Open Thread – 04/14/2023 – Brown Pundits

Since Pandits and Kamboj always ask me if it’s true if they’re Iranian, Iran through the ages: civilization’s eternal crossroads and Pre-Persian Iran: from the invention of agriculture to the Aryan onslaught. Part 3 and 4 will land next week.

I have a post (right now at 5,500 words) that I’m working on relating to caste, the CISCO case, and the US, for my Substack. I want it to be my “last word” on the topic…but basically, the issue here is that Leftist-prog types who believe in the total malleability of culture somehow also believe that Indian Americans are moving their society in toto to the US without modification. This is obviously false. You can speculate why this is happening, but it’s just a fact.

Also, Saagar Enjeti is asked about his caste on Red Scare. It’s kind of a joke, as the hosts are pro-Indian (especially Dasha). I am hopefully going to on Red Scare in the next six months to talk about genetics (last time I was in New York Anna K. was out of town).

Cousin marriage in Bangladesh


This piece arguing for the end to cousin marriage in the UK in The Times (driven by Pakistanis) took me to a paper in PLOS One, Genetic and reproductive consequences of consanguineous marriage in Bangladesh:

The mean prevalence of CM in our studied population was 6.64%. Gross fertility was higher among CM families, as compared to the non-CM families (p < 0.05). The rate of under-5 child (U5) mortality was significantly higher among CM families (16.6%) in comparison with the non-CM families (5.8%) (p < 0.01). We observed a persuasive rise of abortion/miscarriage and U5 mortality rates with the increasing level of inbreeding. The value of lethal equivalents per gamete found elevated for autosomal inheritances as compared to sex-linked inheritance. CM was associated with the incidence of several single-gene and multifactorial diseases, and congenital malformations, including bronchial asthma, hearing defect, heart diseases, sickle cell anemia (p < 0.05). The general attitude and perception toward CM were rather indifferent, and very few people were concerned about its genetic burden.

A rate around 5% is in line with my intuition and what I’ve seen elsewhere, though there is wide variance by locality. The best thing about the paper is the chart above, the offspring of first cousin marriage have mortality rates 3 times greater than non-cousin marriages. There are other numbers relating to disease, etc. The paper is good because it’s from a developing country without world-class healthcare (though no longer a total basketcase) so you can see disease risk plainly.

More generally in relation to “cousin marriage”

– I have seen “outbred” Pakistani genomes that look like the product of cousin marriage due to the practice’s frequently earlier on in the pedigree

– This is comparable to some Indian caste groups that practice exogamy (North Indian) on the jati level. The jati has been endogamous so long that everyone has become a second cousin…

Intellectual Brown Web

Sarah Haider, Shadi Hamid, myself and Murtaza Hussain recorded an impromptu podcast that we titled the “Intellectual Brown Web.” These are basically people I know well (I am good friends with both Sarah and Shadi) or who got involved in Twitter threads repeatedly (Murtaza). But there is no “Hindo-origin person.” Since I don’t give a shit about representation or affirmative action I don’t care too much…but this got me thinking, what based Hindu Americans would you have on? I know plenty of based Hindus from India…but most Hindu Indian Americans are Rho Khanna at the most based.

I mean think about this: why the fuck am I having to write long pieces about how the anti-caste discrimination stuff is bullshit? I’m just a tech entrepreneur who isn’t even from a Hindu background. Suhag at HAF does stuff and others, but where are the big hitters? Instead you have public Hindu Americans proudly pushing this stuff.

Note: there are plenty of based Hindu Americans who are doctors, engineers and business people. They just aren’t public people. Which is fine, but if you don’t speak for yourself, at some point Razib Khan is going to get tired of doing so.

American University in Delhi?

India might open to foreign universities. That could be a game-changer:

And India’s higher education system badly needs shaking up. Setting aside issues of quality (as if those can be set aside), India does not come close to providing sufficient seats to those aspiring to higher education — a glaring shortcoming as India’s burgeoning middle class strives to prepare their children for the opportunities of the future.

India’s system has its successes, of course, but they are narrow. Just nine Indian higher education institutions made the top 500 of the most recent QS World University Rankings. The top one — the Indian Institute of Science (at 155) — is a highly specialized institution focused on postgraduate studies and research in the sciences. The other eight are part of the well-known Indian Institutes of Technology, which specialize in engineering. The highest-ranked comprehensive university was the University of Delhi, falling in the 520s.

That is simply not good enough. All told, India has just over 1,000 institutions of higher learning. China, with a similar population, has three times that. The United States, with a much smaller population, has four times as many.

This all sounds find, but India will replicate some of the US’s pathologies in the education sector. The “consumer model” of higher education has been causing serious problems here over the past few decades. The op-ed even states that “Private universities, too, are overly regulated and cannot operate for profit. That deters the best entrepreneurs from entering the sector.” Entrepreneurs entering the sector was a disaster, and for-profit colleges were a way to absorb student loans from the public fisc.

But I wish India well.

Hindenburg vs. Adnani

Don’t know much about this, but I noticed it hit WSJ today, India’s Adani Group Fails to Halt Short-Seller Driven Decline:

A giant Indian conglomerate couldn’t stop the freefall in its shares and bonds set off by an American short seller in what has grown into a bitter fight over the empire created by one of India’s richest and most politically connected businesspeople.

Adani Group, an energy and infrastructure company, released its 413-page rebuttal to the short seller’s claims just as the trading week began in Asia. Investors weren’t convinced and dumped shares of the company on Monday, bringing the total value lost to $64 billion since last week.

The fight could have wide implications for India’s power industry and for its transition to clean energy. It has also caused billions of dollars in losses for Indian investors who have helped drive up the company’s share price to stratospheric levels.

You can find the Hindenburg Ressearch Report here. This part jumped out at me:

Most large companies hire credible, well-known external auditing firms in order to give investors confidence that their financials are being independently reviewed by a capable team.

Given the complexity of Adani Total Gas and, particularly, Adani Enterprises, with 156 subsidiaries and many more affiliates and joint ventures, one would expect a large, highly experienced team to be monitoring its labyrinthian corporate structure.[62]

But Adani Group has apparently shunned this approach, choosing a tiny auditor named Shah Dhandharia to oversee the audits for these two public companies.

Shah Dhandharia’s website has gone offline during our investigation and now appears to have no website. Archived versions of the website as of February 2020 show that the firm was comprised of only 4 audit partners and 7 support staff.[63]

Of the partners featured on its team page, we found that 3 were in their 20s – hardly the level of experience or seniority needed to seriously scrutinize one of the world’s wealthiest and most powerful businessmen.

Apparently, the Adani group has a 413-page rebuttal to the short-sellers. Rebuttals often take more time/space…but I not going to lie, I am not surprised at the length here…

(though some short-sellers have done sketchy things, my own view is short-sellers are an essential part of af functioning market and discourage crony-capitalism)

Down with eggs?


I don’t have a big personal issue with vegetarians, though I really enjoy ribeye and you’ll take shrimp from my dead hands. My daughter has been a vegetarian since she was five due to ethical concerns about animal cruelty.

But every now and then I hear that BJP-aligned governments or officials are removing eggs from school meal programs due to cultural sensitivities. I get that, but is there a good argument from this from a utilitarian/nutritional angle? Children at critical ages need protein and fat, and perhaps I’m wrong, but India still seems to have a lot of nutritional issues in a lot of is population. These kids are the future, and honestly, this seems like the cultural forces are shooting society in the face.

If Marin county or the Irvine School District unveiled this I wouldn’t care. With enough money and care you can design a vegan diet with balance and supplementation to be healthy. But this requires care and execution, and I see many American with lots of money who don’t pull it off well judging by their physique and fatigue.

What’s the deal? It’s true that the Chinese eat everything, but sometimes I wonder if the Indians eat nothing.

(this matters to all of us because a massive number of working age people in the next few decade are going to be Indian, and we need them to be as healthy as possible)

Division

One of the things that has saddened and frustrated me on this weblog over the last 12 years has been the tendency of brown people, Indian subcontinentals, South Asians, etc. to engage in differentiation. As a geneticist, I am aware of differences, and I accept and admit it candidly to an extent that is rare in an open manner in the West. Also, some ribbing and joking is normal, and I am not offended.

But Pakistanis vs. Indians, Southies vs. Northies, Bangladeshis vs. Indians. High caste vs. low caste, vegetarian vs. non-vegetarian.

Our cultural differences are striking. Our diversity of form, belief and practice is mind-blogging. But we come from the same roots. The rest of the world looks at us, and recognizes the kinship. We? Not so much. Muslims claim Arab or Iranian heritage. Jats and northwest Indians distinguish themselves from the lower and dark races. Southerners express contempt for the barbarism of BIMARU. BIMARU claims that they are the font of culture. And so forth.

This is not to end with a resounding assertion. But sometimes, I wonder if the silent majority is not like this, and we hear the prattling of the minority?

Showing an early entry of steppe ancestry into India

Introduction

A common claim that can be increasingly found in the Indic internet is that the steppe ancestry found in modern day Indians with significant frequency entered India in the late Iron Age and/or the Early Historic Period. Dr Niraj Rai has implied as much in interviews, and Ashish has championed this theory, recently identifying a sample in Iron Age Turkmenistan as an example source of ancestry for modern day Indians.

I previously responded to these claims on Twitter and am here restating my arguments together with some additional analyses. To begin with, we must understand the geography of gene flow from the steppe, whether via migrations or via inter-marriages.

Geography of migrations

Map showing Gandhara and Swat, with archeological mountain sites in Swat valley North of Gandhara

Here are some maps of the northern end of the Indian subcontinent. Notably, the Hindu Kush mountains formed a barrier between Gandhara and the areas north of it – travel through this area in large numbers was quite difficult. Instead, travelers from the steppe would travel around the western tip of the Hindu Kush mountains, heading southeast from Balkh to Kabul/Begram through semi-mountainous lands, and from there heading east down the Kabul river valley into the Vale of Peshawar via the Khyber Pass, to the city of Pushkalavati at the Bala Hisar / Charsada sites. From there, they could head down the Indus Valley or more commonly further east to Taxila, before continuing on towards the Ganga Valley. An alternate route would travel around the semi-mountain regions of Afghanistan, heading south from Herat to Kandahar, and then southeast from there via the Bolan Pass into the middle of the Indus Valley (i.e. roughly the Punjab-Sindh border).

Either way, the Swat Valley in the mountains north of Gandhara was not a stopping point along the route into India. Furthermore, the Swat Valley was not directly part of the general Indian geographic sphere, which extended up to about Shahbazgarhi. In many ways Swat’s relationship to the Indus Valley was akin to Nepal’s relationship to the Ganga Valley – significant trade and cultural contact but also some degree of genetic differentiation.

As such, we would expect steppe ancestry to have entered in greater proportions into Indo-Gangetic Plains than in Swat – especially into Punjab. In fact, that’s exactly what we observe in modern populations. The highest steppe ancestry modern populations are Punjabi / Haryanvi Rors and Jats.

To ascertain the timing of steppe admixture, ideally we’d have ancient DNA samples from the relevant time periods in these regions to check directly for steppe admixture. However, due to a mixture of climate issues, underfunded archeology, and a culture of cremation, there is a total dearth of relevant ancient DNA samples. Instead, we must rely on what samples we’re able to find and utilize the DATES tool to estimate admixture times.

DATES Estimates

Interpreting / theory

Now, to interpret DATES results, we must keep in mind particularly with an incompletely admixed population such as India’s, that admixture times can be much later than migration times. When Indian-residing groups with elevated steppe ancestry interbreed with those with low steppe ancestry, their intermediate steppe ancestry offspring will show more recent admixture. This does not mean the steppe migration occurred at the time of admixture, but rather that admixture continued after migration occurred. As such, admixture times are lower bounds, not mean estimates, for the timing of migration. In the Indian context, we must look to older samples as well as groups with early caste endogamy to discern the true time of migration, without the confounding effects of later intermingling.

Additionally, when modeling with DATES, preference should be given to the model that provides the narrowest estimates. Per Chintalapati et. al., a model is considered to be valid if the Z-score is > 2, the normalized root mean square deviation is below 0.7, and estimated number of generations is below 200.

To model the sources of admixture in DATES, I’ve used Sintashta-Petrovka samples for the steppe source (both sets of Sintashta samples as well as the Petrovka sample available in the Reich database) against the AASI-proxy used by Narasimhan et. al. (STU.SG, ITU.SG, BIR.SG) plus Irula.DG and Pallan-like Roopkund outliers. Using the relatively pure Sintashta-Petrovka samples instead of Central_Steppe_MLBA particularly reduces the noisiness of DATES modeling in the single target sample modeled later here.

We can sanity check this model by testing admixture times for steppe-enriched Iron Age Swat samples and ensure the results are calibrated in line with the Narasimhan paper:

Graph showing DATES curve for SPGT

mean: 27.970 std error: 2.691 Z: 10.394
nrmsd: 0.055
Sample date estimate: 920 BCE
95% interval admixture estimate: 1853-1552 BCE

This yields a good fit that’s pretty much identical to the Narasimhan paper and indicates that steppe ancestry entered the Swat Valley in the first half of the 2nd millennium BCE.

In Roopkund

To find a bound on the timing of admixture in mainland India, we can examine one of the few sets of premodern DNA samples – namely, a collection of pilgrims  who had succumbed to hailstorms in the 8th-10th centuries CE in Roopkund Lake. The skeletons sequenced here had a variety of steppe ancestry and included several individuals with relatively high steppe ancestry who clustered with modern day Brahmin Tiwaris.

Graph showing DATES curve for Roopkund A

mean: 84.592 std error: 10.206 Z: 8.288
nrmsd: 0.100
Sample date estimate: 850 CE
95% interval admixture estimate: 2091-948 BCE

The fit is excellent and the results are highly statistically significant. We see clear evidence that the Roopkund samples obtained their steppe admixture in the 2nd millennium BCE and became relatively genetically isolated by the start of the 1st millennium BCE.

In Loebanr outlier

Now, we can look at one outlier Iron Age woman from the Swat culture who had particularly high steppe ancestry, and appeared to be an individual at the far end of the ANI cline. This woman proved to be a better proximal source of steppe ancestry for modeling modern day Indians than her Turkmenistan contemporary (another single sample that has been proposed as a source of late steppe ancestry). Where did this woman come from? Punjab would be a good bet. After all, her significant amount of AASI in combination with a relatively low Anatolian neolithic ancestry argues against a location in Central Asia. And modern day Punjabi / Haryana Jats and Rors are not far removed from her – e.g. I modeled a Haryanvi Ror sample as 16% Irula and 83% ancestry from a population akin to this woman. Therefore, it’s likely she was a migrant up from Gandhara or further south and can be used as a representative of higher caste Punjabis of her time.

Let’s look at the DATES modeling for this woman:

Graph showing DATES curve for Loebanr outlier

mean: 37.593 std error: 13.239 Z: 2.840
nrmsd: 0.191
Sample date estimate: 920 BCE
95% interval admixture estimate: 2714-1231 BCE

As is normal for a single sample, the data is somewhat noisy. Nevertheless, DATES is designed to be able to handle single target samples, and we have a good nrmsd score and a statistically significant result, albeit with a wide range. This would confirm that the woman came from a large population that had been well formed by the late 2nd millennium BCE. More crucially, the weighted covariance at large genetic distance is close to 0, indicating she was not for example a product of recent marriage between a high steppe migrant from Turkmenistan and a lower steppe inhabitant of Loebanr. However, let’s obtain a narrower estimate of admixture time.

IVC-related as source

To improve the fit, in light of the low AASI proportion in the Loebanr outlier, we can use IVC and similar individuals high in neolithic ancestry but lacking in steppe ancestry as the source. For this group, I’ve used the IVC periphery samples in the Reich dataset, along with Aligrama (Iron Age Swat samples without steppe ancestry), and SiS-BA-1 (non-Indus-periphery samples from the Helmand culture, which have India-related ancestry).

Once again, let’s check calibration against the results from the Narasimhan paper:

mean: 24.077 std error: 2.658 Z: 9.059
nrmsd: 0.101
Sample date estimate: 920 BCE
95% interval admixture estimate: 1743-1445 BCE

The nrmsd is somewhat worse but the results are essentially in line with the modeling using AASI-rich sources.

Now, let’s give it a go on the Loebanr outlier woman:

mean: 27.621 std error: 5.222 Z: 5.290
nrmsd: 0.356
Sample date estimate: 920 BCE
95% interval admixture estimate: 1986-1401 BCE

Due to noise, nrsmd worsened but is still well below 0.7. Notwithstanding this though, the shape of the curve fits like a glove and appears spot on with the average weighted covariance. And that good curve fit is reflected in the improved Z score and lower standard error. The result lets us conclude that the Loebanr outlier woman received her steppe ancestry admixture at roughly the same time as her Swat Valley contemporaries did.

Conclusion / Implications

To conclude, we’ve found evidence that high steppe ancestry may have reached the Ganga Valley by the end of the 2nd millennium BCE, and likely had reached  Gandhara / Punjab by the middle of the 2nd millennium BCE. Some of the steppe ancestry that entered Gandhara also traveled up into the Swat Valley in the same timeframe.

All of this evidence is consistent with steppe ancestry settling in the Punjab centuries prior to the composition of the Rigveda there, in conjunction with the observed spread of R1a-L657 in India which originated from the R1a-Z93 Y-haplogroup of the steppe. It’s also consistent with the beginning of formation of caste groups in the Kuru-Panchala Kingdoms around the time the varna system began to be implemented in the Iron Age Late Vedic Period.

We may also hypothesize that perhaps the people of the Swat Valley spoke old Burushaski. After all, the modern day Burusho people are located in the mountains further uphill from the Swat Valley, and genetically have some traits in common with the non-outlier samples of the Swat – viz. lower Sintashta ancestry and elevated IAMC (Aigyrzhal-like Inner Asian Mountain Corridor) ancestry. They have additional East Asian ancestry but this is consistent with a population that would have had trade links to the Tarim Basin, and the observed presence of Turkic and Tibetan loanwords in the Burusho language.

Note that while the evidence here indicates that there had already been substantial steppe admixture into India in the Bronze Age, it does not preclude additional later admixture of steppe ancestry in the Iron Age or Early Historic Period. Substantial admixture in this period is unlikely for a few reasons: lack of admixture from East Asian or Anatolian heavy groups (why would the groups resembling earlier steppe populations be the only ones to admix into India?), lack of migration of newer steppe-originated Y chromosome lineages, and the sheer size of the growing Indian population which would lessen the relative genetic contribution of migrants. But regardless though, the presence or absence of additional late steppe admixture does not have much of a bearing on the debate regarding the origins of the Indo-Aryan languages.

Brown Pundits