Sometimes the Bible just gets it right

I can’t claim to have read the Bible, the only books I read are book club prescribed ones and Holy Books haven’t yet come onto the selection.
But I always turn back to my favorite chapter

To every thing there is a season—Whatever God does, it will be forever—God will judge the righteous and the wicked.
 1 To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven:
 2 A time to be born, and a time to die; a time to plant, and a time to pluck up that which is planted;
 3 A time to kill, and a time to heal; a time to break down, and a time to build up;
 4 A time to weep, and a time to laugh; a time to mourn, and a time to dance;
 5 A time to cast away stones, and a time to gather stones together; a time to embrace, and a time to refrain from embracing;
 6 A time to get, and a time to lose; a time to keep, and a time to cast away;
 7 A time to rend, and a time to sew; a time to keep silence, and a time to speak;
 8 A time to love, and a time to hate; a time of war, and a time of peace.

Another Angry Voice on Podemos

Why the EU is damned to doom

On facebook I follow the extreme left page, Another Angry Voice, and they have a small piece on Podemos, the new left-wing party that’s virulently growing in Spain (even more worryingly the party wants to call a referendum on the Spanish monarchy).

Podemos and the appeal of Pablo Iglesias

Pablo Iglesias is the 36 year old leader of a new left-wing party in Spain called Podemos (We Can) that was born out of the 15-M street protest movement.

The Origins of Podemos

Podemos arose out of the 15-M “indignados” protests, which were a little bit like the Spanish version of the Occupy Wall Street Movement, but crucially the Spanish protesters managed keep the movement going and convert it into a powerful political force, whilst the Occupy Wall Street movement has faded away into near irrelevance in the grand scheme of US politics.

When the right-wing Spanish government led by Mariano Rajoy brought forward plans to introduce €600,000 fines for people participating in “unauthorised” public protests, they gave the 15-M movement a huge incentive to legitimise themselves as an official political party.

The rise of Podemos

Since Podemos was formed in March 2014, the party has experienced an unprecedented rise in popularity. In May 2014, just two months after it was formed, Podemos took 8% of the vote in the European elections to bag 5 MEPs (that’s two more than the Green Party managed in the UK, despite the UK having 73 European Parliament seats to Spain’s 54).

One area in which Podemos is utterly dominating Spanish politics is in the online sphere. The Podemos Facebook pagehas picked up over 950,000 followers, which is more than the pages of all of the other political parties in Spain combined!

At any rate it’s a chicken and an egg scenario; the Eurozone is a doomed project banking on economic synchronizing between the heavyweight Germanic economies and the more haphazard Romantic Europe.
A telling example is the rift between Germanic Europe and the rest (via Inside Europe):

Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Sam Manekshaw (and a comment from Major Agha Amin)

A post from Dr Hamid Hussain. A (typically earthy) comment from military historian Major Agha Amin follows below Dr Hamid Hussain’s post.

Dear Sir;

A while ago, many officers asked about the controversies about Ayub Khan’s selection and I wrote a piece that may interest those raising these questions.

Mr. Ardeshir’s comment about Sam Manekshaw and Ayub Khan is incorrect.  It is related to Sam and Yahya Khan.  The real story is as follows;

In early 1947, Sam and Yahya were serving together at Military Operations directorate in New Delhi.  Sam owned a red James motorcycle that looked like the picture below;

Yahya fell in love with it and Sam agreed to sell it for 1000 Rupees.  In the chaos of partition, Yahya left for Pakistan promising to send the money from Pakistan but later forgot about the money.  After 1971 war, Sam once joked about the incident stating that ‘”Yahya never paid me the Rs1,000 for my motorbike, but now he has paid with half his country.” In 2001, Pakistani columnist Aredshir Cowasjee went to India and met Sam.  Cowasjee remembered Sam’s quip and offered to pay the money Yahya owed along with the interest.  Sam replied that ‘Yahya was a good man and a good soldier.  We served together and he didn’t have a mean or corrupt bone in his body’.

An additional corollary to the above story is another story.  In 1946, Lt. Colonel Sam Manekshaw was GSO-1 (Operations), Major Yahya Khan was GSO-2 (Frontier Defence) and Captain S. K. Sinha was GSO-3 (Internal Security) at Military Operations Directorate in New Delhi.  In 1971, General Sam Manekshaw was Indian army chief, Yahya was Pakistan army chief and Lieutenant General S. K. Sinha was head of pay and pension department at army headquarters in Delhi.  When war started, Sinha sent a letter to Sam requesting for chance to participate in the war.  Sinha wrote, “old G-1 is going to war with old G-2 and G-3 is being left out’.


Selection of First Native C-in-C in Pakistan

Hamid Hussain

In 1947, India and Pakistan emerged as new independent states and Indian army was divided.  There were no senior native officers and both countries decided to keep British officers at senior posts while native officers were given accelerated promotions to prepare them for senior positions.  In India, General Robert Lockhart (commissioned in 51st Sikh; now 3 Frontier Force Regiment of Pakistan army) was appointed first C-in-C.  He relinquished charge in January 1948 and was succeeded by Lieutenant General Francis Robert Roy Bucher (commissioned in 55th Coke’s Rifles; now 7 Frontier Force Regiment of Pakistan army.  He later changed to 32nd Lancers that was amalgamated with 31st Lancers in 1922 to form 13thLancers; now an elite cavalry regiment of Pakistan army).  Near the end of 1948, it was decided to appoint an Indian C-in-C to complete the nationalization process and in January 1949, General Cariappa took charge as first Indian C-in-C.  In case of Pakistan, General Frank Messervy (he was commissioned in Hodson Horse) was appointed first C-in-C on August 15, 1947.  He retired on February 1948 and succeeded by his Chief of Staff (COS) General Douglas Gracey (commissioned in Ist King George’s Own Gurkha Rifles and later commanded 2/3rd Gurkha Rifles).  Interestingly, the last two British C-in-Cs of India belonged to regiments that were allotted to Pakistan and the two British C-in-Cs of Pakistan belonged to regiments that went to India.

On the eve of independence, Pakistan inherited only two native Brigadiers; Muhammad Akbar Khan and Nawabzada Agha Muhammad Raza.  Several officers were given accelerated promotions and senior positions were filled with Pakistani officers.  In 1949, it was decided that Major General Iftikhar Ali Khan will be the first native C-in-C.  He was commissioned from Sandhurst in August 1929.  His parent regiment was 7 Light Cavalry.  Later, he was transferred to 3 Cavalry when later regiment was Indianized and he served as regiment’s Adjutant.  During war, he served with newly raised 45 Cavalry.  He was junior to several Pakistani officers and the list includes with commission dates in brackets; Muhammad Akbar Khan ‘Rangroot’ was Daly College Indore graduate and not Sandhurst commissioned (December 1919), Faiz Mohammed Khan (July 1921), Mohammad Ishfakul Majid (August 1924), Khairuddin Mohammad Idris (September 1925), Malik Fazal-ur-Rahman Kallue (January 1927), Nawabzada Agha Muhammad Raza (January 1927), Raja Mohammad Afzal Janjua (January 1927), Muhammad Ayub Khan (February 1928), Nasir Ali Khan (February 1928) and Mohammad Yusuf (January 1929).  It is important to clarify seniority issue.  At every rank, several officers are superseded and seniority alone is never a criterion for senior positions.  Some officers when superseded ask for retirement while others continue to serve.  Two examples will clarify this position.  Mir Haider was commissioned in December 1919 and in 1949, he was Major. Jamaldar Orakzai was commissioned in August 1928 and in 1948 he was Colonel serving at Quarter Master General (QMG) branch.  Haider and Orakzai were senior to Iftikhar but in view of their service track and rank, they were not relevant to the selection of army chief.  It was decided to send Iftikhar for Imperial Defence Course (IDC) in London to prepare him for his job.  In December 1949, his plane crashed near Jangshahi in Karachi killing all on board that included his wife and son and Director Military Operations (DMO) Brigadier Mohammad Sher Khan.  Sher was a Sandhurst graduate commissioned in September 1932 and joined 6th Battalion of 13th Frontier Force Rifles (now 1 Frontier Force Regiment).

There are many confusing stories about selection of first native C-in-C of Pakistan but they relate to selection of Ayub and not Iftikhar with the exception that Ayub contended that Iftikhar’s name was floated as possible first native C-in-C but no final decision was made.  This may be due to the fact that decision was made but Iftikhar died before any official notification was issued.  Very few officers of that time period wrote memoirs therefore written record is very limited.  Political leadership of newly independent Pakistan under Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan selected Iftikhar on the advice of British senior brass.  British considered Iftikhar professionally sound and apolitical. His thoroughly westernized life style was probably a plus.  Some suggest that he was tough disciplinarian and may have temper problem.  According to Major General A. O. Mitha, he had ‘the reputation of eating a Brigadier or Lt. Colonel for breakfast everyday’.  Ayub considered Iftikhar a good officer but ‘a difficult man’ and ‘short-tempered’.  Two most credible sources about the subject matter are Major General Sher Ali Khan Pataudi and Major General Syed Shahid Hamid.  Pataudi knew Iftikhar for a long period of time starting from the days when two were at Royal Indian Military College (RIMC) at Dehra Dun where Iftikhar was senior to him.  In early 1948, Pataudi served as 14 Para Brigade commander under Iftikhar when later was commanding 10 Division.  Pataudi was bachelor and stayed at Iftikhar’s house and knew Iftikhar intimately.  When Pataudi came to Pakistan in October 1947, he was posted to Gardai Brigade in Waziristan commanded by Ayub. The two were together for three months and developed friendship.  When Ayub was C-in-C, he superseded Pataudi therefore he was resentful.  Hamid served with Iftikhar in the same 3 Cavalry Regiment.  Hamid’s time in 3 Cavalry was not pleasant and he soon left the regiment.  He didn’t have good memories as some Indian officers including Iftikhar preferred to interact with British officers rather than fellow Indian officers.  Hamid also had friendly relations with Ayub and Ayub used to stay with him.  He served as Master General Ordnance (MGO) and Adjutant General (AG) under Ayub.

These two contemporaries of Iftikhar and Ayub give different accounts and these perspectives are based on their own personal relations with the two.  It is important to note that during a professional life spanning over two to three decades an officer interacts with several hundred officers in different capacities therefore one can expect quite diverse opinions.   Major General Sher Ali Khan Pataudi considered Iftikhar professionally sound, well read and highly intelligent.  In contrast, he considered Ayub as a typical battalion officer good at basic soldiering but not cut for higher direction of war.  He defended Iftikhar’s aloofness by suggesting that ‘he was a very shy person which gave the impression of his being conceited, which he wasn’t’.  Pataudi claims that Iftikhar was concerned about politicization of officers and distrusted politicians.  He once commented that ‘it would be better for both of us if we both got out before our hands were stained and garments polluted’.  Pataudi is of the view that if Iftikhar had been C-in-C, ‘he would not have allowed the Army to be used for political purposes and ‘would have never used his position as C-in-C, to come into power through the Army’.  In contrast, Major General Shahid Hamid is of the view that Iftikhar was a thoroughly westernized officer (he was married to a charming Parsee girl who was number one woman rider in India.), ruthless and hated politicians.  Hamid is of the view that Iftikhar would have adopted the same course later adopted by Ayub.

Iftikhar’s choice as first native C-in-C is an established fact and Pataudi states that Prime Minister contacted Iftikhar and informed him about the decision which Iftikhar shared with him.  In addition, Pataudi also states that on that day Ayub was also in Lahore and contacted him and asked to arrange for a meeting with Iftikhar to get to know the incoming C-in-C.  Ayub was leaving the next day therefore meeting didn’t materialize.  Hamid also alludes to the fact that Ayub was always curious about Iftikhar as it was an open secret that Iftikhar would be next C-in-C.  An incident narrated by Ayub also gives credence that Prime Minister had considered Iftikhar for C-in-C position.  There was a division commander’s conference and Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan invited some senior officers to circuit house.  He brought up the subject of selection of C-in-C and told the audience that ‘it was possible that the appointment would not go to the most senior officer’.  He then elicited opinion of several officers regarding selecting a junior officer as C-in-C.

Among the list of officers senior to Iftikhar, Akbar was commissioned in 1 Brahmans but spent most of his career with Royal Indian Army Service Corps (RIASC) with no command, staff or instructional experience (the only exception was command of Meerut sub area in 1947).  In April 1946, British recommended several Indian officers for senior appointments to prepare them for command when British left.  Akbar was recommended by the selection board to be Army Commander but it was probably to have a Muslim and not for professional excellence.  Akbar was the only senior Muslim officer at Brigadier rank while the remaining six recommend for promotions and coveted postings were Hindus (Cariappa, Rajindra Singhji, Srinagesh, Nathu Singh, A.J. Rudra and B.S. Chimni).  In Pakistan, by 1949, several officers have attained accelerated promotions and were considered professionally superior therefore Akbar was not considered for post.  He retired at Major General rank in 1950.    One other qualified candidate Raza was not liked by British.  Brigadier Francis Ingall in the process of establishment of Pakistan a military academy dealt with Raza who was then serving as Adjutant General (AG) and didn’t have high opinion of him.  Ingall considered him ‘extremely pompous’, ‘difficult to deal with’, vague’ and ‘hesitant to make decisions’.   A junior councilor at British High Commission A. H. Reed remarked that Raza ‘a born intriguer, had been lobbying hard for the Commander-in-Chief position’.  He also remarked that Raza was feared by juniors and universally disliked by both British and Pakistani officers.  Major General A. O. Mitha who served under Raza summed up the general opinion that Raza was professionally average and ‘had the reputation of being strict and a bit of bully’.  However, after a personal encounter he developed great respect for Raza for his ‘large-heartedness’ and ‘broad-mindedness’.  Many other officers senior to Iftikhar later retried at Colonel and Brigadier ranks.

In early 1948, Ayub was superseded at the rank of Brigadier and two sources confirm this.  Shuja Nawaz was given access to Ayub’s file for his encyclopedic work on Pakistan army and his information removes doubts about seniority.  Ayub Khan was sent to command East Pakistan sub area (later designated 14th Division) with the local rank of Major General.  This could have caused confusion in terms of seniority and General Gracey sent a note to Military Secretary stating that when Ayub is promoted to Major General rank, this will be antedated to the date of his local Major General rank starting January 08, 1948.  Gracey went ahead to clarify the seniority list putting Ayub ‘NEXT below Maj. General Iftikhar Khan, and next above Major General Nasir Ali Khan’.  This clearly shows that while Iftikhar was junior as far commission date is concerned but when he was promoted Major General, Ayub was Brigadier with only local Major General rank thus making him junior to Iftikhar.  Pataudi was a friend of C-in-C General Frank Messervy and both played polo together.  Pataudi states that in early 1948, when he was serving under Iftikhar at Lahore, Ayub on his way to East Pakistan passed a note to him ‘been superseded.  Can you do something’?  Pataudi went to Rawalpindi and met Frank Messervy and gently raised the subject.  Messervy replied that selection of right officers at this stage was crucial as they will lead the army when British officers are gone.

After the death of Iftikhar, selection of C-in-C came up again.  The decision was finalized sometime in September 1950 when General Douglas Gracey was C-in-C.  Syed Wajahat Hussain (later Major General) served as ADC to General Gracey in 1947-48 at the rank of Lieutenant.  In 1956, he visited England and stayed with General Gracey.  Wajahat states that Gracey told him that after the death of Iftikhar in plane crash, the choice of C-in-C was narrowed down to Ayub, Raza and Nasir Ali Khan.  According to Gracey, Ayub was picked because of his command experience compared to Raza and Nasir although Gracey was worried about Ayub’s political ambitions.  Raza was commissioned in 1/7 Rajput Regiment and later commanded 6/7 Rajput and 18/7 Rajput battalions.  Raza was the first Pakistani Adjutant General (AG).  Nasir was also commissioned in 7th Rajput Regiment and commanded 9/7 Rajput.  He was the first Pakistani Military Secretary (MS), Quarter Master General (QMG) and Chief of Staff (COS) of Pakistan army.  Nasir spent all post independence time at staff positions and didn’t command a Brigade or Division.  Nasir was not particular about military decorum and this may have also gone against him.  In summer, sometimes he was seen wearing sandals without socks with his military uniform.  In a British trained army, I’m sure this attitude would have horrified not only British but many Pakistani officers.

Gracey’s remark about Raza’s lack of command experience is curious as he commanded 12 Division.  12 Division was raised in Peshawar in November 1948 by Major General Mohammad Yusuf who commanded it until December 1949 (Division was later moved to Batrasi and finally to Murree).  Yusuf was succeeded in command by Raza.  Major General A. O. Mitha confirms that in his memoirs.  He served under Raza when he was Commanding Officer (CO) of 9/8 Punjab Regiment and his battalion was defense battalion of the division at Batrasi.  When decision about C-in-C was made in summer of 1950, Raza was in command of the division for about six months and this may have not been thought as adequate.  One possibility is that Gracey was referring to mid 1949 time period during consideration for C-in-C position when Iftikhar was chosen as at that time Raza had not yet commanded a division.  Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan had a favorable view of Raza as Raza’s father was Liaqat’s friend but probably recommendation of General Gracey and favorable input by Secretary of Defence Sikandar Mirza tilted the balance in Ayub’s favor.  Sikandar Mirza was Secretary Defence and he weighed in Ayub’s favor.  Mirza had spent his long career in Indian Political Service (IPS) on North West Frontier and familiar with the byzantine intrigues.  He contacted the head of nascent Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Colonel (later Major General) Shahid Hamid and asked him to generate an adverse intelligence report about Raza with the intention of getting him out of the race for C-in-C.  Shahid refused to oblige.

The command of 14th Division needs some elaboration.  At the time of partition, the command in East Pakistan was designated East Pakistan Army.  Ironically, this grand title was given to a formation that consisted of a single infantry battalion; 8/12 Frontier Force Regiment.  When Ayub assumed command in January 1948, it was called East Pakistan Sub Area and consisted of only two infantry battalions (8/12 Frontier Force Regiment and 2/8 Punjab Regiment).  In December 1948, sub area was designated 14th Division and although its command played a major role in the decision of  Ayub’s appointment as first C-in-C, technically Ayub’s command consisted of only two infantry battalions.

In September 1950, it was decided that Ayub would be next C-in-C.  He was appointed Deputy C-in-C under Gracey to groom him for the top job.  He visited military installations in England and Germany.  He took charge on January 17, 1951.  Lieutenant General Ross McKay was appointed his advisor.  Ayub’s appointment as first C-in-C has been criticized by many with the hindsight.  This criticism is invariably in the context of Ayub’s coup and long tenure as President with the assumption that another army chief was not likely to launch the coup.

The issue of seniority and a bad report in Second World War is cited against Ayub.  As far as seniority is concerned regarding three contenders; Raza, Ayub and Nasir, Raza was senior and Nasir and Ayub from the same course although Nasir was put junior to Ayub in army list.  In the argument against Ayub’s professionalism a bad report is cited which is probably ‘tactical timidity’ during Second World War in 1945 by his commander Major General Thomas Wynford ‘Pete’ Rees (Served with 1/3 Madras during First World War, long stint with 5/6 Rajputana Rifles and commanded 3/6 Rajputana Rifles).  Rees was commanding 19th Division in Burma.  Ayub was serving with First Assam Regiment as second in command (2IC) at the rank of Major.  First Assam was a divisional support unit under direct command of Rees.  On January 10, 1945, Commanding Officer (CO) of First Assam Lieutenant Colonel W. F. Brown was killed and Ayub Khan assumed command.  Ayub was removed from the command by Rees when Ayub suggested that battalion was not fit for the assigned task.  Rees considered this as tactical timidity and removed Ayub from command.  On March 07 (some accounts give the date of March 15) 1945 Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Parsons took command from Ayub.  Parsons was originally from 5/6thGurkha Rifles and had served with First Assam in the past.  Ayub stayed in the tent of Risaldar/Honorary Captain Ashraf Khan of Hazara until his departure to India on April 18.

All evidence suggests that Ayub got a bad report during his command of First Assam Regiment although exact nature is not clear.  Pataudi states that Ayub discussed this with him when he was working with him in Waziristan.  Pataudi also claims that he had seen this report when he was in Delhi.  Pataudi opted for Pakistan and came to Pakistan in October 1947.  While in Delhi, he was given access to files of Muslim officers opting for Pakistan as he was designated Deputy Military Secretary of Pakistan army.   In October 1958, British High Commissioner Sir Gilbert Laithwaite pointed to this in his report about Ayub.  Laithwaite wrote, ‘he was according to our records, a failure as a Commanding Officer (Lieutenant Colonel) on active service and had to be relieved’.  Ayub survived the bad report of Rees and later re-raised and commanded his parent battalion 1/14 Punjab Regiment (now 5 Punjab of Pakistan Army).  Later, he served as President of Army Selection Board tasked with recommending permanent commission to Emergency Commissioned Officers (ECOs).  Some suggest that Ayub had this negative report removed from his file when he became C-in-C.  Shuja Nawaz who was given access to Ayub’s file communicated to me that he does not recall seeing Rees’s report in the file.  Pete Rees and Ayub’s paths crossed again when Rees was commanding Punjab Boundary Force (PBF) and Ayub served under him.  Ayub Khan was one of the advisors to Reese at Colonel rank.  It is not clear whether two had any problems in view of their previous unpleasant encounter.  PBF was severely criticized by Punjab politicians for failure to control law and order.  PBF story is another neglected chapter of subcontinent history and very little has been written about it.   I have done some work on the subject and in my view it is quite unfair to criticize PBF or Ayub for the tragedy that was a chapter from Dante’s inferno.  I think this left a deep mark on Ayub and his extreme distrust of politicians.

Some suggest that country’s founder Jinnah was not in favor of Ayub which is probably not correct.  In October 1947, Ayub was Brigadier and commanding Gardai Brigade Group in Waziristan area command.  If the assertion that Mr. Jinnah was not happy with Ayub is true then it does not make sense that Ayub is promoted Brigadier against Mr. Jinnah’s wishes and given the task of execution of Operation Curzon; withdrawal of troops from tribal areas.   Similarly, Ayub was promoted Major General in January 1948 and posted to East Pakistan when Mr. Jinnah was very well in full control of all affairs.  In Pakistan, there is a wrong perception that Operation Curzon was the brainchild of Jinnah.  By 1946, it was clear that British were leaving and British high command had put in place a plan for removal of regular troops from tribal areas.  This decision was reached before the Cabinet Mission plan when even partition of India was not envisaged.  On April 24, 1946, a conference was held at Peshawar.  It was attended by Governor North West Frontier Province George Cunningham, Agent to Governor General Baluchistan, Air Officer Commander-in-Chief (AOC-in-C), British minister at Kabul, C-in-C General Claude Aukinleck and senior military and civil officers.  It was realized that the status of tribes will be uncertain until the outcome of Cabinet Mission plan.  The decision was made that regular troops will be replaced by civil armed forces although the process was to be gradual.  It was in this context that decisions such as Indianization of officer Corps of Scouts, raising of Central Waziristan Scouts, Malakand battalion and re-raising of Khyber Rifles was discussed.  Gardai brigade was the first to be withdrawn and replaced by local tribal levies; Khassadars. Once Civil Armed Forces were properly organized and equipped then Wana and Razmak brigades withdrawn.  Events of sub-continent moved much faster with impending independence of India, emergence of Pakistan and massive migration and slaughter put this issue on the back burner. It is to Jinnah’s credit that he made the decision quickly and swiftly implemented the plan.  The caveat is that by that time tribesmen had been directed by Pakistan to greener pastures of Jammu & Kashmir during 1947-48 conflict.

Ayub Khan was an average officer not different from many of his contemporaries.  He was trained as a regimental officer and he was neither trained nor did he strive to learn the higher direction of war.  His reading was limited to Readers Digest type of publications and Philip Mason’s Men Who Ruled India.  He was not known for reading classic or modern military works on history or art of war.  This was the reason that Lieutenant General Ross McKay was appointed his advisor.  Ayub was mild mannered and humble.  He was handsome with an impressive personality and very pleasant.  This endeared him to many international leaders.

Ninety percent of officers of Indian army both British and Indian were groomed for regimental service.  Selection and training of Indian officers during Indianization of officer corps was focused on basic regimental training.  It was envisioned that probably the highest rank an Indian could achieve was command of a battalion.  Second World War opened the door wide open and large numbers of Indians were commissioned.  War also resulted in accelerated promotions and several Indians commanded battalions.  After the war, when it was clear that British Raj would come to an end, then the question of promoting Indians to senior ranks was seriously discussed.  In 1947, only a handful of Indians were at colonel and brigadier ranks. Indian subcontinent went through cataclysmic changes with emergence of new states.  It had an impact on all institutions including army.  In these extraordinary circumstances, officers were given accelerated promotions and first Pakistani C-in-C was selected in these exceptional circumstances.  What else describes the anomalies of that time period than the fact that first Indian C-in-C jumped six ranks from Major to four stars General in six years while first Pakistani C-in-C accomplished this feat in five short years?


–        Major General ® Shaukat Raza.  The Pakistan Army 1947-49 (Lahore: Services Book Club, 1989)

–        Shuja Nawaz.   Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008)

–        Major General Sher Ali Khan Pataudi.  The Story of Soldering and Politics in India and Pakistan (Lahore: Wajidalis, 1978)

–        Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan.  Friends Not Masters (London: Oxford University Press, 1967)

–        Interview of Major General ® Syed Wajahat Hussain by Major ® Agha H. Amin, Defence Journal, August 2002

–        Lieutenant Colonel Mustasad Ahmad.  Living Up To Heritage: The Rajputs 1947-1970 (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1997)

–        Major General Shahid Hamid.  Disastrous Twilight (London: Leo Cooper, 1986)

–        Lt. Colonel ® Gautam Sharma.  Nationalization of The Indian Army 1885-1947 (New Delhi: Allied Pubslishers, 1996)

–        Brigadier Francis Ingall.  The Last of the Bengal Lancers (California: Presidio, 1988)

–        Pradeep P. Barua.  Gentlemen of the Raj: Indian Army Officer Corps 1817-1949 (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2008 Indian Edition)

–        Major General S. Shahid Hamid.  Early Years of Pakistan (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1993)

–        Major General A. O. Mitha.  Unlikely Beginnings: A Soldier’s Life (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003)

Hamid Hussain

February 13, 2014

The following comment is from Major Agha Amin, (from his website here)
Dear Dr Hamid Hussain

you have simply left out joginder singh who stated that ayub khan was in chamar regiment ? joginder was his unit officer and mentioned this incident in his book behind the scenes

Shuja Nawaz had a vested interest as his brother Asif Nawaz was from Ayub Khans unit.

Also note that Shuja Nawaz in his work referred by you as encycolpedic distorted history and elevated his fatherin laws brother abdul ali malik as main hero of Chawinda while Shaukat Rizas official account maintains that Abdul Ali Malik was indecisive and just implored commanding officer 25 Cavalry “Nisar do something”

Problem is that in biased pakistan army hero had to be from between rivers indus and chenab ! Thus all Nishan i Haidars were awarded to people from this region as most generals were from this area.

I interviewed Major General Tajammul Hussain Malik in 2001 and he stated that Major Aziz Bhattis Nishan i Haidar award was not based on merit.

Even in Battle of Sulaimanke 6 FF Pashtun officer Farooq Afzal or Saeed Afzal was ignored.

I dont think that Nishan i Haidar could have been awarded to Karnal Sher and Lalak both non Punjabis if Pakistan Army had a non Punjabi Chief.

Even General Musharraf acknowledged General Kakars extreme parochialism in his book.

General Khwaja Ziauddin told me that on Asif Nawazs death Kakar requested General Ali Kuli to fly to Pindi to convince his relative President Ghulam Ishaq to appoint Kakar Chief.So Kakar was trying to reward his benefactor Ali Kuli.

It is same General Kakar who as per General Ameer Hamza was thrashed by Major Rasheed Warraich at Sulaimanke.

I remember Kakar was so unpopular for illegally stopping armys election allowance of 1993 elections that he was literally hooted by troops in Darbar held at Fortress stadium .I was on leave and went to this darbar to give company to a friend.

Brigadier Nisar main hero of 1965 war was just ignored by promotion boards as he was from Patiala (Pashtun descent) and not from main Punjabi belt.

It is same Nisar who was praised by Indians for his outstanding performance as commander of Changez Force in 1971.

You see Psc and afwc business came only in 1976 when MG Abdullah Saeed (6 FF) GOC 33 Division asked my father to write a paper and in that analysis it was discovered that most serving generals were non Psc or non afwc.Nisar was bypassed long before that time when Psc or afwc became compulsory.

Frankly much of what is going on in Pakistan is a farce.Pakistan seems to exist only between Indian border and Indus river !

In retrospect one may state that partition of 1947 was a failure .Punjabi Hindus regarded as exploiters were replaced by Lahore Gujranwala Faisalabad Sargodha and Pindi Divisions with some Pashtun low caste Khattak Kammis and Hindko Kakar clowns.LTC Feroz , 33 FF my squash partner in Okara in 1993 recounted that kakar counted cherries of his garden as corps commander and suspected that 33 FF guard was pinching the official residences gardens cherries ?

A Trip to Pakistan

A heartfelt post consisting only of pictures and Urdu verses from Dr Hamid Hussain (about his latest trip to Pakistan). 
My recent trip to Pakistan was in the aftermath of the December tragedy in Peshawar.  More painful at personal level as it is my hometown but I and many had no illusions and though hoping against all hopes that this may be the last whole sale slaughter but we knew in our hearts that this is not yet the drop scene of the horror movie.  Surely, the ever enterprising militants showed up again and mowed down several Shia praying in a mosque in Hayatabad where brother and cousins of a very dear friend narrowly escaped death.   During my trip, many in different cities in Pakistan were kind enough to share their fears, anger and hopes with me and I’m thankful.  Sometimes few short verses give more meaning to feelings than lengthy explanations but off course it is only for Urdu readers. 
November 2009. Over ninety People killed in bombing of a crowded bazaar in Peshawar.
زمیں سے آیے ھیں یا آسماں سے آیے ھیں
عزاب شھر پہ جانے کھاں سے آیے ھیں

Fazlullah: Leader of Pakistani Taliban.
حکم دے رکھا ھے شھروں کی تباھی کے لیے
کوی قانون نھیں ضل الھی کے لیے
Taliban Leaders
لوگ ٹوٹ جاتے ھیں ایک گھر بنانے میں
تم ترس نھیں کھاتے بستیاں جلٓانے میں
December 2014.  Pictures of some of the children killed in an attack on a school in Peshawar. 133 children and 16 members of school staff were killed.
کب اٹھاے گا خدا حشر خدا ھی جانے
آدمی روز یھاں حشر اٹھا دیتا ھے
December 2014.  Family members mourning one of the victims of the school attack in Peshawar.
اک صف ماتم بچھی ھے کوچہ و بٓازار میں
نوحہ خوانی ھو رھی ھے قصہ خوانی کی جگہ
December 2014.  Pakistani political leaders at a meeting after the tragedy of Peshawar.
وہ سبھی لوگ معاون تھے میرے قاتل کے
جن کو منصف نے بلایا ھے گواھی کے لیے
Leaders of religious parties of Pakistan.
بشر مجبور اھل  مصلحت پر رحم آتا ھے
کے يے بیمار ذھنوں کو بھی چارہ گر بتاتے ھیں
November 2014.  Civilians killed in a suicide attack in Paktika Province in Afghanistan and laments by Afghans as well as many pakistanis questioning pakistan’s support for some Afghan militants.  For a decade they had been warning, pleading and begging Pakistan.
وہ دھشتوں کو ھوا دے رھا ھے بستی میں
اسے بتٓاو یے تمھید ھے اجڑنے کی
March 2013.  A mob destroys 150 houses of Christian minority in Lahore
رحمت سید لولاک پہ کامل ایماں
امت سید لولاک سے خوف آتا ھے
May 2010. Ninety four Ahmadis killed in attack on their mosque in Lahore.  Members of the community standing over freshly dug graves with names of the deceased in their hands.
<p>Members of the Ahmadi Muslim community hold the names of victims as they stand over their graves in Chenab Nagar, in Punjab's Chiniot District, on May 29, 2010.</p>
دل ھي تھے ھم دکھے ھوے تم نے  دکھا لیٓا تو کٰیا
خود بھی تو  بے اماں ھوے ھم کو ستا لیا   تو کٰیا
February 2013. Preparation of graves of Hazara Shia killed in Quetta.
ھمی کو قاتل کھے گی دنیا ھمارا ھی قتل عام ھو گا
ھمیں کنویئں کھودتے پھریں گے ھمیں پے پانی حرام ھو گا
 September 2008.  Marriott Hotel bombing in Islamabad, killing over 60 people.
کتنے خوش طبع ھیں إس شھردل آذار کے لوگ
موج خوں سر سے گزر جاتی ھے تب پوچھتے ھیں
Karachi: A city held hostage by political, ethnic, sectarian & criminal mafias.
ھجرت کے چراغوں سے سجا رکھا تا جس کو
اس شھر کراچی میں تماشا بھی ھمیں ھیں
Baluch Rebels
ھم کسی اور کے ھو جائییں تو حیرت کیسی
تم نے جو زخم دئے ھیں انھیں بھرنا بھی تو ھے
Leaders of religious parties of Pakistan.
کسے سجدہ کرو آخر کسے أپنا خدا ماںو
کے ھر پتھر یھی کھتا ھے مجھ کو دیوتا ماںو
February 2013.  Pakistan Army Chief General Raheel Sharif chairing Corps Commander’s conference.
جو اندھیرا میری تقدیر نے پھیلایا ھے
إس میں شامل تیری زلفوں کی گٹھا بھی کچھ ھے
PTI Leadership standing with Mr. Munawar Hassan and Mr. Shaikh Rashid
میں چلںے سے
تو بڑھتے ھیں
فاصلے نھیں  گٹھتے
آرزوئیں جلتی ھیں
منزلیں تمنا کی ساتھ
  ساتھ چلتی ھیں
صبح دم ستاروں کی تیز جھلملاھٹ کو
روشںی کی آمد کا پیش باب کھتے ھیں
إک کرن جو ملتی ھے آفتاب  کھتے ھیں
دائرہ بدلنے کو
انقلاب کھتے ھیں
Family member holding picture of one of the victims of Peshawar school attack.*
ھزار دکھ مجھے دینا مگر خیال رھے
مرے خدایا مرا حوصلہ بحال رھے
August 2013.  Coffins of police officers killed in attack when they were attending the funeral of a fellow officer in Quetta.
Image result for attack on the funeral prayer of police officers quetta
ھوا کے ظلم سے بجھنا قبول ھے لیکن
ھوا کے حکم سے جلنا ھمیں قبول نھیں
یار مقتل سے بہر حال گزرنا ہو گا
بچ گۓ ہم تو کسی اور کو مرنا ہو گا
ٹال دینے سے کہاں مسئلہ حل ہوتا ہے
اک نہ اک دن تو کوئ فیصلۂ کرنا ہو گا
اگلی نسلوں کو تباہی سے بچانے کے لۂے
جو بھی کرنا ھے اسی نسل کو کرنا ہو گا
Indian school children holding candles in memory of school children killed in attack in Pesahwar.
محبت ایسا دریا ھے
کے بارش روٹھ بھی جائے
تو پانی کم نھیں ھو تا

End of the Muslim Brotherhood

This is an old post and I would probably change some things now (and in fact, will change some things soon once I do a new post) But this was lost when the old Brownpundits crashed and I wanted to recover it. So here it is
Posted on October 7, 2013 by omar

Hussein Ibish has written an article on the decline and (impending?) fall of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Reports of their death may be exaggerated, but surely the “Islamist political party” project is not doing well in most places. Turkey will be cited as an immediate counter-example, but I think AKP just hasn’t had the chance to really become too “Islamic” yet. If and when they do (and pressure to do so is bound to come from within, unless the project falls apart so badly in the middle east that Turkey gets away without trying it), they will find themselves in trouble as well.

The problem (in over-simplified form):

Modern states and modern politics (not just all the complex debates about how power should be exercised, who exercises it, who decides who exercises it, the theories around it; but also the actual institutions and mechanisms that evolved) arose first and foremost in Europe. There are surely things about that evolution that are contingent and could have been different elsewhere, but there are also many very fundamental features of modern life (modern levels of knowledge, modern industry and organization, modern understanding of human biology, psychology, sociology etc) that will still hold no matter where they develop on this planet. This is an extremely dense and imposing edifice. You cannot reject it and be modern in ways most people do seem to want to be modern (I have NEVER met an Islamist who did not want an air-force). Some non-western countries have already managed that knowledge transfer (e.g. Japan, South Korea), others are getting there (China), others hope to get there someday (India?) but Muslims are notable for wanting to get there while remaining medieval in terms of theology, law and politics. And not just at the fringes. Fringes are fringes everywhere. But in the Islamicate world, this dream is mainstream.

Why? maybe because while no serious theory of politics developed in Islamicate religious thought (Ibn Khaldun is not religious literature), some dreams/fantasies of an idealized “Islamic state” were allowed to percolate. The deal was that the ulama would throw this dream around at each other and leave actual ruling to the rulers (who in practice were always and everywhere guided by existing Byzantine, Persian and Central Asian models and by “mirrors for princes” kind of literature, not by the dreamworld of the “rightly guided caliphs”). Every Islamicate empire down to the late Ottomans ruled in the name of Islam, but they did so using institutions and methods that were typically West-Asian/Central-Asian in origin. And then the Europeans took off (literally by 1903 but earlier metaphorically) and that whole world crashed and burned.

And out of this wreckage, somebody dug up the old stories of the rightly guided caliphs; It seems to me that early fantasists (like Allama Iqbal) took it for granted that a lot of this is just propaganda and we all need propaganda, so “ek hi suf mein khaRey ho gaey Mahmood o Ayaz” (a famous verse of Iqbal, describing how Sultan Mahmood and his “slave” Ayaz could pray in one row; the wonders of Islam, that sort of thing) but they fully expected reality to be much closer to London than it was to Medina (witness his approval of the Grand Turkish assembly). To them, it was more like Chinese or Japanese reformers creating their own version of what worked and getting out from under the imperialist thumb. I am sure Iqbal did not expect to be the leading poet of the Pakistani Taliban! But over time, stories frequently repeated can come to be seen as the truth. Islamist parties want to create powerful, modern Islamic states. But the stories they are using are more Islamic than modern. Far more so than the early reformers perhaps realized. The result is that every party is all the time in danger of becoming hostage to those espousing primitive notions of Shariah law and medieval political ideas. It turns out that pretending to have “our own unique genius” was much easier than actually having any genius that could get the job done. Human nature being what it is, the easy path was taken.

A small role was also played by well-meaning Western supporters, who wished to help the “lesser races” out of their misery and raise their “self-esteem”, and piled it on thick. With validation coming from Westerners, some in the Westoxicated Muslim elites had little difficulty believing “our indigenous tradition, our glorious heritage” and so on.

And last but not the least, some of the brightest minds of our generation chose to be ruined by postcolonialism instead of opting for more wholesome pursuits like sex, drugs and rock and roll. Today, the Leftist intelligentsia (otherwise the natural opponents of the Islamist parties) in Muslim countries is so heavily contaminated with Western academic claptrap that some can be found cheering on the Islamists as signs of welcome “resistance to the dominant narrative”. OK, maybe this is not true of Arab countries, I dont know. It seems to be prevalent in a certain Western educated, upper-class Pakistani and Indian context though.

The results do not look pleasant.

PS: On Islamicate empires, my background view:

Islamicate empires (the dominant form of political organization in the middle east and South Asia since the advent of Islam) had a near-total separation religion and state. The empires were run as West Asian empires, mostly (almost totally) an evolution of previous imperial patterns in that region. The religion evolved within these empires, but had practically nothing to say about politics. Religion was part and parcel OF the empires, but religious doctrine provided practically NO guidance to the political process. The political process used religion but was neither derived from it, nor bound by it .

Islamic theology accepted practically ANY ruler as long the rulers were Muslims. An imaginary idealized Islamic state was discussed at times but had little to no connection with actual power politics, contemporary OR past.

Empires governed loosely and interfered little with the everyday religious rituals of the ruled, especially outside the urban core. The rulers were interested in collecting taxes and continuing to rule. Most of the ruled gave as little as possible in taxes and had as little as possible to do with their rulers. This is not a specifically Islamic pattern, but it was almost universal in Islamicate empires.

As a result, Muslim religious literature developed no serious political thought. “mirrors of princes” and pre-Muslim (or not-specifically Muslim) traditions guided actual politics, not some notion of “Islamic state”.

PPS: some misconceptions are coming up repeatedly:

1. That I am referring to ALL muslims. Not so. I am talking about Islamist parties, which are NOT a majority in most Muslim countries, but are mainstream in most. There is also the matter of the Islamist parties getting a certain authenticity cachet in the eyes of Western observers looking for “Muslim representatives” in the multiculturalist universe.

2. That this is about whether the Egyptian military or the Morroccan king are making X or Y correct choice. No, its not about them. Its a broader generalization; the MODE of failure may vary. But failure of the Islamist political project is inevitable…not because there can be no such project in principle, but because the project as it has actually developed in the 20th century is based on the twin illusions of “the ideal Islamic state” and “Islamic political science”…neither of which actually existed in history.

The signs when you become white

(1.) you actually start becoming punctual

(2.) your schedule runs months into advance
(3.) you stop socialising nearly as much
(4.) you start saying Christ inadvertently
(5.) when you and your other half are the only dark-haired (let alone dark-skinned) people in the room
(6.) your friends are based on shared hobbies
(7.) your social calendar revolves around societies
(8.) you would never dream to drop into other people’s homes as you used to
(9.) seeing people once a year is more than enough to sustain a friendship
(10.) Christmas becomes a BIG thing and you start thinking about bona fide Easter Eggs lol.
Bonus 11:
(11.) your ethnic identity becomes a very valuable tool to differentiate yourself from the white bread upper middle class, who are very homogenous & metropolitan at times.

Is Islam a Religion of the Book?

Razib put up an interesting post on this topic on his blog . I think his point is that no religion is a “religion of the book”. People make the religion and they remake it as time demands. Messily and unpredictably in many cases, but still, it moves. And in this sense, Islam is no more fixed in stone by what is written or not written in it’s text (or texts) than any other religion.

Someone then commented (and I urge you to read the post and the comments, and the hyperlinks, they are all relevant and make this post clearer) as follows:

“Well, if you take the Old Testament and Koran at face value, the OT is more violent. The interesting question is then why Islam ends up being more violent than Judaism or Christianity, and for that I agree you have to thank subsequent tradition and reinterpretation of the violence in the text. It appears that for whatever reason Islam has carried out less of this kind of reinterpretation, so what was originally a less violent founding text ends up causing more violence because it is being interpreted much more literally.”

I replied there, and then thought I would put that reply up as a new post here because I want to see what people think of this quick and off-the-cuff comment. THEN, I can maybe improve it in a final new post this weekend. So, without further ado, my comment:

There is an easier explanation. Islam the religion we know today (classical Islam of the four Sunni schools and it’s Shia counterparts) developed in the womb of the Arab empire. It is evident that it provided a unifying ideology and a theological justification for that empire (and in the case of various Shia sects, varying degrees of resistance or revolt against that empire), but at the very least, they grew and formed together; one was not the later product of the fully formed other. Being the religion of a (very successful and impressive) imperialist project, it’s “official” mature Sunni version obviously has a military-supremacist feel to it.

Whether the text canonized as “foundational document” does or does not fully explain the imperialism and supremacism is a red herring. The Quran is a fairly long book, but to an outsider it should be immediately obvious that you can create MANY different Islams around that book and if you did it all over again, NONE of them have to look like classical Sunni Islam. The details of Sunni Islam (who gets to rule, what daily life is supposed to look like, how non-Muslims should be treated, etc) are not some sort of direct and unambiguous reading of the Quran. Even the 5 daily prayers are not specified in the Quran. The schools of classical Sunni Islam are supposedly based on the Quran and hadith, but the Quran and the hadiths are clearly cherry picked and manipulated (and in the case of the hadiths, frequently just invented) based on the perceived needs of the empire, the ulama, the individual commentators, human nature, economics, whatever (insert favorite element here).
So in principle, we should be able to make new Islams as needed (and some of us have indeed done so over the centuries…the Ismailis being one extreme example) and I am sure many of us will do that in the days to come as well. The Reza Aslan types are right about that (though i seriously doubt that HE can make anything lasting). In fact, in terms of practice, millions of Muslims have already “invented new Islams”. Just as a random example, most contemporary Muslims do not have concubines and do not buy and sell slaves (and find the thought of doing so shocking). They take oaths of loyalty to all sorts of “un-Islamic” states and most of them turn out to be loyal at least to the same degree as their other fellow citizens of various hedonistic modern states. And so on and so forth.
What sets them apart is their inability (until now) to publicly and comfortably articulate a theological framework that rejects medieval (aka no longer fashionable) elements of classical Sunni Islam. And this is especially a problem in Muslim majority countries. What stops them? I think apostasy and blasphemy laws (and the broader memes that uphold those laws) play a big role. King Hussein or Benazir Bhutto or even Rouhani may have private thoughts about changing X or Y inconvenient parts, but to speak up would be to invite accusations of blasphemy and apostasy. So they fudge and do one thing while paying lip service to another. Unfortunately, this means the upholders of classical Islam (and ISIS and the Wahabis are not as far from the mainstream Sunni Ulama in theory as is sometimes portrayed, though clearly they are pretty far in practice) have the edge in debates in the public sphere. This IS a serious problem. But the internet has made it very hard to keep inconvenient thoughts out of view. So there will be much churning. Eventually, some countries will emerge out of it better than others.
ISIS itself will not. Of course, in principle, anything is possible. But we can still make predictions based on whatever model we have in our head. Like most predictions in social science and history, they will not be mathematical and precise and our confidence in them (or our ability to convince others, even when others accept most of our premises) will not be akin to the predictions of mathematics or physics. But for whatever it’s worth, I don’t think ISIS will settle into some semi-comfortable equilibrium. They will only destory and create chaos. And eventually they will be destroyed, though it is possible (maybe even likely) that large parts of Syria, Iraq and North Africa could become like Somalia. Too messy, too violent and too poor to be worth the effort of colonizing even by intact nearby states. But probably not forever. The real estate is too valuable and eventually someone will bring order to it. Probably using more force and cruder methods than liberal modern intellectuals are comfortable with.

Indian Troops in East Africa

As usual, a post from Hamid Hussein, this time about the British Indian army in East Africa, with some comments about “all Muslim regiments’ and neo-orientalist claptrap about the Pakhtoons and the British. Enjoy. 
Major ® Agha H. Amin; an authority on history of subcontinent armies sent a reminder about 129th Baluchistan Infantry in E. Africa.  Few questions about Indian soldiers in E. Africa in Great War as well as some ancillary long forgotten aspects of military archeology came my way and following was the outcome.  Only for those interested in military history of the region.
Indian Soldiers in East Africa in Great War
“We are too much inclined to think of war as a matter of combats, demanding above all things physical courage.  It is really a matter of fasting and thirsting; of toiling and waking; of lacking and enduring; which demands above all things moral courage”.   Sir John Fortescue
East Africa is a forgotten chapter of Great War.  Several Indian battalions served in East Africa.  British East Africa is now Kenya and German East Africa is now Tanzania, Rawanda and Burundi.  German army in East Africa was calledSchutztruppe.  Indian Expeditionary Force (IEF) – C commanded by Brigadier ‘Jimmie’ Stewart arrived in September 1914.  This force was predominantly from state forces with about half battalion strength each from Rampur, Kapurthala, Bharatpur and Jind state forces.  Only one regular Indian battalion 29th Punjabis was part of the force.  Indian Expeditionary Force (IEF) – B under the command of Major General Aitken consisted of 27th Bangalore Brigade (2ndLancashire, 101st Grenadiers, 98th Infantry and 63rd Palamcottah Light Infantry – four companies of Madrassi Muslims, two Tamils and two Christian Madrassi companies) and Imperial Service Brigade (Gwalior Rifles, 2nd and 3rd Kashmir Rifles).  This was followed by battalions re-deployed from European and Egyptian theatres as well as.  As usual unsung heroes of the theatre are pioneers, railway volunteers and sappers and miners who were superb in the most trying conditions.

 In general, troops deployed from European theatres had performed well but suffered horrendous casualties and turnover of recruits and officers was very rapid.  The role of state forces was essentially ceremonial and they were neither armed nor trained for war.  Each state contingent was different from other and they had never even paraded together let alone trained for any significant military maneuver.  Most of the area was unmapped but Indian units didn’t get maps where they were available.  During the whole campaign, troops were on half ration.  Harsh weather, terrain, mosquitoes, flies, fleas, fever, malaria, dysentery and man eaters and alligators took more toll on all soldiers than enemy’s bullets.  Despite all these difficulties, Indian soldiers performed very well and discipline of Indian troops was exemplary.  Discipline of Indian troops was much superior to others especially South African soldiers when a number of times they were busy looting the towns. 
Most of white troops went out of action due to disease.  British political officers proved to be superior in linking up with local communities and raising African infantry.  New battalions of King’s African Rifles (KAR), Hausa Regiments and a Nigerian Brigade were now effective British force commanded by Brigadier F. H. Cunliffe in addition to Indian troops.  Germans lost about one third of their force to sickness but still had about 14,000 natives and 2000 European soldiers.  Local African soldiers called Askaris trained and led by German officers also performed very well.   
Disproportionately, large number of Pathans in different units served in E. Africa.  Having said all this, it should be remembered that Indians made only a very small part of the force operating in E. Africa and majority of troops of all arms were South African (infantry, cavalry and artillery).  South Africans had initially a very low opinion of Indian troops referring to them as ‘coolies’ but after seeing them in action had great respect for them.  Union Jack flying over Kibata belonged to 1/2 KAR and was a frequent target of German soldiers and gunners. After the battle 1/2 KAR presented this flag to 129th Baluchistan Infantry. 
129th Duke of Connaught’s Own (DCO) Baluchistan Infantry (now 11 Baloch of Pakistan army): This battalion came to East Africa from the killing fields of France.  This battalion has the distinction of being first in two aspects; first British officer casualty of Great War (Captain Vincent) and first Indian winner of Victoria Cross Sepoy Khudadad Khan). It narrowly missed being first Indian battalion to lock horns with Germans when their comrade of 57th Wilde’s Rifles became first Indians to fire at Germans. 
On the eve of Great War, infantry battalions were organized as four double companies (total 8 companies).  It was an all Muslim battalion and had six Pathan companies – all trans-frontier (three Mahsud, one Mohmand and two Afridis; Adam Khel Jowaki) and two Punjabi Muslim companies.  One double company of 127th Queen Mary’s Own Baluchistan Infantry was attached to bring up the battalion to war establishment (desertion of trans-frontier Pathans from some regiments resulted in discontinuation of their recruitment.  This is a whole separate subject and I have been working on it for some time so I may dwell on it sometime in future). Battalion suffered heavy casualties in France with repeated replenishments from sister as well as other battalions (Mahsud and Wazir Pathans from 124th Duchess of Connaught’s Own Baluchistan Infantry, Orakzai Pathans and Baluchis of 127th Baluchistan Infantry).  Only 4 British and 5 Indian officers and less than two dozen sepoys of original contingent were unhurt after a year of service in France.  It left for E. Africa under the command of Lt. Colonel H. Hulseberg DSO of 127th Baluchistan Infantry and spent one year in E. Africa (January 1916 – January 1917). 
Indian component of Ist East African Division consisted of 129th Baluchistan Infantry and 29th Punjabis (they were part of 2nd East African Brigade.  Later 40th Pathans joined the brigade).  Later, in a battle when CO of 29th Punjabis Lt. Colonel H. A. Vallings was killed and Adjutant wounded, soldiers were lost.  Later 30 soldiers of 29th Punjabis were court martialled for leaving battle with self inflicting hand wounds. 
From 1914 to 1918, four and a half thousand men of honor served the battalion’s colors with over three thousand and five hundred casualties.  Many lie buried in hallowed grounds all over the globe.  Many indomitable men of the battalion belonging to different ethnicities like Subedar Kambir Khan; a Baluch, Subedar Sarbiland; a Pathan and Jamadar Fateh Haider; a Punjabi Muslim and long list of Indian Order of Merit (IOM) winners are now just names on the forgotten pages of history.  Naik Alim Khan (127th attached) during a scouting patrol spotted a five men German picket and this superb marksman killed four of them and the fifth survived only by fleeing.  The ultimate compliment a regiment can get is what its adversary thinks about the soldiers.  German Commander Lettow-Vorbeck said about the regiment that “… the 129th Baluchis …..  Were without a doubt very good”.  A memorial in memory of contributions of all Baluchistan Infantry regiments in first world war at Frere Hall in Karachi is a tribute to sacrifices of many such men of honor.
130th King George’s Own Baluchistan Infantry (now 12 Baloch of Pakistan army): The deployment of 130thBaluchistan Infantry in E. Africa is interesting.  At the start of war, when battalion was in Calcutta getting ready to be deployed overseas, a Mahsud sepoy attacked battalion’s second-in-command Major Norman Ruthven Anderson who later died of his wounds.  Battalion was sent to Burma where two Pathan companies mutinied.  200 soldiers were court martialled and two soldiers executed.  British commander in East Africa Major General Richard Wapshare specifically requested deployment of 130th to East Africa.  I’m puzzled by why he specifically asked for the battalion. Battalion received double company of 46th Punjabis and it arrived under the command of Lt. Colonel P. H. Dyke (later Lt. Colonel C. U. Price) in February 1915 to become part of Ist East African Brigade (130th Baluchistan Infantry, 3rd Kings African Rifles, 2nd Loyal Lancashire and 2nd Rhodesia Regiment) commanded by Brigadier Wilfred Malleson of 2ndEast African Division commanded by General Michael Tighe.  Battalion participated in the battle of Latema. 
40th Pathan (now 16 Punjab of Pakistan army):  On the eve of Great War, battalion was in China and arrived in France in April 1915 and fought under Jullundur Brigade.  Battalion was decimated in the killing fields of France in the Second Battle of Ypres losing most of its officers.  It arrived in E. Africa in January 1916 under the command of Lt. Colonel Henry Tendyll.  40th Pathan was originally an all Pathan Muslim battalion (in 1901 the composition was changed with one company Orakzai, half company each of Afridis and Yusufzais, one company of Punjabi Muslims and one company of Dogras). That diluted to some extent the flavor of the original élan as well other naughtiness.  Battalion was nick named ‘Forty Thieves’ as whenever stationed at a cantonment things will mysteriously disappear and CO earned the nick name of ‘Ali Baba’.  Battalion’s marching tune was Pushtu song ‘Zakhmi Dil’ played on dhol andsurnai with strong homosexual connotations.  This song was later adopted by pipe bands of Ist and 2nd Battalions of Seaforth Highlanders.  Any officer commanding 700 young men living together in close quarters has to deal with many naughty souls but Commanding Officer of a battalion with significant number of Pathans had his hands full with many intricate issues such as how to deal with two young sepoys insisting to be put together at night for sentry duty, a young recruit putting a bullet through a randy old Subedar for undue advances or keeping a close tab on home furloughs to make sure that two soldiers with blood feud in their village are not sent home at the same time else one will not return.  
57th Wilde’s Rifles (Now 9 Frontier Force of Pakistan army): This battalion went to France in 1914 with four companies instead of eight.  Class composition was one company each of Sikh, Dogra, Pathan (Afridis) and Punjabi Muslims.  After a year in the killing fields of France, battalion went to Egypt for six months before landing in East Africa in July 1916.  Commanding officer was Lt. Colonel Thomas Willans DSO.  Battalion was part of 2nd East African Brigade.  Pathan Subedar Arsala Khan Afridi winner of MC and IOM in France (already IOM winner in 1908 Mohmand expedition) also served in E. Africa where he was wounded.  He earned an OBI for service in E. Africa and became Subedar Major of the battalion. 
57th landed in E. Africa with 11 British officers, 21 Indian officers and around 850 men.  Merely two months later, only 3 British officers and 180 men were fit for service.  An amazing incident happened here.  No: 2 Pathan company commander was Major James Buller.  During an attack on entrenched German position, he shot at German company commander Lieutenant von Ruckteschel but bullet went through the hat.  Ruckteschel fired back severely wounding Buller.  Buller was captured and sent to German hospital in Dar ul Salam where he was nursed back to health by a kind nurse who was wife of Ruckteschel.  Later, Ruckteschel’s leg was shattered by a shell.  Battalion returned to India in October 1917 leaving behind about 35 comrades buried in E. Africa but were proud owners of the German Imperial flag that flew on Governor’s House of German East Africa.  Another irony of the times is the story of Havaldar Salim Khan.  He survived the killing fields of France, German bullets and shells, malaria, snakes, alligators and man eaters in East Africa, won an IOM for a daring attack on a German machine gun position capturing it but killed by fellow Zakha Khel tribesmen when he was going on his well earned pension in 1921.
One squadron of 17th Cavalry:  This squadron reached E. Africa in February 1915.  17th Cavalry (later in 1922 amalgamated with another all Muslim cavalry regiment 37th Horse to form 15th Lancers) was another all Muslim regiment consisting of two squadrons of trans-frontier Pathans and two squadrons of Punjabi Muslims.  The squadron sent to E. Africa was a composite 120 men Pathan squadron (60 from A and 60 from B Pathan Squadrons) commanded by Major R. C. Barry-Smith.  Indian officers were Risaldar Usman Khan and Risaldar Sajid Gul.  Squadron became orphan when two of the three British officers of the contingent were killed in an ambush until replacements came from India.  Many horses were lost due to harsh climate and horse illness.  After two years, squadron returned to India leaving twenty comrades buried in E. Africa.
Colonel Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck: He was commander of German forces in E. Africa.  There is no doubt that he was head and shoulders above all his British rivals in the theatre.  He was master of planning, logistic details, tactics and almost always one step ahead of his British foes.  For four years, he fought, feigned, disappeared, re-appeared and engaged his rivals in a lengthy retreat and in the process kept a large number of troops under British command entangled.  However, inter-war German writings raised him to a mythical level which is not accurate.  His success was partly due to inept British military leadership in the theatre but then he who takes advantage of foe’s mistakes is the man who wins.  First German victory at Tanga using conventional strategy clouded Lettow-Vorbeck’s judgment and he didn’t change his strategy despite changing circumstances.  He assumed that another victory like Tanga would end the campaign in his favor despite two alternatives offered by his subordinates (Captain Max Wintgens and Captain Heinrich Naumann advised for guerrilla warfare campaign by deep raids which they had successfully applied and Captain Max Looff’s suggestion about positional strategy to take advantage of the terrain and concentrate dwindling German forces in selected areas).  Lettow-Vorbeck continued on his own path that ultimately destroyed his forces and when finally he realized it was too late.  All this however doesn’t diminish his achievements. 
He was student of Chief of German General Staff Graf Alfred von Schlieffen; master of maneuver warfare.  He was banished to remote E. Africa because he was not much liked by General Staff due to his personality as well as his dogmatic adherence to conventional warfare.  The last act of maverick Lettow-Vorbeck during his retreat was another brilliant maneuver surprising the 900 strong Portuguese contingent under Major Pinto on his heels.  He re-crossed the river, made a swift encircling march and after a brief sharp encounter, 700 Portuguese surrendered and provided Lettow-Vorbeck much needed supplies especially ammunition. Clothing his men in Portuguese uniforms and armed with foe’s arms, he captured Fort Naguri.  Lettow-Vorbeck was uncompromising to the extent of ruthlessness and expected one hundred percent effort from his subordinates.  After an encounter, he sat on judgment of one of his subordinates Major Fischer and after announcing that Fischer has not tried hard enough to block enemy’s advance handed him revolver.  Fischer dutifully took revolver from his commander went away and shot himself.  South African commander General Jan Smuts acknowledged his foe by stating that “The enemy’s stubborn defense of his last colony is a tribute to the military qualities of Von Lettow”.  (John Nesselhuf’s master’s thesis on the subject is a very good analysis looking at the alternative view of Lettow-Vorbeck).
I found Edmund Dane’s British Campaigns in Africa and the Pacific 1914-18 and Ross Anderson’s Forgotten Front: The East African Campaign 1914-1918 good comprehensive review of the E. African campaign. 
·       Above narrative clearly demolishes at least one myth prevalent in Pakistan especially among army officers that there were no all Muslim regiments in Indian army.  At different time periods there have been several all Muslim regiments and I think Major ® Agha H. Amin has given a detailed account a while ago.  A similar myth is about Pathan being anti-British where hostility of a segment of trans-frontier Pathans is generalized.  They ignore the simple fact that trans-frontier Pathans generally didn’t accept central authority whether Mughal or even their own kin i.e. Pathan rulers of Afghanistan.  They flocked in droves to serve East India Company and later British Crown all over the globe as well as acted as game keepers in their own hinterlands joining scouts.  Pathans were way over represented in Indian army compared to their population.  Numbers of Afridis and Mahsuds is simply astounding. I’m currently working on Pushtun recruitment in British Indian army during Great War.  There were whole companies of Yusfuzais, Khattaks, Mohmands, Orakzais, Mahsuds and Afridis who bravely fought under Union Jack for the pig eating Queen (later King).  Pondering over the Khyber Agency political agent’s files at Peshawar archives of that era I found long lists of many who gave up the ghost in the killing fields of Europe, Mesopotemia, Middle East and Africa.  What is the lesson from this page of history? When properly trained and led by first rate officers even alien who shared nothing with their soldiers and look at the results.  Zakha Khel Afridis of Khyber Rifles with only four years of service were steady as a rock even against their own kin in a battle.  In 1897, when whole frontier was aflame and sole British officer of Khyber Rifles was not allowed to go back to Landi Kotal to join his soldiers, one indomitable Subedar Mursil fought to his last breath in a situation where one son was with him while two sons were with the tribesmen attacking his post.  Compare it to what happened recently.  Poorly trained and horribly led scouts would not fight even for their own homes and hearths. Even in the darkest days of the Empire, a scout would risk his life despite severe wounds to bring back his rifle with his head held high let alone think about surrender.  And here you have dozens including regular troops surrendering without firing a shot or deserting.  Officers who should have been court martialled for their acts of omission and commission were promoted and given prized appointment ensuring that rot went all the way up the chain of command.  Things have improved a lot but still there is lot of room for improvement.  At Moschi in E. Africa, a Mahsud sepoy hardly out of his boyhood was hit with two bullets in his left arm.  When Company Commander ordered the company to rise and reinforce the firing line, he saw the bleeding Mahsud and telling him to report to hospital.  Cocky Mahsud refused telling his Company Commander that ‘you have two arms, you take my rifle and I have one arm, I’ll take your revolver.  We will both go to the perimeter’.  In 1930, only three resolute British and three Indian Scout officers (one Swati, one Afridi and one Khattak) lead their men to defend the Sararogha fort against a large lashkar.  Everyone knew that government was here to stay and not going to run away no matter what is the challenge and the result was that a strange combination of an outlaw, a Khassadar Subedar, a local Mahsud Malik and a retired Subedar Major Mir Badshah Khan stood as a rock against heavy odds and prevailed. (this incident is described in detail by Charles Chenevix Trench in his great work The Frontier Scouts).  In 2008, the same fort was lost to militants due to strategic myopia, pathetic indifference at all levels and due to the fact that men with lot of brass on their shoulders but with feet of clay were at the helm of affairs.  In 1888, the death of only two British officers and four soldiers of 5th Gurkha Rifles moved the whole government machinery and Black Mountain expedition was launched.  Resoluteness of government was for everyone to see and the result was that 300 Afridi volunteers of Khyber Rifles joined the fray.  Over a century later, dozens of soldiers were abducted and beheaded, two and three star officers were killed in major cities and nobody seem to be in any hurry.  No surprise that chair lift operators (Mullah Fazlullah) and bus conductors (Mangal Bagh) made a mockery of state authority.  The wages of such incompetence are the tragedies that militants are slaughtering children in schools and blowing dozens in attacks on mosques. Now Pakistan will need a lot of blood and treasure to reverse the rot. 
·       Indomitable Baluch fought for the alien sovereign with pride hundred years ago and hundred years later his alienation from the state of Pakistan is almost complete.  Wisdom of Solomon and patience of Job will be needed to bring him back into the national fold but some in high temples thought that dumping Baluch bodies will keep the nation together.  They forgot that we have seen this movie before and it ends very badly.
Hamid Hussain
February 2, 2015

Caste “privilege”, the Americal Dalit speaks

Over at The Aerogram there is an interesting piece up, Caste Privilege 101: A Primer for the Privileged. The main downside of the piece is that it is standard post-colonial “social justice warrior” claptrap. Unless you buy into the premises a lot of the rhetoric falls flat. You can really write a regular expression to just “search & replace”, and it could be about another set of people. Really the post just leverages pretty generic ideas about race privilege, and interpolates them into a South Asian context.

But the good part is that it is interesting that the experiences of low caste South Asians is highlighted. There simply aren’t that many in the Diaspora…or are there? Perhaps they “pass” as this woman and her family have done? And it is a nice reality check to note that what many South Asians consider normative South Asian behavior and folkways are actually just representative of a relative thin and elite strata of Indian cultures. It is also quite sweet and delicious when the authors suggest that many South Asian Americans with names like Iyer and Mukherjee who play the part of “oppressed person of color,” despite a customary elite family background, and impeccable educational qualifications and a high income, are oblivious to the structures of privilege in which they partake while excoriating white society.

The major issue I have is that in the process of lecturing (and frankly hectoring) higher caste Indians the authors express their own narrow viewpoints. For example, when talking about religious differences between low castes and higher castes, they excise Muslims out of the equation. As Muslims are about 1/3 of the South Asian population this seems an important lacunae, and as we all know there are caste and caste-like structures within Islam too, some of which have been imported from Hinduism (e.g., “Muslim Dalits”).

Finally, a lot of the generalizations about upper caste Indians seems to be bullshit. American born Indian Americans intermarry at nearly a 50% clip. I really don’t think that caste matters that much when they (we) are marrying people of other races at a very high rate. The fact is that no matter if you are a fair skinned Pandit or a dark skinned Nadar in this country you’re a “sand nigger.” Next to that all the caste posturing looks like a farce.

Victimhood, Desi Post-Marxists, Social Justice, Racism and other random thoughts

Just some random thoughts trigerred by a question that Razib asked and a post on FB.
The question:

Why are all South Asian American websites so Left?
Any thoughts? It’s a consistent tendency that explicitly South Asian (de facto Indian) websites tend to have a Left inflection. This means that they’re soaked in critical race theory assumptions, but also genuflect to broader Left liberal concerns and priorities (e.g., “black lives matter” or the boycott of Israel). My hypothesis is that it’s a selection bias in the type of people who set up these websites, and read these websites. Though the average South Asian American is a liberal Democrat, they’re not that political, and too busy to know much about “intersectionality.” There are conservative South Asian Americans in the public intellectual space, but they are people like Avik Roy or Reihan Salam, whose focus is rarely on South Asians (though Reihan brings up his Bangladeshi background now and then).”

I think (and I think Razib would agree) that not ALL South Asian websites have a Left inflection. For example, I am sure there are a number affiliated with Hindutvadis/RajivMalhotra types that are explicitly anti-Left wing. And I am sure there are a number affiliated with various Muslim groups that are in their own world, impossible to classify as left or right, just not-WEIRD.  But that being said, there IS a very distinct leftward tilt in the highly educated westernized South Asian crowd. Since this is exactly the crowd one finds in universities and “serious” media and arguing in “intellectual” blogs and so on, their visibility is far beyond their actual numbers. And it is not just about visibility. Most people (in some sense, almost ALL people) get their views and opinions ready-made from a relatively small group of opinion-makers. The extraordinary dominance of some (not all; some process of meme-selection does go on) left wing tropes in this highly educated and influential group therefore translates into wide (mostly uncritical and superficial) acceptance of many of these tropes within the larger South Asian community.
Which then brings us back to why? I have a few thoughts:

1. Victimhood bonus. I really think this is the single most powerful motivator. Many highly educated Indians (and Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, etc) come from an elite background and any reasonably consistent left wing analysis would have them feeling guilty about their position back home. But suddenly, here in Columbia university, you can get to play victim at no cost (and with some benefits..especially if you stay in the humanities, in which case career choices and peer groups will reinforce and support that choice). It is a VERY tempting offer and only the most churlish and obstinately pig-headed can pass it up. Racialicious is delicious. And this bonus is on offer from the Left, not the Right. That fork in the road and the choice to be made are therefore completely clear and impossible to resist.

2. Marxism from back home. Marxism was really the default ideology of the first anti-colonial generation in Asia and Africa. In some places, where real Marxist revolutionaries tried armed violent revolution and got put down (as in Malaysia) or were pre-emptively slaughtered by CIA-supported generals (Indonesia) the situation was more muddled, but in the Indian subcontinent the educated elite was highly influenced by Marxism. Most of us brought that vague left wing symnpathy with us to the West (it was not very deep. But then, it never is, anywhere; most left wing parties have 3 ideologues who actually try to read Capital, the rest are lucky if they can read the manifesto) and therefore naturally gravitated to the left in the West. The Left in the West had meanwhile moved on to post-Marxist pomo poco bullshit and that actually proved more attractive to most elite-origin desis than the more “economist” and organized revolutionary Marxism of the old days. No need to be poor, no need to be hunted by the FBI, and all the benefits of being on the right side of history. Who could resist?

3. Racism. Obviously there really IS a substratum of race conciousness and of explicit, or now mostly implicit,  racial superiority in European and North American civilization. This is owned and massively condemned by the new Left (in fact, it has almost become the default organizing principle of the new Left, in place of proletarian revolution) and denied or (on the fringes these days) owned and honored by the Right. The choice is clear.

4. Ignorance. Never underestimate the ignorance of the educated human specimen. Since, unlike our working class fellow immigrants, we are mostly ignorant and simultaneously proud of our vast erudition, there is little chance we can spot blind spots, misrepresentation or total muckups in the Left wing post-marxist world after we move into it. We read the correct books, follow the correct opinion makers and become more and more ignorant and more and more proud of our vast knowledge. The clear choice is then reinforced. No surprise.

5. Truth. And last (and maybe least, or am I being too harsh?) there are elements of truth in the left wing position. The fetishization of individualism and guns and whatnot on the Right in America for example is just not very appealing. Environmentalism, healthcare, education, social justice, tolerance…on so many things the claim is that the left has the humane, reasonable and progressive position. And this claim has enough truth in it to keep the left the default setting for most educated immigrants. There is a “thinking right” and there are great inconsistences and even idiocies in the actual details of the “Left” once you get into it, but once you step ashore on the left side of the beach, you rarely even get to see those… So you keep going. Something like that.

Finally, and at a tangent to this whole business. The young people so tragically shot in N. Carolina. Some of our friends were naturally concerned that this reflects a new level of Islamophobia in this country. I had posted a link to a story about lynchings in the deep South (a century ago, things have changed a lot, even in the South) and a good friend commented that now they are lynching Muslims. My first muddled thoughts were (as usual? I am beginning to suspect I am sometimes just contrarian for the sake of being contrarian? maybe so) to deny that this is a lynching. I am copying my FB comments here without editing (you can figure out the context pretty easily) just to get thoughts from other better informed (and perhaps wiser) commentators:

Me: The “Muslim Lynching” in N Carolina, while a huge tragedy for those three good people and their grieving families, was NOT a lynching at all. That was my point. Actually this thought first came to me several years ago in LA. I was at an award ceremony for a (good) South Asian social work organization and some of the speakers were laying it on about their struggle against oppression and racism. I happened to be sitting next to a Black lady and after I told her that I did not think our experience had ANYTHING in common with the Black experience, she felt permitted to open up…and she did. She said she was happy to work in solidarity with people like us, but for us to somehow claim victimhood in the same ranks as Black Americans was, frankly, very very irritating to her. I agreed with her completely and we parted in perfect harmony 🙂 . Since then, I have had other reasons to get irritated by the “social justice warrior” types and have had occasion to think that Neitzsche (PBUH) may have had a bit of a point about such things. As a non-aristocrat (and unlike you, not much of a Roman General at heart 😉 ) I am not exactly pining for the return of aristocratic values, but I cannot help the occasional thought that White people who write for “The Nation” and whine about White supremacy and the poor huddled masses of Brown people being fooled by their superiors are, in some sense, in the happy position of whining about being so bloody superior..and of course, there are other more substantive problems with the whole identity politics run amuck thing.. .anyway, I am not sure it reflects well on us….this thought needs more serious elaboration and is liable to massive misunderstanding, so I will leave it here, but no, I dont think Carolina was ANYTHING like a lynching. It’s not a lynching when the local community goes around trying to be nice to the lynched..

To which a friend responded:
It’s a terrible tragedy what happened in NC. I’m sure the victims’ faith had something to do with it, but it’s also important to realize that it’s extremely hard to demand an understanding and compassionate attitude from the non-Muslim US public when the later has been witnessing unimaginable scenes of carnage running on a daily basis from the Muslim quarters of the world—beheading, burning people alive, rape, and plunder, being done systematically and in keeping with the ideological framework of Islam. I believe this was a random act of terror and doesn’t represent the mainstream American attitude. Comparing this tragedy by invoking lynching of black people is disingenuous or rather simplistic. In these trying times one has to be mindful that If only 10% of the Muslims are to be the extremists type, the number is higher than this, we are talking about 150 million strong diehard army which is glad to slay and get slain in their march to subjugate the entire world to their god, as per their holy book, surah 9111. It’s a staggering number indeed that’s diffused globally, and not to mention a good 50% of their sympathizers, the useful idiots, the clueless moderates. Eventually if moderate Muslims don’t accept this as a reality they are the ones who will be the next victims, either at the hands of the extremists or the hate crimes that’s bound to shoot up in the wake of atrocities which are too many to count. Islam has the crisis of ideology, an ideology that is intertwined with Muslims identity. Ultimately, it’s a crisis of Muslim identity. It’s not looking good for a very long time to come.

  I will take the opposite tack and suggest that the “fear of Muslims” and their impending clash with civilization is itself exaggerated. I think IS type atrocities will mostly occur in Muslim countries. Most European Muslim tourists-killers going to IS will get blown up by barrel bombs and go on to meet their houri quota rather soon. Few will make it back to explode in Europe and VERY FEW will make it to America (two oceans and Canada, alhamdolillah). Neither the terrorist campaign nor the backlash will be as huge as we sometimes fear. Or at least, that is my guess for today. Tomorrow, I may be in a different frame of mind…

 Him: Technically you are correct. Omar Ali. But humans are not that objective when it comes to matters pertaining to faith and scenes of daily brutality committed in the name of religion. Perception is what matters in these situations.

Me: My thought was that we may see those scenes and think about them more than the average American. Most people have already classified “those barbarians” as barbarians. But then they have a life to live and I dont find most Americans obsessing about it…Maybe I am wrong, but that is how it seems right now.

HimThose ‘barbarians’ carry a black flag inscribed with the first kalimah. Images like these make it very easy for the mind to associate.

Me: again, my thought was that the kalima and so on are more OUR crisis and OUR problem. Hardly worth notice for most Americans…

I have to run, but what do you think??

Brown Pundits