakistanis to end the conflict but he miscalculated the immense hatred against Pakistan among general population in Afghanistan.  He didn’t build a reasonable consensus before embarking on the journey.  Another factor may be that he exaggerated Pakistani influence over Taliban.  Pakistan didn’t help Ashraf to bring some gifts to the table so that Ashraf could convince his critics to give Pakistan more time. I was of the view that the only way Ashraf’s gamble will pay if Pakistan hands him a major gift.  Whether Pakistan had the capacity or intention is another matter.  Pakistan’s problem is that it may have some influence on some factions but it cannot dictate to Taliban.  Those factions who resent too much of Pakistan involvement have already found sanctuaries inside Afghanistan and financial support from many other parties including Iran and Russia.  Everybody is responsible for the mess of forty years and now wants results in months. They need to come down to earth. As far as Afghanistan is concerned, everyone thinks that only they are doing the right thing and everybody else is messing up. My own view is that every country messed up according to its own ability and resources and it will need collective efforts to bring some order.  However, first condition is that every nation has to discard its previous notions and start fresh. I’m near sighted therefore don’t see any change in behavior of all the players. Another important factor is to be realistic about violence.  It is extremely naïve to expect that violence will be completely rooted out.  Even in well established states with good functioning government, violence of various sorts is inevitable.  In case of Afghanistan, as long as violence is kept below a certain threshold where it does not interfere with day to day functioning of government and ordinary life, I’ll consider it a success.)

Clearly, real power in Afghanistan still lies with the ethnic triumvirate of the Tajik, Uzbek and Hazaras, although the power is shifting now that President Ashraf Ghani has begun to bring in Ghijai into the power structure; thus clearly a large number of the Pashtun in whose areas the war is being conducted and who have been the main target of NATO/ISAF operations is ignored. This is one big weakness in the fabric of Afghan and West‟s counter-insurgency efforts. It is no wonder that despite the expenditure of billions of dollars and loss of countless lives, the Taliban have not been defeated or reconciled. This absence of ethnic coherence in Afghanistan indicates that unless a solution is found to the larger issue of the tussle between the Ghiljai and the Durrani confederacy‟s is ended the war in some form or another is likely to continue unabated. (In broken societies, this question never gets answered.  There are two dimensions of the problem; one perceptions of non-Afghans and other of Afghans.  As far as outsiders are concerned, first, we are told that conflict between Pushtun and non-Pushtun needs to be settled for peace, then it is between Durrani and Ghiljai.  Even if we miraculously achieve this goal then it will be between tribes, then clans then families.  As far Afghans are concerned they are of the view that the problem lies with foreigners who don’t understand Afghans.  They think that if outsiders stop interference then everything will be fine.  Everyone has the capacity to spoil the game.  Any disgruntled party can pay someone to put a bomb or send a suicide bomber – like any other weapon on the market you can actually buy and sell a suicide bomber.  A society that reaches this low point needs a lot of introspection and reflection.  In my view, even if all the gold of Fort Knox is transferred to Afghanistan, it will not solve their problems.  Only Afghans will solve their own problem.)

India’s Presence in Afghanistan In his insightful essay on the drivers of war in Afghanistan, Dalrymple begins by narrating how a female Indian army officer teaching English to army cadets viewed the events; “Major Mitali Madhumita, was awakened by the ringing of her mobile phone. Mitali, a 35-year-old Indian army officer from Orissa, had been in Kabul less than a year. Fluent in Dari, the most widely spoken language in Afghanistan, she was there to teach English to the first women officer cadets to be recruited to the Afghan National Army.” “It was a sensitive posting, not so much because of gender issues as political ones: India‟s regional rival, Pakistan, was extremely touchy about India providing military assistance to the government in Afghanistan and had made it very clear that it regarded the presence of any Indian troops or military trainers there as an unacceptable provocation.” 12 India‟s presence in Afghanistan is viewed as a mortal threat by Pakistani strategists who would wish that it was not so; yet India remains in Afghanistan and is associated with security matters, reviving memories in the mind of the Pakistanis of a previous Cold War Era when Afghan-India cooperation against Pakistan, when they actively sponsored the irredentist Pukhtunistan movement that at times boiled over into 10 The Hindu, Suhasini Haider, “MOU with ISI dropped says Karzai”, accessed on 21.5.16, URL: 11 The Hindustan Times, correspondent, “Mullah Omar „died two years ago‟, Taliban remain mum,” accessed on 21.5.16, URL: 12 Brookings Institute, Brooking Essay, William Dalrymple, “Deadly Triangle: Afghanistan, Pakistan & India,” Section 1, accessed on 21.5.16, URL: 7 hot contact with the use of Pakistan air-force and clash of militaries in Bajaur region of Pakistan in the early 1960s. Pakistan fears the re-emergence of a similar alliance and is likely to undertake counter-measures now that there is a strategic alignment also between the US, Afghanistan and India! It is therefore very worrying for Pakistani strategists to note the presence of safe-havens for Pakistani terrorists like Mullah Fazalullah and Mangal Bagh, as well as the Baluch insurgents.  (Mumbai carnage in 2008 was the turning point as far as Indian strategic community was concerned.  I heard from some in India’s strategic community that this issue could shift the balance in India in favor of hawks.  There was lot of ambiguity.  Pakistan’s ISI chief Lt. General Ahmad Shuja Pasha admitted that some former ISI handlers were involved but state was not mad enough to embark on such adventure.  India waited to see how Pakistan will act.  My own assessment at that time was that Pakistan had a very narrow window of opportunity. No one advocated some military operation or other grand scheme.  Only thing was to inform India through a back channel that two or three key players in Mumbai drama will soon meet their maker either a natural or unnatural death.  After all when the state decided, what it did to Mr. Malik Ishaq?  However, it was ten years too late and in this decade state lost the trust of Shia community. Some more water and blood flowed under the bridge but in this time there was a definite shift in India.  Indian National Security Advisor announced that ‘you can do another Mumbai; but you will lose Baluchistan’. In pre-2008 era there was no official meaningful support to Baluchs from any quarter.  In fact, Nawab Akbar Bugti sent a message to Hamid Karzai asking for a safe passage to Afghanistan before moving to hills where he was finally killed. Karzai checked with Americans and the answer was no.  Bugti was told to mend fences with Mussharraf.  This was communicated to me by a good friend of Karzai.  Similarly, there was no presence of Pakistani Taliban in Afghanistan.  It was frustration of a decade before many decided that Pakistan will only listen if it is paid in the same coin.  In my view, in post 2001 decision making process, Pakistanis have seriously underestimated two things; first how vulnerable they are and second failing to comprehend internal debates in American, Indian and Afghan security establishments. They don’t have to agree with these debates but they need to take into consideration the impact of the outcome of these debates on their own national security. It is their right to think that some Afghan Taliban could be helpful in their national security policy and follow on this line.  However, they should also be aware of consequences of such policy.  To be fair to Pakistanis, they are not responsible for all the ills of the region and to expect that they have the key to all the problems is unrealistic.  Even if they get out of the room, India still have to deal with discontent in Kashmir and Afghanistan have to solve its own problems.)

The Benefits of Peace for Pakistan: From the above description of the situation, and a different analysis of the drivers of conflict in Afghanistan, it is clear that peace will only come when the issues pertaining to the following class of disputed positions can be ameliorated;  Finding a solution to the on-going conflict between the Ghiljai and the Durrani• tribal confederacies  Creating greater economic opportunities for the marginalized members of the• Afghan population  Reconciliation with the Taliban will be best achieved by bilateral negotiations• between the Afghan government and the Taliban (or should it be conducted as peace building between the two contesting tribal confederacies?). This later is a new design and holds more promise that the QCG approach that grows out of the US‟s narrative of the 9/11 War on Terror and is thus flawed.   (Loss of large swaths of territory by Pakistan at the hands of militants is the direct result of Afghan policy when events spiraled out of Pakistan’s control as more powerful players landed in the neighborhood. However, the disaster was not inevitable.  I held the view in 2001 and advocated that Pakistan had a very narrow window to make a clean break as far as Afghanistan was concerned while at the same time make a proactive move to ensure that disorder doesn’t spread in its own territory.  Shell shocked retreating militants were robbed of even their shoes and money by local tribesmen in Kurram agency.  If state had asserted itself it could have protected its interests at a fraction of a cost.  Strategic myopia at the highest level prevented some common sense measures.  If only high command had read Machiavelli who said ‘one ought never to allow a disorder to take place in order to avoid war.  For war is not thereby avoided but only deferred to your disadvantage’.  We should remember that in 2001-02, the action needed was not war but assertion of state’s authority with vigor and punishing militant start ups promptly to send a message that state meant business. Pakistan deferred it to its own disadvantage. It had to spend lot of blood and treasure to regain the control back from militants. In the end, it did the right thing but in the process lost the good will of a large number of tribesmen. In my own interactions, tribesmen are extremely bitter about state policy that devastated their lands.  No wonder thousands of tribesmen from North Waziristan sought shelter in Afghanistan.)

Bridging the distrust between Pakistan and India on Afghanistan is essential• and must be initiated as early as possible.  (This is a tall order. Both countries are prisoners of their past and willing to mortgage their future for misplaced fear, envy and pride. The grand bargain now means that Pakistan has to wash its hands off Kashmir and let Kashmiris decide what they want and India pull back from a dangerous posture. Both countries are facing many internal pressures due to economic, political, ethnic and religious factors and these forces are straining internal cohesion of both societies.  This phenomenon is not limited to third world countries.  Look at Western Europe where brigade strength of alienated Muslim youth left for the killing fields of Middle East and now fighting for Daesh. It is true that India and Pakistan can stir troubles in each other’s backyard and give some sleepless nights to decision- makers of opposite side. However, igniting a fire in neighbor’s backyard is not a sound national security policy. A new vision directed by young global generation of both countries attempts to understand the other ‘out of the box’ and exert pressure on their own governments so that they desist from self-defeating policies. This is the hope for the future for both countries. It will be truly tragic if they decide to fight another battle on the killing fields of Afghanistan.)

Peace in Afghanistan can only come if the international climate remains• peaceful that does not bring tension to the region related to containment of Russia or balancing China by creating new pressure points. If we are lucky to obtain relief in the areas described above or at least begin to move in the right direction, then one can assume that the following benefits could flow for Pakistan and the region. Once peace is brought to the region the fires of extremism and radicalism will be extinguished. It must be noted that as stated earlier in this research the persons, who are benefitting most from regional unrest are the „criminal entrepreneurs,‟ who want unrest in the region and weak states, so that they may conduct their trade based on drug trafficking, smuggling, human trafficking and gunrunning. Such individuals have an interest in unrest, as it allows them to prosper at the expense of general insecurity for the majority of inhabitants.13 If relative security is created in the region, Pakistan will benefit as under:  Increase in trade with Afghanistan that today stands at about $2.5 billion• annually 13 (Ibid) 3, P. 2 8
Security will allow Pakistan and India as well as the other states in the• region to multiply regional trade by linking up with China, India, S. Asian region, Central Asia, Iran and the Middle-East. This alone can generate billions dollars‟ worth of trade and employment opportunities leading to an average regional annual growth rate of 8-10% per year. This will transform this region and convert it into a hub of economic growth meaning a better life for all its people.  Peace will improve the security situation in Pakistan and concomitantly• reduce its security budget.  It will expedite the completion of power projects like CASA – 1000 and the• TAPI project leading to propelling of industrial growth.  These changes will act as a catalyst for the China-Pakistan Economic• Corridor Project whose benefits will spread much further than envisaged at present.  This design of growth can only come about with the commitment towards• peace by the great powers and India and Pakistan. If peace can double Pakistan‟s total net assets through an 8 -10% annual growth could become a huge engine of regional growth. Naturally, its main beneficiaries are likely to be Pakistan itself as well as its neighbors Afghanistan, India, Iran and China. It is thus obvious that peace in Afghanistan will be of immense significance to Pakistan and the region as well as its poor masses who struggle to make two ends meet.  (I agree that dividends of peace are enormous for everyone.  However, every player is short sighted and their judgment is clouded by existing distrust and imagined fears.  Some Afghans are happy to carry foreigner’s gun and foreigner is happy to fight to the last Afghan.)
“Everyone may begin a war at his pleasure; but cannot so finish it”.  Machiavelli 

Comment from famous military analyst Major Amin: 

My own (tangential) comments:

1. Regarding the Wavell quote and the fact that some (by no means all) British “strategists” thought it a great idea to have a “reliable” pro-British Muslim state on India’s Northwest frontier after they pulled out:
One may add to all this the fact that no person or even institution knows everything and foresees everything. The British had dominated the globe for a 150 years and the “strategic thinking” built around this domination was deeply ingrained in capable senior administrators. In hindsight, any Tom, Dick or Harry can see that there was to be NO British “strategic interest” in Central Asia or even India after Indian independence. They would be VERY junior partners in whatever maneuvering the US and Russia were doing against each other and if they were lucky they could make money in some ventures. That is all. But sane and intelligent people like Wavell were destroying the future of generations of Punjabis and Pakhtoons based on some notion of their “duty” to think ahead and keep British strategic interests in mind! 
In the long run, it does look like a tragic comedy.

2. It is interesting to see that Khalid Aziz sahib, with his patriotic (saner than most) Paknationalist glasses, repeatedly quotes Dalrymple. There is a lesson in there somewhere 🙂

3. Ideologies matter. But only a few people may be promoting a given ideology while fully conscious of its harshest implications (irrespective of what you think about the rightness or wrongness of an ideology, there will always be harsh implications when it comes to large human groups and their clashing interests, or maybe we should say, small elites and theirs). This is true of all dreams (the dream of India, of Hindutva, of America, of one world, of the Ummah, of the Middle Kingdom, whatever), but  the more fantastic ones do require more fantastic change and therefore, more fantastic sacrifice.. Pakistan is a very fantastic dream. It may be better if we can tone it down a bit 🙂

Of course, countless Paknationalists want what is best for Pakistan and its people, but only a small number are willing to get millions killed in that process. Unfortunately, those few are also the ones with the determination, the vision and the persistence needed to make great plans and put them into practice… 

But not to get TOO worked up about this vision thing, we are still human. When we were young Marxists, we believed that none of this dream BS matters. The means of production and so on and so forth. There is probably some truth in that, for better and for worse, that truth may sink ideological nightmares and dreams, eventually.... Besides, I have been told this is especially true in India, where The Man is mostly ignored as people get on with life. As Indians, who knows, we may yet sabotage all the grand schemes of great men. 
Inshallah 🙂

Brown Pundits