Pakistan 2022; Things fall apart?

 

Another BP Podcast is up. You can listen on LibsynAppleSpotify, and Stitcher (and a variety of other platforms). Probably the easiest way to keep up the podcast since we don’t have a regular schedule is to subscribe to one of the links above!

In this episode, Omar talks to Ambassador Kamran Shafi and Columnist Dr Mohammed Taqi about the current political crisis in Pakistan. We take our best guess on whether the army is falling apart or just having a hiccup.

Some background:

  1. NFP (nationalist-leftist columnist from Karachi) writes a pretty good summary of the Imran Khan experiment and how it fell apart. https://www.dawn.com/news/1719266/smokers-corner-the-self-destruction-of-imran-khan
  2. Former ISI chief Asad Durrani writes about the failure of Project Imran: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/the-army-took-a-back-seat-because-its-project-imran-khan-bombed-says-former-isi-chief-asad-durrani/articleshow/95305574.cms
  3. Mainstream Pakistani nationalist Mosharref Zaidi writes on this topic: https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/1007665-november-29-and-pakistan-s-polycrisis

it is worth noting that I could not find a single recent good article by a pro-khan columnist. That is not his style. He has a simple message, and no details and no plan.

Maj General Tajammal Malik. Very Important Interview

An old piece from Major Amin. A “must read” for anyone trying to understand the Pakistan army. From its peculiar combination of Jihad and British ideals to its performance in 1965 and 1971, to its full politicization under Zia.
Gen Tajammal Hussain Malik was an excellent officer (ie very good at his primary job of training and leading troops into battle), an asset to any army, but also a coup maker and a fanatic with very shallow ideas about nations and how they can (or cannot) function.. A great officer to have on your side in war, but in Pakistan the army does much more than  fight wars, so there you have it… (It is a very long interview, so if you are in a hurry, just jump to the highlighted excerpts, you will get a flavor of the whole thing).

Major General tajammul hussain malik-Hero of Battle of Hilli and twice Coup maker

Agha H Amin
This is the man who was praised by Indians and they established a commission to study his masterpiece Battle of Hilli. He was praised by his Indian battle opponent in his book “Indian Sword penetrates East Pakistan” as a singularly brave man. He was miles above pygmies like Zia, Ayub and Musharraf. When we joined the army we were inspired by his battalion 3rd Baloch’s attempted coup of 23 March 1980 to wipe out despicable clown Zia and his dirty clique!
One good thing that General Beg did immediately after that glorious crash in 1988 was to restore Tajammul’s complete military honors and privileges. Tajammul was serving a sentence of 14 years RI for planning to liquidate all army generals and Zia on 23 March 1980 ,a brilliant scheme indeed!
We had to wait till glorious 17th August 1988 when that plane finally crashed right into the Hindu Shamshan Ghat on Basti Lal Kamal ! Tajammul has thrown light on Zia’s shallow personality in this interview !
 May God Bless His Soul !
Major Agha H Amin (Retired)
Please tell us something about your early life, parents?
I was born on 13th June 1924, in village Thanil Kamal, Tehsil Chakwal, then District Jhelum (now District Chakwal). I spent my childhood in rural atmosphere, which at that time was quite primitive. There was no electricity, no roads, no telephones and as far as I remember no one owned even a bicycle. Radio came much later. Men, women and children wore the same dress as their ancestors put on centuries ago. There was not much difference between the rich and the poor. There were no social barriers and the living style of all the inhabitants was almost alike. A village was a self-sustained compact unit. They produced their own wheat, meat, vegetable, rice, ghee, eggs and almost everything one needs for ones simple living. The village shopkeepers were Hindus or Sikhs. Almost all purchases from the shops were on barter system. The prices of agricultural and dairy products were very low: -Wheat was sold at 1 1/4 rupees a maund. (40 Kilo) Meat 1/4 rupee a seer ( Kilo) Milk – 10 seers for one rupee.Pure desi ghee – 1 1/4 seer for one rupee. Chicken weighing one seer for about four annas (1/4 rupee). These rates compared
favourably with the rates laid down in “Aaeen-i- Akbari” during the Mughal Emperor Jalal ud Din Akbar’s rule, more than four hundred years ago.
Both my father and mother were highly religious. I inherited my religious convictions from my parents.
Please tell us about your school / college days and any decisive influences on your personality formation / development of convictions ?
A common village boy living in rural atmosphere, as mentioned above, could not conceive any high ambitions. I had many relatives in the Army but the highest rank held by any one of them was that of a Subedar, (which was then called Viceroy Commission). In fact, as far as I remember, there was not even a single King’s Commission Officer in the  whole of Tehsil Chakwal at that time. ( First IMA course passed out in 1934/35). From village school, I moved to Government High School Chakwal. Lieut General Abdul Majeed Malik and Maj General Nazar Hussain Shah were a class ahead of me. Brig Amir Gulistan Janjua, whose last appointment was Governor of NWFP, was my class fellow. I think if statistics are taken, that rural area High School produced more Brigadiers and Generals than Aitchison College and Burn Hall combined.
What were your perceptions as young man in pre-1947 India about the prevalent political conditions, Muslim League, Congress etc?
The British Indian army was a mercenary Army. Although occasionally we used to read about the political developments then taking place, yet at that time it never occurred to us that the Indian Army would be divided so soon and a new state of Pakistan would come into being as a homeland for the Muslims. It looked a fantasy. I vividly remember when I was a cadet, I had read an article in one of the magazines, perhaps the Military Digest, wherein, the then Commander-in-Chief Indian Army, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auckinleck, while addressing army personal at some station had said, “In ten years time, you would have all Indian Battalion Commanders, in fifteen years time you would have all Indian Division Commanders, and in twenty years time you would have an Indian Commander-in-Chief.” From this statement it would become evident that the division of Army was never visualised even at the highest level of military hierarchy, nor did theBritish officers ever think of vacating their biggest colony so soon. At the most one could say that India might get dominion status in due course of time, but complete independence was still being regarded as a dream.
Any memorable incidents, which left an indelible impression on your personality?
I cannot think of any particular instance, which left an indelible impression on my mind. However, by the time I was a Platoon Commander at PMA in 1954/55, my experiences, observations in life, extensive study of books of history, philosophy and religion particularly Iqbal’s book “Reconstruction of religious thought in Islam” and his Urdu poetry had convinced me of existence of God and all that is laid down in Quran. From then onwards I became a dedicated practicing Muslim and started praying regularly which continues till today. Islam is the guiding force for all my actions and reactions. Whether in peace or in war, I drew my aspirations from Islam. I pray to Almighty Allah that may He continue to guide me for the rest of my life.

Continue reading Maj General Tajammal Malik. Very Important Interview

General Qamar Javed Bajwa

A few months old, but worth a read.

From Dr Hamid Hussain

20 January 2022

“A friend is someone who tells you the truth; not someone who believes in you”.  Late King Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz​.

I usually do review of army chief’s tenure. I do critical part when chief is in uniform and things done right when he hangs his boots. This is the first part.  I know that this kind of work makes many officers uncomfortable but as they say ‘it is a dirty job; but somebody got to do it”.

غرور جاں کو مرے یار بیچ دیتے ہیں
قبا کی حرص میں دستار بیچ دیتے ہیں
یہ لوگ کیا ہیں کہ دو چار خواہشوں کے لیے
تمام عمر کا پندار بیچ دیتے ہیں

Regards,
Hamid

​(TRANSLATION OF THE URDU COUPLETS: My friends sell their pride; To acquire a robe they sell their head covering. Who are these who for a few wishes; Sell an entire life’s treasure of self-respect)

General Qamar Javed Bajwa

General Qamar Javed Bajwa is in the last year of his extended six years tenure as Chief of the Army Staff (COAS). Army is the most powerful institution of the country and COAS works behind the scenes and influence important policy decisions. This has been a preferred option for the institution to avoid controversy and even accepted by all major political forces of the country. This is a critical review of General Bajwa’s tenure in the context of his political role and running of the army.

General Bajwa was appointed COAS in November 2016 at a time of strained civil-military relations. General Bajwa inherited the institutional decision of political engineering project of actively supporting a third force under the leadership of Imran Khan. This project was later called a ‘hybrid regime’ as it involved active participation of the army in the political process rather than constitutional role of active support of a duly elected civilian government. This became a slippery slope and institution got entangled in political mud fights. There were two major reasons.

First, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) government headed by Prime Minister Imran Khan is a thin majority government supported by allies who were brought into the tent by the army by incentives or arm twisting. Second, Imran Khan was unable to switch from the role of an opposition leader to a head of the government. This had a negative impact on his relations with his allies as well as day to day governance. Army had to step in several times to tackle internal governance as well as some foreign policy issues. In this General Bajwa had full support of his senior brass. However, the negative fallout was that the institution became controversial for such an overt political role.
Opposition leader Nawaz Sharif in his speeches started to name senior army officers that was unprecedented and resulted in embarrassment. This combined with deficient performance of the government and serious economic crisis resulted in criticism of the army. This perception resulted in blaming of the army even in cases where government was using civilian levers to gag opposition and try to rig some by-elections. Army is overly concerned about its public image, and this made senior brass very uneasy.

In the summer of 2019, I became aware that General Bajwa was positioning himself for an extension. I am against extension of tenures of senior army officers as it seriously erodes professionalism of the army and creates friction among senior brass. My view is based on the sordid history of extension business in Pakistan army. In my view, three years tenure of Chief is a blessing and best instrument to safeguard institutional interest as new Chief can sweep the slate clean and start over again. Tinkering with it by extension has seen reputations ruined and institution badly bruised. At that time, I wrote following and shared with some officers:

“2019 looks more like 2007. General Pervez Mussharraf had come under criticism from different quarters of society and in the process army’s reputation was sullied. Change of command provided an exit. General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani slowly consolidated his command by sidelining old guard and then convincing all players that army has turned a page. The possible exit for the army is change of command in November 2019. However, personal interests of three key players; Prime Minister Imran Khan, army chief General Bajwa and Director General Inter-Services Intelligence (DGISI) Faiz Hamid now converge where extension of General Bajwa is being seriously considered. A three-year extension will serve all three parties. Bajwa to enjoy few more years of private jet and being the expert gamekeeper at the national park. Imran Khan will be seriously thinking about giving him an extension to make sure that an unknown factor does not come into equation. Imran is faced with enormous challenges. However, he has not been able to put his house in order. Rising economic woes and diverse opposition groups coming closer can cause many headaches. Having army brass in his corner is important to weather any storm. He would prefer to continue with known entity than venture into unchartered territory. In case of three years extension, Faiz will be among top contenders in 2022. After 18-24 months as DGISI, Bajwa can appoint him Corps Commander to make him eligible for the top slot. I am not in favor of any extension but especially in case of Bajwa, negative fallout for the army is manifold. Army is seen no more as a neutral body and extreme polarization of Pakistani polity is now directly affecting army as an institution.” 

Imran Khan announced three years extension and General Bajwa lost all moral authority. In my interaction with dozens of officers of all ranks, I have not found even one who supports extension of tenure. Off course, they cannot express their views publicly. Ironically, General Bajwa was able to rally his institution when Chief Justice Asif Saeed Khosa entertained the petition that challenged General Bajwa’s extension (it was disposed of asking government to just legislate it). Now, even those who disagreed in principle, fully supported General Bajwa to make sure that no one can challenge army’s pre-eminence.

General Bajwa’s decisions about promotions and postings followed the normal process and he did not deviate from the norms. Two areas raised eyebrows in the army circles. One was picking some Major Generals from obscure and sidelined posts, promoting them to three-star rank and giving them prized postings. This was viewed as an attempt to give an impression of personal favor and hence adding ‘smiling nodders’ at ‘the long table of the knights.’  Second was promoting and giving prized postings to officers from his alma mater Baloch Regiment. The list includes four Lieutenant Generals; all with prized postings including three to be the top contenders to succeed him in 2022. There is also a lengthy list of Balochi Major Generals given prized command, staff and instructional appointments that improves their profile for further promotion. It is important to note that all these officers are qualified for promotions. However, competition is very tough from Brigadier and upwards ranks and posting; a sole prerogative of Chief can give edge to the officer.

In 2019, promotions of two officers; Faiz Hamid and Asif Ghafoor to lieutenant general rank created problems for the institution. During review process of promotions, I strongly advised against promotion of both officers. This was not about qualification of the officers but due to negative fallout for the institution. Faiz Hamid served as Director General of Counterintelligence (CI) directorate. Internal security wing of CI manages political tasks of the army. Spooks are successful only when they are not seen and heard. Hamid was extremely careless and against all norms, tried to do everything with his own hands. At that time, I wrote that “ Faiz Hamid has managed political tasks of the institution and his promotion may create potential problems if some damaging information becomes public while he is still serving at a senior position.”

I was referring to the information that at that time former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was accusing him of encouraging defection from Pakistan Muslim League ranks during 2018 elections but only privately to close associates and not publicly. In November 2017, a religious party blocked major highway to Islamabad for several days paralyzing the capital. Army negotiated a settlement between the government and protest leaders that was dubbed by many as abject surrender of government authority. The last sentence of the agreement clearly stated that this agreement was reached due to the efforts of army chief and his team. Faiz Hamid signed that document on behalf of the army. In early summer of 2021, I wrote about this phenomenon and its negative impact on the institution that “ I’m strongly against senior officers doing everything with their own hands. Many controversies could have been easily avoided if junior officers or in case of ISI retired contract officers were given such tasks (i.e., Faiz Hamid signing the TLP contract, DG Rangers handing money to protestors; a task which a Havildar could have easily done). In case of problem, retired/junior officer can be eased out with less negative fallout for the army. Chief is partly to blame for this mindset as he is meeting everyone and his cousin. He should have assigned such tasks to a junior officer to represent GHQ.”  

About Ghafoor, I wrote “Asif Ghafoor has been the public face of the army and as Director General Inter Services Public Relations (DGISPR), he was conveying message of the army brass to the country. In this capacity, he became the public face of many controversies during civil military relations crisis of 2017-18. He was simply a messenger, but his elevation will be bad optics.”

My view was that as there are only about two dozen Lieutenant Generals therefore their promotion will create problems about accommodating them to low profile postings. I suggested that after supersession, both can be rewarded by giving them a lucrative post-retirement position in army-controlled corporations. When I became aware that General Bajwa has decided to promote both officers, I thought the middle ground to prevent negative fallout for the institution would be to give them second or third tier staff postings away from the limelight. Appointment of Hamid as Adjutant General (AG) and Ghafoor as Inspector General Communications & Information Technology (IG C & IT) looked like a safe bet. However, few months later when Hamid was appointed Director General Inter-Services Intelligence (DGISI), I concluded that General Bajwa has taken the institution into the mud puddle. In view of the role of DGCI in Pakistani context, elevation of DGCI as DGISI usually does not bode well for the concerned officer as well as the institution. Recent example of Lieutenant General Zaheer Ul Islam was the case in point.

Army suffered a serious setback when what is talked in hushed voices in drawing rooms is now discussed publicly. General Bajwa and Hamid’s name came up in opposition rallies, senior officers discussed in the mainstream media and ridiculed on social media. Army was blamed for the dismal performance of the government and army was forced to retrace its steps to go back to the drawing board.

Chief informed Imran that after three years of unqualified support, army will now take away the training wheels and move into its own lane. This was in early summer of 2021 when I became aware of it. I thought that this will lead to gradual divergence of path of Imran Khan and General Bajwa. I had been advocating that it was in institutional interest to step back and shared with many officers. One senior retired officer with fingers on the pulse of the events responded that “The reason that I think your advice to step back on matters like Justice Isa is not likely to be taken is because the institution, especially its head, has dug itself too deep in the hole. Probably a clash between IK and QJB (you have alluded to it) might cut the Gordian Knot.”

Later, army also sent reconciliation messages to two major opposition parties. These overtures rattled Imran Khan who saw this move as army brass undermining his rule. In the fall of 2021, friction between Imran Khan and General Bajwa on appointment of DGISI quickly turned into a rapidly widening gulf. I was completely baffled by this action of Imran Khan that made absolutely no sense. It was all downhill from that point. Now, army must keep a close eye on Imran Khan as he is mercurial and can throw a wrench in the machine causing new headaches.

General Bajwa periodically meets with a select group of journalists and social media activists. Most participants hold sympathetic view about the army that is fine. However, same group is also publicly denouncing opposition politicians and dissident judges and journalists.  They may be expressing their personal views, but it is viewed as being done at the behest of the army and gives the impression of General Bajwa directing this crusade. These meetings are private and non-attributable. However, leaks start literally within minutes after the meeting as participants want to show off their connection with the fountain of power of Pakistan.  When General Bajwa’s appointment was announced in the winter of 2016, he met few journalists and told them that he was looking forward to more interactions in the future. Some of us familiar with this terrain, cautioned against these interactions as such conversations quickly leak and make Chief controversial.

Full time involvement of COAS with political engineering meant that there was little time for other key areas. General Bajwa was unable to chart a new path in Baluchistan. Focus was only on throwing more bodies at the problem. Securing key centers and communications is an important task, but it needs to be complemented by engaging population and finding political solution including addressing forced disappearances and extra judicial killings. Alienation of Balochs is now almost complete affecting all segments of Baloch society.

More importantly, he mishandled the Pushtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM) issue and in the process missing a chance of shaping post-conflict environment of the battle areas of former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). PTM is a grass root movement and by publicly and directly confronting it, army lost a large segment of tribal society that was its natural ally. Direct public confrontation emanating from General Bajwa and DGISPR was a case of poor judgement. This was despite the advice of caution by some senior retired Pushtun officers when General Bajwa invited them for a discussion on this subject. In my view absence of Pushtun officers at important higher command and intelligence posts contributed to mishandling of this issue.

A new element of management of higher judiciary called by some senior armed forces officers as ‘new frontier’ has dragged the army into new controversy and in the process earned the ire of some segments of the judiciary and a large segment of lawyer community. This was completely avoidable, but anger trumped the better sense. Justice Qazi Faiz Isa passed some remarks in his judgment against Faiz Hamid that had no practical implications. In few weeks, this would have faded away from the memory. However, army brass decided to retaliate against Justice Isa compounding the initial folly. The result of this futile exercise is that some justices are passing remarks in their judgements that embarrass defense establishment. This is more to show to the public that they are independent. The real threat is that Justice Isa may take his sweet revenge in time when he becomes Chief Justice in 2023. If Hamid is selected as army chief, then there is a clear and present danger of direct clash between army chief and Chief Justice.

I became aware of possibility of army’s potential clash with higher judiciary when after some negative remarks, there was talk of filing a reference to Supreme Judicial Council against Justice Gulzar Ahmad and Justice Isa. Sane voices at Judge Advocate General (JAG) branch warned against these moves. Unfortunately, anger of DGISI rather than a well thought out plan was the driving force. I strongly advocated against opening this front as this was unchartered waters. In fact, I argued that army will need the help of judiciary to solve the thorny issue of internment centers and forced disappearances. I recommended that now with a friendly government, a high-level coordination committee with members from government, army and judiciary should work for a framework of legislative and judicial measures to resolve the issue of people in military custody. General Bajwa asked Chief Justice Asif Saeed Khosa for help in this matter, but it was too late as army had already picked a fight with higher judiciary.  Judiciary was divided by this time and Justice Khosa did not want to leave his office with allegation of working as handmaid of the army. He excused himself by stating that this will cause a constitutional crisis.

General Bajwa is in the lame duck last lap of his tenure and there is truly little that he can do that can shape the environment. He can do limited actions to provide room for his successor. As momentum is building up against Imran Khan to bring down his government, there is lot of uncertainty regarding his moves that can directly impact the army senior brass. Dangling the carrot of another extension to General Bajwa or early announcement of his successor to make Bajwa a lame duck chief are two possibilities. In view of deep mistrust and now clearly visible of anger of Imran against General Bajwa makes first possibility less likely. Early announcement of new Chief eight months before the retirement of General Bajwa will put a lot of strain on senior brass. The nuclear option is sacking of General Bajwa that will result in a crisis.

Earlier my view was that sometime in the summer, General Bajwa should move Hamid from Peshawar based XI Corps and park him in the sideline to complete his tenure. This will effectively take him out of the race as he will not meet the new criteria of command of a Corps for one calendar year. In view of rapidly changing scenario, it will be prudent to move Hamid sooner rather than later. Ghafoor can be kept at his current post to complete his tenure. Keeping Hamid at his current post and giving Ghafoor a high-profile command or staff appointment will add new uncertainties and complicate things for his successor.

In my view, policies adopted by the army as an institution in the last few years has unwittingly brought the institution into a dead-end street. The major risk is that in the dead-end street, one is an easy target for snipers. Army’s pre-eminence is accepted by everyone in the country, and it was able to achieve its objectives without taking direct control. It was ankle deep in politics and that was manageable as one only had to change the boots and keep uniform clean. Marching right into the mud of the political pig pen was not a smart move as mud has splashed all over the uniform. Now, uniform needs to be changed and washed. This will be the challenge for the next Chief.

Hamid Hussain
coeusconsultant@optonline.net
10 February 2022

Continue reading General Qamar Javed Bajwa

Pakistan vs Tehreek e Taliban, Dr Hamid Hussain’s view

From Dr Hamid Hussain. As usual, he has some interesting tidbits about who did what, even if you disagree with his analysis. I am also attaching a later exchange between Dr Hussain and a British analyst.

Questions from a senior Pakistani army officer and my response to them. First segment carries his views and the second segment mine.
…………………………………………………………………………
Dear Hamid, AOA.

Thank you for sharing your usual rational and pragmatic analysis.

The reasons put forward by former intelligence officer about rapprochement with TTP are both concocted and devoid of logic. In the past also there have been many abortive deals with TTP, which have never worked.

TTA (Afghan Taliban) & TTP (Pakistani Taliban) have always collaborated with each other, at least, in sharing intelligence . Both are Deobandis and have elements in each, which have come from the other. The public opinion in Pakistan resents this deal because of the loss of thousands of lives and APS (Public School), Peshawar tragedy. There is definite proof of RAW & Afghan intelligence masterminding most incidents in Pakistan (for sure Kamra & Mehran bases). Pakistan has even presented these evidence dossiers to UN Secy Gen. What moral justification or credibility we have then to strike a deal with a terrorist organisation both from international and domestic perspectives?

Even if there is a deal, what stops TTP or even Taliban to launch a terrorist attack inside Pakistan and blame it on a splinter group of TTP? The critical question is of funding . TTP were foreign funded for the acts at the behest of sponsors. If they are unable to undertake these terrorist acts, how would they be sustained, recruited and pay to the members?

If you link the TTP deal with TLP (Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan), for a temporary truce we have lost the war.

Best Regards, Army Officer

…………………………………………………………………………………….
24 December 2021

Thanks, Sir, for your insight.  Sorry for the delayed response as I am busy with many chores and some hectic travels.

TTA & TTP:  You have highlighted the ideological, infrastructure, recruitment and financial relationships between two entities.  The problem for the Pakistan army was perception management for both domestic & foreign audiences.  It was supporting TTA but fighting TTP, therefore, it tried to convince the Pakistani public that the two entities were different although privately there were concerns about symbiotic relationship between the two. Hope was that with TTA having a major say in running Afghanistan (no one expected that Taliban will walk over after making a deal with US) will be able to rein in TTP.  My view was that it was a wrong assumption and lack of grasp of recent Afghan history despite deep involvement. Continue reading Pakistan vs Tehreek e Taliban, Dr Hamid Hussain’s view

Book Review: Rivals by Dr Saad Shafqat

Rivals: Saad Shafqat: Bloomsbury India

A review I wrote for India Today a few months ago.

Rivals is the third book and second novel from the pen of Dr Saad Shafqat, professor of neurology at the Agha Khan Hospital and Medical School in Karachi. He started writing with pieces about cricket and is the proud author of Javed Miandad’s autobiography (“cutting edge”) as well as a previous medical thriller (“breath of death”). This book is set in the same “Avicenna University Hospital” (a thinly disguised version of the author’s actual place of work) as his first novel, but the main protagonist in this one is not terrorists or terrorist hunters but doctors competing for a prestigious department chairmanship.
The book opens with Dr Tanya Shah at her morning constitutional and the author is clearly familiar with the world of Karachi’s rich and famous. As she puts on her Maria B lawn suit and grabs her Luis Vuitton bucket bag and heads out to work, every detail is lovingly described; Unfortunately, another character is also at his morning constitutional at exactly the same time, shaving his pubes and underarms so that he can be in a state of ritual purity when he meets his 72 virgins. Yes, there is a suicide bombing in chapter 2, but while it will play a bit of a role in the drama that unfolds later, this is not really a book about Islamist terrorists or their victims. It is a book about Dr Tanya Shah and her colleague Dr Hammad Khan, professor of ophthalmology and her rival in the race to become Avicenna’s next chief of surgery. Dr Hammad plots sexual escapades with medical reps and underhand maneuvers to undermine Dr Shah’s candidacy with his hangers on while sipping cocktails at an elite club, while a “white tiger” type ambulance driver and a bomb victim’s poor mother add some working-class spice to the mix. There is also a lot of medical excitement (operating room, trauma surgery, that sort of thing) that is well written and interesting.

The book is generally well written and is a fun and easy read, but the characters are not fully developed and promising detours frequently fade out without getting anywhere genuinely exciting. Still, it is set in Karachi and anyone with any connection to the medical world will find many familiar sights and sounds and depictions to keep him interested. And while there is a suicide bombing and some run ins with poor people, the book cannot be accused of relying on either poverty porn or Jihad-mongering for cheap thrills. Instead, Dr Shafqat stays mostly with the world he knows well and avoids any temptation to crudely take notice of how westernized and “un-Islamic” it is. These doctors are worrying about publications, presentations, trainees, committee meetings, departmental politics and sexual scandals and their stories hold no grand political lessons and attempt to correct no terrible historical crimes. That at least is refreshing. Overall, a fun read, but one is left with the feeling that it could have been better.

 

Browncast: Omar Ali on Pakistan, Myths and Realities

Another BP Podcast is up. You can listen on LibsynAppleSpotify, and Stitcher (and a variety of other platforms). Probably the easiest way to keep up the podcast since we don’t have a regular schedule is to subscribe to one of the links above!

In this podcast we reverse positions and guest blogger Maneesh Taneja interviewed me (Omar Ali) instead of the other way round. We talk about the usual stuff, the ideology of Pakistan,  partition, why the army rules Pakistan, how the India-Pakistan thing is likely to evolve, and suchlike. Just a casual conversation.

Errata:

  1. I said at around the 40 minute mark that the Indian army at partition was around 50% Muslim. That is not correct (thanks to @genionomist for pointing this out on twitter). It was about 33% Muslim, 33% Sikh and 33% Hindu.
  2. I said Pakistan officially teaches pride in the Indus valley civilization and then jumps to Mohammed Bin Qasim. I forgot to mention that we DO own the Gandhara civilization, but we present it as Buddhist, almost never as Hindu or generically “Indian”. In that sense, it is used to buttress the assertion that Pakistan was never really too “Indian”. And I did not get into this, but left-liberal types who reject or question the Two Nation theory then insist on a very sharp and black and white British 19th Century type vision of evil Aryans invading “our real people”, the heroic Dravidians. Win some, lose some 😉

I promised in the podcast that I would also post links to some articles and books I believe may be relevant. So here goes:

  1. Pakistan, Myths and Consequences. My article in “Pragati” about the ideology of Pakistan and its consequences for Pakistan can be found here. 
  2. Podcast with Venkat Dhulipala can be found here. 
  3. A link to Venkat Dhulipala’s book “creating a new Medina“, which I think is an excellent introduction to how Pakistan was imagined by many (not all) of its creators.
  4. Abdul Majeed Abid on the Objectives resolution, adopted by the Pakistani constituent assembly as the basis for a future constitution of Pakistan, can be found here. 
  5. Martial Race Theory, myths and consequences. This article by Major Amin sheds light on the genesis of the Pakistan army and its self image.
  6. Our fellow blogger “the emissary” views on India’s Islam. 
  7. Dr Hamid Hussain’s summary of the Kashmir problem is here.

The Afghan National Army

From Dr Hamid Hussain (discussing question of whether the ANA can be resurrected? what will become of them?)

Some informed individuals asked for my two cents worth opinion about a conversation about the Afghan National Army (ANA) in a changed scenario.  One concern is that a large number of unemployed soldiers can join any faction of the war economy. It invariably resulted in comparison with the disbandment of the Iraqi army after the second Gulf war.

 

Hamid

Afghan National Army (ANA)

Thanks Sir for your email.  You raise an important point and following is my take;

“Blood cannot be washed out with blood”.   Pashto proverb

ANA had disintegrated in the aftermath of Soviet withdrawal and subsequent civil war.  New ANA post American occupation is a more recent phenomenon and has an interesting history. In the first few years after the U.S. arrival in late 2001, security was provided by militias of local warlords.  The U.S. had no initial plan for the nation building project and the Department of Defense (DOD) under Donald Rumsfeld was allergic to the whole idea. Constitution of the new Afghan government was a highly centralized template and deft Hamid Karzai had great influence on the process.  Once this centralized project was adopted, then it dawned that this will need an effective national army.  This also neatly fitted into the idea of sidelining local powerful warlords and shedding militias.  However, when the nascent structure for ANA was put in place in 2005-6, insurgency had started in Pashtun south and east.  This meant dominance of non-Pashtuns for a variety of reasons.

These non-Pashtuns had joined the U.S. quite early and had influence due to direct contact with American handlers.  As insurgency was mainly in Pashtun areas therefore there was hesitancy to recruit Pashtuns.  However, one could not do away with Pashtuns therefore Soviet era leftist officers were brought back and urban educated as well some tribal rural Pashtuns resenting Taliban dominance were recruited. Later, some of these officers were eased out again due to the influence of non-Pashtuns power brokers.  Every power player used ANA and police to fill ranks with his partisans.  This was a favor providing a secure job. During the Obama administration, ANA was expanded but rapid expansion simply provided more avenues of corruption including pocketing salaries of ‘ghost soldiers’ that only existed on army payroll.  Despite these handicaps, ANA had a reasonable structure and more importantly in view of rampant corruption in police and other government departments. ANA was held in high esteem by the general public.  More money was spent on Special Operations Forces (SOF) that were better trained, equipped & supported. Disproportionately, a large number of SOF was Uzbek, Tajik & Hazara. Continue reading The Afghan National Army

Blasphemy and blasphemy laws in Pakistan

This was on old post about blasphemy laws that I wrote in 2015 and revised in 2021. It is on the site, but hard to search for, so i decided to repost it now that blasphemy is again in the news with two recent episodes where the police were able to arrest the accused (ie save him from mob killing) but then the police themselves executed the blasphemer in custody. There has been an episode in the past where a Shia who had blasphemed against the sahaba (the companions of the prophet) was killed (with an axe) by a police officer while in custody and there have been a couple of episodes where blasphemers were killed by other prisoners, but this trend of execution by the police is now at a new level. The police officers who carried out the execution were garlanded and immediately received promises of millions of rupees in rewards (though with Pakistan reaching new levels of conmanship, it is likely that some of these pledges are fake). So now, not only will the mob kill you any time you are accused of blasphemy, if the mob fails, the police will finish the job the same day.
Of course, if it does reach trial, the courts will always sentence to death in any case because judges who let off previous accused have also been killed.

 

SO it goes.

Meanwhile, as liberal muslims and Liberals and Leftists in the West who want to use orthodox Muslims for their own purposes and want to find ways to oppose blasphemy laws without upsetting Muslims will dig up their usual “colonial era blasphemy laws in Pakistan” story to see if blame can be pinned on some dead entity, such as the British empire. So I wanted to have a post handy where I could direct them; so here it is, a quick overview of the blasphemy issue in Pakistan

A blasphemy law was part of the 19th century Indian Penal code as section 295.. It was not a bad law at all and the lazy habit of blaming it for later blasphemy law crap in the Indian subcontinent is just that: a lazy habit.

Here is section 295 of the Indian Penal Code of 1860:

 Injuring or defiling place of worship with intent to insult the religion of any class.—Whoever destroys, damages or defiles any place of worship, or any object held sacred by any class of persons with the intention of thereby insulting the religion of any class of persons or with the knowledge that any class of persons is likely to consider such destruction, damage or defile­ment as an insult to their religion, shall be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

The aim of the law was to prevent/punish things like someone throwing a dead pig into a mosque or a cow’s head into a temple. An actual physical desecration is to be punished. This seems like an eminently sensible law  and cannot really be blamed for all the evils that came later. But in the 1920s there was a famous case in Lahore where a Hindu publisher was arrested by the colonial authorities after Muslims agitated against him for having published a book called Rangila Rasul (“merry prophet”). The British colonial authorities tried to prosecute him for hurting the religious sentiments of Muslims, but the high court in Lahore (quite properly) found him innocent because there was no law on the books against just publishing a book, no matter how offensive it may be to some religious group. Fearing future communal discord from such provocations, the British then had the legislative assembly add section 295A to the law in order to criminalize deliberate attempts to “outrage the religious feelings of any community”. This section states:

Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of citizens of India, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise], insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 4[three years], or with fine, or with both. 

But even with this new and expanded article 295A in place, prosecutions for blasphemy were few and far between until, in the 1980s, General Zia added two new sections to the law in Pakistan and really set the ball rolling.  These infamous sections are labelled 295B and 295C.

295-B:  Defiling the copy of Holy Qur’an. Whoever wilfully defiles, damages or desecrates a copy of the Holy Qur’an or of an extract there from or uses it in any derogatory manner for any unlawful purpose shall be punishable with imprisonment for life.

295-C: use of derogatory remarks etc., in respect of the Holy Prophet: – who ever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by any imputation innuendo, or insinuation, directly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life and shall also be liable for fine.

Note that the law no longer requires that the offense be malicious in intent. Intent is no longer an issue. Insulting the Quran or the prophet, even unintentionally, is now punishable by death. To seal the deal, in 1991 the Federal Shariat Court of Pakistan struck down the option of life imprisonment and made the death penalty obligatory. 
And of course, the new amendments only apply to blasphemy against Islam, not against all religions (in this sense, the new laws are more “rational” and internally coherent, since all religions blaspheme against all other religions as a matter of course, so the original law was not coherent in principle, though still workable in practice). Between 1984 to 2004, 5,000 cases of blasphemy were registered in Pakistan and 964 people were charged and accused of blasphemy; 479 Muslims, 340 Ahmadis, 119 Christians, 14 Hindus and 10 others. Thirty-two people charged with blasphemy were killed extra-judicially during that time. More have died since. Eighty-six percent of all the cases were reported in Punjab.

Every time the shit hits the fan, many liberal people start hoping that this blasphemy law can be changed to finally stop or slow down this torrent of prosecutions and killings. Others have noted that the law is not the problem, free-lance enforcement of a broader blasphemy meme in the Muslim community is the problem and will likely persist even if the law is repealed. 

In my view the law is not the only problem, but it IS a very potent symbol of the surrender of state and society in front of the blasphemy meme. Repeal of the law will not kill that meme, but repeal of the law will be an equally powerful signal that things have changed and that state and society no longer approve of the killing of blasphemers. It will not end the problem, but it will be the beginning of the end. Repeal of the law is not a sufficient condition for this nightmare to end, but it is a very important necessary condition.

Unfortunately, I don’t think such repeal or amendment is actually likely in the foreseeable future. My predictions: Continue reading Blasphemy and blasphemy laws in Pakistan

Steppe lineages in northern Pakisan

This is not the most important paper, but it is a contribution: Complete mitogenomes document substantial genetic contribution from the Eurasian Steppe into northern Pakistani Indo-Iranian speakers. Abstract:

To elucidate whether Bronze Age population dispersals from the Eurasian Steppe to South Asia contributed to the gene pool of Indo-Iranian-speaking groups, we analyzed 19,568 mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) sequences from northern Pakistani and surrounding populations, including 213 newly generated mitochondrial genomes (mitogenomes) from Iranian and Dardic groups, both speakers from the ancient Indo-Iranian branch in northern Pakistan. Our results showed that 23% of mtDNA lineages with west Eurasian origin arose in situ in northern Pakistan since ~5000 years ago (kya), a time depth very close to the documented Indo-European dispersals into South Asia during the Bronze Age. Together with ancient mitogenomes from western Eurasia since the Neolithic, we identified five haplogroups (~8.4% of maternal gene pool) with roots in the Steppe region and subbranches arising (age ~5–2 kya old) in northern Pakistan as genetic legacies of Indo-Iranian speakers. Some of these haplogroups, such as W3a1b that have been found in the ancient samples from the late Bronze Age to the Iron Age period individuals of Swat Valley northern Pakistan, even have sub-lineages (age ~4 kya old) in the southern subcontinent, consistent with the southward spread of Indo-Iranian languages. By showing that substantial genetic components of Indo-Iranian speakers in northern Pakistan can be traced to Bronze Age in the Steppe region, our study suggests a demographic link with the spread of Indo-Iranian languages, and further highlights the corridor role of northern Pakistan in the southward dispersal of Indo-Iranian-speaking groups.

Don’t focus on the percentages too much. Rather, focus on the coalescence estimate. Basically, that indicates diversification and demographic expansion. The presence in the southern subcontinent is indicative of the fact that “steppe” ancestry and cultural influence extends far beyond the distribution of modern Indo-Aryan languages. R1a we know, as it is found in adivasis. And low fractions of steppe are found in most South Indian groups (but not all).

Araingang: Pakistani American nationalist and internet troll

Another BP Podcast is up. You can listen on LibsynAppleSpotify, and Stitcher (and a variety of other platforms). Probably the easiest way to keep up the podcast since we don’t have a regular schedule is to subscribe to one of the links above!

You can also support the podcast as a patron. The primary benefit now is that you get the podcasts considerably earlier than everyone else. This website isn’t about shaking the cup, but I have noticed that the number of patrons plateaued a long time ago.

In this episode, Akshar, Mukunda, and Razib discuss Pakistani and Indian nationalism with Araingang, a well-known Pakistani American nationalist on the internet. We talk about the influence of Sarvakar, the Pakistani focus on West Asia, and the inchoate nature of Pakistani nationalism.

Brown Pundits