Book Review: In their own words by C.Christine Fair

“In Their Own Words informs contemporary discussions and analysis of this organization by mobilizing the vast corpus of LeT’s own writing…. I draw from these materials to advance two key claims about the organization. First, as is generally accepted, I argue that LeT’s ability to conduct complex terroattacks in India and Afghanistan-coupled with its loyalty to the Pakistani security establishment-render it incredibly useful as a reliable and obedient proxy. In fact, it is the state’s most duteous and governable agent. While it has long been appreciated that LeT is useful to the Pakistani state for its loyalty and lethality in conducting its militant operations in India and, more recently, in Afghanistan, analysts have overlooked its domestic utility to the state. This forms the second principal focus of my study. LeT/JuD stands in stark opposition to Al Qaeda, the Islamic State and the various Deobandi militant groups savaging the Pakistani state and its citizenry because it vigorously opposes violence within Pakistan. This stance puts LeT/JuD at odds with other Salafi and Deobandi organisations in Pakistan that propound the doctrine of takfiri[sic](excommunication and often murder) for Muslims who ‘misbehave’ by failing to live their lives as these organizations demand and expect and for those Muslim leaders who fail to impose shariat when they have the opportunity to do so. Not only does it argue against violence against minorities. This yields a surprising paradox: while LeT decries Hindus and Christians outside of Pakistan as the worst polythiests and worthy objects of militarized Jihad, within Pakistan it argues for their conversion through compassion, preaching and proselytization. LeT is one of the state’s most important partners in helping it manage the aftershocks of its long-term policy of using Islamist militants as state proxies.” (Page 3)

 

“The Pakistani state long ago developed two dangerous tools to reverse these purported crimes of Partition (“imagined” loss of parts of Punjab and Kashmir). One is the ever-expanding fleet of Islamist militant groups, as well as non-Islamist groups, that Pakistan deploys in India as well as Afghanistan. The second is a growing arsenal of nuclear weapons which makes it virtually impossible for India or any other state for that matter to punish Pakistan for using terrorism as a tool of statecraft or compel it to cease doing so. Pakistan acquired a crude nuclear device around 1983-4, after which Pakistan became evermore emboldened in its strategy of sub-conventional warfare as it continued making progress in developing its nuclear deterrant. Under this expanding nuclear umbrella, Pakistan became increasingly confident that India would not risk responding militarily to Pakistan’s various terrorist outrages in Kashmir and the rest of India. Equally important, Pakistan became steadily assured that the United States and the international community would intervene to prevent any conflict from escalating to an all-out war, with the always lingering possibility for inadverent or deliberate escalation to nuclear use.” (page 23)

“Several developments in Kashmir influcened Singh’s course of action.  Perhaps the most important event that conditioned Singh’s options was an invasion of his state by Pakistanis. Troubles for the maharaja began when some 60,000 veterans of WWII returned to their homes in Poonch (Westen Jammu) to find that they had become subjects of Hari singh of Kashmir, whom they disliked because of his imposition of onerous taxes. These mostly muslim Poonchis, annoyed with becoming  Singh’s subjects and outraged by the communally-motivated murders of muslims, ongoing through India, declared their preferance of joining Pakistan during a public assembly during August 1947.”  (Page 29)

Why do nonmuslims treat muslims so badly (f)?

 

The Dalai Lama demonstrates how the world’s 6 billion nonmuslims can treat the world’s 1 1/2 billion muslims. In the above video the Dalai Lama hosts Kashmiri Ladhak muslims. The Dalai Lama emphasizes the ancient close ties between Tibetan and Kashmiri Muslims, Buddhists and Hindus. Including how Tibetan and Kashmiri Buddhists and Hindus have built mosques for muslims for centuries.

The Dalai Lama said that for too long Tibetan, Kashmiri and Indian muslims have been silent. Now they must speak out and inspire the rest of the muslim world to follow their impressive example. Tibetan, Kashmiri and Indian muslims have been less affected by the Islamic civil war than the rest of the muslim world. Sunnis, Shia and other sects of Islam get along reasonably well in Tibet, Kashmir and India. Tibetan, Kashmiri and Indian muslims also need to share their perspectives with the rest of the muslim world about harmony between muslims and nonmuslims.

The Dalai Lama is completely correct in this. Dharmic muslims (muslims of Tibet, Kashmir, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia) are a precious treasure and remarkable by global standards. The Dharmic peoples need to protect their muslims from Islamist extremists and encourage Dharmic muslims (Tibetan, Kashmiri, Indian muslims, Bharatiya muslims, Hindu muslims) to engage in dialogue with the rest of the muslim world.

As an aside, there are many close ties between Sufis, Hindus and Buddhists that the Dalai Lama alludes to (Dalai Lama uses the word “muslim” instead of “Sufi”). One of these ties is the connection between Mahayana Vajrayana Tibetan Buddhism, Trika Kashmiri Shaivism and Sufism. One of the mothers of modern Trika Kashmiri Shaivism is Lal Ded or Lalleshwari (perhaps 1320-1392). {Of course Trika is far older} Almost all Kashmiri Shaivites revere Lal Ded and her many amazing musical and poetic compositions. One of her main disciples was the great Sufi master Nund Rishi–patron saint of Kashmir. Nund Rishi remains incredibly revered and influential among Kashmiri muslims and the Rishi order of saints he founded. He is also deeply respected by Indian Sufis more generally, including in Ajmer India.

Most Sanathana Dharmic Uttara Mimaamsa orders emphasize 25 tattvas or subtle sub-elements or qualities that can be identified in meditation. But there is an infinity beyond them. Mahayana Buddhists break this down into many Swargas (often translated as heaven; perhaps these are levels of Samadhi). So do the Trika. The Trika combine Samkhya (one of the ten Darshanas) with Yoga (one of the ten Darshanas) with Purna Mimaamsa with Uttara Mimaamsa. Trika uses 36 tattvas–defining Tattvas closer to how the Samkhyas do. Of these 24 are Samkhya standard and unreal. {Note that Chitta is called Pritvi in Trika.} 7 are partly real and partly unreal. 5 come closer to the truth. In this Trika describes the Alokic or transcendental realms of consciousness in some detail, similar to how lord Buddha did. Note that Sufi Muraqabah descriptions are very similar to this. The wikipedia article is remarkably good and similar to many Sufi books I have perused. Many parts of the Muraqabah are almost identical to several

 

 

The Dalai Lama is asked about the Rohingya and expresses great sadness. He is sad that major global publications headline Buddhist monks with the title “terrorist.” The Dalai Lama alluded to the immense complexity and nuance required to deal with Rohingya. The Dalai Lama smiled and laughed sweetly while saying that others call him terrorist too.  {I was impressed by how the Dalai Lama reacts to being called a terrorist. This is the Sanathana Dharma way. Loving and respecting our enemies and bad people with all our hearts, all our souls, all our minds and all our might. This includes loving and respecting those who are “white supremacist”, “Nazi”, “racist”, “bigoted”, “hegemonic”, “imperialist”, “colonialist”, “exploitative”, “oppressive” towards us. Or people who accuse us of these things and other permutations of being evil. }

 

The Dalai Lama counsels compassion or love. If not this then being “wise selfish” rather than “foolish selfish”. We are connected to others; benefit from their success and suffer from their harm. When we don’t treat others well we don’t

 

As an aside the Dalai Lama is asked 1 hour, 50 seconds in about the true state of Nirvana. The Dalai Lama tried to describe it with words, which is very difficult. My paraphrase would that a pure mind without any ignorance can see reality clearly through practice {Sadhana in Sanskrit}. Mere understanding is not sufficient. He said that ancient Indian and Buddhist literature describe learning Nirvana in three levels:

  1. Through hearing or reading {in sanskrit this is called Apta Shabda Pramana or Shastra Shabda Pramana}
  2. You yourself think deeply and understand through reasoning which gradually brings deeper experience and constant “think” {I would translate this as deep contemplation or Dhyaana or what Patanjali would call “Savitarka Samprajnata Samaapatti Samadhi” . . . it has specific names in Muraqabah texts as well. I would say a cross between Idraak and Waruud. Or similar to Kashf or Ihaam}

  3. Deep experience. This really affects our emotion. {I would say that this is transcending all 31 Swargas or levels of awareness. The Muraqabah equivalents might be Fanāʾ Fī ʾilāh, Safr-e-Nuzooli and Baqa billah and nafs al-mutma’inna}

 

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PS. Previous Brown Pundit articles on this subject are:

Why do nonmuslims treat muslims so badly (e)?

Global alliances and wheels within wheels

Why do nonmuslims treat muslims so badly (d)?

Why do nonmuslims treat muslims so badly (c)?

Our existence is an offense to moderate Muslims!

Why do nonmuslims treat muslims so badly (b)?

Why do nonmuslims treat muslims so badly (a)?

Why do English nonmuslims treat English muslims so badly?

Why nonmuslims treat muslims so badly?

Why do nonmulims mistreat muslims so much?

Why do nonmuslims treat atheist muslims so badly?

Congratulations Sajid Javid!

Who are the Indus Periphery people ?

From the pre-print of the Narasimhan et al paper, we got hold of 3 ancient  Bronze Age samples which the authors contend, based on their genetic ancestry (which had significant levels of AASI ancestry and no Anatolian Neolithic farmer ancestry (ANF)) to have been South Asian in origin.

Since these 3 samples were found outside of the geographical expanse of the Harappan civilization (2 from Shahr-i-Sokhta in Eastern Iran & 1 from Gonur (BMAC) in Turkmenistan), they have been designated as Indus Periphery samples – implicitly under the assumption that they were migrants from the Harappan civilization.

It has been a long time since the Narasimhan et al preprint had come out in 31st March 2018, and we still await the peer-reviewed publication of the paper. However, there are a few things we already know about the final paper. One of these is the fact that the final paper, in comparison to its preprint, will have significantly greater number of samples from Eastern Iran and Central Asia, including as many as 14 Indus Periphery samples.

This is exciting stuff !

More specifically, 10 of these Indus Periphery samples are from Shahr-i-Sokhta are from Eastern Iran and 4 from the site of Gonur in BMAC.

This is a very important information !

Let me explain how it is so.

The Indus Periphery samples have been assumed to be Harappan migrants from South Asia into Eastern Iran and Central Asia, an assumption which is largely correct.

However, the Narasimhan et al paper went one step further and argued that these 3 Indus Periphery samples can be taken as a good sample representation of the entire Harappan genetic diversity which spread over a vast geographical expanse from Afghanistan in the West to Western UP in India in the East and upto the northern half of Gujarat in the South.

Clearly, the mature Harappan civilization had emerged by the assimilation of several distinct but interacting early Harappan cultures. The Early Harappan period is broadly defined by 4 cultural groups –

  • The Damb Sadat or Quetta ware tradition of northern Baluchistan and southern Afghanistan,
  • the Amri-Nal tradition of the southern Baluchistan and Sindh but also extending into Gujarat (Dholavira is considered a type site of this culture)
  • The Kot Diji tradition of the Greater Punjab region
  • The Sothi-Siswal tradition of North Rajasthan, Haryana, Western UP and also parts of Punjab.

The Kot Diji and Sothi-Siswal traditions were clearly the dominant cultural traditions in the formation of the Mature Harappan civilization and their sites were also typically larger in size than the other 2 traditions.

There are also greater nuances even within this broad 4-way classification. Therefore it is rather simplistic to assume that the 3 Indus Periphery samples give us a good estimation of the genetic diversity of the Harappans, without identifying the likely geographical origins of these Indus Periphery samples within South Asia.

And the fact that we have 10 Indus Periphery samples from Shahr-i-Sokhta and 4 from Gonur helps us a great deal in narrowing down their geographical origins within South Asia.

Archaeological evidence clearly shows that the site of Shahr-i-Sokhta only began to emerge around 3200 BC (very close in time to 1 Indus Periphery sample from this site which dates to around 3100 BC). And there is a lot of cultural similarities with the Chalcolithic cultural traditions of Baluchistan in the East, which has lead archaeologists to argue that there likely was migration from Baluchistan into Shahr-i-Sokhta.

To put it more directly and clearly, there was a significantly large input from the Chalcolithic people of Baluchistan in the formation of Shahr-i-Sokhta, including migration of people. The ancient DNA evidence has now confirmed it by showing the presence of as many as 10 Indus Periphery samples in Shahr-i-Sokhta (where perhaps the total no. of aDNA samples are unlikely to be more than 20-25).

By the way, hundreds of cattle figurines were discovered from the site of Shahr-i-Sokhta, and all the securely indentified figurines of cattle (more than 600 of them) are of the South Asian Zebu cattle.

The place in South Asia which was most directly involved in the formation of Shahr-i-Sokhta was Baluchistan and therefore it is quite safe to say that the Indus Periphery samples in Shahr-i-Sokhta are also migrants from Chalcolithic cultures of Baluchistan.

Furthermore, Shahr-i-Sokhta and the cultures of Eastern Iran in general and quite possibly Baluchistan as well, are said to have in turn significantly influenced the cultural formation of BMAC. So the 4 Indus Periphery samples from the BMAC site of Gonur could very well have been from these regions in Baluchistan or Eastern Iran in the South.


Now that we have identified the most likely place of origin of the Indus Periphery people within South Asia, let us understand the implications of this in terms of the genetic data.

Why the Steppe Theory of PIE Origins is likely to be wrong

In the last post by Razib, there is a lot of psycho-analysing being done by various commentators about what motivates Indians to deny AIT/AMT and support OIT. The underlying assumption being AIT/AMT is gospel truth. But is it so ? And if it is not, questioning the theory and bringing up facts that don’t support this theory should be looked at and discussed in a healthy debate.

Let me in the spirit of that debate share some pieces of evidence that massively undermine the Steppe PIE origin theory and also manages to indicate a possible SC Asian connection & migration to the steppe that is of the pre-Yamnaya stage.

 

Settler Colonialism and Permanent Settlement

I just read a short but very thought provoking article by Will Dalrymple in the Spectator website (https://spectator.us/algeria-current-colonization/). Some people may find the article a bit off-character from Dalrymple because here he provides a critique of all sort of colonialism and imperialism in history, including Muslim. Anyway, there are several interesting points in the article but I found a particular point very fascinating because although the implication seems huge in history of the Sub-continent, I haven’t much thought about it before. Without further ado,

“In the bloody 1954-62 War of Independence which ended French rule in Algeria, perhaps as many as 25,000 French and one million Algerians lost their lives in Franco-Algerian fighting, a terrible tale brilliantly told in Alistair Horne’s classic study A Savage War of Peace. In contrast, despite horrific death tolls in Hindu-Muslim violence at Partition and the creation of Muslim-only Pakistan, only seven Brits lost their lives in 1947 during the British decolonization of South Asia. The man to thank for this, more than anyone, is probably Lord Cornwallis, the British general who received such an unfair caricature in the Mel Gibson movie The Patriot. Having surrendered British forces in America to Washington at Yorktown in 1781, Cornwallis was recruited by the East India Company to make sure the same never happened in British India. He achieved this by enacting one simple law which made it illegal, except in very exceptional cases such as indigo plantations or hill stations, for British individuals ever to own land in India. This meant no settler class developed, as in the 13 American Colonies or French Algeria. As a result, in 1947, the last British officials were able to board their ships in Bombay harbor with little more than a backward glance, a regretful shrug and a rush to buy leafy bungalows in Tunbridge Wells.”

 

Why are Pakistanis such a jealous and vicious lot?

I’m sure everyone on Twitterstan (why are there so many Pakis on twitter btw) is condemning BBZ’s brave Sindh festival. Apparently the hoo-ha is caused by the fact that Mohenjardo has been scaffolded and used as a stage for the festival.

My own thoughts on the festival is that it seems rather ethnic and downmarket as opposed to cosmopolitan and pseudo-Western (let’s keep it real – the upscale Urdu-speaking Mohajers are now the core constituency of Guccistan, we like Urdu but prefer English), which is what elite should be trying to foster.

At any rate now half of Twitterstan is slinging at BBZ and his anglo allies for somehow desecrating Mohenjardo. Myra Macdonald made the good observation where were these Pakistanis when Bamiyan was being blow to bits. Also these are the same Pakis (middle class Urdu speaking Islam lot) that believe our history beings with Mohammed Bin Qasim & ends with Quaid-e-Azam.

Personally I’m glad I stay out of Paki politics (I have to since it’s doctrine for us to remain strictly non-partisan) but Pakistan seems to be uniquely affected by Tall Poppy syndrome (which deeply affects the Old Commonwealth; contrast the US & Canada) and also the developing world problem of vicious, aggressive cut-throat competition for the limited space.

Bilawal is what promises for a Hereditary Princeling of Pakistan these days; he and his sisters are a localised version of a fumbling royal dynasty. Let them indulge their passing fancy because there aren’t many other good representatives of Pakistan (their cousin Fatima is of course stunning but then again she’s only quarter Paki, far too caught up in a blood feud & doesn’t have that feel for Pakistan that a Guccistani should naturally have).

Pakistanis sadly make so little use of Mohenjardo and other such sites that at least a good send-off in some forgettable festival isn’t the best way to mark the true end of 5,000 years of Indus Civilisation. Since these very same critics of Bilawal (the Urdu speaking Punjabi Islam middle classes) are the very same one who’ll happily put on Burka & Dishdasha  to make sure that Pakistan finally becomes the Arab-Muslim country that Quaid-e-Azam may or may not have promised us.

Bengalis are like Tamils, and Jatts are sui generis, and Syrian Christians are not Brahmins

Zack Ajmal has closed comments on Harappa DNA. Though they were amusing, they had gotten out of control. But that doesn’t mean that his blog still isn’t a comment worthy. The data is still there. I check in on it every now and then, mostly because Zack’s sample has populations which you can’t find elsewhere. It can also answer some questions which I’ve always wondered about. So three things are now clear with his sample sizes/constituents

1) Like Tamils, Bengalis exhibit a dichotomous distinction between Brahmins and non-Brahmins genetically. By and large Bengali Brahmins seem only moderately effected by the distinctive East Asian admixture found in other Bengalis, and are rather like North Indian Brahmins. The other Bengali samples are very similar in having elevated East Asian admixture, and lower fractions of “Northwest” Indian affinities than the Brahmins. This is in contrast to the situation in Uttar Pradesh where there are non-Brahmin high castes who have similar genetic profiles to the Brahmins (e.g., Kshatriya).

2) The Jatt samples are unique and distinctive, and have more European-affinities than almost any other South Asian samples Zack has (more than Punjabi Brahmins, for example). And, they are relatively uniform in this pattern. To me this does suggest that these populations have a more recent infusion of ancestry from outside South Asia.

3) Syrian Christians have told me for years that their ancestors were Brahmins. Not necessarily all Syrian Christians, but their ancestors. This was so common I assumed it was false because there are about ten times more Syrian Christians in Kerala than Brahmins. The Harappa DNA results show that Syrian Christians are probably not descended from Brahmins, probably none in Zack’s sample. But their genetic profile often matches that of the Nairs, and also other various castes. Unlike Bengali Brahmins, or Jatts, this implies to me that multiple communities have moved into the Syrian Christian category over the centuries.

A lonely BP

Since most of our contributors haven’t been enabled yet it’s pretty much me manning the fort. Two always riveting pieces from Centre India (lest I deviate from a “Brown” Topic) . The below is from Harsh Gupta who I follow on twitter and it touches on Indian identity, which is an apparently inexhaustible topic (like Israeli identity) since they have to at least nominally some measure of inclusion (purport to be liberal democracies) yet also chauvinism (such is the way of nationalism).

The Indian centre-left tries to co-opt Christians, dalits, tribals and the “very poor” into a coalition that is electorally sustainable. In 2009, large sections of the urban middle class too went with them. But they are now coming back towards the BJP, which has grown from middle and upper castes in North India to a broader coalition.
The Muslim percentage of population of what is now India is about half of what it was in 1924, because of the partition, despite faster population growth amongst Indian Muslims. The 2011 census results as far as I know have not yet been broken down by religion, but the Muslim population should be around 15%, higher than 13.6% in 2001. This would mean the Indian Muslim population is around 180-190 million Muslims. The 250 million number peddled by fanatics – both Hindu and Muslim – is simply inaccurate. Sikhs and especially Christians make significant religious minorities as well. A Letter to Indian Muslim Youth
India and identity – In ten pieces Varshney’s writing (‘Why India must allow hyphens‘, IE, Feb 13) that “If Indians can be Gujarati Indians or Hindu Indians, why can’t there be Muslim Indians or Christian Indians?”, is a strawman. Nobody is saying Indians cannot see themselves and fellow citizens as belonging to any group. The argument is simply for the government to not see Indians as Hindus, Muslims, and Christians or so on… 9. Against entrenched identities – Indian Express
…it is high time the Indian state breaks from Nehru’s construct of seeing religious minorities as “separate from us” and stops indulging in the “soft bigotry of low expectations” from certain communities.

The best of Goldman shines if not Kashmir then Cali?

Kashmiri Pandit Neel Kashkari is planning to run for Governor of California; it seems that Indian-Americans (FCs at that) are just gravitating towards the civil service & politics.

Of course even more interesting is his background as a Goldman banker, who really do seem to be Masters of the Universe.

Just a short sample of the very familiar household names of these GS Alums (via Wikipedia):

Brown Pundits