AK Asifâs debut novel (available on Amazon,) (also available on Amazon India) mixes dystopian science fiction, sufism, politics, humor and Salafist Islam to create a stunning and unexpected joy-ride through post-apocalyptic Pakistan in 2050. Of course it is no longer called Pakistan (there being no P in Arabic), it is now called Al-Bakistan, and it is ruled by a Khalifa who established law and order after the proletariat rose in revolt and decapitated the ruling elite in a paroxysm of rioting and holy war a few years earlier.
Author: Omar Ali
Spoils of War; The Aircraft of the Afghan Air Force
From Dr Hamid Hussain
Spoils of War
 Chaotic United States withdrawal from Afghanistan and consequent vacuum rapidly filled by Taliban surprised everyone. Large amounts of weapons, especially aircraft falling into the hands of the Taliban raised some concerns. However, these fears are exaggerated. Taliban were an insurgent force engaging in a protracted warfare focused on hit and run, small scale engagements, ambushes, Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks and assassinations in rural and urban areas. It used motorcycles and civilian trucks for mobility and small arms, Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs), mortars and explosives for its operations.
The United States developed the Afghan Air Force (AAF) with the primary aim of supporting Afghan security forces with aerial reconnaissance and intelligence, logistic support to troops deployed in operational areas and use of rotary wing and light fixed wing attack planes to attack insurgent deployments.
Russian MI-17 was the nucleus as Afghan pilots and maintenance crew have long experience with these helicopters. Many Afghans living in Russia and Eastern European countries with experience with MI-17 and newly trained pilots and crew managed these helicopters. However, the MI-17 workhorse was downgraded in favor of new shiny American aerial toys. Many factors were at play. Russian trained officers including pilots were eased out and when sanctions were placed on Russia, Afghan government funds could not be used for Russian equipment. This issue was circumvented to some extent by routing MI-17s and its parts through India. American regulations require that U.S. finding should be used to buy American made equipment. The U.S. government was planning to phase out MI-17 by 2022 and no further funding was planned for this category.
Russian planes are simple to operate and manuals donât need Russian language. Afghanistan already had long experience with Russian aircraft and there was an available pool that could be easily expanded. Maintenance crew with limited education can be trained without mastering Russian language. On the other hand, American planes are complex and the English language is essential. Pilots and maintenance crew had to first learn the English language before training on American planes. Some training programs were in the United States that required a lengthy process of vetting and visa requirements. In 2020, with COVID pandemic, Afghan pilots who came back from basic training in the United States could not start flying with their trainers and mentors. There was always a deficiency of qualified Afghan pilots and maintenance crew. Private contractors were operating and maintaining AAF planes. When the security situation deteriorated, some of the training was moved to third countries especially Gulf sheikhdoms. Continue reading Spoils of War; The Aircraft of the Afghan Air Force
The Afghan National Army
From Dr Hamid Hussain (discussing question of whether the ANA can be resurrected? what will become of them?)
Some informed individuals asked for my two cents worth opinion about a conversation about the Afghan National Army (ANA) in a changed scenario. One concern is that a large number of unemployed soldiers can join any faction of the war economy. It invariably resulted in comparison with the disbandment of the Iraqi army after the second Gulf war.
Hamid
Afghan National Army (ANA)
Thanks Sir for your email. You raise an important point and following is my take;
âBlood cannot be washed out with bloodâ.   Pashto proverb
ANA had disintegrated in the aftermath of Soviet withdrawal and subsequent civil war. New ANA post American occupation is a more recent phenomenon and has an interesting history. In the first few years after the U.S. arrival in late 2001, security was provided by militias of local warlords. The U.S. had no initial plan for the nation building project and the Department of Defense (DOD) under Donald Rumsfeld was allergic to the whole idea. Constitution of the new Afghan government was a highly centralized template and deft Hamid Karzai had great influence on the process. Once this centralized project was adopted, then it dawned that this will need an effective national army. This also neatly fitted into the idea of sidelining local powerful warlords and shedding militias. However, when the nascent structure for ANA was put in place in 2005-6, insurgency had started in Pashtun south and east. This meant dominance of non-Pashtuns for a variety of reasons.
These non-Pashtuns had joined the U.S. quite early and had influence due to direct contact with American handlers. As insurgency was mainly in Pashtun areas therefore there was hesitancy to recruit Pashtuns. However, one could not do away with Pashtuns therefore Soviet era leftist officers were brought back and urban educated as well some tribal rural Pashtuns resenting Taliban dominance were recruited. Later, some of these officers were eased out again due to the influence of non-Pashtuns power brokers. Every power player used ANA and police to fill ranks with his partisans. This was a favor providing a secure job. During the Obama administration, ANA was expanded but rapid expansion simply provided more avenues of corruption including pocketing salaries of âghost soldiersâ that only existed on army payroll. Despite these handicaps, ANA had a reasonable structure and more importantly in view of rampant corruption in police and other government departments. ANA was held in high esteem by the general public. More money was spent on Special Operations Forces (SOF) that were better trained, equipped & supported. Disproportionately, a large number of SOF was Uzbek, Tajik & Hazara. Continue reading The Afghan National Army
The Plagues of Amwas and Justinian: The 200 years long series of plagues and pestilence and the conquest of Muslims over Rome and Persia
From Gypsy Syed.
The Plagues of Amwas and Justinian: The 200 years long series of plagues and pestilence and the conquest of Muslims over Rome and Persia
Part 1:
During Umar bin Khattabâs caliphal rule, early Muslims experienced a sum of disasters which convinced them that the Day of Judgement is upon them.
During the last 1400 years, every generation of Muslims have had at least some groups and/or leaders who assured others that the Day of Judgement is imminent, yet the force of this conviction of impending apocalypse was perhaps never stronger than in the year 639 of Common Era (18 of Hijri).
The primary reason for this certitude was prophet Muhammadâs two hadeeths: 1) The prophet Muhammad, holding out his middle and index fingers, said, âMy advent and the Hour (of Judgement) are like this (or like these),â namely, the period between his lifetime and the Day of Judgement is like the distance between his two fingers, i.e., very short (https://sunnah.com/bukhari/68/50). 2) During the Ghazwa of Tabuk while he was sitting in a leather tent, the prophet said, âCount six signs that indicate the approach of the Hour: my death, the conquest of Jerusalem, a plague that will afflict you (and kill you in great numbers) as the plague that afflicts sheep, the increase of wealth to such an extent that even if one is given one hundred Dinars, he will not be satisfied; then an affliction which no Arab house will escape, and then a truce between you and Bani Al-Asfar (i.e. the Byzantines) who will betray you and attack you under eighty flags. Under each flag will be twelve thousand soldiers.â (https://sunnah.com/bukhari/58/18).
The prophet died in the year 632 CE, Muslims conquered Jeurasalem in 638 CE, and during the same year the regions of Levant and Arabia experienced such a severe famine that according to historian Ibn Abi Hajala, the sand of the Arabian peninsula turned black and thousands died due to hunger. He adds that caliph Umarâs body turned so weak that companions feared his death was upon him, and that in the Muslim chronicles the year 638 CE (17 of Hijri) was recalled as the Year of Ashes.
Since historically plagues have often followed famines, it is no surprise that soon after the famine a series of plagues began appearing in many Middle Eastern cities. In the Levantine city of Amwas (Emmaus Nicopolis), where Muslim army had been camping, the plague spread with such swiftness that according to several Muslim historians within a few days more than 25,000 Muslim soldiers died, including several prominent companions of the prophet. (Note: the figure of 25,000 shouldnât be taken literally, as pre-modern historians often meant by such numbers to signify a large amount of people; there was of course no way to count the specific number of bodies.)
The most prominent among these companions was Abu Ubaidah ibn al-Jarrah, who is among the ten companions preordained by the prophet to be one of his companions in paradise. Abu Ubaidah was appointed by caliph Umar the head of Muslim army in Syria replacing Khalid Bin Waleed, and under his competent leadership Muslim army won a series of battles, moving from Jerusalem to Beirut to Damascus with lightening speed. Umar had even said that if Abu Ubaidah had stayed alive, heâd have been the one appointed as the third caliph. But after Abu Ubaidahâs unfortunate death during the infamous Plague of Amwas, Umar conferred the governorship of Damascus on the competent shoulders of Muadh ibn Jabal. But soon after even he died, along with his son Abdul Rehman and his two wives. The prophet had said about Muadh that he will lead all Muslim scholars into the gates of paradise. The person who replaced him was Yazid ibn Abi Sufyan but soon plague took his life too. The fourth person to be appointed the governor of Damascus was Muawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan who was fortunate enough to survive the plague and thirty years later announced the beginning of his own caliphate and in doing so launched the Umayyad caliphate that continued for next hundred years.
Meanwhile, during the year 639, according to several hadeeths and Arab historians, caliph Umar traveled with two military battalions towards Syria, but when he reached the borderland region of Sargh, he met Abu Ubaidah ibn al-Jarrah, Yazid ibn abi Sufyan, and Shurahbil ibn Hasana, all three of them had traveled down there from the garrison town of Amwas to inform him that a plague had spread at a brisk pace along the cities of Syria and heâd be better off returning back to Medina with his soldiers. According to the famous 9th century Arab historian Abu Jafar ibn Yazid al-Tabari, the caliph first consulted the early migrant âMuhajirunâ Muslims of Makkah and then the Medinans, but both groups differed. One said that itâs not wise to return after heading out to fight in the service of God, and the other said that it is a caliphâs duty to protect his soldiers and thus it is logical to return. Then Umar sought the view of those Makkans who had converted to Islam after its conquest by the Muslims. They were quick to suggest that the army should immediately head back. âThis time, no two men among them disagreed, but they all said, âReturn (to Medina) with the men; this is an affliction that may bring about our ruin.ââ
Next morning, as narrated in The History of al-Tabari Volume XIII (Trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll), when Umar got ready to leave, Abu Ubaydah said to him, âAre you fleeing from Godâs providence?â âYes,â Umar replied, âI flee from one divine ordinance to another. Donât you see? Suppose a man goes down into a riverbed with two slopes, one fertile, the other barren, does the one who grazes his animals on the infertile slope not do so according to Godâs ordinance, and does the one who grazes his animals on the fertile one not do so according to Godâs ordinance?â Umar went on, âIf somebody other than you had said this, Abu Ubaydah, . . . ,â (presumably Umar meant heâd have punished him). Then he went with him to a spot away from the people. While the men were thus busily readying themselves to depart, suddenly Abd al-Rahman bin Awf appeared on the scene. He had been following at a distance and had not been present yesterday. He exclaimed, âWhat on earth is the matter with the men?â So he was told. Then he said, âI know something about this which is relevant.â Umar said, âIn our eyes you are a truthful and honest man,- what can you tell us?â Abd al-Rahman said, âI heard the Messenger of God say: âWhen it comes to your notice that there is a pestilence in a certain country, do not go near it, and if it breaks out while you are in it, do not flee from it then.â Therefore, Abd al-Rahman concluded, ânothing should make you leave this place except those words.â Umar exclaimed, âGod be praised, so leave, all you men!â Then he departed with them. (https://sunnah.com/bukhari/76/44)
What follows after the departure of caliph Umar is narrated by Al-Tabari in these words:
âAccording to Ibn HumaydâSalamahâMuhammad b. Ishaqâ Aban b. SalihâShahr b. Hawshab al-Ashâariâsomeone from his clan who, after his father had died, was left behind to take care of his mother and was an eyewitness of the plague of Amwas, (in other words Shahrâs stepfather), âWhen the disease became widespread, Abu Ubaydah stood up among his men and delivered the following speech, âMen, this sickness is a mercy from your Lord, a request from your Prophet Muhammad and it has caused the death of the pious who died before you; I, Abu Ubaydah, ask God that He assign to me my share thereof.â Suddenly he suffered (an acute attack of) the disease, as a result of which he died. Muadh ibn Jabal was appointed as his successor over the people. He went on: Then, after that, (Muadh) delivered a speech in which he said, âTruly, men, this sickness constitutes a mercy from your Lord, a request from your Prophet and it has caused the death of the pious who died before you; I, Muadh, ask God that He assign thereof a share to my family.â Then his son, Abd al-Rahman bin Muadh, suffered (a sudden attack of) the plague as a result of which he died. Then Muadh stood up and prayed for a share of the disease for himself, after which it smote him. Indeed, I saw him looking at his palm, then he kissed the back of his hand and said, âI prefer not to have anything of this world (together) with what (I have) in you (i.e. my hand).â When he had died, Amr bin al-âAs was made his successor over the people. Amr stood up to address the people and said,â âMen, when this sickness strikes, it spreads like wildfire, so let us run away from it to the mountains.â Then Abu Wathilah al-Hudhali said, âby God, you are known to us as a liar. While you were still no better than the donkey I sit on, I had already become a Companion of the Prophet.â But, he went on, âby God, this time I will not reject what you say. I swear by God, we should not stay here!â Then he departed and the people went with him and scattered in all directions. Eventually God took the plague away from them. He went on: News of this opinion of Amr bin al-âAs reached Umar bin al-Khattab and, by God, he did not raise objections to it.â
In fact, Umar appointed Amr bin al-âAs head of the Muslim army in Egypt, and he famously led the Muslim conquest of Egypt within the next five years.
It is vital to give the Sargh and Plague of Amwas accounts in detail here because during the next several centuries Muslims were beset with an interminable series of plagues and pestilence, and this Sargh debate, along with three germane hadeeths, were rehashed each time by Muslim scholars in their dogged debates about how to countenance these plagues. One of those hadeeths was mentioned above by Abd al-Rahman bin Awf, and the second one is included in Sahih Bukhari according to which the prophet said, ââNo Adwa (i.e. no contagious disease); nor (any evil omen in the month of) Safar; nor Hama (a bird used to foretell future) exists.â A bedouin asked, âO Allahâs Messenger! What about the camels which, when on the sand (desert) look like deers, but when a mangy camel mixes with them they all get infected with mange?â On that Allahâs Apostle said, âThen who conveyed the (mange) disease to the first (mangy) camel?ââ (https://sunnah.com/bukhari/76/84)
And according to the third hadeeth, âNarrated Aisha (the wife of the Prophet): I asked Allahâs Messenger about the plague. He told me that it was a Punishment sent by Allah on whom he wished, and Allah made it a source of mercy for the believers, for if one in the time of an epidemic plague stays in his country patiently hoping for Allahâs Reward and believing that nothing will befall him except what Allah has written for him, he will get the reward of a martyr.â (https://sunnah.com/bukhari/60/141)
Thus keeping in mind the judgements of prophetâs companions at Sargh, and the three aforementioned hadeeths, Muslim scholars and jurists have had three foremost opinions on plagues and pestilence: 1) that all plagues and pestilence are a gift from God to believers but Godâs wrath for unbelievers, and that a Muslim who dies due to a plague is a martyr, 2) that a Muslim should neither enter a plague-infested region nor escape from it, and 3) that there is no truth to contagion, all disease and deaths are directly from God.
(Side note: Iâve got to mention here Lawrence Conradâs excellent paper, Umar at Sargh: The Evolution of an Umayyad Tradition of Flight from the Plague. Conrad is the preeminent historian of plague and medicine in the medieval Muslim world, and in this paper he scrutinizes the evolutionary nature of the seven riwayaats of the Umar at Sargh narrative and convincingly concludes that itâs an invention of 9th century Arab historians involved in debate over the nature of plagues, that there is no doubt Muslim army was stuck with a major plague and that many prominent companions died including Abu Ubaidah, but it is doubtful if Umar had ever led an expedition towards Syria (since no rowayaat properly explains the nature of the expedition), and that even if he had taken an expedition, the debates are certainly invented. He argues that each of the seven riwayaats of the epidsode has bits added to it for literary and rhetorical purposes, and that in this case the riwayaats were adopted by later muhaddiths.
He writes, âThe Umar at Sargh tradition provides a valuable example of how an account that in its earliest extant form simply seeks to report Umarâs journey and the reason for its failure, could be so elaborately revised and altered as to lose almost all contact with its original basis (insofar as we have access to this stage of the process) by the time it reached its fully developed form. Specifically, it illustrates how a sophisticated Hadith of the Prophet Muhammad could evolve from what had earlier been a simple historical khabar.â He adds, âit bears notice, however, that the Umar at Sargh materials do not support the commonly asserted position that the genre of akhbar originated from that of hadith, indeed, they illustrate development in precisely the opposite direction.â Later, âthe actual journey is henceforth reduced to the role of a frame story that provides the setting for an effort to address major doctrinal and theological issues that had not drawn the attention of earlier tradents. Specifically, the tradition now raises the problem that as all things â including plague â come from God, flight from stricken places and prudent cautionary measures against the epidemic would seem at least to reflect deficient faith, or even comprise defiance of the will of God. The advice of three groups of Muslims neatly sets the stage, an altercation between Umar and Abu Ubayda, soon to fall victim to the Plague Amwas, poses the issue of divine will, and a solution is found in Umarâs parable of the herdsman in the wadi. The tradition of the Prophet, however, lacks the authority to settle the matter, and rather only introduces the problem. In this and all subsequent versions, the Qurâanic motif of consultation with the Companions proves to be crucial.â And finally, âIf it seems reasonable to concede that Umar ibn al-Khattab actually did undertake a journey that was terminated prematurely by the outbreak of plague in Syria, the fact remains that even the later tradents, creative in so many other ways, were at a loss as to what to make of this journey. Only the last version, heavily embroidered in all respects, goes so far as to say that Umar was âon a campaignâ (ghaziyan), but which campaign? Such lack of differentiation is in itself suspect, and no other source knows of any military expedition led personally by Umar, to Syria or anywhere else.â)
All of this gets infinitely more fascinating once we expand our field of vision in both space and time from Hijaz and Syria to the greater Middle East and the Mediterranean world and from merely the 630s to the entire 6th and 7th centuries and beyond. Because around 150 years before the year 639, Christians of the Byzantine Middle East and Persia had convinced themselves that the world is about to end. (Hence, the thesis of many scholars, Stephen J. Shoemaker prominent among them, that Islam was a natural, though uniquely Arab, product of the greater Mediterranean zeitgeist of the Late Antique 6th and 7th centuries, and that the prophet Muhammad and early Muslims were motivated by their belief in an imminent apocalypse.) There were several reasons for this belief among 6th century Christians: 1) Using dates given in Bible, Christian clergy figured that the world will not age beyond 6000 years, and by calculating the ages of prophets they estimated that the age of the world had already reached 6000 years during the sixth century. 2) Christian Bibleâs Book of Revelation had prophesied that right before the second coming of Jesus, the world will be enveloped in a series of wars, famines, plagues, and earthquakes. And sixth century had indeed been a long century of quite literal darkness enveloping the Mediterranean world and beyond, ushering with it several episodes of plagues, famines, earthquakes, a Late Antiquity version of climate change, indeed a âGlobal Cooling,â and to top it all, a century long tug of wars between the Roman/Byzantine empire and the Persian empire. These endless calamities had hollowed out both these grand old empires, politically and financially, to such an extent that a new group of warriors were able to emerge from Arabia and in quick succession topple both.
(Itâs a four part series. The first part deals with the Plague of Amwas and, briefly, its impact on debates about plagues among medieval Muslim scholars, and historicity of the Plague of Amwas tradition. Second part expands to the Justinian Plague (the most fun part). Third one on the 6th century Byzantine Persian wars and the rise of Islam. Fourth part on the 4 major plagues during the Umayyad period given in Muslim historical traditions and, briefly, the rise of Abbasids.)
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Bibliography:
History of al-Tabari: The Conquest of Iraq, SouthWestern Persia, and Egypt Vol XIII (Trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll)
Arabic Plague Chronologies and Treatises Social and Historical Factors in the Formation of a Literary Genre, Lawrence I. Conrad
TA âUN AND WâABA: Conceptions of Plague and Pestilence in Early Islam, Lawrence I. Conrad
The Comparative Communal Responses to the Black Death in Muslim and Christian Societies by Michael W. Dols
Epidemic disease in central Syria in the late sixth century: Some new insights from the verse of HassÄn ibn ThÄbit, Lawrence I. Conrad
Abraha and Muáž„ammad: Some Observations Apropos of Chronology and Literary âtopoiâ in the Early Arabic Historical Tradition, Lawrence I. Conrad
Life and Afterlife of the First Plague Pandemic, Lester K. Little
Historians and Epidemics: Simple Questions, Complex Answers, Jo N. Hays
âFor Whom Does the Writer Write?â: The First Bubonic Plague Pandemic According to Syriac Sources, Michael G. Morony
Justinianic Plague in Syria and the Archaeological Evidence, Hugh N. Kennedy
Crime and Punishment: The Plague in the Byzantine Empire, 541â749, Dionysios Stathakopoulos
Bubonic Plague in Byzantium: The Evidence of Non-Literary Sources, Peter Sarris
Procopius and the Sixth Century, Averil Cameron
When Numbers Donât Count: Changing Perspectives on the Justinianic Plague, Monica H. Green
Rejecting Catastrophe: The Case of the Justinianic Plague, Lee Mordechai, Merle Eisenberg
Ancient Yersinia pestis genomes from across Western Europe reveal early diversification during the First Pandemic (541â750), Marcel Keller and others
The Political and Social Role of Khurasan under Abbasid Rule 747-820, Elton L. Daniel
Browncast: Major Amin on the Age of Strategic Anarchy in Afghanistan
Another BP Podcast is up. You can listen on Libsyn, Apple, Spotify, and Stitcher (and a variety of other platforms). Probably the easiest way to keep up the podcast since we donât have a regular schedule is to subscribe to one of the links above.
This episode was recorded over the phone, so please excuse some minor audio issues. As many of our readers know, we posted an article from Major Amin a few days ago, arguing that the US had made a brilliant strategic move out of Afghanistan (even though the disengagement has been handled poorly). In this podcast, he repeats this view and has a few salty words about this and related topics.. Enjoy.
Comments welcome.
Btw, my own random amateur views can be found at this link.Â
Postscript 1: Several friends have said that they cannot take his views seriously if he thinks “lower middle class” is such an insult, etc. But I no longer use that particular filter too much. I think people can have very “problematic” AND insightful views simultaneously. If we are interested in learning (and not just in virtue signaling) then we can filter them out and still find something useful. Of course, friends will do that all the time with each other, but I admit that it is a more complicated question when we talk with strangers online, so if you feel strongly about this issue, this may not be the podcast for you.
Postscript 2: Is there anything in the podcast that I should have objected to during the conversation? I think yes, there is. I should have suggested that we cannot really say “the only good Chinese is a dead Chinese”. Other than that, I have no regrets đ
Afghanistan; Graveyard of Western Policy Wonks (but certainly NOT the graveyard of empires)
I had posted an earlier blog post with the somewhat tongue in cheek title “America’s brilliant strategy in Afghanistan”. This was basically a note (and an audio version of the same) from Major Amin, arguing that strategically a US exit was a brilliant move as it ensured that this tar baby is now the problem of Pakistan, China, Russia and Iran (and to some extent, India), and not an expensive American headache. The thought is strategically sound (if very cynical and cold blooded), but I have some doubts about whether the US is consciously trying to do this (they may indeed end up doing this, and could even emerge stronger, with their rivals weaker, as a result, but that may not have been the conscious intention). Â Anyway, here, in no particular order, are my random thoughts on this topic:
- There are no grounds for thinking that the same damn people who created the disaster and were wrong about it at every step for 20 years are now suddenly these Machiavellian geniuses who will trap Pakistan and its patron China (not to mention Russia and Iran) in Afghanistan. It is far more likely that the geniuses are still dreaming of “engagement”, only now instead of engaging with Musharraf and the anti-Taliban Afghans, they will engage with General Bajwa and the Taliban. These geniuses will now sell new kool aid about how the new government they have helped to install will ensure security and crackdown on alqaeda and whatever bogeyman the Americans are now supposed to be scared of. And of course, to do this the new “anti-terror allies” will need aid (part of which will be stolen by corrupt Americans at step one, the rest to be stolen locally by these new allies, with a small trickle making it to starving afghans). Meanwhile, these new allies, not new to the game themselves, will make sure a steady supply of “alqaeda number threes” are handed over to be housed in Guantanomo or wherever. They will also make sure there are enough terror incidents and threats to keep the show going forever. We will of course get mucho dinero from the EU as well, since that is the only way refugees can be kept out of fortress Europe (or at least, this is the line that will be sold on TV). Now, this may NOT come to pass fully like this because Western powers are still democracies, there will be debate and the best laid plans of mice and thinktankers may be thwarted by bad publicity and “aid fatigue”, but NOT by their own planning. In short, the US and the West may indeed end up leaving the tar baby to less gentle caretakers, but they will do so unwillingly and in spite of themselves, NOT because this (sensible) plan is what they have opted for now that the first (nonsensical) grand strategic plan has failed and they have well and truly lost the war.
- The failure in any case is not a failure of Democrats or Republicans, it is a systemic failure of the entire postmodern Western establishment. And the systemic failure starts from the vast gap that exists between Western civ and the rest of the world. For better AND for worse, the West has moved very far from where most humans were a century ago. Leaving aside all questions of whether this is good, bad or ugly, or whether this is sustainable or not, the fact remains that at this point in time the average ivy league educated “analyst” is bound within so many layers of WEIRD assumptions and habits that he or she (maybe especially she, since she will not have hormonal access to the patriarchal and macho world of men outside the West; though this is by no means a general rule; some Western women can also know men AND women and their quirks very well) has no framework for even beginning to see what is going on. Garbage in, garbage out is always true, but it is also worth remembering that there CAN be a machine that converts good information into garbage. If the software is faulty, then non-garbage going in will also become garbage on the way out. This should not be forgotten.Â
- Some people say that Western corporate capitalism has become so powerful that it has now eaten through whatever older human paradigms were operating (and are still operating at some level) in Western societies. If this is indeed the case then the questions become all about who profits and who loses? but the twist here is that the usual Lefty answers are also mostly propaganda. War is profitable, but so is peace. Peace is actually MORE profitable for more corporations than war is. But if war profits alone were (and are) driving policy choices, then the issue becomes one of how SOME corporations and individuals (who DO profit from war) have managed to capture institutions to such an extent that their profits drove policy to invade Afghanistan? and their profits will determine what comes next? People have strong opinions on this, but I find that most of the opinions turn out to be emotional outbursts or propaganda on close examination. There is almost certainly SOMETHING to this angle of attack, but I still think, not as much as advertised; because I think they make money when they get the chance, but getting the chance was not something they planned in detail.. eg, “corporations” (who would that even be?)Â did not blow up the towers just so they could go to war. Other human concerns (race, religion, identity, national interest, individual madness, individual desire to do good, plain stupidity, error, chance, etc) are still driving us.
- The whole notion of “non-state actors” is a huge red herring. There ARE non-state actors, and states usually defeat them. They are mostly a police issue, not a military issue. A really serious insurgency (Vietcong, Taliban, Kashmir, etc etc) needs overt or covert state support. Conversely, the really cost-effective counter (provided you have the conventional forces to have such an option) is to confront the states supporting them. The notion that the USA is helpless in front of some ragtag gang of Islamist mujahids is just bullshit. At some point, the US could be up against sponsors that the US cannot go to war with (China, Russia) and would then have to settle for other measures, but to fail to get countries such as Afghanistan, Iran or Pakistan to change their behavior (short of being under the a full Chinese or Russian umbrella) is a choice, not a given.
- The Taliban are going to rule all of Afghanistan now because the US chose to give them the country (whether as part of some Machiavellian scheme or just because Khalilzad and Trump were idiots), but they will not do so in some mythical “inclusive” or “moderate” fashion. They will not last long if they do anything that stupid, and they are not stupid. Their asabiya comes from Islam and their core supporters are committed to a very jihadist and harsh version of Islam. They can certainly be smart enough to act moderate or to include non-taliban in their govt because of considerations of realpolitik and their fighters have enough discipline and their ISI minders have enough influence that this can be done. But just as the Chinese communists included many non-communists in their national reconciliation councils or whatever, but never lost sight of the need for unity of command and clear authority over all aspects of national life, so will the Taliban. if they dont, they will fall quicker than expected. That said, they will not enjoy a free run. There will be many groups trying to undermine them. There will be criminals There will be smugglers. There will be local warlords. They will have to be harsh, they WILL be harsh, but they still wont enjoy enough tranquility to start giving out mining concessions to Shenyang Mining corporation number five or whatever. The US may eventually get out of the region (with think tankers kicking and screaming about “failure of engagement” all the way) and then will be able to enjoy the show from a safe distance. But with so many intelligence agencies and agents operating at every level, peace is not likely. Neither is it likely that the Taliban regime (even if it stabilizes) will totally eliminate all the various terrorists who are still holed up in Afghanistan. Ideologically, they cannot. Practically they cannot.
- There will be massive economic disruption in Afghanistan very very soon. The whole place was running on American taxpayer money (and smaller contributions from the EU and others). Even though the think-tankers will try their level best to keep the manna flowing, it is not likely to reach even a tenth of the levels achieved in the corrupt war years. Neither China nor Russia believe in throwing money into tar pits. So who will pay? The afghan people will pay, by moving abroad (mostly to Pakistan and Iran, luckier ones further West), by living on less, by selling what drugs they can (though most of that profit goes to middlemen and smugglers, not to the growers). Pakistan will pay what it can, which is not a lot. There is no way there can be a sudden turnaround and prosperity and mining contracts raining down on Kabul. None.
- But can there be a longer term recovery? Can China do what the USA could not? build a viable Afghan state? I doubt it. I doubt that they will even try. At best, they will give some money to Pakistan to have a go, but it will not be American level cash, it will be strictly “cash on delivery”. Can Pakistan deliver them a functioning Afghanistan? Our entire past record suggests we cannot. For the sake of the Afghan people, I hope I am wrong.
- India mostly gets to sit tight and hope that their “balakot deterrence” still holds after Pakistan has so decisively defeated the great Satan. It could. We will see. Mostly, I think India comes out of this relatively OK. Their main issue is whether this will embolden Pakistan to restart the kashmir Jihad. It may. It may not.
- Major Amin has also raised another interesting question: this one for Pakistani think tankers who think they have won some grand victory by defeating the USA. His thought is “what if our boys actually succeed”? ie what if the Taliban. actually stabilize their government and become a viable state? The think tankers in Pakistan maybe missing the possibility that these “grains of sand” (the Afghans) could come together to form a solid mass at some point. And at that point, they will start thinking about strategic depth in Pakistan. After all, if Islamic zeal is what gave them victory, then why not export that zeal to Pakistan? and who better to do it than Afghans? I believe the crucial point here is that Pakistanis (especially our Punjabi and Mohajir elites) have this misconception that just because they (through no great gifts of their own) are inheritors of the Sikh conquests and the administrative machinery and mercenary army of the Raj, they are somehow eternally meant to lord it over the Afghans. This is NOT how any Afghan (Leftist, Rightist, whatever) sees themselves. They are down and out right now because the Sikhs drove them out of the trans-Indus districts and the British created a modernish state in the region that is much more sophisticated and capable than the Afghan state (which was not very advanced to begin with, and whatever it was, we managed to utterly destroy in the first CIA Jihad in the 1980s). But this is not some sort of eternal historic truth. A truly stable Afghanistan will want those districts back and will export true Islam to Pakistan as the means with which to get their way. The current arrangement, with Pakistani officers issuing (or at least, trying to issue) orders to Afghans is only because the Taliban lack many things that only a modernish state can supply and we are that supplier. Let them get settled in, and they will start to look East. We cannot afford to let them win in the way Sethi sahib thinks we want (and hope to).
- From the last post: Some people have asked if this was not inevitable. I think it was not. I think there was a slim chance in 2002 to make it work. But it involved two very difficult (but doable) things; 1. A more competent American occupation and transition. and 2. Pakistan decisively switching sides and abandoning Jihad in Kashmir and Afghanistan (since the one is our justification for the second, both had to go). 1 in retrospect seems near impossible. 2 may have been more doable than 1, So putting the primary blame on Pakistan may be a bit unfair now. (Until a week ago, I might have blamed Pakistan first; though i saw the American effort as hugely corruption ridden and frequently incompetent, even I had not idea HOW incompetent it was. THAT effort was never going to succeed. Though it did not have to end in giving the country to the Taliban. It could still have ended with the US leaving a pro-US govt behind, who would likely have held on to some areas if given some money and support. Anyway, after what we have seen of american incompetence and cynical abandonment of friends, I think 1 (US incompetence and strategic and tactical blindness) is the more important reason this failed. Without Pakistan the Taliban could not have retaken the country. Without US incompetence, neither could have won their respective victories.
See the older post for more random thoughts and predictions.
Sethi sahib’s optimistic takes are here:
An Indian, a Pakistani and a World Bank guy talk Afghanistan
Another BP Podcast is up. You can listen on Libsyn, Apple, Spotify, and Stitcher (and a variety of other platforms). Probably the easiest way to keep up the podcast since we donât have a regular schedule is to subscribe to one of the links above.
In this episode Amey, myself and Karol Karpinski (Karol is a self-described financial plumber at the World Bank, with experience in Afghanistan and other “gap” countries) talk about Afghanistan and the American pullout. Check it out, leave comments. We hope to talk again soon on this topic and focus on aspects we left out.
If you want to just hear my summary of what happened in Afghanistan, it starts at the 7 minute mark. I think i talked too much, and should have asked Karol more questions, but that will have to be the next podcast đ
America’s Brilliant Strategy in Afghanistan
From Major Amin. As most readers know by now, I am not a fan of this kind of realpolitik because I am too faint-hearted to be this cynical about thousands of Afghans being sold down the river, but the world is a nasty and brutish place and in the big picture, who knows… Anyway, the style of the American withdrawal and their general performance in Afghanistan for 20 years does not inspire much confidence, but if there is some method to this madness, it is probably this.. by the way, I would like to ask Major Amin if his assessment is in any way affected by the utter chaos and incompetence of the withdrawal itself? (see my postscript at the end)
Enjoy.
Major Amin also sent this text version. Please ignore any typos or formatting issues. After repeating the assertion he makes in his podcast (that the US has made a brilliant strategic move), he has attached his 2008 piece, which does accurately describe/predict the strategic quagmire the US had settled into in 2008, and suggests the response that Major Amin believes the US has now decided to pursue. Comments welcome. What follows is from Major sahib.
They can’t touch the _____t of America but Such a large concentration of nuts will certainly disturb Iran Russia and even china and PAKISTANS establishment is also not exactly happy .as insiders report—The Billion dollar question is that with 2500 Americans in Afghanistan, since last few months no Taliban advance but now a sudden emergence .clearly a secret agreement has been made.
A QUESTION: WHY THE USA deliberately created weakest afghan army with
(1) no tanks
(2) no artillery
(3) all seasoned officers of old army never allowed or dismissed
Listen to the most recent episode of my podcast: Taliban and their future
Listen to the another recent episode of my podcast: AMIN SAIKAL’S STRATEGIC NAIEVETTE ABOUT AFGHANISTANÂ
US WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN WILL BE BEST PUNISHMENT AND A LOVELY WAY TO DESTABILISE THE REGION AND CREATE MANY NEW STATES-
A 2008 ASSESSMENT
SEPTEMBER 2008
WAR IS NOT ABOUT ETHICS GOD IS NEITHER WITH US NOR WITH THEM
THERE IS NOTHING INEVITABLE IN HISTORY
USA MUST RECONSIDER ITS STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ OR ITS CULMINATING POINT MAY NOT BE FAR AWAY.
USA MUST RECONSIDER ITS STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ
In the last seven years or so the USA at the strategic, operational and tactical level has became the laughing stock of the world. Starting from the premise that both USA’s total failure or total success would not be good for world peace, one may state with confidence that the USA needs to seriously re- consider its strategy in both Iraq and Afghanistan and worldwide.
The present situation is that the USA is making the major effort while its NATO allies less Britain are just pretending that they are also pushing the bogged down vehicle. This is true for both Iraq and Afghanistan. If this continues China and Russia will have the last laugh. Continue reading America’s Brilliant Strategy in Afghanistan
Pocket Review: The Dharma Forest

The Dharma Forest by Keethik Sasidharan
Keerthik Sasidharan is an incredibly erudite Indian economist who works in the US and who has somehow managed to work full time, read so much AND write the first volume of a planned trilogy about the Mahabharata. The idea is that he will retell the Mahabharata through the eyes of 9 of its main characters and each segment will also bring out one aspect of the 9 rasas of ancient Indian philosophy. A general familiarity with the Mahabharata is helpful before you can read this, because the author does not provide you with a roadmap before you begin. But as long as you have that basic familiarity, you should be able to read and enjoy this book.
The first book introduces us to Bhishma, Draupadi and Arjun. The book is over 500 pages, so each character gets a lot of room to express themselves. And express themselves they do, in a very philosophical and subtle book that raises (and sometimes answers) profound philosophical questions while telling what is ostensibly a war story (one can say the same thing about the original Mahabharata). But be aware, just like the original, this IS a war story, and no detail is spared. At first glance some readers may look at that and decide this is just too much detail, but again, as with the original, patience is rewarded; The philosophical, psychological and sociological insights are scattered within, and worth the time spend reading the details of the war, the weapons and the stratagems.
The author’s greatest achievement is his ability to render the actions and motivations of these ancient characters in terms a modern reader can grasp. The actions and choices made by the various actors in this drama can appear mystifying in the original, but Keerthik is able to stick to the original story (and even the original phrases) while making them fully comprehensible to us. For example, the story of Amba and her kidnapping and subsequent rejection can seem very foreign and strange in other tellings, but in this book you can almost understand why every character acts the way they do. That is a tremendous achievement. Well worth a read.
You can read an extended excerpt here.
PB Mehta has a good review here.
We Interviewed Keerthik for a podcast last year:
What Happened to the Afghan Army?
From Major Amin. As time goes on, we will no doubt see more information about how the USA “lost Afghanistan”. At the level of American PR/media the blame will mostly fall on Pakistan for now, since there is a lot of truth in it and it gets the clowns who run the state dept and the pentagon off the hook (or so they think) but in time the details about how the US mismanaged its project will also become prominent.. this is one of them. (To some extent it is a structural issue.. Americans live so far above/away from Afghan (or even Pakistani) reality.. well intentioned ones have no framework that remotely resembles situation on the ground, ill intentioned ones only want to make money or have fun killing gooks)
WHAT HAPPENED TO Â AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMYÂ
Major A.H Amin (Retired)Â
what happened to afghan national armyÂ
- August 2021Â
- DOI:Â
- 10.13140/RG.2.2.14621.44004
- Project:Â
- Military History
- Agha H Amin
Arm chair strategists are taking great delight in criticizing Afghan Army for collapsing in face of so called Taliban onslaught.Â
“A little knowledge of philosophy , inclineth man towards atheism” as the adage goes but , “depth in philosophy bringeth back man to God !” This is how I will describe these novices and critics !Â
The first point to be noted is that armies are not created by US firms like Military Professional Human Resources International in a decade but a long process spanning centuries.Â
The real Afghan Army with traditions dating back to 1719 or 1747 was destroyed by joint US Pakistan design about 1978-1992 when a proxy war was financed in Afghanistan.Â
Characters like Peter Tomsen went out of their way to destroy the real Afghan Army between 1989 and 1992 , just because it was viewed as Pro Soviet or Pro Russian entity.
Afghanistan had no army between 1992 and 2001.Â
In 2001 the USA initiated efforts to create a new army but this exercise had ulterior motives. First the exercise was awarded to contractors which was the first blunder.Â
US myopia and petty mindset was such that USSR trained pilots , available in thousands were not reemployed as they were regarded as Russian proxies !
While the USSR trained many thousand Afghans in USSR and Warsaw Pact states, US petty parsimony and narrowmindedness was such that hardly any Afghan was taken to the USA for courses.Â
Instead characters who no one would employ in USA , and had no options were in Afghanistan training the Afghan Army.Â
To give an example , the main project supervisor of Schools and Clinics program in Louis Burger was a male nurse ! To entrust billion dollar construction projects to a male nurse was ludicrous.Â
My driver and many taxi drivers I met were outstanding war pilots trained for 5 years in USSR and with combat flying experience between 3000 hours to 15,000 hours !Â
Tanks were regarded as future threat and armour was hardly created or organised.Â
The list is endless but will never be investigated like Louis Burgers billion dollar failure published by Washington Post as a âBUILDING PLAN FULL OF CRACKSâ , LATE 2005 !Â
The simple issue was security ! US trainers were simply SCARED that they would get shot in the back ! Â
SO THERE WAS HARDLY ANYÂ TRAINING !!!Â
I saw some of these contractors in Kabul when I was living about 110 metres from gate of Kabul Compound or camp Eggers !Â
These characters were here to do hole punching and make some bucks and not to create an army. So the real spirit was missing .Â
The USA preferred so called ex Mujahids which was a bad idea.Â
The best Afghan officers like Ulumi etc were never taken in the loop as they were considered pro Russian.Â
Many old Afghan Army officers joined but these were sabotaged by the Mujahid Mafia who were a collection of USA, Pakistan or so many other state proxies who had destroyed their own country between 1978 and 1992 !Â
The unkindest cut was delivered by this character Ashraf Ghani who between 2014 and 2019 summarily removed 90 % of pre 1992 Afghan Army officers , thus totally destroying the Afghan Army !
The incompetent US staff in Kabul did not oppose this most IDIOTIC and FOOLISH step !Â
Or perhaps it was US design that Afghan Army should collapse quickly so that the Taliban are back in power and then they can be sorted out properly !Â
The collapse of Afghan Army has to be seen in the context of the fact that FIRST the USA and its proxy states DESTROYED the REAL AFGHAN ARMY in 1978-92 ! Then the RECONSTRUCTION of AFGHAN ARMY by the USA was a SHALLOW EXERCISE , MARRED by MASSIVE CORRUPTION and a BAD TEAM . Lastly no army can be created in 20 years . FINALLY Ashraf Ghanis Removal of the REAL AFGHAN ARMY OFFICERS BETWEEN 2014 AND 2019 WAS THE DEATH SENTENCE OF AFGHAN ARMY !
Audio of the same points:

