Middle East Musings on New Pundits

I do more writing on New Pundits now but I thought I would point to three recent posts of mine dealing with the geopolitics in the region:

The Ghost of the Persian Empire will Own the Middle EastThe ghost of geopolitics means that the only true counterweight to Iran is not Saudi Arabia, Pakistan or Israel (The Sunni-Semitic axis Egypt doesn’t even figure, as it’s geopolitically so dependent on Israel post Aswan Dam) but Turkey. However Anatolia is ultimately a bridge to the West and Turkey’s highland configuration point towards Istanbul and that land bridge.

The ā€œIran dealā€ signals Persia’s return to Geopolitical PreeminenceThe Iranians, like their closely related kin the Indians, are an Aryan people who settled on the hugely strategic Iranian plateau. Unlike the Indians upon conquest (or a few centuries after) the Iranians gave up their hugely influential native born faith, Zoroastrianism, to embrace Islam and consequently the hugely Iranian inflected Shi’ite faith. Of course Islam can properly be conceived of a fine line between the more orthodox (and less theologically innovative) Sunni practises, which adhere most closely to the original Arabian teachings, and the far more syncretic Ismaili cluster, in which 12ver Shi’ite Islam falls in the middle.

How Pakistan and Turkey must play the crisis in the Middle EastNow far more interesting, in that it is much contestable, about what is Pakistan. I would argue Pakistan is the Mughal Empire successor state reimagined (even if partially) on the Indus River Valley System. This linkage survived 1971’s breakup and to put it succinctly Pakistan looks to Akbar, its arch rival fratricidal twin India looks to Asoka.

Arab-Pakistani Security Cooperation

From Dr Hamid Hussain:

        Pakistan and
Arab World:  Security Cooperation

Hamid Hussain

 ā€œThe
desire to gain an immediate selfish advantage always imperils their ultimate
interests.  If they recognize this fact, they usually recognize it too
lateā€.
  Reinhold Niebuhr

 There is long
history of security relations between Pakistan and several Arab
countries.  In 1970s and 80s, many Arab countries flushed with oil money
bought state of the art equipment but local population lacked technical
skills.  A number of Pakistan army and air force personnel were deputed to
several countries including Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain,
Qatar, Jordan, Syria and Iraq.  A much smaller number of naval officers
also served in UAE training local naval forces.  The numbers and duration of
deployment varied from less than a dozen to few thousand and from few weeks to
several years.  The main role of Pakistani officers was in training local
security forces although they also manned complicated equipment such as
radars. 

Pakistan
sometimes got into difficulties in view of squabbles among Arab countries as
well as internal strife in some of these countries.  Pakistani troop
presence in Saudi Arabia though very small put it at odds with Egypt. 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt were supporting opposing parties in the civil war in
Yemen.  This continued till Anwar Sadat got off the ship of Arab socialism
and took a turn towards the right side of the curve.  In 1980s, in the
context of Iran-Iraq war, presence of Pakistani troops in Saudi Arabia put
Pakistan at odds with Tehran. 

 Pakistani army
and air force personnel trained Saudi forces in 1970s and 80s.  Iran-Iraq
war changed Saudi security environment and both countries started to negotiate
about limited Pakistani troop deployment.  After prolonged negotiations it
was agreed to deploy a limited Pakistani contingent on Saudi soil.  Delay
in negotiations was partly due to differences among Saudi decision
makers.  Debate among Saudis was on the issues of a larger foreign
contingent (about two division strength), expansion of Saudi army and balance
between army and Saudi Arabian National Guards (SANG). Finally, a negotiated
middle ground agreed on a much smaller foreign contingent that consisted
of  only a reinforced brigade strength.  In 1982, a formal agreement
was signed and Saudi Pakistan Armed Forces Organization (SPAFO) headquarters
was established at Riyadh.  Pakistani troops were stationed at Tabuk and
Khamis Mushayet.  An armored brigade group was stationed at Tabuk from
1982 to 1988.  It was a complete formation deputed for three years and two
brigades rotated in 1982-85 and 1985-88.  Initially, Major General Shamsur
Rahman Kallu (later Lieutenant General) was appointed to the SPFAO headquarters
but he never took charge and the contingent was headed by a Brigadier rank
officer.  First commander was Brigadier Mehboob Alam (later Major General)
who served from 1982-85 and under him Colonel (later Brigadier) Saeed Ismat
served as GSO-1 Operations and Training.  From 1985 to 1988, Pakistani
armored brigade was commanded by Brigadier Jahangir Karamat (later General and
Pakistan army Chief).  In 1988, for a variety of reasons, the brigade was
withdrawn and only a small number of Pakistani personnel involved in training
remained (majority of foreign training personnel were from United States and
Britain). 

 In my view,
several factors such as increased confidence about Saudization process of armed
forces, modernization of forces, acquisition of surface to surface missiles and
friction with Pakistan about composition and control of the contingent
contributed to this decision.  Saudis had asked General Zia that Shia
officers and troops should be excluded from the units sent for
deployment.  Zia presented this condition during one of his meeting with
his Corps Commanders.  Several senior officers protested stating that this
may significantly damage the cohesion of Pakistani armed forces.  The
reason was that the policy could not be implemented discreetly.  They
argued that a complete formation with full cohesive battalions was to be
deputed and removing a particular group of soldiers based on their sect would
negatively affect the cohesion of the units.

 
In 1990s, need
for Pakistani troops became obsolete in view of presence of large number of
U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of First Gulf War.  In late
1990s, the key strategic issue between two countries was nuclear factor. 
There is no conclusive proof but it is generally believed that both countries
agreed in principle that in case of Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons, Pakistan
will provide nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia.  In return, Saudi Arabia
provided oil at discount rate to cash strapped and sanctioned Pakistan in the
aftermath of its 1998 nuclear tests.  This was done off the books to avoid
Pakistan’s creditors asking for more pound of the flesh.  In 2003,
revelations about Pakistani nuclear proliferation by its lead scientist Abdul
Qadeer Khan including clandestine shipments to Iran stunned the world. 
Saudis were angry and felt that Pakistanis were a bunch of cheaters trying to
milk money from all sides.  Saudis showed their displeasure by now asking
for full price for the oil supply.  Saudis have mediated between ruling
elites of Pakistan dating back to mass protest movement organized by a
coalition of opposition parties against then Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto
in 1977.  Saudi ambassador tried to negotiate a deal but eventually
military staged a coup.  Most recently, Saudis guaranteed exile of former
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to the Kingdom as well as negotiated safe passage
to former President Pervez Mussharraf.  This has severely damaged
Pakistan’s reputation among Saudis.  Saudi royal family has very little
respect for feuding Pakistani ruling elite. 

 Intelligence
agencies of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia enjoy close relationship going back over
two decades.  Currently, main focus of cooperation is Arab
extremists.  Though small in numbers but shuttling of Saudi militants
between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and Afghanistan is a major Saudi
concern.  Details of this cooperation are usually not made public and both
countries prefer to work behind the scenes.  Pakistani and Saudi
intelligence officials usually don’t leak; a nuisance that has been taken to an
art form by Americans.  One case became public when in May 2009; Pakistani
paramilitary force Frontier Corps (FC) arrested four Saudi militants in Mohmand
tribal agency.  These four Saudi militants along with a Libyan and an
Afghan national were arrested at Khapakh check post.  FC troops were
escorting them to FC camp in Ghalanai when they came under attack.  Over
60 militants attacked FC escort and gunfight lasted for over two hours with
many casualties. 

 
Looking from
Riyadh point of view, the security dilemma has mushroomed into a
nightmare.  Externally, Shia dominated government in a fragile Iraq,
unrest in Bahrain with potential rise of another Shia entity on the border,
unraveling of Yemen, increasing voices of demand of constitutional monarchy in
Jordan, exit of Mubarak in one of the most historic change in Egypt are enough
to cause many sleepless nights for Saudi decision makers.  Internally,
presence of a small but lethal extremist fringe and undercurrents of discontent
in Saudi society and much more alienation of small Shia minority in the Kingdom
are additional worries.  Traditionally, Saudi Arabia carefully balanced
its security structure to prevent a coup.  Army doctrine was more static
in orientation and ā€˜jointness’ was carefully avoided to prevent cohesion of armed
forces to a level where they could easily overthrow the rulers.  In
addition, SANG was used as a check against army.  SANG operates
independent of Ministry of Defence running its own recruitment, training and
retention.  SANG is also structured in a way to prevent it from posing a
threat to the government.  Out of total strength of over 50’000 personnel
of SANG only about 10’000 are on active duty.   Remainder is divided
into regular reserve and part time tribal irregulars.  

 

In case of
massive protests though less likely in Saudi Arabia, there is always the
question of how much force local security apparatus will be willing to use
against their own countrymen.  Potential requirement of foreign troops
forced Saudis to work with current Pakistani civilian government for whom they
had nothing but utter contempt until very recently.  President and Prime
Minister of Pakistan faced with grim economic situation of the country and army
brass uncertain about continued U.S. funding are too delighted at the potential
of cash windfall from Saudi patrons.  Secretary General of Saudi National
Security Council Prince Bandar bin Sultan made too quite trips to Pakistan in
the aftermath of protests.  Main subject was getting Pakistani support for
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) action to send Saudi troops to Bahrain,
encourage Pakistan to send retired personnel for Bahrain security forces and in
case of mass unrest in Saudi Arabia possibility of deployment of Pakistani
security personnel.  Presently, Saudi security apparatus is able to handle
most internal security problems and use of any foreign troops is more a
contingency plan and will be used as a last measure if things spiral down out
of control. 

 

In 1969, Pakistan sent a military training mission
to Jordan.  The mission’s primary task was to assess state of Jordanian
forces in the aftermath of 1967 defeat at the hands of Israelis and recommend
overhaul.  Officers from different arms (Infantry, Armor and Artillery) of
army and air force were part of this mission.  Main objective of the
mission was survey of Jordanian armed forces, find deficiencies, recommend
solutions and guide in training.  Pakistanis got entangled in Jordan’s
clash with Palestinians.  The simmering tensions between Jordanians and
Palestinians resulted in September 1970 showdown when King Hussain
ordered  Jordanian forces  to quell an attempt by Palestinian groups
based in Jordan to overthrow the Hashemite kingdom.  There were
exaggerated reports circulated by Palestinian sympathizers that Pakistani
troops helped Jordanian forces in combat.  Later, after General Zia-ul
Haq’s coup, those opposing him continued these unsubstantiated reports as Zia
was in Amman during that time period. 

 Pakistani training mission consisted of only about
two dozen army and air force officers and no combat troops (only exception was
an Anti-Air Craft detachment sent in June 1970 at King Hussain’s request as he
was worried that Syrian and Iraqi air forces may intervene in support of
Palestinians).  Pakistan military mission was headed by Major General
Nawazish Ali while Air Commodore Anwar Shamim (later Air Chief Marshal and
Pakistan air force chief) was in charge of air force officers.  
During main Jordanian offensive in September, Pakistani ambassador in Amman
Nawab Rahat Ali Chattari as well as head of military mission Major General
Nawazish were not in the country.  Brigadier Zia ul Haq was in charge of
the military mission.  King Hussain asked Brigadier Zia to take over the
command of a Jordanian division.  Pakistan’s charge de affairs got
approval of this move from Ministry of Defence.  

In Amman, 4th Mechanized Division commanded by Brigadier
Kasab al-Jazy operated and 60th Armored
Brigade of the division commanded by Colonel Alawi Jarrad was at the
forefront.  After 1967 war, 3rd Iraqi
Armored Division had stayed back in Jordan and was deployed in Zarqa. 
King Hussain was suspicious about the motives of Iraqis and he deployed 99th Brigade commanded by Colonel Khalil Hajhuj of
3rd Jordanian Armored Division near Iraqis to keep
them in check.  However, young Saddam Hussain emerging from his own recent
successful power struggle inside Iraq shrewdly pulled Iraqi troops away from
conflict area and finally removed them from Jordan to avoid getting
entangled. 

 
2nd Jordanian
Infantry Division was based in Irbid near the Syrian border.  Palestinian
guerrillas had taken control of the town.  Syria entered the fray in
support of Palestinians by sending 5th Division
commanded by Brigadier Ahmed al-Amir.  This was a reinforced division
consisting of 67th Mechanized, 88th Armored and 91st Armored Brigades of Syrian army and Hittin
Brigade consisting of Palestinians.  Commanding officer of 2nd Jordanian Infantry Division Brigadier Bahjat
al-Muhaisen (he was married to a woman from a prominent Palestinian family)
went AWOL and Brigadier Zia took command of the division at the request of King
Hussain.  2nd Jordanian Infantry Division was shaky after
desertion of Jordanian commander and Zia helped to keep the formation
intact.  This division helped to take back control of Irbid.  Syrian
armored thrust near Irbid was tackled by 40th Armored Brigade commanded by Colonel Atallah
Ghasib of 3rd Jordanian Armored Division. Major damage to
Syrian armor was done by Royal Jordanian Air Force.  Inside Syria, a power
struggle between Saleh Jadid and Defence Minister and Air Force commander Hafiz
al-Asad was at its peak and Asad decided to keep Syrian Air Force out of
conflict.  In the absence of air cover, Syrian forces were mauled by
Jordanian air force and within two days, battered Syrian troops retreated
back.  Two months later, Asad took control of the affairs of the country
sending Jadid to prison.  In 1970, Nawazish gave a bad Annual Confidential
Report (ACR) to Zia although details of it are not available.  It is not
clear whether report was written before or after September 1970. 
Apparently, report was bad enough to possibly end Zia’s career at the rank of
Brigadier.  Zia asked his former Commanding Officer (CO) of Guides Cavalry
Colonel (R) Pir Abdullah Shah for help.  Abdullah asked then Chief of
General Staff (CGS) Major General Gul Hassan Khan (Zia had also served under
Gul Hassan) and report was quashed by army chief General Yahya Khan on Gul’s
recommendation.   

 

Traditionally,
Oman recruits from specific Baluch communities to man its state security
forces.  This is not new and the practice goes back to several
decades.  Pakistan is not the sole source of manpower for security
services but citizens of a number of other countries also serve in Omani
security forces.  Oman was facing a rebellion in southern region in 1960s
and 70s.  In 1960s, two Southern Regiments consisting of Baluchis were
raised.  In 1971, a Frontier Force battalion consisting of Baluchis was
also raised. 

 

Many Pakistanis along
with other foreigners serve in Bahrain’s police, National Guard and armed
forces.  This fact has been highlighted recently in view of protests in
many Arab states and additional requirement of personnel for riot
control.  Bahrain saw large scale protests recently against ruling
dynasty.  Government needed more man power to control the situation. 
GCC under the leadership of Saudi Arabia sent about 4000 soldiers mostly Saudi
troops to Bahrain.  Bahrain’s foreign minister Khalid Bin Ahmed al Khalifa
visited Islamabad in March 2011 and Commander of Bahrain’s National Guards
Lieutenant General Sheikh Mohammad bin Isa bin Salman al-Khalifa visited
Pakistan in December 2010 and June 2011.  Defence cooperation between two
countries was the main subject during the talks, however Pakistan army knowing
the potential political fallout stayed in the background and let the President
and Prime Minister handle the issue.  No exact data is available but some
estimate that few thousand Pakistanis serve in Bahrain’s police, National
Guards and armed forces.  A small Pakistani contingent of about a
battalion strength has been serving mainly in training capacity long before the
start of protests.  There is no evidence that these Pakistani soldiers
were used in crackdown on protesters.  In the last few months, about 1000
additional retired military personnel from Pakistan have been recruited for
Bahrain by welfare foundations run by Pakistan army and navy. 

 

In Bahrain the
negative fallout is for a large number of Pakistani workers and there have been
instances of violence against them.  Several Pakistanis were killed and
many wounded by angry mobs of Bahrainis.  Many Pakistanis left their homes
for fear of their safety.  Some of these Pakistanis families are now
living in facilities run by Bahraini government as well as Pakistan Club run by
Pakistani embassy.  Bahraini protesters obviously object to presence of
foreigners in security apparatus but there is also a sectarian angle. 
Majority of population is Shia while ruling family is Sunni.  They view
recruitment of foreign Sunnis as an attempt to suppress Shia.   Iran
obviously sympathizing with Shia kin of Bahrain has strongly objected to
recruitment of Pakistanis in Bahrain’s forces.  Pakistan’s charge de
affairs in Tehran was summoned by Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister and warned
about negative fallout on Pakistan-Iran relations.  In addition, Shia
organizations in Pakistan also protested this action of Pakistani
government.  As expected Pakistani Sunni clerics came out supporting Saudi
Arabia and Gulf sheikhdoms. 

 The best course
for Bahrain is to use minimal force, deploy mainly indigenous forces for law
and order and institute constitutional reforms to satisfy its own
citizens.  Heavy handedness will surely radicalize some in the opposition
resulting in a self-fulfilled prophecy.  If there is any proof of foreign
involvement in unrest, they should make it public.  On part of opposition
forces, it will be suicidal for their cause to get direct help from Iran. 
This will simply confirm the ruling dynasty’s narrative that Shia are not loyal
citizens of the state thus justifying continued denial of their rights. 
Leaders of opposition movement have great responsibility to keep protests
peaceful. 

 
Saudi Arabia and
Iran are engaged in a sectarian war for the last three decades.  The
battlefields are scattered everywhere including Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan and
Pakistan.  New battle lines are being drawn where Saudi Arabia is trying
to scare Iran by threat of overwhelming Sunni numbers.  Riyadh is lining
up Sunni countries including almost all Arab countries, Pakistan, Malaysia and
Indonesia.   Iran is left with a smaller team of ruling Alawi Syrian
regime and Hezbollah.  The prospect of a new potential ally in case of
overthrow of minority Sunni ruling dynasty in Bahrain is quite a welcome
thought for Iran.  To counter enormous numbers Tehran is also trying to
work with Sunni schools of thought at variance with Saudi puritanical version
as well as trying to take control of the ā€˜emotional push button’ issue of
Palestinian cause by supporting almost exclusively Sunni Hamas in occupied
territories. 

 

Iran is very
nervous at losing its only Arab ally Syria.  Tehran is vocally supporting
opposition movements in all Arab countries but totally silent about
Syria.  The reason is quite obvious that in case of a democratic change in
Syria, the power hold of minority Alawi regime will disappear.  Thought of
a Sunni government in Damascus is quite discomforting to Tehran.  If new
government aligns with Saudi Arabia, it can cut off the lifeline of Tehran’s
support to its proxies in Lebanon.  Tehran can potentially loose one
important ally (Syria) and left with a much weaker proxy (Hezbollah) in one
stroke.  If recently concluded Egypt mediated reconciliation between Fatah
and Hamas results in weaning of Hamas from Tehran, then Iran will be left only
with a weak Hezbollah on Middle Eastern chessboard.  The case of Bahrain
is opposite where Shia majority is ruled by a Sunni dynasty.  In case of
democratic change, a Shia dominated government more friendly with Tehran can
come to power.  It was this fear that sent shock waves in Riyadh forcing
dispatch of Saudi troops to Bahrain.  Riyadh is trying to rally Arab as
well as non-Arab countries to its cause.  GCC welcomed Jordan and
Morocco’s request to join GCC.  Saudis are also negotiating with Indonesia
and Malaysia for possible troop commitment in Gulf. 

 

Saudi Arabia and
Iran are actively involved in Afghanistan and Pakistan through their proxies. 
Recently, Director General of Inter Services Intelligence (DGISI) Lieutenant
General Ahmad Shuja Pasha disclosed during in-camera briefing to Parliament
that some Pakistani clerics were receiving funds from Saudi Arabia.  It is
an open secret that a large number of madrassahs in Pakistan receive funds from
government and non-government sources from Gulf and Saudi Arabia.  Iran on
its part is trying to counter this by supporting its own proxies inside
Pakistan. 

 
Tehran and
Riyadh are embarking on a very dangerous course and both countries are equally
guilty of stoking the sectarian fires all over the Muslim world.  Every
effort should be made by citizens of both countries to put pressure on their
respective governments to focus on internal problems and avoid proxy war. 
Citizens of both countries deserve a peaceful and prosperous future and not to
be used as instruments of another round of fratricidal war.  Tehran should
remember that the ā€˜spring’ is not going to be restricted to Arab world. 
Young Iranians are as disappointed from their own cleric cum politicians. 
Large scale protests in the aftermath of President Ahmadinejad’s elections were
the first warning shots.  The pressure from below is gradually building
and in the next 2-3 years, it is very likely that streets of major Iranian
cities will see large scale protests.  It is in Iranian interest to focus
more on internal problems and avoid stoking the sectarian fires.

 
Increased
involvement of Pakistan in the security affairs of Arab countries can have some
negative fallout.  It will increase the sectarian gulf inside Pakistan and
first shots were recently fired.  In Karachi, there was wall chalking
against recruitment of Pakistanis in Bahrain’s security forces and Shia
organizations staged protests.  In response, clerics of Ahl Hadith (group
close to Saudi school of thought) and Deobandi school of thought gathered and
raised concerns about criticism of Sunni ruling houses of Arab world. 
There was a grenade attack on Saudi Consulate in Karachi and few days later a
Saudi diplomat was assassinated in Karachi. A large number of Pakistanis work
in Gulf states and Saudi Arabia.  Pakistan’s involvement in security
affairs in the context of protests entails the risk that all Pakistanis will be
linked with the state’s oppression thus coming under attack from opposition
forces of these countries.  Recently, there were attacks on Pakistani
workers in Bahrain causing fear among all Pakistanis. 

 
Pakistan’s main
problem is its economy.  Pakistan’s increased engagement in security
affairs of Gulf is transactional in nature.  In view of deteriorating
relations with U.S. and potential drying up of economic resources from
Washington is forcing Pakistani civilian and military leaders to look towards
newer and greener pastures.   Oil prices running over $100 a barrel
means that new checks will come from Arab patrons.  No one hands money
freely and in return Pakistan will be asked to do some heavy lifting. 
Poor countries like Pakistan are now caught in the fratricidal war in the house
of Islam.  Pakistan can diminish the fallout for its own country by
following the example of Bangladesh.  Bangladesh has so far kept its
forces out of the Middle East fires.  Instead it gets economic benefits
from increasing troop contribution to more acceptable and less risky United
Nations peace keeping missions.  If Pakistan can strictly limit military
missions to training in Gulf then it can mitigate some of the side effects of
such ventures.
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
Some more tidbits from Arab Air-Force historian “Crowbat”
Here some additional ‘bits and pieces’ that might be useful to enhance Mr.
Hussain’s write-up. It’s based on interviews with several Jordanian, Egyptian,
and one of Bangladeshi (ex-Pakistani) pilots that served during those fateful
times (entire story can be found in books Arab MiGs, Volume 3, and Arab MiGs, Volume 4):

– Pakistani Air Force was
posting two of its pilots to the RJAF already since early 1960s. One of them,
Hamid Anwar, barely survived a crash with a two-seat Hunter flown by RJAF pilot
1st Lt Amer Zaza, in 1964 (Anwar ejected on time, Zaza too late: he descended
with the parachute right into the burning wrecakge of their aircraft…).

– Two PAF officers served with No. 1 Squadron RJAF (flying Hunters),
during the June 1967 Arab Israeli War, and were granted permission to fly combat
sorties over Jordan. Flt Lt Saif-ul-Azam flew two sorties on 6 June 1967, then
evacuated to Iraq with rest of RJAF fighter-pilots, and flew another sortie with
Iraqi Hunters over H-3 airfield, two days later. He was credited with three
confirmed kills and highly decorated (by Jordanians, Iraqis, and Pakistanis),
before quitting the PAF and joining the newly-established Bangladesh Air Force,
following the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. Flt Lt Sarwar Shad fell ill and was
hospitalized, on 5 June 1967, and did not fly during that war.

– After
the June 1967 War, Azam and Shad were replaced by two unknown pilots. For most
of the next two years, they served with the RJAF contingent in Iraq (based there
because nearly all of Jordanian Hunters were destroyed and airfields had to be
repaired). In March 1969, these were replaced by Flt Lts Noor Khan (future Air
Marshal) and Akmal: immediately on arrival in Amman, Noor Khan and Akmal were
sent to Dmeyr AB in Syria, where they joined the rest of reorganized No.1
Squadron RJAF. Within few weeks, they were reinforced by a bigger group of
advisers, including Muhammad Mahmood Alam (probably the most famous PAF pilot of
the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War), Arif Manzoor, Atique Sufi, Shahid Foozi and
Sarafaz…. (there would be a lot to say about what kind of training they run in
Syria, but that’s ‘a different story’…).

– As soon as Mafraq AB was
completely rebuilt and extended, they moved back to Jordan and then the RJAF
began receiving F-104 Starfighters from the USA. During the summer 1969,
Pakistanis assisted in conversion of about 15 Jordanian pilots to that
type…

…that said, it seems at least a few Pakistanis did remain in
Syria until at least 1972, when they were met there by the CO of an Egyptian
MiG-17-squadron deployed in that country…

A big delegation from
Pakistani Army visited Jordan immediately after the June 1967 War. I don’t know
much about it though. Jordanians only told me that the Pakistanis were
instrumental for reorganization of the Jordanian Army and introduction of
divisional structure.

– In regards of Saudi Arabia… it was around the
same time – i.e. between 1967 and 1970 – that another group of PAF pilots was
seconded to the RSAF. They flew six Hunters acquired to support introduction to
service of Lightning interceptors purchased by Saudi Arabia from the UK, and did
so together with a small group of contracted British personnel. It was them that
saw the ‘standoff’ with Egyptian forces involved in Yemen War ofthe 1960s,
mentioned by Mr. Hussein. I do not know any of their names, though…

 
———————————————————————————————————————
and from Pakistani Air-Force writer Group Capt. M. Kaisar Tufail (PAF)
Post-haste summons for volunteers found an eager band of sixteen Pakistan Air Force (PAF) fighter-pilots on their way to the Middle East, in the midst of the 1973 Arab-Israeli ‘Ramadhan’ War. After a gruelling Peshawar-Karachi-Baghdad flight on a PAF Fokker F-27, they were whisked off to Damascus in a Syrian jet. Upon arrival, half the batch was told to stay back in Syria while the rest were earmarked for Egypt. By the time the PAF batch reached Cairo, Egypt had agreed to a cease-fire; it was therefore decided that they would continue as instructors. But in Syria it was another story.

The batch in Syria was made up of pilots who were already serving there on deputation (except one), but had been repatriated before the war. Now they were back in familiar surroundings as well as familiar aircraft, the venerable MiG-21. They were posted to No. 67 Squadron, ‘Alpha’ Detachment (all PAF). Hasty checkouts were immediately followed by serious business of Air Defence Alert scrambles and Combat Air Patrols from the air base at Dumayr.

Syria had not agreed to a ceasefire, since Israeli operations in Golan were continuing at a threatening pace. Israeli Air Force missions included interdiction under top cover, well supported by intense radio jamming as the PAF pilots discovered. The PAF formation using the call-sign “Shahbaz” was formidable in size – all of eight aircraft. Shahbaz soon came to stand out as one that couldn’t be messed with, in part because its tactics were innovative and bold. Survival, however, in a jammed-radio environment was concern number one. As a precaution, the Pakistanis decided to switch to Urdu for fear of being monitored in English. Suspicions were confirmed during one patrol, when healthy Punjabi invectives hurled on radio got them wondering if Mossad had recruited a few Khalsas for the job!

After several months of sporadic activity, it seemed that hostilities were petering out. While the Shahbaz patrols over Lebanon and Syria had diminished in frequency, routine training sorties started to register a rise. Under these conditions it was a surprise when on the afternoon of 26th April 1974, the siren blasted from the air-shafts of the underground bunker. Backgammon boards were pushed aside and the “qehva” session was interrupted as all eight pilots rushed to their MiGs; they were airborne within minutes. From Dumayr to Beirut, then along the Mediterranean coast till Sidon, and a final leg eastwards, skirting Damascus and back to base – this was the usual patrol, flown at an altitude of 6 km.

The limited fuel of their early model MiG-21F permitted just a 30 minutes sortie; this was almost over when ground radar blurted out on the radio that two bogeys (unidentified aircraft) were approaching from the southerly direction ie Israel. At this stage fuel was low and an engagement was the least preferred option. Presented with a fait accompli, the leader of the formation called a defensive turn into the bogeys. Just then heavy radio jamming started, sounding somewhat similar to the “takka tak” at our meat joints, only more shrill. While the formation was gathering itself after the turn, two Israeli F-4E Phantoms sped past almost head-on, seemingly unwilling to engage. Was it a bait?

Flt. Lt. Sattar Alvi, now the rear-most in the formation, was still adjusting after the hard turn when he caught sight of two Mirage-IIICJ zooming into them from far below. With no way of warning the formation of the impending disaster, he instinctively decided to handle them alone. Peeling away from his formation, he turned hard into the Mirages so that one of them overshot. Against the other, he did a steep reversal dropping his speed literally to zero. (it takes some guts to let eight tons of metal hang up in unfriendly air!) The result was that within a few seconds the second Mirage filled his gun-sight, the star of David and all. While Sattar worried about having to concentrate for precious seconds in aiming and shooting, the lead Mirage started to turn around to get Sattar. Thinking that help was at hand, the target Mirage decided to accelerate away. A quick-witted Sattar reckoned that a missile shot would be just right for the range his target had opened up to. A pip of a button later, a K-13 heat-seeker sped off towards the tail of the escaping Mirage. Sattar recollects that it wasn’t as much an Israeli aircraft as a myth that seemed to explode in front of him. (The letter ‘J’ in Mirage-IIICJ stood for ‘Jewish’, it may be noted.) He was tempted to watch the flaming metal rain down, but with the other Mirage lurking around and fuel down to a few hundred litres, he decided to exit. Diving down with careless abandon, he allowed a couple of Sonic bangs over Damascus. (word has it that the Presidential Palace wasn’t amused). His fuel tanks bone dry, Sattar made it to Dumayr on the vapours that remained.

As the other formation members started to trickle in, the leader, Sqn. Ldr. Arif Manzoor anxiously called out for Sattar to check if he was safe. All had thought that Sattar, a bit of a maverick that he was, had landed himself in trouble. Shouts of joy went up on the radio, however, when they learnt that he had been busy shooting down a Mirage.

The Syrians were overwhelmed when they learnt that the impunity and daring of the Pakistani pilots had paid off. Sattar was declared a blood brother by the Syrians, for he had shared in shedding the blood of a common enemy, they explained.

Sattar’s victim Captain M. Lutz of No. 5 Air Wing, Israeli Air Force (IAF), based at Hatzor, ejected out of his disintegrating aircraft. It has been learnt that the Mirages were on a reconnaissance mission, escorted by Phantoms of No. 1 Air Wing, IAF operating out of Ramat David Air base. The Phantoms were to trap any interceptors while the Mirages carried out the recce. Timely warning by the radar controller (also from the PAF) had turned the tables on the escorts, allowing Sattar to sort out the Mirages.

The dogfight over Golan is testimony to the skills of all PAF pilots, insists Sattar, as he thinks anyone could have got the kill had he been “Shahbaz-8” on that fateful day. Sattar and his leader Sqn. Ldr. Arif Manzoor, were awarded two of Syria’s highest decorations for gallantry, the Wisaam Faris and Wisaam Shuja’at. The Government of Pakistan awarded them a Sitara-e-Jurat each. Sattar, an epitome of a fighter pilot, befittingly went on to command PAF’s elite Combat Commanders’ School (CCS) and the premier PAF Base Rafiqui (Shorkot). He retired recently as an Air Commodore. 

CrowBat is offline Report Post
 

 

Slouching Towards Mecca?

Mark Lilla has a review of Michel Houellbecq’s new book at the New York Review of Books.

Final paragraph:
For all Houellebecq’s knowingness about contemporary culture—the way we love, the way we work, the way we die—the focus in his novels is always on the historical longue durĆ©e. He appears genuinely to believe that France has, regrettably and irretrievably, lost its sense of self, but not because of immigration or the European Union or globalization. Those are just symptoms of a crisis that was set off two centuries ago when Europeans made a wager on history: that the more they extended human freedom, the happier they would be. For him, that wager has been lost. And so the continent is adrift and susceptible to a much older temptation, to submit to those claiming to speak for God. Who remains as remote and as silent as ever.”

Michel Houellbecq’s own interview about his book was good
Why did you do it?
For several reasons, I’d say. First of all, I think, it’s my job, though I don’t care for that word. I noticed some big changes when I moved back to France, though these changes are not specifically French, but rather Western. As an exile you don’t take much of an interest in anything, really, neither your society of origin nor the place you live—and besides, Ireland is a slightly odd case. I think the second reason is that my atheism hasn’t quite survived all the deaths I’ve had to deal with. In fact, it came to seem unsustainable to me.
 
Personally, I think it doesnt matter. In fact, I have a cheerfuly optimistic pessimistic alternative: Whatever happens, some people will understand the technology and use it better> They will be the ones on top (even if they themselves are consumed by loneliness and unhappiness)…precariously and viciously balanced on top of vast mountains of bodies and civil wars… and masses of unhappy struggling infighting desperately envious Muslims who have no clue they are the ones that are supposed to be so close to submission and true happiness.
So there…
 
Photo by Sylvain Bourmeau

Empower women; let them marry out of their clan & race

I have excerpted several paragraphs (after the jump) of this excellent article where black women need to follow the footsteps of Asian women and start intermarrying at much higher levels.

Of course intermarriage rates vary by region. White men in California in 1990 were more than six times as likely as Midwestern white men to marry outside their race. Overall, interracial marriages are more than twice as common in California (1 in 10 new couples) as in the rest of the country (1 in 25). According to the magazine Interrace, San Jose, San Diego and Oakland are among the Top 10 cities for interracial couples. America’s racial complexion, then, will change more quickly on the coasts than in the heartland.
Nevertheless, the overall increase in intermarriage means that both multicultural liberals and nativist conservatives have misunderstood the major demographic trends in this country. There is not going to be a nonwhite majority in the 21st century. Rather, there is going to be a mostly white mixed-race majority. The only way to stop this is to force all Hispanic and Asian-Americans from now on to marry within their officially defined groups. And that is not going to happen.
Thus, the old duality between whites and nonwhites is finally breaking down. But don’t cheer just yet. For what seems to be emerging in the United States is a new dichotomy between blacks and nonblacks. Increasingly, whites, Asians and Hispanics are creating a broad community from which black Americans may be excluded.
Disparities in interracial marriages underline this problem. Black-white marriages have risen from a reported 51,000 in 1960 (when they were still illegal in many states) to 311,000 in 1997. Marriages between white men and black women, though still uncommon, rose from 27,000 in 1980 to 122,000 in 1995. Although black out-marriage rates have risen, they remain much lower than out-marriage rates for Hispanics, Asians and American Indians. For the 25-34 age group, only 8 percent of black men marry outside their race. Less than 4 percent of black women do so.
While many blacks frown upon marriage by blacks to members of other groups — such relationships are viewed by some as disloyal — it seems very unlikely that such conservative attitudes are more pronounced among black Americans than among whites or Hispanic or Asian immigrants. The major cause of low black out-marriage rates may well be anti-black prejudice — the most enduring feature of the eroding American caste system. Furthermore, antiblack prejudice is often picked up by immigrants, when it is not brought with them from their countries of origin.

In the past, the existence of an untouchable caste of blacks may have made it easier for Anglo-Americans to fuse with more recent European immigrants in an all-encompassing white community. Without blacks as a common other, the differences between Anglo-Americans, German-Americans, Irish-Americans and Italian-Americans might have seemed much more important. Could this be occurring again? A Knight-Ridder poll taken in May 1997 showed that while respondents were generally comfortable with intermarriage, a full 3 in 10 respondents opposed marriage between blacks and whites.
According to the 1990 census, white men 25-34 in the U.S. military were 2.3 times as likely to marry nonwhite women as civilians. And white women in the same age group who served in the military in the 1980’s were seven times as likely as their civilian counterparts to have black husbands. Indeed, for all groups except for Asian men, military service makes out-marriage much more likely. The reason for this is clear: the U.S. military is the most integrated institution in American society because it is the most egalitarian and meritocratic. It is also — not coincidentally — the least libertarian and least tolerant of subcultural diversity. It may be that in the nation as a whole, as in the military, the integration of individuals can be achieved only at the price of the sacrifice of lesser differences to a powerful common identity.
In the end, racial intermarriage is a result, not a cause, of racial integration. Racial integration, in turn, is a result of social equality. The civil rights revolution abolished racial segregation by law, but not racial segregation by class. Ending racial segregation by class might — just might — bring about an end to race itself in America. It is certainly worth a try.

The Beige And The Black

New Pundits- Asians can never be upper-class?

My friend, Shoaib, and I have started a new blog called New Pundits. The main advantage of NP is that it’s WordPress, which I prefer much more to Blogger. At any rate NP is still very much in it’s infancy. I believe we started BP around Christmas time 2010 so it’s almost years on and still going strong. I’m a very big fan of the UNZ review, which is really becoming a staple of the alternative media scene and there is no reason in my mind why the fledgling Desi Diaspora shouldn’t have something similar to that.

Last night at dinner I was mentioning to some friends that London was now becoming so Asian that segregation is now an entrenched phenomenon. It’s best seen in social groupings of the prime demographic (20’s & 30’s); very few of them are mixed in any real sense. Class has always been a huge determiner in Britain (which school did you go to?) and a friend of mine once told me “Asians can never be upper class.”

Now I remember this statement very distinctly as it was said in a mixture of remorse & bitterness. At the moment I deeply disagreed with the statement but now that I think of it, it is true that the British Asian (Sikh & Hindu community especially) is merging into the middle classes (just as the Muslim community, for the large part the Mirpuri & Tower Hamlet contingents, are floating between the working and reckless classes).

However I’ll end this slight meandering on this note. I know of a Sindhi lady who fell in love with an Englishman in the 40’s and as a result of familial disapproval, eschewed her love and stayed single. She did mention that in those days many Indian girls liked Englishmen because they were so dapper and looked good (obviously in a subcontinent that venerates fairness, Northwest Europeans would have some advantages). However what was interesting to me is that apart from the early generations of the East India Company (mixtures which created the Anglo-Indians) we don’t really think of Europeans and Indians mixing (especially after the British disbarred royal intermarriage in the fear that the Indian Royalty would go the way of the Aga Khan and be fully Europeanised in a few generations).

Perhaps the reason why British Asians stand apart from the class structure is simply because the culture of intermarriage is so weak compared to any other global culture (East Asians embrace it with alacrity and even black population mix in Europe).

This is a rape culture

I’m not a big fan of the latest and newest terminologies that are bandied about by “social justice warrior” types. The issue is not the terminology taken literally, but its context. In the United States a focus on college campuses strikes me as fixating on a population less at risk, but class privileged. Rather, the more economically and socially marginal women, not women as a whole, is probably where the cultural focus should be. But these people are generally not in the limelight, and are not able to fluently deploy the verbal tools which the more educated are familiar with and understand and unlock keys of media attention (this goes to the issue that when a sex or race are viewed as a class as a whole without distinction resources and attention often go to its more elite segments).*

These terms become even more freighted when viewed in a cross-cultural context. Consider what is occurring in India, as one of the Delhi rapists has now spoken in a film. Man Convicted of Rape in Delhi Blames Victim:

You can’t clap with one hand,ā€ said Mr. Singh, who was convicted of rape and murder, though he denied taking part in the assault. ā€œIt takes two hands. A decent girl won’t roam around at 9 o’clock at night. A girl is far more responsible for rape than a boy. Boy and girl are not equal. Housework and housekeeping is for girls, not roaming in discos and bars at night doing wrong things, wearing wrong clothes. About 20 percent of girls are good.ā€

As abhorrent as the views are, we can’t look away. They reflect real sentiments which must be abolished.

* Can you imagine that the UVA rape story could be transferred into a public housing project, and still be published in a high profile journal such as Rolling Stone?

Islam, ISIS and the Dream of the Blue Flower

First published on 3quarksdaily.com

A few days ago, Graeme Wood wrote a piece in the Atlantic that has generated a lot of buzz (and controversy). In this article he noted that:
“The reality is that the Islamic State is Islamic. Very Islamic. Yes, it has attracted psychopaths and adventure seekers, drawn largely from the disaffected populations of the Middle East and Europe. But the religion preached by its most ardent followers derives from coherent and even learned interpretations of Islam”
The article is well worth reading and it certainly does not label all Muslims as closet (or open) ISIS supporters, but it does emphasize that many of the actions of ISIS have support in classical Islamic texts (and not just in fringe Kharijite opinion). This has led to accusations of Islamophobia and critics have been quick to respond. A widely cited response in “Think Progress” quotes Graeme Wood’s own primary source (Princeton scholar Bernard Hakykel) as saying:
ā€œI think that ISIS is a product of very contingent, contextual, historical factors. There is nothing predetermined in Islam that would lead to ISIS.ā€
Indeed. Who could possibly disagree with that? I dont think Graeme Wood disagrees. In fact, he explicitly says he does not. But that statement is a beginning, not a conclusion. What contingent factors and what historical events are important and which ones are a complete distraction from the issue at hand? 
Every commentator has his or her (implicit, occasionally explicit) “priors” that determine what gets attention and from what angle;  and a lot of confusion clearly comes from a failure to explain (or to grasp) the background assumptions of each analyst. I thought I would put together a post that outlines some of my own background assumptions and arguments in as simple a form as possible and see where it leads. So here, in no particular order, are some random comments about Islam, terrorism and ISIS that I hope will, at a minimum, help me put my own thoughts in order. Without further ado:
1. The early history of Islam is, among other things, the history of a remarkably successful imperium. Like any empire, it was created by conquest. The immediate successors of the prophet launched a war of conquest whose extent and rapidity matched that of the Mongols and the Alexandrian Greeks, and whose successful consolidation, long historical life, and development of an Arabized culture, far outshone the achievements of the Mongols or the Manchus (both of whom adopted the existing deeper rooted religions and cultures of their conquered people rather than impose or develop their own).
2. Islam, the religion we know today (the classical Islam of the four Sunni schools, as well as the various Shia sects) developed in the womb of the Arab empire. It provided a unifying ideology and a theological justification for that empire (and in the case of various Shia sects, varying degrees of resistance or revolt against that empire) but, at the very least, Islam and the nascent Arab empire grew and developed togetherone was not the later product of the fully formed other. Being, in it’s classical form, the religion of a (very successful and impressive) imperialist project, it is not surprising that its”official” Sunni version has a military and supremacist feel to it. Classical Islam is not intolerant of all other religions (though it is in principle almost completely intolerant of pagans) but the rules and regulations of the four classical schools all agree on the superior status of Muslims and impose certain restrictions, disabilities and taxes on the followers of the “religions of the book” that they do tolerate. By the standards of contemporary European “Christendom”, many of these rules appear tolerant and broad-minded; and since Western intellectuals (leftists as much, or even more than rightists) are completely focused on European history and culture (and therefore,on the achievements and deficiencies of that culture), this relative tolerance is frequently remarked upon as a stellar feature of Islamicate civilization. But it should be noted that this degree of tolerance is quite intolerant compared to contemporary Chinese or Indian norms and is horrendously intolerant compared to post-enlightenment ideals and fashions. The imposition of Ottoman rules today would be most unwelcome even to post-Marxist intellectuals if they had to live under those rules. Of course, this does not mean they cannot speak highly of these norms as long as they themselves are a safe distance away from them, but such long-distance  approval is of academic interest (literally, academic) and not our concern for the purposes of this post.


3. Modern states and modern politics (not just all the complex debates about how power should be exercised, who exercises it, who decides who exercises it etc., but also the institutions and mechanisms that evolved to manage modern states and modern politics) mostly reached their current form in Europe. They did not arise from nothing. Many ancient strands grew and intersected to create these states and their political institutions. And there are surely things about this evolution that are contingent and would have been different if they had happened elsewhere. But there are also many features of modern life that are based on new and universally applicable discoveries about human psychology, human biology and human sociology. They have made possible new levels of organization and productivity and in a globalized world (and the Eurasian landmass has had some sort of exchange of ideas for millennia, but this process has accelerated now by orders of magnitude) it is impossible for any large population to ignore these advances and suvive unmolested by those willing to take advantage of these advances.
The modern world that has been created is not just one random “civilization” among many. It is the cutting edge of human knowledge and the human ability to apply that knowledge to good and evil ends. Whatever else it may be (and there is no shortage of people who feel it is too oppressive, too unfair, too fast, too anxiety-provoking, too inhuman, etc etc.) it is an extremely powerful and progressive culture. You can reject it, and countless people (including, it seems, many of the most privileged intellectuals of this very civilization) do reject many aspects of it. But it should also be noted that there are degrees of rejection. Most of the critics (but not all of them) are either critics-from-within, who only reject certain aspects of it, or non-serious critics whose wholesale contempt for the project is not matched by any equivalent personal commitment or serious consideration of alternatives. Most of them also seem unable to do without critical aspects of modernity. Aspects you cannot have without having far more of the rest than they seem to care for. To give two random examples, I have never met a multiculturalist liberal or leftist in the West (including those of Desi origin) who is willing to himself or herself live under the restrictive sexual morality and the community-centric balance of community vs individual rights characteristic of “traditional cultures’. And I have NEVER met an Islamist who did not want an air-force (you can work out for yourself all the other innovations and institutional mechanisms that would be needed in order to have a competitive indigenous air-force). 
In fact, forget traditional cultures, just look at Maoist China and the Khmer Rouge, both of whom explicitly rejected modern individualism and mere meritocracy and insisted they wanted to be “Red rather than Expert“. One ended up honoring the legacy of Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping over Mao, the other ended up on the proverbial “dust heap of history”. There is a lesson (or several lessons) in those choices and their spectacular failure.
In short, the only people who can realistically stay outside of “our universal civilization” are either museum communities permitted to survive as quaint exemplars of bygone days (like the Amish) or VERY tiny communities that are so isolated and remote that they have escaped the maw of the Eurasian beast until now.  Our universal civilization does not have to be seen as positively as Naipaul famously saw it, but it still has to be seen for what it is, a gigantic human achievement and a work in progress; all criticism and resistance being included within it (dialectics anyone?) 
And it is important to note that this universal civilization is no longer exclusively European (and never was exclusively European for that matter). Soon, this universal civilization may be dominated by non-European people, a fact that Eurocentric PostMarxist intellectuals seem to have very great difficulty assimilating into their worldview. The institutions and ideas that developed in Europe (from earlier sources that came from all over Eurasia) in the last 400 years have been adopted and adapted already by several Asian nations (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan), with China not far behind and India set to follow. Muslims are not special enough to escape that fate. The only thing truly remarkable about the Muslim core region is the widespread desire to integrate huge elements of modern civilization while remaining medieval in terms of theology, law and politics. Of course we are not unique in this desire; there are Indians and Chinese and Japanese who “reject  modernity” as being too European, and who insist they have an alternative path. Whether they do or do not is to some extent a matter of semantics, but Muslims are not unique in claiming that “we are a fundamentally different civilization”. Where we are unique (for now) is only in our inability to generate a genuinely open debate on this topic; the tendency in the Islamicate core is for almost everyone in the public sphere to pay lip-service to delusional or formulaic and practically meaningless Islamist ideals and to avoid direct criticism of medieval laws and theology. This is unlike how it is routine for Indians to criticize Indian “fundamentalists” or Christians to criticize Christian ones. And for that we have to thank the blasphemy and apostasy memes more than any intrinsic unchangeability of Islamicate laws and theology.
4. But while Islamicate empires (the dominant form of political organization in the middle east and South Asia from the advent of Islam to the colonial era) insisted they were “Islamic” and used Islam (especially in the first 500 years) as the central justification for their expansionist ambitions, there was another sense in which these same empires had a near-total separation of mosque and state. All these empires operated as typical Eurasian empires and they were, in most administrative details, a straightforward evolution of previous imperial patterns in that region. Religion was part and parcel of the empires, but religious doctrine provided practically no guidance to the political process. The rulers used religion to justify their rule, but the battle-axe determined who got to rule and how. Some rulers attempted to conduct an inquisition and impose their favorite theology on their subjects, but most were content to get post-facto approval for their rule from the ulama (and the ulama were happy to oblige). Islamic theologians accepted practically ANY ruler as long the ruler said he was Muslim and continued to work for the expansion of the Islamic empire. ALL four schools of classical Sunni Islam insisted that the ruler should be obeyed and rebellion was unislamic. This did not stop people from rebelling, but once a rebellion succeeded, the ulama advised submission to whatever ambitious and capable prince had managed to kill his way to the top. An imaginary idealized Islamic state was discussed at times but had little to no connection with actual power politics.
5. It must also be kept in mind that Empires governed loosely and interfered little with the everyday religious rituals of the ruled, especially outside the urban core. The rulers were interested in collecting taxes and continuing to rule. Most of the ruled gave as little as possible in taxes and had as little as possible to do with their rulers. This is not a specifically Islamic pattern, but it was practically a universal feature of Islamicate empires. Muslim religious literature developed no serious political thought. Power politics was guided more by ā€œMirrors of princesā€ type literature and pre-Muslim (or not-specifically Muslim) traditions and not some detailed notion of ā€œIslamic stateā€. There is really NO detailed “Islamic” blueprint for running a state. The so-called Islamic system of government is a modern myth. Every Islamicate empire down to the late Ottomans ruled in the name of Islam, but they did so using institutions and methods that were typically West-Asian/Central-Asian in origin, or were invented to solve a particular Islamicate problem, but had no direct or necessary connection with fundamental Islamic texts and traditions.  
6. After defeat at the hands of more capable imperialists and during the (relatively brief) colonial interlude, some people dug up the old stories of the rightly guided caliphs; It seems to me that early Islamicate fantasists (like Allama Iqbal in India) took it for granted that the everyday institutional reality of any “Islamic” state would, for the foreseeable future, be much closer to England than it was to Medina (witness for example his approval of the Grand Turkish assembly). Most Muslim leaders, like their Chinese or Japanese counterparts, were first and foremost interested in getting out from under the imperialist thumb. If they gave some thought to the form their states would take, their imagination ranged from Marxist Russian models to very poorly imagined Islamist utopias.  But over time, stories frequently repeated can take on a life of their own. Islamist parties want to create powerful, modern Islamic states. But the stories they were using were more Islamic than modern. The result is that every Islamist party is forever in danger of being hijacked by those espousing simple-minded and unrealistic notions of Shariah law. It turns out that pretending to have ā€œour own unique geniusā€ is much easier than actually having any genius that can get the job done. Modern ideas (fascism, the grand theatre of modern media manipulation, modern methods of guerilla war) are used to promote legal codes and theology whose relationship with these new institutions has not been worked out yet (and I see no problem with sticking my neck out and saying “will NOT be worked out satisfactorily by ANY contemporary Islamist movement). 
7. The MODE of failure may vary, but the failure of the Islamist political project in the next 20 years is inevitable. This is not because there can be no such project in principle, but because the project as it has actually developed in the 20th century is based on the twin illusions of  an ā€œideal Islamic stateā€ and an existing alternative ā€œIslamic political scienceā€ā€¦neither of which actually existed in history. AFTER this failure, there can certainly be new ways of creating modern, workable institutions that have enough of an Islamic coloring to deserve the label “Islamist” while incorporating all (or most) of the new discoveries in the hard sciences as well as in economics, human psychology, politics, social organization, administrative institutions, mass communication and so on.

8. I do want to emphasize that I do not believe Islamic theology per se is some sort of insoluble problem.  It may be a difficult problem, but both liberals who are trying to discover modern fashions in that theology and “Islamophobes” who insist that the theology is a permanently illiberal fascist program are wrong in their emphasis on the centrality of this theology. As Razib put it in an interesting post on this topic on his blog, “Islam is not a religion of the book”. NO religion is a religion of the book. People make religions and people remake them as the times demands. Messily and unpredictably in many cases, but still, there is movement. And in this sense, Islam is no more fixed in stone by what is written or not written in its text (or texts) than any other religion.
Someone commented on Razib’s blog (and I urge you to read the post and the comments, and the hyperlinks, they are all relevant and make this post clearer) as follows:
“Well, if you take the Old Testament and Koran at face value, the OT is more violent. The interesting question is then why Islam ends up being more violent than Judaism or Christianity, and for that I agree you have to thank subsequent tradition and reinterpretation of the violence in the text. It appears that for whatever reason Islam has carried out less of this kind of reinterpretation, so what was originally a less violent founding text ends up causing more violence because it is being interpreted much more literally.”
I replied that there is an easier explanation: Whether the text canonized as “foundational document” does, or does not, explain the imperialism and supremacism of the various Islamicate empires is a red herring. The Quran is a fairly long book, but to an outsider it should be immediately obvious that you can create many different Islams around that book and if you did it all over again, NONE of them have to look like classical Sunni Islam. The details of Sunni Islam (who gets to rule, what daily life is supposed to look like, how non-Muslims should be treated, etc) are not some sort of direct and unambiguous reading of the Quran. While the schools of classical Sunni Islam claim to be based on the Quran and hadith, the Quran and the hadiths are clearly cherry picked and manipulated (and in the case of the hadiths, frequently just invented) based on the perceived needs of the empire, the ulama, the individual commentators, human nature, economics, whatever (insert your favorite element here).
So in principle, we should be able to make new Islams as needed (and some of us have indeed done so over the centuries, the Ismailis being one extreme example; some Sufis being another) and I am others will do just that in the days to come. The Reza Aslan types are right about this much (though i seriously doubt that he can invent anything new or lasting; that does not even seem to be his primary aim). In fact, in terms of practice, millions of Muslims have already “invented new Islams”. Just as a random example, most contemporary Muslims do not have sex with multiple concubines that they captured in the most recent Jihad expedition to the Balkans (or bought from African slave-traders for that matter). Not only do they not buy and sell slaves, they find the thought of doing so somewhat shocking. Also see how countless Muslims lived very obediently under British laws in the British empire and in fact provided a good part of the armies of that empire.  Or see the countless Muslims who take oaths of loyalty to all sorts of “un-Islamic” states and for the most part, turn out to be as loyal and law-abiding as any of their Hindu or Sikh or Christian fellow citizens in the various hedonistic modern states. Their “Islam” has already adapted itself to new realities. 
What sets Muslms apart is really their inability (until now) to publicly and comfortably articulate a philosophical rejection of medieval (aka no longer fashionable) elements of classical Sunni Islam. And for all practical purposes, this is a serious problem only in Muslim majority countries. In other countries that have a strong sense of their own identity and of the necessity of their own laws, Muslims mostly get on with life while following those laws. In the Muslim majority countires, it is the apostasy and blasphemy laws (and the broader memes that uphold those laws) that play a central role in preventing public rejection of unfashionable or unworkable aspects of classical Islam.  A King Hussein or a Benazir Bhutto or even a Rouhani may have private thoughts rejecting X or Y inconvenient parts or medieval Islamicate laws and theology, but to speak up would be to invite accusations of blasphemy and apostasy. So they fudge, they hem and how, and they do one thing while paying lip service to another. Unfortunately, this means the upholders of classical Islam have the edge in debates in the public sphere. And ISIS and the Wahabis are not far enough from mainstream classical Sunni Islam; for example, classical Islamic theology recommends cutting the hands of thieves, stoning adulterers, going on jihad (not just some inner jihad of the Karen Armstrong type, but the real deal), capturing slaves, buying and selling concubines, killing apostates and so on; ISIS of course goes much further in their willingness to kill other Muslims, to rebel against existing rulers and to bypass common humanity and commonly cited restrictions and regulations about prisoners, hostages, punishments and so on, but when they say classical Islam permits the first set of things noted above, they are not lying, the apologists are lying. 
By the way, while this inability to frontally confront aspects of classical Islam that are out of sync with the current age is a serious problem in Muslim communities, it is not insoluble. The internet has made it very hard to keep inconvenient thoughts out of view. So even in Muslim majority countries, there will be much churning and eventually, much change. It’s just that some countries will emerge out of it better than others.
ISIS itself will not get anywhere. Of course, in principle, an evolved ISIS living on in the core Sunni region is possible. But we make predictions based on whatever models we have in our head. Like most predictions in social science and history, these will not be mathematical and precise and our confidence in them (or our ability to convince others, even when others accept most of our premises) will not be akin to the predictions of mathematics or physics. But for whatever it’s worth, I don’t think ISIS will settle into some semi-comfortable equilibrium (irrespective of whether more capable powers like Israel or Turkey or even the CIA are supporting them or not). They will only destroy and create chaos. And eventually they will be destroyed. It is possible that in the process parts of Syria, Iraq and North Africa could become like Somalia; too messy, too violent and too poor to be worth the effort of pacification, even by intact nearby states. But even if a Somalia-like situation continues for years, it will not go on forever. The real estate involved is too valuable, the communities involved were too integrated in the modern world, to be left alone. Eventually someone will bring order to to those parts. Though it is likely that this “someone” will be local and will use more force and cruder methods than liberal modern intellectuals are comfortable with. The first stage of pacification is more likely to be handled by local agents of distant imperialists, not directly by the imperialists themselves. That is just the way it is likely to work best. 
Of course, success and failure are always relative to something. If the zeitgeist (whatever that means) is no longer in favor of something then a “successful” policy would be one that achieves a soft landing. Since the zeitgeist is (almost by definition) unknowable in full in real time, even the soft landing is not going to land where the first planners of soft landing imagined it as being headed. Being able to land softly, wherever that may be is the best outcome we can hope for in many cases. With that cheery note, here are some other useful links (many extracted from an extremely learned discussion on smallwarsjournal)  that shed light on some aspects of the above, raise opposing ideas, or help to understand where I am coming from. 

 Our religion problem by Babar Sattar in DAWN Pakistan. 
 Reforming the blasphemy laws, in many ways, an enlightened “Islam-based” initiative.  
 Razib Khan on “The Islamic State is right about some things”
 From Zenpundit Charles Cameron on Misquoting Mohammed 
“Brown is a Muslim, a professor at Georgetown, and author of Hadith: Muhammad’s Legacy in the Medieval and Modern World. His book Misquoting Muhammad ā€” not his choice of title, btw — lays open the varieties of interpretive possibility in dealing with the Qur’an and ahadith with comprehensive scholarship and clarity. In light of the upsurge in interest in Islamic and Islamist religious teachings occasioned by Graeme Woodā€˜s recentAtlantic article, I asked Prof. Brown’s permission to reproduce here the section of his book dealing with abrogation and the rules of war.
Here then, with his permission, is an extract from Misquoting Muhammad. I hope it will prove of use both here and to others beyond the circle of Zenpundit readers. Spread the word!”
http://zenpundit.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Extract-from-Misquoting-Muhammad.pdf
An ISIS reading list. 
MUST read: Enough about Islam: Why religion is not the most useful way to understand ISIS
From a conservative Western perspective: The fantasy of an Islamic reformation. 

“Q 2:256, ā€œThere is no compulsion in religion . . .ā€ (lā ikrāha fÄ« l-dÄ«ni) has become the locus classicus for discussions of religious tolerance in Islam. Surprisingly enough, according to the ā€œcircumstances of revelationā€ (asbāb al-nuzÅ«l) literature (see occasions of revelation), it was revealed in connection with the expulsion of the Jewish tribe of BanÅ« l-NadÄ«r from Medina in 4⁄625 In the earliest works of exegesis (see exegesis of the Quran: classical and medieval), the verse is understood as an injunction (amr) to refrain from the forcible imposition of Islam, though there is no unanimity of opinion regarding the precise group of infidels to which the injunction had initially applied. Commentators who maintain that the verse was originally meant as applicable to all people consider it as abrogated (mansÅ«kh) by q 9:5, q 9:29, or q 9:73 (see abrogation). Viewing it in this way is necessary in order to avoid the glaring contradiction between the idea of tolerance and the policies of early Islam which did not allow the existence of polytheism — or any other religion — in a major part of the Arabian peninsula. Those who think that the verse was intended, from the very beginning, only for the People of the Book, need not consider it as abrogated: though Islam did not allow the existence of any religion other than Islam in most of the peninsula, the purpose of the jihād (q.v.)against the People of the Book, according to q 9:29, is their submission and humiliation rather than their forcible conversion to Islam.[…]
From Tolerance and Coercion in Islam 
“Both verses that are said to have abrogated Quran 2:256 speak about jihad. It can be inferred from this that the commentators who consider Quran 2:256 as abrogated perceive jihad as contradicting the idea of religious freedom. While it is true that religious differences are mentioned in both Quran 9:29 and 9:73 as the reason because of which the Muslims were commanded to wage war, none of them envisages the forcible conversion of the vanquished enemy. Quran 9:29 defines the purpose of the war as the imposition of the jizya on the People of the Book and their humiliation, while Quran 9:73 speaks only about the punishment awaiting the infidels and the hypocrites in the hereafter, and leaves the earthly purpose of the war undefined. Jihad and religious freedom are not mutually exclusive by necessity; religious freedom could be granted to the non-Muslims after their defeat, and commentators who maintain that Quran 2:256 was not abrogated freely avail themselves of this exegetical possibility with regard to theJews, the Christians and the Zoroastrians. However, the commentators who belong to the other exegetical trend do not find it advisable to think along these lines, and find it necessary to insist on the abrogation of Quran 2:256 in order to resolve the seeming contradiction between this verse and the numerous verses enjoining jihad. p. 102-3t al-_arab). Despite the apparent meaning of q 2:256, Islamic law allowed coercion of certain groups into Islam. Numerous traditionists and jurisprudents ( fuqahā_) allow coercing female polytheists and Zoroastrians (see magians) who fall into captivity to become Muslims — otherwise sexual relations with them would not be permissible (cf. q 2:221; see sex and sexuality; marriage and divorce). Similarly, forcible conversion of non-Muslim children was also allowed by numerous jurists in certain circumstances, especially if the children were taken captive (see captives) or found without their parents or if one of their parents embraced Islam. It was also the common practice to insist on the conversion of the Manichaeans, who were never awarded the status of ahl al-dhimma. Another group against whom religious coercion may be practiced are apostates from Islam (see apostasy). As a rule, classical Muslim law demands that apostatesbe asked to repent and be put to death if they refuse.”
The pact of Umar 
“In the name of Allah, the merciful Benefactor! This is the assurance granted to the inhabitants of Aelia by the servant of God, ‘Umar, the commander of the Believers. He grants them safety for their persons, their goods, churches, crosses – be they in good or bad condition – and their worship in general. Their churches shall neither be turned over to dwellings nor pulled down; they and their dependents shall not be put to any prejudice and thus shall it fare with their crosses and goods. No constraint shall be imposed upon them in matters of religion and no one among them shall be harmed. No Jew shall be authorised to live in Aelia with them. The inhabitants of Aelia must pay the gizya in the same way as the inhabitants of other towns. It is for them to expel from their cities Roums (Byzantians) and outlaws. Those of the latter who leave shall be granted safe conduct… Those who would stay shall be authorised to, on condition that they pay the same gizya as the inhabitants of Aelia. Those of the inhabitants of Aelia who wish to leave with the Roums, to carry away their goods, abandon their churches and Crosses, shall likewise have their own safe conduct, for themselves and for their Crosses. Rural dwellers (ahl ‘I-ard) who were already in the town before the murder of such a one, may stay and pay the gizya by the same title as the people of Aelia, or if they prefer they may leave with the Roums or return to their families. Nothing shall be exacted of them.
Witnesses: Khaledb.A1-Walid, ‘Amrb.A1-Alp, ‘Abdar-Rahmanb. ‘Awf Muawiya b. Abi Sufyan, who wrote these words, here, In the year 15 (33).
Winston King states in the Encyclopaedia of Religion, 2nd Ed., Vol. 11
ā€œMany practical and conceptual difficulties arise when one attempts to apply such a dichotomous pattern [ sacred / profane ] across the board to all cultures. In primitive societies, for instance, what the West calls religious is such an integral part of the total ongoing way of life that it is never experienced or thought of as something separable or narrowly distinguishable from the rest of the pattern. Or if the dichotomy is applied to that multifaceted entity called Hinduism, it seems that almost everything can be and is given a religious significance by some sect. Indeed, in a real sense everything that is is divine; existence per se appears to be sacred. It is only that the ultimately real manifests itself in a multitude of ways—in the set-apart and the ordinary, in god and so-called devil, in saint and sinner. The real is apprehended at many levels in accordance with the individual’s capacity.ā€ p.7692, 
Paul Radin, Primitive Religion: Its Nature and Origin in connexion with early societiesā€Where there is little trace of a centralized authority, there we encounter no true priests, and religious phenomena remain essentially unanalysed and unorganized. Magic and simple coercive rites rule supremeā€.p.21
Carl Schmitt in Political Theology,
ā€œAll significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularised theological conceptsā€Ÿ (p. 36)
or again in The Concept of the Political that
ā€œThe juridic [sic] formulas of the omnipotence of the state are, in fact, only superficial secularisations of theological formulas of the omnipotence of Godā€Ÿ (p. 42).










 

Sometimes the Bible just gets it right

I can’t claim to have read the Bible, the only books I read are book club prescribed ones and Holy Books haven’t yet come onto the selection.
But I always turn back to my favorite chapter

To every thing there is a season—Whatever God does, it will be forever—God will judge the righteous and the wicked.
 1 To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven:
 2 A time to be born, and a time to die; a time to plant, and a time to pluck up that which is planted;
 3 A time to kill, and a time to heal; a time to break down, and a time to build up;
 4 A time to weep, and a time to laugh; a time to mourn, and a time to dance;
 5 A time to cast away stones, and a time to gather stones together; a time to embrace, and a time to refrain from embracing;
 6 A time to get, and a time to lose; a time to keep, and a time to cast away;
 7 A time to rend, and a time to sew; a time to keep silence, and a time to speak;
 8 A time to love, and a time to hate; a time of war, and a time of peace.

Another Angry Voice on Podemos

Why the EU is damned to doom

On facebook I follow the extreme left page, Another Angry Voice, and they have a small piece on Podemos, the new left-wing party that’s virulently growing in Spain (even more worryingly the party wants to call a referendum on the Spanish monarchy).

Podemos and the appeal of Pablo Iglesias

Pablo Iglesias is the 36 year old leader of a new left-wing party in Spain called Podemos (We Can) that was born out of the 15-M street protest movement.

The Origins of Podemos

Podemos arose out of the 15-M “indignados” protests, which were a little bit like the Spanish version of the Occupy Wall Street Movement, but crucially the Spanish protesters managed keep the movement going and convert it into a powerful political force, whilst the Occupy Wall Street movement has faded away into near irrelevance in the grand scheme of US politics.

When the right-wing Spanish government led by Mariano Rajoy brought forward plans to introduce ā‚¬600,000 fines for people participating in “unauthorised” public protests, they gave the 15-M movement a huge incentive to legitimise themselves as an official political party.

The rise of Podemos

Since Podemos was formed in March 2014, the party has experienced an unprecedented rise in popularity. In May 2014, just two months after it was formed, Podemos took 8% of the vote in the European elections to bag 5 MEPs (that’s two more than the Green Party managed in the UK, despite the UK having 73 European Parliament seats to Spain’s 54).

One area in which Podemos is utterly dominating Spanish politics is in the online sphere. The Podemos Facebook pagehas picked up over 950,000 followers, which is more than the pages of all of the other political parties in Spain combined!

At any rate it’s a chicken and an egg scenario; the Eurozone is a doomed project banking on economic synchronizing between the heavyweight Germanic economies and the more haphazard Romantic Europe.
A telling example is the rift between Germanic Europe and the rest (via Inside Europe):

Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Sam Manekshaw (and a comment from Major Agha Amin)

A post from Dr Hamid Hussain. A (typically earthy) comment from military historian Major Agha Amin follows below Dr Hamid Hussain’s post.

Dear Sir;

A while ago, many officers asked about the controversies about Ayub Khan’s selection and I wrote a piece that may interest those raising these questions.

Mr. Ardeshir’s comment about Sam Manekshaw and Ayub Khan is incorrect.  It is related to Sam and Yahya Khan.  The real story is as follows;

In early 1947, Sam and Yahya were serving together at Military Operations directorate in New Delhi.  Sam owned a red James motorcycle that looked like the picture below;

Yahya fell in love with it and Sam agreed to sell it for 1000 Rupees.  In the chaos of partition, Yahya left for Pakistan promising to send the money from Pakistan but later forgot about the money.  After 1971 war, Sam once joked about the incident stating that ‘”Yahya never paid me the Rs1,000 for my motorbike, but now he has paid with half his country.” In 2001, Pakistani columnist Aredshir Cowasjee went to India and met Sam.  Cowasjee remembered Sam’s quip and offered to pay the money Yahya owed along with the interest.  Sam replied that ‘Yahya was a good man and a good soldier.  We served together and he didn’t have a mean or corrupt bone in his body’.


An additional corollary to the above story is another story.  In 1946, Lt. Colonel Sam Manekshaw was GSO-1 (Operations), Major Yahya Khan was GSO-2 (Frontier Defence) and Captain S. K. Sinha was GSO-3 (Internal Security) at Military Operations Directorate in New Delhi.  In 1971, General Sam Manekshaw was Indian army chief, Yahya was Pakistan army chief and Lieutenant General S. K. Sinha was head of pay and pension department at army headquarters in Delhi.  When war started, Sinha sent a letter to Sam requesting for chance to participate in the war.  Sinha wrote, “old G-1 is going to war with old G-2 and G-3 is being left out’.

Regards,
Hamid

Selection of First Native C-in-C in Pakistan

Hamid Hussain

In 1947, India and Pakistan emerged as new independent states and Indian army was divided.  There were no senior native officers and both countries decided to keep British officers at senior posts while native officers were given accelerated promotions to prepare them for senior positions.  In India, General Robert Lockhart (commissioned in 51st Sikh; now 3 Frontier Force Regiment of Pakistan army) was appointed first C-in-C.  He relinquished charge in January 1948 and was succeeded by Lieutenant General Francis Robert Roy Bucher (commissioned in 55th Coke’s Rifles; now 7 Frontier Force Regiment of Pakistan army.  He later changed to 32nd Lancers that was amalgamated with 31st Lancers in 1922 to form 13thLancers; now an elite cavalry regiment of Pakistan army).  Near the end of 1948, it was decided to appoint an Indian C-in-C to complete the nationalization process and in January 1949, General Cariappa took charge as first Indian C-in-C.  In case of Pakistan, General Frank Messervy (he was commissioned in Hodson Horse) was appointed first C-in-C on August 15, 1947.  He retired on February 1948 and succeeded by his Chief of Staff (COS) General Douglas Gracey (commissioned in Ist King George’s Own Gurkha Rifles and later commanded 2/3rd Gurkha Rifles).  Interestingly, the last two British C-in-Cs of India belonged to regiments that were allotted to Pakistan and the two British C-in-Cs of Pakistan belonged to regiments that went to India.

On the eve of independence, Pakistan inherited only two native Brigadiers; Muhammad Akbar Khan and Nawabzada Agha Muhammad Raza.  Several officers were given accelerated promotions and senior positions were filled with Pakistani officers.  In 1949, it was decided that Major General Iftikhar Ali Khan will be the first native C-in-C.  He was commissioned from Sandhurst in August 1929.  His parent regiment was 7 Light Cavalry.  Later, he was transferred to 3 Cavalry when later regiment was Indianized and he served as regiment’s Adjutant.  During war, he served with newly raised 45 Cavalry.  He was junior to several Pakistani officers and the list includes with commission dates in brackets; Muhammad Akbar Khan ‘Rangroot’ was Daly College Indore graduate and not Sandhurst commissioned (December 1919), Faiz Mohammed Khan (July 1921), Mohammad Ishfakul Majid (August 1924), Khairuddin Mohammad Idris (September 1925), Malik Fazal-ur-Rahman Kallue (January 1927), Nawabzada Agha Muhammad Raza (January 1927), Raja Mohammad Afzal Janjua (January 1927), Muhammad Ayub Khan (February 1928), Nasir Ali Khan (February 1928) and Mohammad Yusuf (January 1929).  It is important to clarify seniority issue.  At every rank, several officers are superseded and seniority alone is never a criterion for senior positions.  Some officers when superseded ask for retirement while others continue to serve.  Two examples will clarify this position.  Mir Haider was commissioned in December 1919 and in 1949, he was Major. Jamaldar Orakzai was commissioned in August 1928 and in 1948 he was Colonel serving at Quarter Master General (QMG) branch.  Haider and Orakzai were senior to Iftikhar but in view of their service track and rank, they were not relevant to the selection of army chief.  It was decided to send Iftikhar for Imperial Defence Course (IDC) in London to prepare him for his job.  In December 1949, his plane crashed near Jangshahi in Karachi killing all on board that included his wife and son and Director Military Operations (DMO) Brigadier Mohammad Sher Khan.  Sher was a Sandhurst graduate commissioned in September 1932 and joined 6th Battalion of 13th Frontier Force Rifles (now 1 Frontier Force Regiment).

There are many confusing stories about selection of first native C-in-C of Pakistan but they relate to selection of Ayub and not Iftikhar with the exception that Ayub contended that Iftikhar’s name was floated as possible first native C-in-C but no final decision was made.  This may be due to the fact that decision was made but Iftikhar died before any official notification was issued.  Very few officers of that time period wrote memoirs therefore written record is very limited.  Political leadership of newly independent Pakistan under Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan selected Iftikhar on the advice of British senior brass.  British considered Iftikhar professionally sound and apolitical. His thoroughly westernized life style was probably a plus.  Some suggest that he was tough disciplinarian and may have temper problem.  According to Major General A. O. Mitha, he had ‘the reputation of eating a Brigadier or Lt. Colonel for breakfast everyday’.  Ayub considered Iftikhar a good officer but ‘a difficult man’ and ‘short-tempered’.  Two most credible sources about the subject matter are Major General Sher Ali Khan Pataudi and Major General Syed Shahid Hamid.  Pataudi knew Iftikhar for a long period of time starting from the days when two were at Royal Indian Military College (RIMC) at Dehra Dun where Iftikhar was senior to him.  In early 1948, Pataudi served as 14 Para Brigade commander under Iftikhar when later was commanding 10 Division.  Pataudi was bachelor and stayed at Iftikhar’s house and knew Iftikhar intimately.  When Pataudi came to Pakistan in October 1947, he was posted to Gardai Brigade in Waziristan commanded by Ayub. The two were together for three months and developed friendship.  When Ayub was C-in-C, he superseded Pataudi therefore he was resentful.  Hamid served with Iftikhar in the same 3 Cavalry Regiment.  Hamid’s time in 3 Cavalry was not pleasant and he soon left the regiment.  He didn’t have good memories as some Indian officers including Iftikhar preferred to interact with British officers rather than fellow Indian officers.  Hamid also had friendly relations with Ayub and Ayub used to stay with him.  He served as Master General Ordnance (MGO) and Adjutant General (AG) under Ayub.

These two contemporaries of Iftikhar and Ayub give different accounts and these perspectives are based on their own personal relations with the two.  It is important to note that during a professional life spanning over two to three decades an officer interacts with several hundred officers in different capacities therefore one can expect quite diverse opinions.   Major General Sher Ali Khan Pataudi considered Iftikhar professionally sound, well read and highly intelligent.  In contrast, he considered Ayub as a typical battalion officer good at basic soldiering but not cut for higher direction of war.  He defended Iftikhar’s aloofness by suggesting that ‘he was a very shy person which gave the impression of his being conceited, which he wasn’t’.  Pataudi claims that Iftikhar was concerned about politicization of officers and distrusted politicians.  He once commented that ‘it would be better for both of us if we both got out before our hands were stained and garments polluted’.  Pataudi is of the view that if Iftikhar had been C-in-C, ‘he would not have allowed the Army to be used for political purposes and ‘would have never used his position as C-in-C, to come into power through the Army’.  In contrast, Major General Shahid Hamid is of the view that Iftikhar was a thoroughly westernized officer (he was married to a charming Parsee girl who was number one woman rider in India.), ruthless and hated politicians.  Hamid is of the view that Iftikhar would have adopted the same course later adopted by Ayub.

Iftikhar’s choice as first native C-in-C is an established fact and Pataudi states that Prime Minister contacted Iftikhar and informed him about the decision which Iftikhar shared with him.  In addition, Pataudi also states that on that day Ayub was also in Lahore and contacted him and asked to arrange for a meeting with Iftikhar to get to know the incoming C-in-C.  Ayub was leaving the next day therefore meeting didn’t materialize.  Hamid also alludes to the fact that Ayub was always curious about Iftikhar as it was an open secret that Iftikhar would be next C-in-C.  An incident narrated by Ayub also gives credence that Prime Minister had considered Iftikhar for C-in-C position.  There was a division commander’s conference and Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan invited some senior officers to circuit house.  He brought up the subject of selection of C-in-C and told the audience that ‘it was possible that the appointment would not go to the most senior officer’.  He then elicited opinion of several officers regarding selecting a junior officer as C-in-C.

Among the list of officers senior to Iftikhar, Akbar was commissioned in 1 Brahmans but spent most of his career with Royal Indian Army Service Corps (RIASC) with no command, staff or instructional experience (the only exception was command of Meerut sub area in 1947).  In April 1946, British recommended several Indian officers for senior appointments to prepare them for command when British left.  Akbar was recommended by the selection board to be Army Commander but it was probably to have a Muslim and not for professional excellence.  Akbar was the only senior Muslim officer at Brigadier rank while the remaining six recommend for promotions and coveted postings were Hindus (Cariappa, Rajindra Singhji, Srinagesh, Nathu Singh, A.J. Rudra and B.S. Chimni).  In Pakistan, by 1949, several officers have attained accelerated promotions and were considered professionally superior therefore Akbar was not considered for post.  He retired at Major General rank in 1950.    One other qualified candidate Raza was not liked by British.  Brigadier Francis Ingall in the process of establishment of Pakistan a military academy dealt with Raza who was then serving as Adjutant General (AG) and didn’t have high opinion of him.  Ingall considered him ‘extremely pompous’, ‘difficult to deal with’, vague’ and ‘hesitant to make decisions’.   A junior councilor at British High Commission A. H. Reed remarked that Raza ‘a born intriguer, had been lobbying hard for the Commander-in-Chief position’.  He also remarked that Raza was feared by juniors and universally disliked by both British and Pakistani officers.  Major General A. O. Mitha who served under Raza summed up the general opinion that Raza was professionally average and ‘had the reputation of being strict and a bit of bully’.  However, after a personal encounter he developed great respect for Raza for his ‘large-heartedness’ and ‘broad-mindedness’.  Many other officers senior to Iftikhar later retried at Colonel and Brigadier ranks.

In early 1948, Ayub was superseded at the rank of Brigadier and two sources confirm this.  Shuja Nawaz was given access to Ayub’s file for his encyclopedic work on Pakistan army and his information removes doubts about seniority.  Ayub Khan was sent to command East Pakistan sub area (later designated 14th Division) with the local rank of Major General.  This could have caused confusion in terms of seniority and General Gracey sent a note to Military Secretary stating that when Ayub is promoted to Major General rank, this will be antedated to the date of his local Major General rank starting January 08, 1948.  Gracey went ahead to clarify the seniority list putting Ayub ‘NEXT below Maj. General Iftikhar Khan, and next above Major General Nasir Ali Khan’.  This clearly shows that while Iftikhar was junior as far commission date is concerned but when he was promoted Major General, Ayub was Brigadier with only local Major General rank thus making him junior to Iftikhar.  Pataudi was a friend of C-in-C General Frank Messervy and both played polo together.  Pataudi states that in early 1948, when he was serving under Iftikhar at Lahore, Ayub on his way to East Pakistan passed a note to him ‘been superseded.  Can you do something’?  Pataudi went to Rawalpindi and met Frank Messervy and gently raised the subject.  Messervy replied that selection of right officers at this stage was crucial as they will lead the army when British officers are gone.

After the death of Iftikhar, selection of C-in-C came up again.  The decision was finalized sometime in September 1950 when General Douglas Gracey was C-in-C.  Syed Wajahat Hussain (later Major General) served as ADC to General Gracey in 1947-48 at the rank of Lieutenant.  In 1956, he visited England and stayed with General Gracey.  Wajahat states that Gracey told him that after the death of Iftikhar in plane crash, the choice of C-in-C was narrowed down to Ayub, Raza and Nasir Ali Khan.  According to Gracey, Ayub was picked because of his command experience compared to Raza and Nasir although Gracey was worried about Ayub’s political ambitions.  Raza was commissioned in 1/7 Rajput Regiment and later commanded 6/7 Rajput and 18/7 Rajput battalions.  Raza was the first Pakistani Adjutant General (AG).  Nasir was also commissioned in 7th Rajput Regiment and commanded 9/7 Rajput.  He was the first Pakistani Military Secretary (MS), Quarter Master General (QMG) and Chief of Staff (COS) of Pakistan army.  Nasir spent all post independence time at staff positions and didn’t command a Brigade or Division.  Nasir was not particular about military decorum and this may have also gone against him.  In summer, sometimes he was seen wearing sandals without socks with his military uniform.  In a British trained army, I’m sure this attitude would have horrified not only British but many Pakistani officers.

Gracey’s remark about Raza’s lack of command experience is curious as he commanded 12 Division.  12 Division was raised in Peshawar in November 1948 by Major General Mohammad Yusuf who commanded it until December 1949 (Division was later moved to Batrasi and finally to Murree).  Yusuf was succeeded in command by Raza.  Major General A. O. Mitha confirms that in his memoirs.  He served under Raza when he was Commanding Officer (CO) of 9/8 Punjab Regiment and his battalion was defense battalion of the division at Batrasi.  When decision about C-in-C was made in summer of 1950, Raza was in command of the division for about six months and this may have not been thought as adequate.  One possibility is that Gracey was referring to mid 1949 time period during consideration for C-in-C position when Iftikhar was chosen as at that time Raza had not yet commanded a division.  Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan had a favorable view of Raza as Raza’s father was Liaqat’s friend but probably recommendation of General Gracey and favorable input by Secretary of Defence Sikandar Mirza tilted the balance in Ayub’s favor.  Sikandar Mirza was Secretary Defence and he weighed in Ayub’s favor.  Mirza had spent his long career in Indian Political Service (IPS) on North West Frontier and familiar with the byzantine intrigues.  He contacted the head of nascent Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Colonel (later Major General) Shahid Hamid and asked him to generate an adverse intelligence report about Raza with the intention of getting him out of the race for C-in-C.  Shahid refused to oblige.

The command of 14th Division needs some elaboration.  At the time of partition, the command in East Pakistan was designated East Pakistan Army.  Ironically, this grand title was given to a formation that consisted of a single infantry battalion; 8/12 Frontier Force Regiment.  When Ayub assumed command in January 1948, it was called East Pakistan Sub Area and consisted of only two infantry battalions (8/12 Frontier Force Regiment and 2/8 Punjab Regiment).  In December 1948, sub area was designated 14th Division and although its command played a major role in the decision of  Ayub’s appointment as first C-in-C, technically Ayub’s command consisted of only two infantry battalions.

In September 1950, it was decided that Ayub would be next C-in-C.  He was appointed Deputy C-in-C under Gracey to groom him for the top job.  He visited military installations in England and Germany.  He took charge on January 17, 1951.  Lieutenant General Ross McKay was appointed his advisor.  Ayub’s appointment as first C-in-C has been criticized by many with the hindsight.  This criticism is invariably in the context of Ayub’s coup and long tenure as President with the assumption that another army chief was not likely to launch the coup.

The issue of seniority and a bad report in Second World War is cited against Ayub.  As far as seniority is concerned regarding three contenders; Raza, Ayub and Nasir, Raza was senior and Nasir and Ayub from the same course although Nasir was put junior to Ayub in army list.  In the argument against Ayub’s professionalism a bad report is cited which is probably ‘tactical timidity’ during Second World War in 1945 by his commander Major General Thomas Wynford ‘Pete’ Rees (Served with 1/3 Madras during First World War, long stint with 5/6 Rajputana Rifles and commanded 3/6 Rajputana Rifles).  Rees was commanding 19th Division in Burma.  Ayub was serving with First Assam Regiment as second in command (2IC) at the rank of Major.  First Assam was a divisional support unit under direct command of Rees.  On January 10, 1945, Commanding Officer (CO) of First Assam Lieutenant Colonel W. F. Brown was killed and Ayub Khan assumed command.  Ayub was removed from the command by Rees when Ayub suggested that battalion was not fit for the assigned task.  Rees considered this as tactical timidity and removed Ayub from command.  On March 07 (some accounts give the date of March 15) 1945 Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Parsons took command from Ayub.  Parsons was originally from 5/6thGurkha Rifles and had served with First Assam in the past.  Ayub stayed in the tent of Risaldar/Honorary Captain Ashraf Khan of Hazara until his departure to India on April 18.

All evidence suggests that Ayub got a bad report during his command of First Assam Regiment although exact nature is not clear.  Pataudi states that Ayub discussed this with him when he was working with him in Waziristan.  Pataudi also claims that he had seen this report when he was in Delhi.  Pataudi opted for Pakistan and came to Pakistan in October 1947.  While in Delhi, he was given access to files of Muslim officers opting for Pakistan as he was designated Deputy Military Secretary of Pakistan army.   In October 1958, British High Commissioner Sir Gilbert Laithwaite pointed to this in his report about Ayub.  Laithwaite wrote, ‘he was according to our records, a failure as a Commanding Officer (Lieutenant Colonel) on active service and had to be relieved’.  Ayub survived the bad report of Rees and later re-raised and commanded his parent battalion 1/14 Punjab Regiment (now 5 Punjab of Pakistan Army).  Later, he served as President of Army Selection Board tasked with recommending permanent commission to Emergency Commissioned Officers (ECOs).  Some suggest that Ayub had this negative report removed from his file when he became C-in-C.  Shuja Nawaz who was given access to Ayub’s file communicated to me that he does not recall seeing Rees’s report in the file.  Pete Rees and Ayub’s paths crossed again when Rees was commanding Punjab Boundary Force (PBF) and Ayub served under him.  Ayub Khan was one of the advisors to Reese at Colonel rank.  It is not clear whether two had any problems in view of their previous unpleasant encounter.  PBF was severely criticized by Punjab politicians for failure to control law and order.  PBF story is another neglected chapter of subcontinent history and very little has been written about it.   I have done some work on the subject and in my view it is quite unfair to criticize PBF or Ayub for the tragedy that was a chapter from Dante’s inferno.  I think this left a deep mark on Ayub and his extreme distrust of politicians.

Some suggest that country’s founder Jinnah was not in favor of Ayub which is probably not correct.  In October 1947, Ayub was Brigadier and commanding Gardai Brigade Group in Waziristan area command.  If the assertion that Mr. Jinnah was not happy with Ayub is true then it does not make sense that Ayub is promoted Brigadier against Mr. Jinnah’s wishes and given the task of execution of Operation Curzon; withdrawal of troops from tribal areas.   Similarly, Ayub was promoted Major General in January 1948 and posted to East Pakistan when Mr. Jinnah was very well in full control of all affairs.  In Pakistan, there is a wrong perception that Operation Curzon was the brainchild of Jinnah.  By 1946, it was clear that British were leaving and British high command had put in place a plan for removal of regular troops from tribal areas.  This decision was reached before the Cabinet Mission plan when even partition of India was not envisaged.  On April 24, 1946, a conference was held at Peshawar.  It was attended by Governor North West Frontier Province George Cunningham, Agent to Governor General Baluchistan, Air Officer Commander-in-Chief (AOC-in-C), British minister at Kabul, C-in-C General Claude Aukinleck and senior military and civil officers.  It was realized that the status of tribes will be uncertain until the outcome of Cabinet Mission plan.  The decision was made that regular troops will be replaced by civil armed forces although the process was to be gradual.  It was in this context that decisions such as Indianization of officer Corps of Scouts, raising of Central Waziristan Scouts, Malakand battalion and re-raising of Khyber Rifles was discussed.  Gardai brigade was the first to be withdrawn and replaced by local tribal levies; Khassadars. Once Civil Armed Forces were properly organized and equipped then Wana and Razmak brigades withdrawn.  Events of sub-continent moved much faster with impending independence of India, emergence of Pakistan and massive migration and slaughter put this issue on the back burner. It is to Jinnah’s credit that he made the decision quickly and swiftly implemented the plan.  The caveat is that by that time tribesmen had been directed by Pakistan to greener pastures of Jammu & Kashmir during 1947-48 conflict.

Ayub Khan was an average officer not different from many of his contemporaries.  He was trained as a regimental officer and he was neither trained nor did he strive to learn the higher direction of war.  His reading was limited to Readers Digest type of publications and Philip Mason’s Men Who Ruled India.  He was not known for reading classic or modern military works on history or art of war.  This was the reason that Lieutenant General Ross McKay was appointed his advisor.  Ayub was mild mannered and humble.  He was handsome with an impressive personality and very pleasant.  This endeared him to many international leaders.

Ninety percent of officers of Indian army both British and Indian were groomed for regimental service.  Selection and training of Indian officers during Indianization of officer corps was focused on basic regimental training.  It was envisioned that probably the highest rank an Indian could achieve was command of a battalion.  Second World War opened the door wide open and large numbers of Indians were commissioned.  War also resulted in accelerated promotions and several Indians commanded battalions.  After the war, when it was clear that British Raj would come to an end, then the question of promoting Indians to senior ranks was seriously discussed.  In 1947, only a handful of Indians were at colonel and brigadier ranks. Indian subcontinent went through cataclysmic changes with emergence of new states.  It had an impact on all institutions including army.  In these extraordinary circumstances, officers were given accelerated promotions and first Pakistani C-in-C was selected in these exceptional circumstances.  What else describes the anomalies of that time period than the fact that first Indian C-in-C jumped six ranks from Major to four stars General in six years while first Pakistani C-in-C accomplished this feat in five short years?

Notes:

–        Major General Ā® Shaukat Raza.  The Pakistan Army 1947-49 (Lahore: Services Book Club, 1989)

–        Shuja Nawaz.   Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008)

–        Major General Sher Ali Khan Pataudi.  The Story of Soldering and Politics in India and Pakistan (Lahore: Wajidalis, 1978)

–        Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan.  Friends Not Masters (London: Oxford University Press, 1967)

–        Interview of Major General Ā® Syed Wajahat Hussain by Major Ā® Agha H. Amin, Defence Journal, August 2002

–        Lieutenant Colonel Mustasad Ahmad.  Living Up To Heritage: The Rajputs 1947-1970 (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1997)

–        Major General Shahid Hamid.  Disastrous Twilight (London: Leo Cooper, 1986)

–        Lt. Colonel Ā® Gautam Sharma.  Nationalization of The Indian Army 1885-1947 (New Delhi: Allied Pubslishers, 1996)

–        Brigadier Francis Ingall.  The Last of the Bengal Lancers (California: Presidio, 1988)

–        Pradeep P. Barua.  Gentlemen of the Raj: Indian Army Officer Corps 1817-1949 (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2008 Indian Edition)

–        Major General S. Shahid Hamid.  Early Years of Pakistan (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1993)

–        Major General A. O. Mitha.  Unlikely Beginnings: A Soldier’s Life (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003)

Hamid Hussain

February 13, 2014

The following comment is from Major Agha Amin, (from his website here)
Dear Dr Hamid Hussain

you have simply left out joginder singh who stated that ayub khan was in chamar regiment ? joginder was his unit officer and mentioned this incident in his book behind the scenes

Shuja Nawaz had a vested interest as his brother Asif Nawaz was from Ayub Khans unit.

Also note that Shuja Nawaz in his work referred by you as encycolpedic distorted history and elevated his fatherin laws brother abdul ali malik as main hero of Chawinda while Shaukat Rizas official account maintains that Abdul Ali Malik was indecisive and just implored commanding officer 25 Cavalry “Nisar do something”

Problem is that in biased pakistan army hero had to be from between rivers indus and chenab ! Thus all Nishan i Haidars were awarded to people from this region as most generals were from this area.

I interviewed Major General Tajammul Hussain Malik in 2001 and he stated that Major Aziz Bhattis Nishan i Haidar award was not based on merit.

Even in Battle of Sulaimanke 6 FF Pashtun officer Farooq Afzal or Saeed Afzal was ignored.

I dont think that Nishan i Haidar could have been awarded to Karnal Sher and Lalak both non Punjabis if Pakistan Army had a non Punjabi Chief.

Even General Musharraf acknowledged General Kakars extreme parochialism in his book.

General Khwaja Ziauddin told me that on Asif Nawazs death Kakar requested General Ali Kuli to fly to Pindi to convince his relative President Ghulam Ishaq to appoint Kakar Chief.So Kakar was trying to reward his benefactor Ali Kuli.

It is same General Kakar who as per General Ameer Hamza was thrashed by Major Rasheed Warraich at Sulaimanke.

I remember Kakar was so unpopular for illegally stopping armys election allowance of 1993 elections that he was literally hooted by troops in Darbar held at Fortress stadium .I was on leave and went to this darbar to give company to a friend.

Brigadier Nisar main hero of 1965 war was just ignored by promotion boards as he was from Patiala (Pashtun descent) and not from main Punjabi belt.

It is same Nisar who was praised by Indians for his outstanding performance as commander of Changez Force in 1971.

You see Psc and afwc business came only in 1976 when MG Abdullah Saeed (6 FF) GOC 33 Division asked my father to write a paper and in that analysis it was discovered that most serving generals were non Psc or non afwc.Nisar was bypassed long before that time when Psc or afwc became compulsory.

Frankly much of what is going on in Pakistan is a farce.Pakistan seems to exist only between Indian border and Indus river !

In retrospect one may state that partition of 1947 was a failure .Punjabi Hindus regarded as exploiters were replaced by Lahore Gujranwala Faisalabad Sargodha and Pindi Divisions with some Pashtun low caste Khattak Kammis and Hindko Kakar clowns.LTC Feroz , 33 FF my squash partner in Okara in 1993 recounted that kakar counted cherries of his garden as corps commander and suspected that 33 FF guard was pinching the official residences gardens cherries ?

Brown Pundits