The Clip That Explained a Civilisation
A short video of an Iranian woman is circulating on X. In it, she says Islam is not Iran’s native religion and was imposed on Zoroastrian Persians through torture, massacre, rape, and enslavement. The clip is amplified by familiar accelerants, including Tommy Robinson, and is now being treated as a one-line explanation for a fourteen-century transformation.
Almost immediately, a counter-narrative appears. It insists there is “not a single piece of evidence” for forced conversion in Persia; that Islamisation was slow; and that many Persians, especially Sasanian elites, moved toward the new order for political, fiscal, and social reasons. A further layer is added: nostalgia for the Sasanians is misplaced because late Sasanian society was rigid, unequal, and harsh, and early Muslim rule improved conditions for ordinary people. These are two different claims. They are routinely fused. History does not require that fusion.
Conquest Is Not ConversionThe scholarly material being shared, often selectively, starts from a basic distinction: conquest and conversion are not the same thing.
In The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates, Hugh Kennedy warns against the slogan “Islam was spread by the sword” when it is used to imply mass, immediate conversion. He draws a line between rapid military success and the slower, uneven work of religious change, noting, without romance, that conquest created the political conditions in which Islam could spread “in the way it did.” That formulation rejects both extremes: instant forced conversion and conversion untouched by power.
Ira Lapidus, in A History of Islamic Societies, pushes the same distinction further. He notes how thin the explicit narrative evidence is when modern commentators speak as if we possess village-by-village conversion logs. He also documents early Muslim governance as pragmatic: not only tolerant at times, but actively reliant on non-Muslim administrators and institutions. Empires run on scribes, taxes, and local elites long before they run on ideology.
This complicates the viral claim. It also complicates its mirror image.
Persia Is Not Everywhere
A sentence from Bertold Spuler’s Iran in the Early Islamic Period is doing the heavy lifting: that almost all Persians became Muslim within a few centuries “without significant outside coercion.” It reads like a verdict. It is not one.
“Without significant outside coercion” is comparative language, not a denial of conquest, pressure, or episodic violence. Spuler’s claim is narrower: that the long-run Islamisation of Persia is not best explained by a model of continuous forced conversion at swordpoint. That matters because it directly challenges the trope of rape and terror as the default mechanism; without pretending power relations were irrelevant.
Spuler’s broader point is often omitted: Persia did not merely absorb Islam; it reshaped it, retained its language, and re-emerged culturally in New Persian. Islamisation here was neither annihilation nor simple submission.
The Sasanian Mirror
At this point, the argument usually turns moral.
Touraj Daryaee’s Sasanian Persia emphasise hierarchy, legal inequality, and elite dominance under the late Sasanian state. The implication is clear: modern romanticism forgets how narrow and coercive that order was for most people; Islam then appears less an alien imposition than a regime change that disrupted an entrenched aristocracy.
This argument has force, but it answers a different question. Demonstrating that the Sasanians were harsh does not demonstrate that conversion was free. A bad old regime alters incentives; it does not abolish coercion. Disliking an aristocracy does not prove persuasion; it reshuffles coalitions.
Tax, Land, and the Arithmetic of Empire
A more concrete line of argument comes from fiscal history, including passages circulated from Authority and Control in the Countryside. These describe lower tax rates in some contexts, land arrangements tied to development, and administrative inclusion as tools of early Muslim rule.
This shortens to: “ʿUmar returned the land to Persian farmers.” The texts themselves are more conditional. They describe land grants tied to obligations, investment incentives, and the creation of a loyal local elite. This is not charity; it is statecraft. The implication is precise and often missed: conversion may not have been demanded at swordpoint, but it unfolded within structured incentives that made alignment with the new order rational over time. “Voluntary” here does not mean ideologically neutral; it means choice under empire.
Two Views, Cleanly Separated
One view holds that the viral claim is historically reckless. Conquest occurred, but mass forced conversion in Persia is not evidenced as the dominant mechanism. Islamisation took centuries, was uneven, and was mediated through elites, institutions, and incentives. The rape-and-massacre line functions less as history than as polemic, amplified today by diaspora identity politics and opportunistic Western actors.
The other view holds that the slow-conversion story is being used as a sanitiser. Conquest is violence even when bureaucratic. Legal hierarchy, fiscal pressure, and social stratification can coerce belief without leaving the kind of evidence modern audiences expect. From this angle, the speaker’s language may be exaggerated, but her intuition, that Islamisation occurred under asymmetric power, is not fantasy.
What the Sources Actually Allow
Read carefully, the scholarship supports a narrower conclusion than either camp prefers. Islam was not imposed in Persia through universal, continuous forced conversion. Nor did it spread in a vacuum where persuasion alone did the work. Military conquest created political dominance. Political dominance reshaped incentives. Over generations, those incentives altered religious affiliation.
Whenever a debate insists the story is “obvious,” it is usually collapsing centuries into a single scene, or erasing power altogether. That is where history stops and myth begins.