Pakistan vs Tehreek e Taliban, Dr Hamid Hussain’s view

Questions from a senior Pakistani army officer and my response to them. First segment carries his views and the second segment mine.
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Dear Hamid, AOA.

Thank you for sharing your usual rational and pragmatic analysis.

The reasons put forward by former intelligence officer about rapprochement with TTP are both concocted and devoid of logic. In the past also there have been many abortive deals with TTP, which have never worked.

TTA (Afghan Taliban) & TTP (Pakistani Taliban) have always collaborated with each other, at least, in sharing intelligence . Both are Deobandis and have elements in each, which have come from the other. The public opinion in Pakistan resents this deal because of the loss of thousands of lives and APS (Public School), Peshawar tragedy. There is definite proof of RAW & Afghan intelligence masterminding most incidents in Pakistan (for sure Kamra & Mehran bases). Pakistan has even presented these evidence dossiers to UN Secy Gen. What moral justification or credibility we have then to strike a deal with a terrorist organisation both from international and domestic perspectives?

Even if there is a deal, what stops TTP or even Taliban to launch a terrorist attack inside Pakistan and blame it on a splinter group of TTP? The critical question is of funding . TTP were foreign funded for the acts at the behest of sponsors. If they are unable to undertake these terrorist acts, how would they be sustained, recruited and pay to the members?

If you link the TTP deal with TLP (Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan), for a temporary truce we have lost the war.

Best Regards, Army Officer

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24 December 2021

Thanks, Sir, for your insight.  Sorry for the delayed response as I am busy with many chores and some hectic travels.

TTA & TTP:  You have highlighted the ideological, infrastructure, recruitment and financial relationships between two entities.  The problem for the Pakistan army was perception management for both domestic & foreign audiences.  It was supporting TTA but fighting TTP, therefore, it tried to convince the Pakistani public that the two entities were different although privately there were concerns about symbiotic relationship between the two. Hope was that with TTA having a major say in running Afghanistan (no one expected that Taliban will walk over after making a deal with US) will be able to rein in TTP.  My view was that it was a wrong assumption and lack of grasp of recent Afghan history despite deep involvement.

It created a difficult situation in dealing with Americans.  Pakistan was telling Americans to bring TTA inside the tent while asking them to help Pakistan take out TTP not only in Afghanistan sanctuaries but even inside FATA.

The U.S. kept telling army brass at highest levels about the risks long before TTP emerged on the scene, and I tended to agree with U.S. concerns as I saw support of TTA as a high-risk gambit for Pakistan. Once TTP came on the stage with a big bang, it shocked the Pakistan army.  For a variety of reasons, initial mishandling complicated the situation.  Later, heavy lifting and sacrifices by the Pakistan army helped to severely degrade TTP and rout them from entrenched areas. However, in early stages, U.S. drone strikes to take out TTP leadership saved many Pakistani lives. I supported this action as I saw benefits in the short term outweighing risks as re-orientation of the army in doctrine, training etc. needed some time.

TTP, NDS (Afghan intelligence) & India:  Outsiders cannot create monsters.  They simply take advantage of an internal problem as they see it suitable for their own interests. Internal and external factors are then intertwined in the web of deceits. Each side then peddles its own narrative. Looking from an Indian perspective, Pakistani support to Kashmiri and Sikh militants fell into the same category.  This has  a long history and there is no way out except engagement and reaching minimum consensus about a détente on this issue.  Each side has to look at this as not a favor to the other but as a sane policy option. Unfortunately, entrenchment of hardliners on both sides of the border will make this a daunting task.

Non-Talib Afghans saw the Taliban simply as tools of Pakistan and blamed Pakistan for all the violence.  There was already a trust deficit involving almost all segments of Afghan society and rising violence inside Afghanistan upped anti-Pakistan sentiment that resulted in policy change. TTP, NDS & India is a late phenomenon. NDS decided to pay back Pakistan in the same coin and only India could help in this venture (this later expanded to supporting Baloch militants). Afghans wanted to use this as a bargaining chip to negotiate with Pakistan. “You stop supporting my terrorist, and I will stop supporting your terrorist.” Washington was caught in the middle.  In the early part of the game when violence was not high paced on both sides, Washington kept Afghans on a tight leash as everything was being routed through General Musharraf.  I’m aware of the fact that when Akbar Bugti got into a fight with General Musharraf, before moving to the hills where he was finally killed by the Pakistan army, he asked the Kabul government for safe passage. Karzai ran this request by the Americans who vetoed the idea. Same was true for Pakistani militants.

Later, when Americans got angry with Pakistan, they made no objection to NDS supporting Baloch militants with the help of Indians.  TTP was a different animal and Americans actively supported Pakistan by taking out TTP leadership both in FATA and inside Afghanistan. First and second tier TTP leadership was eliminated by Americans. They hoped that Pakistan may return this favor by at least curtailing support of TTA as they were realistic enough to know that Pakistan could not and will not take any strong action against TTA.  Pakistan only tightened screws on those elements of TTA who were trying to directly make a deal with the Afghan government or Washington behind Pakistan’s back.  Here came the complicated issue where some American military and intelligence issues came in conflict with NDS projects who decided to actively use the TTP card.

One such case was of Latifullah Mahsud (a close confidant of Baitullah & Hakimullah Mahsud and close liaison with different militant outfits). In 2013, U.S. Special Forces snatched Latifullah from Afghan intelligence custody in Logar.  Details are a bit murky, but my own assessment is that he went to Afghanistan on invitation of Afghan intelligence for negotiations and was traveling in a security/intelligence convoy on his way to Kabul.  Part of this version came from Logar governor Arsala Jamal (later killed in a suicide bombing) and confirmation that he was snatched by Americans from Muhammad Agha district of Logar bordering Kabul.  In 2014, Americans handed Laftifullah to Pakistan and after a death sentence by a military court, he was executed in 2016). Karzai wanted to use it as a bargaining chip in his negotiations with Pakistan but there is another angle that not too many people are aware of.  Karzai wanted to use TTP leaders to help jump start direct negotiations with Haqqanis.  The closest relationship of TTP with any Afghan group is that with Haqqanis.  Both parties had different outlook on the operational side, but they shared facilities and used the same networks and economic channels. There was direct relationship & contact between leadership (I’m aware of cases where the Pakistan army used Haqqanis to lift sieges of Pakistani troops by TTP and negotiate release of abducted security personnel).  This was the reason that Karzai wanted to use the TTP channel.  After Pakistan army operations, a number of militants crossed over into Afghanistan creating equilibrium in ‘nuisance’. Now, when Pakistan asked Afghans and Americans to stop TTP from using Afghan sanctuary, prompt came the reply that Pakistanis should do the same in case of TTA.  Mutual mistrust, anger and outright hatred provided adequate material for all sides to engage in Byzantine intrigues. There were no innocent bystanders in this game but active players.

TTP & Funding: Prior to military operations on the Pakistan side, TTP was the de facto authority holding a large swath of territory covering several thousand square miles. A territory that is a major trade route of legal and illegal trades running in hundreds of millions of dollars. In addition, they generated income from levying taxes on all business activities, high ticket bank robberies and ransom payments from high profile kidnappings (payments from only three high profile kidnappings of son of a business tycoon also son-in-law of a former four star general, sons of a former prime minister and a former governor run into over $100 million.) Of course, funding from hostile agencies contributed but in my view that is only a fraction of homegrown resources.  Currently, with Pakistan taking back control of the territory has changed the dynamics and drying up of most of the local resources.  However, the problem has also evolved. Now, TTP is not running a de facto emirate and its operations are low cost hit and run of remote security posts, planting an IED on the road or target killing of local opponents or security personnel.  These are low-cost operations and do not need huge funding.  TTP can carry out these operations from local resources even in the absence of foreign funding.  In my view, Pakistan is in a much better position now and proactive and robust posture not allowing entrenchment of TTP cadres in former FATA or small cells in urban centers can be achieved.  Tackling TTP presence in Afghanistan needs a multifaceted approach.

Continued engagement with Taliban emirate and nudging them to prevent expansion of TTP sanctuaries. In view of the historical relationship of TTP with TTA and especially Haqqanis, it is not likely that they will take direct military action against TTP.  Using local Afghan assets outside of Taliban circles for intelligence gathering and selective elimination discreetly and without fingerprints needs more skills and less bravado.  Public berating of Taliban emirate or botched attempts inside Afghanistan (see exhibit A: throwing a dud from a drone on Maulvi Faqir house) carry the risk of adding friction.

TTP & Negotiations: For starters, Pakistan cannot afford to permanently deploy more than half of its army in forward posture with no end in sight. Negotiations is not a stand alone question but closely linked with thorny issues of forced disappearances, internment centers and extra-judicial killings (this has markedly decreased after completion of large scale kinetic operations but still an issue that needs to be addressed). This is a tricky question and, in my view, needs a little more public debate.  Any policy no matter how good will not bear any fruit if the Pakistan army cannot sell it to its own public.  The major flaw in this exercise was going alone and only in a clandestine way resulting in scathing criticism from a large segment of the population and in the end a hasty retreat. In the early stage, discreet and secret negotiations are essential but after groundwork, windows need to be opened.  Optics play an important role therefore the army needs to take a long view and not get carried away with the rhetoric.  One day, a Corp Commander is garlanding the militant leader calling him brother in faith, next day he is a misguided fellow, then agent of India, Afghanistan, United States & Israel, then a disgrace to Islam and almost an apostate and then turn around declaring that the chap has repented and again our brother. It looks more like a comic opera. This is not only the fault of the army as confusion in the society about religiously motivated militancy is at play and the army must work in the same society.

At a fundamental level, it is important to understand the difference between a foreign force operating in an alien territory and a national army operating in its own internationally recognized boundaries. In the latter case, one can not simply fire or bomb itself to victory. Kinetic operations have an important role in the initial phase to take back the territory, but then other instruments are needed for disarmament, re-integration etc. In this phase, civilian partners no matter how imperfect are essential.  In the case of Pakistan, the majority of the population fully supported the army in its war against TTP.  This included all major political forces, ethnic groups, minorities & even large segments of religious groups.  In my view, two missteps by the army brass; the political engineering project with unintended consequence of putting diverse groups of population against the army and mishandling of Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement – PTM (despite warning from some well-informed Pushtun army officers with firsthand experience about the issues) had negative impact on the whole exercise.  A certain amount of buy in especially from local communities is essential for two reasons.  First, reconciliation and then re-integration.  In the absence of first, locals will be bystanders in a vital process as well as revenge killings and in case of later deep mistrust of local population about the whole project and state will need to spend huge intelligence resources to monitor those who come back to their communities.

In my view, use of local traditional instruments of reconciliation where aggrieved parties are satisfied and especially foot soldiers get pardon from their own communities is the first step. Reintegration where local and tribal elders take responsibility for supervision of those who have laid arms.  Even these measures will be effective only in case of foot soldiers. Luckily, most high profile TTP leaders whose faces and names were associated with terrible atrocities have left this world to meet their Lord and second and third tier leaders are not well known.  If they renounce militancy, they can be re-integrated in their own communities. These are not easy tasks and need patient and sustained work. Trust deficit is the major handicap.  There is no quick fix or a perfect solution.  It is trying to learn from errors, shed some hubris and aim for an end state that can be managed by available resources.  Violence will always be present in various forms but the goal is to keep it below a certain threshold where it does not impede daily life of the majority of the citizens.

Note: My views are based on my own work about the region and interactions with a large number of folks from different backgrounds including Pakistanis, Americans, Afghans, Indians.  This helps me to understand their perspectives and as always, the case, agreement as well as disagreement with certain aspects.
“Neither to laugh; nor cry
Just to understand”.    Spinoza
———- Forwarded message ———
A dear British friend well versed with the region and one of rare China hand asked questions on the similar subject and my response in bold & red.
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Dear Hamid,
Many thanks for sharing your insights. Because of my profound ignorance and deep curiosity, I would appreciate your thoughts on (sorry, I may have asked too many questions but Kugelman has not been very helpful in this case):

1. Who protected Fazlullah’s team in Nangarhar Province during the NATO ops in Afghanistan, what was their motivation; now that NATO has left, who is protecting them, and why? (Short answer.  In a large swath of ungovernable territory, one does not need protection.  Even a benign neglect of others is enough to survive. In the much-abused cliché of ‘national interest’, one makes many Faustian bargains. In my work about the region, I found every country guilty of acts of omission and commission.  They sleep with the dog at night and then wake up in the morning wondering how they got the fleas.

This question needs understanding of the context.  Fazlullah was head of Swat Taliban.  He cashed in on sympathy among poor and illiterate segments of Swat and neighboring areas of Malakand, Dir & Bajawar for his father-in-law Sufi Muhammad.  His illegal FM radio station then propagating Islamic themes was popular among poor folks and locals were donating to his cause.  When he showed his true colors by attacking girl education and the police force, local public sentiments turned against him. However, at that time Pakistani sentiment was not for any military action against these folks which was viewed as simply a reaction to American presence in Afghanistan. Domestic crisis was multifaceted with extreme unpopularity of General Musharraf with associated negative fallout for the army, General Kayani trying to create a fire-wall while at the same time negotiating with two major political parties, election of PPP government in the center and secular ANP in then NWFP province.

Kunar and Nuristan were not simply empty spaces on the map but had a complex militant scene.  Different militant syndicates were operating in the area competing and cooperating depending on the ground situation.  The list includes local groups hostile to any outsider even from a different province of Afghanistan, local Afghan Taliban loyal to Quetta Shura, Hizb-e-Islami – Gulbadin Hikmatyar, Salafi Jihadists, Pakistani militants belonging to Jaish-e-Muhamad (JEM) and Jamat ut Dawa (JUD) fighting along Afghan militants. There was a two-way traffic of militants crossing from Pakistan to attack Afghan and US forces and crossing from Afghanistan attacking Pakistani forces.  Militants from Swat, Dir, Bajawar, Mohmand & Khyber agencies crossed over to neighboring Afghan districts. The U.S. was mainly busy in the Korengal and Pech valleys. Deep mistrust prevented meaningful coordination between U.S. and Pakistani forces.
 
As far as American forces were concerned, in 2008, a single brigade (3^rd Brigade Combat Team of 10^th Division was responsible for four eastern provinces (Nangarhar, Nuristan, Kunar, Laghman) of Afghanistan. When violence increased, there was debate within the US military about focus on protection of urban centers versus interdiction of militants at the border.  In 2008, the Afghan army was in its infancy with no capacity to control its own territory. Only major urban centers were garrisoned and policed. Large swaths of the periphery had no government presence. The U.S. was bogged down in Iraq with troop surges and heavy casualties.  Afghanistan was simply a distraction. In Afghanistan, Fazlullah along with a small group of militants operated in Kunar along the border with Pakistan. He coordinated some attacks but in view of difficult terrain and no significant public support among local Afghans, he was not very effective.  However, he was carefully maneuvering for a leadership role in the TTP.  In view of rising violence inside Afghanistan, Americans and Afghans were angry at Pakistan and neither U.S. nor Afghans were interested in spending any resources on tackling Fazlullah.  In 2018, there was a U.S.-Pakistan détente and start of U.S.-Taliban talks with tacit support from Pakistan.  In this environment of bargains, the U.S. targeted Fazlullah in a drone strike as a good will gesture. By the time of his death, Fazlullah was more of an irritant rather than a serious threat as many of his militants had moved on to greener pastures and some had joined ISIS-Khorasan franchise.)

2. Both Afghan Taliban and TTP fighters seem to share some ethnic-cultural links and religious orthodoxy; what explains their political animosity towards each other? 

(There is no political animosity.  In fact, TTP leadership consider itself as a branch of TTA and pledge allegiance to the leader of TTA.  For obvious reasons, TTA tries to downplay its association with TTP to avoid annoying Pakistanis.  Among Afghans, TTP has a closer relationship with Haqqanis. I have dealt with this subject in detail.) 

3. Mr Modi is hosting Mr Putin in Delhi today. Do you think they will boost their anti-Taliban and pro-Northern Alliance consensus, or could they accept the current reality?

(The only good thing in the current situation is that none of the neighbors and near neighbors of Afghanistan want another cycle of violence at this stage. My hope is to build on this positive. Everyone is in wait and see mode and wants the Taliban to show their hand. Taliban are shrewd players and talk sweet to everyone who meets them. They have even asked India to come back, open the embassy and carry on with their projects while Talib will provide them with security.  Inside Afghanistan, anti-Taliban folks are also in wait and see mode and not in a position to take on the Taliban frontally.  Assets are in place inside Afghanistan as well as in neighboring areas, but no one is in a hurry to pull the trigger. India’s main concern is the role of Haqqanis in the present set up and how it is going to play out?  It is the only group that has links with foreign militants and here concerns of Russia and India converge.  India is concerned about veterans trickling back to Kashmir & Russia about Tajik and Uzbek militants bringing back instability into their homelands. Russia is bolstering its forward defenses with more robust military engagement with Tajikistan and Kazakhstan and increased direct intelligence presence as well as cooperation with others.)

4. Zalmay Khalilzad negotiated with the Taliban for three years on an agreed US withdrawal. So, what is the logic behind ‘tightening the screws’ once the agreement has been executed?

(Fundamentals of the agreement were safe withdrawal of U.S. with no hindrance from Taliban in the process.  Other vague promises such as intra Afghan dialogue and breaking links with foreign militants were added talking points but not major focus. It was a focused and narrow platform.  In my own limited understanding of Washington, at least in near term I don’t see anyone seem interested in Afghanistan. After spending a lot of treasure and blood, no one is in the mood for any meaningful engagement except a wary eye by the intelligence community to make sure no surprise springs from that theater. Limited humanitarian aid through UN and NGOs and I fully support this to avoid a humanitarian disaster.)

5. What is your assessment of the threat posed by ISIS-Khorasan? Can the Taliban hold it off or will ISIS build its Emirate in Afghanistan? As the only effective defense against ISIS-K, can Taliban leverage their popularity within the D.C. Beltway?

(In Iraq and Syria, Washington cooperated with Tehran in rolling back ISIS-Iraq.  Iran backed Shia militias and human intelligence courtesy of Tehran and air assets, drones and some limited Special Forces forays courtesy of Washington turned the tide in that theater.  Same model was adopted in Afghanistan.  Here in 2020 when the deal was almost done, Afghan government forces, Taliban and United States jointly operated against ISIS-K to degrade its infrastructure in Nangarhar and Kunar. ISIS-K has made a grave mistake of pulling the trigger too early.  Few recent bombings and assassination of Taliban leaders have prompted a quick and very harsh response.  Taliban have executed and beheaded many suspects and evidence is residents finding dead bodies in their neighborhoods where ISIS-K has strong presence. The ideological bedrock of ISIS is salafi doctrine and salafis are the dominant group among ISIS cadres.  Taliban have expanded the witch hunt to Salafi (Wahhabi) segment (they have strong presence in Nangarhar, Nuristan and Kunar) arresting many members and closing their mosques and madrassas.  In 2020, when Taliban rolled back ISIS-K, Salafi leadership was concerned that Taliban may attack them by linking them with ISIS. Large number of salafi leaders pledged allegiance to the Taliban. However, after the Taliban took over things have taken a wrong turn for salafis. In August 2021, after the abduction and killing of a leading Salafi cleric, many salafi leaders went underground.

ISIS-K is the ideological rival to Taliban, but their numbers are small in Afghanistan and their effect will be marginal.  ISIS-K is building a narrative specifically targeting Taliban ideology to try to recruit both foot soldiers and leadership cadres.  During the first Taliban emirate (1999-2001), salafi life was made uncomfortable and they were not allowed to expand their network inside Afghanistan.  Salafi leaders and madrassas relocated to Pakistani border areas and existing ones expanded.  Here both Afghan refugees as well as local Pakistani Pushtuns were indoctrinated in this creed that has been a marginal force in the Indian sub-continent. When Jamat ud Dawa (JUD) with a salafi foundation was partially decommissioned by Pakistan with a generous severance package for leadership, many dejected foot soldiers joined other militant organizations including ISIS. Extreme views of ISIS, especially pretty loose application of doctrine of apostasy to justify large scale indiscriminate killings resulted in the majority of salafi clerics distancing themselves from ISIS.  In addition, rapid changes in Saudi Arabia under Crown Prince MBS has dried up financial largesse from the kingdom.

Combination of these factors resulted in significant degradation of salafi Jihad infrastructure.

It is not likely that ISIS-K will erect a rival emirate inside Afghanistan.  The only possibility of increased nuisance value is if large-scale oppression of salafis by Taliban turns them violent or battle-hardened veterans of killing fields of Iraq and Syria find refuge in Afghanistan.  Even in that case, they can trigger a bombing or assassinate a high-profile figure but not likely to capture and hold large swaths of territory. In view of extreme hostility of everyone to ISIS ideology, Taliban will get intelligence help from everyone.  Messy work on the ground, they have to do it with their own hands. Situation can be different if the Taliban emirate collapses under its own weight and different factions end up holding different areas.  A large swath of ungoverned space can allow even a small ISIS-K to have an impact on the region disproportionate to its numbers or capacity.) 

“The god of victory is said to be one-handed, but peace gives victory on both sides.” 

Ralph Waldo Emerson