Category: Archived Authors
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HINDU-MUSLIM CONFLICT IN INDIA: A “PRE-COLONIAL” VIEW
Ajay Verghese of US Riverside is one of the up and coming political scientists who specialize on South Asia. His earlier book “The Colonial Origins of Ethnic Violence in India” (Stanford University Press, 2016) argued that the geographic pattern of mob-violence in India has its root in the Colonial era but in a surprising way. He argued that religious or communal violence (Hindu-Muslim usually) is associated with the former princely states (the Maharaja, Nawab states), while tribal and caste violence is associated with areas under direct British colonial rule.
I have always thought colonial studies infantalizing. Yhe british drew a few lines
The reorientation of Indian nationalism
Resistance against a common political actor has played a defining role in the emergence of most nationalisms around the world. The wars against the ‘French’ turned England into a nation, even before any semblance of French nationalism emerging.
They make Nazis look good
People may be aware that there has been a small dustup in US media because the venerable New Yorker magazine invited Steve Banon for a debate and then withdrew invitation in face of mounting outcry. The question was that was it advisable to provide Steve Banon’s controvercial politics a venerable platform such as New Yorker. This is a debatable point. Debating Steve Banon in a celebrety gala that will surely be marked with one-line zingers rather than a substantial tussle of ideas and philosophy, is ofcourse a dabatable point. However, most people objecting were not objecting the platform but the very idea of debating with white ethno-nationalism or western nationalists (one-nation or less respectable) themselves.
A millennium of exits from India
The last one thousand years has seen a consistent and substantial shrinking of the Indian world. There are three large scale processes involved in this folding. The first is the exit of the peasantry and warrior castes from India’s margins to the Perso-Islamic world. The second is the de-Indicization of South East Asia, first with Islam replacing Hinduism/Buddhism as the main religion in much of maritime South East Asia, followed by the West becoming the main source of cultural and political influence. The third is the exit of highly educated Indians (overwhelmingly upper caste Hindus) to the West, either physically as migrants or intellectually in terms of mindspace.
The development of a sophisticated, reflective culture in India and its culmination in literary and spiritual terms as the various Indian epics and religions was enabled by the complex intermingling of nomadic and settled societies and the abundant surplus of riverine India’s highly fertile land. Consider this, the pre-industrial population of Uttar Pradesh (47 million in 1871), was more than the population of all of Western Europe combined. But the last 1000 years has seen India contribute very little to the rest of the world despite its natural and intellectual riches.
As modern day citizens of the Republic of India become increasingly self aware about their customs, language and history, their mind will turn to why India remained subdued for such a long time. Notwithstanding convenient pronouncements about India’s ‘ability’ to ‘absorb’ various influences, it remains a fact that there are no Sanskrit or Tamil high words in Arabic, and there is no influence of Indian architecture or art on Persian expression. American and British courts do not refer to Indian law or judgements. The names of Indian scientists do not populate science textbooks. It is all one way traffic.
To be successful and worthwhile, reflection on this has to turn away from simplistic pronouncements about the cruelty of India’s various invaders and betrayals by self centred insiders to allow for an interrogation of the structure of Indian civilization.
What factors allowed for the growth of rule of law and democracy in medieval England,but prevented the same in medieval India ? Such institutions did not look on the horizon even in Hindu kingdoms of Kerala and Assam. Given Fukuyama’s contention that the appearance of these institutions is linked ultimately to Indo-European culture (does this explain the relatively smooth acceptance of democracy in India versus the resistance it got everywhere else ?), it is important to understand how little England got there before us.
What made the native Indian elites at the time of the Delhi Sultanate and the later Mughal Sultanate acquiesce to Persian as the official language ? One of the first actions of the Maratha Empire was the anointment of Sanskrit and Marathi as official languages. So if Indic options were available, especially Sanskrit, why did the Rajputs, Brahmins and Vaishyas not push for its position as the Sultanate’s official language ? After all the Turkic Qing dynasty in China maintained Mandarin as the official language. It is befuddling to imagine that they did not foresee the consequences this would bring.
The conventional response to such questions has revolved around caste as a dehumanizing and denationalizing force. But we know that caste did not play
The awakened Indian lives in an odious, depressing world today. A new generation of elite and middle class appears to have virtually no interest in India beyond superficial cliches. A lifeline was thrown to Indian civilization by Gandhi and the Independence Movement.
Book Review: In their own words by C.Christine Fair
“In Their Own Words informs contemporary discussions and analysis of this organization by mobilizing the vast corpus of LeT’s own writing…. I draw from these materials to advance two key claims about the organization. First, as is generally accepted, I argue that LeT’s ability to conduct complex terroattacks in India and Afghanistan-coupled with its loyalty to the Pakistani security establishment-render it incredibly useful as a reliable and obedient proxy. In fact, it is the state’s most duteous and governable agent. While it has long been appreciated that LeT is useful to the Pakistani state for its loyalty and lethality in conducting its militant operations in India and, more recently, in Afghanistan, analysts have overlooked its domestic utility to the state. This forms the second principal focus of my study. LeT/JuD stands in stark opposition to Al Qaeda, the Islamic State and the various Deobandi militant groups savaging the Pakistani state and its citizenry because it vigorously opposes violence within Pakistan. This stance puts LeT/JuD at odds with other Salafi and Deobandi organisations in Pakistan that propound the doctrine of takfiri[sic](excommunication and often murder) for Muslims who ‘misbehave’ by failing to live their lives as these organizations demand and expect and for those Muslim leaders who fail to impose shariat when they have the opportunity to do so. Not only does it argue against violence against minorities. This yields a surprising paradox: while LeT decries Hindus and Christians outside of Pakistan as the worst polythiests and worthy objects of militarized Jihad, within Pakistan it argues for their conversion through compassion, preaching and proselytization. LeT is one of the state’s most important partners in helping it manage the aftershocks of its long-term policy of using Islamist militants as state proxies.” (Page 3)
“The Pakistani state long ago developed two dangerous tools to reverse these purported crimes of Partition (“imagined” loss of parts of Punjab and Kashmir). One is the ever-expanding fleet of Islamist militant groups, as well as non-Islamist groups, that Pakistan deploys in India as well as Afghanistan. The second is a growing arsenal of nuclear weapons which makes it virtually impossible for India or any other state for that matter to punish Pakistan for using terrorism as a tool of statecraft or compel it to cease doing so. Pakistan acquired a crude nuclear device around 1983-4, after which Pakistan became evermore emboldened in its strategy of sub-conventional warfare as it continued making progress in developing its nuclear deterrant. Under this expanding nuclear umbrella, Pakistan became increasingly confident that India would not risk responding militarily to Pakistan’s various terrorist outrages in Kashmir and the rest of India. Equally important, Pakistan became steadily assured that the United States and the international community would intervene to prevent any conflict from escalating to an all-out war, with the always lingering possibility for inadverent or deliberate escalation to nuclear use.” (page 23)
“Several developments in Kashmir influcened Singh’s course of action. Perhaps the most important event that conditioned Singh’s options was an invasion of his state by Pakistanis. Troubles for the maharaja began when some 60,000 veterans of WWII returned to their homes in Poonch (Westen Jammu) to find that they had become subjects of Hari singh of Kashmir, whom they disliked because of his imposition of onerous taxes. These mostly muslim Poonchis, annoyed with becoming Singh’s subjects and outraged by the communally-motivated murders of muslims, ongoing through India, declared their preferance of joining Pakistan during a public assembly during August 1947.” (Page 29)
AI, STEM and moral philosophers
Why do nonmuslims treat muslims so badly (f)?
The Dalai Lama demonstrates how the world’s 6 billion nonmuslims can treat the world’s 1 1/2 billion muslims. In the above video the Dalai Lama hosts Kashmiri Ladhak muslims. The Dalai Lama emphasizes the ancient close ties between Tibetan and Kashmiri Muslims, Buddhists and Hindus. Including how Tibetan and Kashmiri Buddhists and Hindus have built mosques for muslims for centuries.
The Dalai Lama said that for too long Tibetan, Kashmiri and Indian muslims have been silent. Now they must speak out and inspire the rest of the muslim world to follow their impressive example. Tibetan, Kashmiri and Indian muslims have been less affected by the Islamic civil war than the rest of the muslim world. Sunnis, Shia and other sects of Islam get along reasonably well in Tibet, Kashmir and India. Tibetan, Kashmiri and Indian muslims also need to share their perspectives with the rest of the muslim world about harmony between muslims and nonmuslims.
The Dalai Lama is completely correct in this. Dharmic muslims (muslims of Tibet, Kashmir, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia) are a precious treasure and remarkable by global standards. The Dharmic peoples need to protect their muslims from Islamist extremists and encourage Dharmic muslims (Tibetan, Kashmiri, Indian muslims, Bharatiya muslims, Hindu muslims) to engage in dialogue with the rest of the muslim world.
As an aside, there are many close ties between Sufis, Hindus and Buddhists that the Dalai Lama alludes to (Dalai Lama uses the word “muslim” instead of “Sufi”). One of these ties is the connection between Mahayana Vajrayana Tibetan Buddhism, Trika Kashmiri Shaivism and Sufism. One of the mothers of modern Trika Kashmiri Shaivism is Lal Ded or Lalleshwari (perhaps 1320-1392). {Of course Trika is far older} Almost all Kashmiri Shaivites revere Lal Ded and her many amazing musical and poetic compositions. One of her main disciples was the great Sufi master Nund Rishi–patron saint of Kashmir. Nund Rishi remains incredibly revered and influential among Kashmiri muslims and the Rishi order of saints he founded. He is also deeply respected by Indian Sufis more generally, including in Ajmer India.
Most Sanathana Dharmic Uttara Mimaamsa orders emphasize 25 tattvas or subtle sub-elements or qualities that can be identified in meditation. But there is an infinity beyond them. Mahayana Buddhists break this down into many Swargas (often translated as heaven; perhaps these are levels of Samadhi). So do the Trika. The Trika combine Samkhya (one of the ten Darshanas) with Yoga (one of the ten Darshanas) with Purna Mimaamsa with Uttara Mimaamsa. Trika uses 36 tattvas–defining Tattvas closer to how the Samkhyas do. Of these 24 are Samkhya standard and unreal. {Note that Chitta is called Pritvi in Trika.} 7 are partly real and partly unreal. 5 come closer to the truth. In this Trika describes the Alokic or transcendental realms of consciousness in some detail, similar to how lord Buddha did. Note that Sufi Muraqabah descriptions are very similar to this. The wikipedia article is remarkably good and similar to many Sufi books I have perused. Many parts of the Muraqabah are almost identical to several
The Dalai Lama is asked about the Rohingya and expresses great sadness. He is sad that major global publications headline Buddhist monks with the title “terrorist.” The Dalai Lama alluded to the immense complexity and nuance required to deal with Rohingya. The Dalai Lama smiled and laughed sweetly while saying that others call him terrorist too. {I was impressed by how the Dalai Lama reacts to being called a terrorist. This is the Sanathana Dharma way. Loving and respecting our enemies and bad people with all our hearts, all our souls, all our minds and all our might. This includes loving and respecting those who are “white supremacist”, “Nazi”, “racist”, “bigoted”, “hegemonic”, “imperialist”, “colonialist”, “exploitative”, “oppressive” towards us. Or people who accuse us of these things and other permutations of being evil. }
The Dalai Lama counsels compassion or love. If not this then being “wise selfish” rather than “foolish selfish”. We are connected to others; benefit from their success and suffer from their harm. When we don’t treat others well we don’t
As an aside the Dalai Lama is asked 1 hour, 50 seconds in about the true state of Nirvana. The Dalai Lama tried to describe it with words, which is very difficult. My paraphrase would that a pure mind without any ignorance can see reality clearly through practice {Sadhana in Sanskrit}. Mere understanding is not sufficient. He said that ancient Indian and Buddhist literature describe learning Nirvana in three levels:
- Through hearing or reading {in sanskrit this is called Apta Shabda Pramana or Shastra Shabda Pramana}
- You yourself think deeply and understand through reasoning which gradually brings deeper experience and constant “think” {I would translate this as deep contemplation or Dhyaana or what Patanjali would call “Savitarka Samprajnata Samaapatti Samadhi” . . . it has specific names in Muraqabah texts as well. I would say a cross between Idraak and Waruud. Or similar to Kashf or Ihaam}
- Deep experience. This really affects our emotion. {I would say that this is transcending all 31 Swargas or levels of awareness. The Muraqabah equivalents might be Fanāʾ Fī ʾilāh, Safr-e-Nuzooli and Baqa billah and nafs al-mutma’inna}
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PS. Previous Brown Pundit articles on this subject are:
Why the Steppe Theory of PIE Origins is likely to be wrong
In the last post by Razib, there is a lot of psycho-analysing being done by various commentators about what motivates Indians to deny AIT/AMT and support OIT. The underlying assumption being AIT/AMT is gospel truth. But is it so ? And if it is not, questioning the theory and bringing up facts that don’t support this theory should be looked at and discussed in a healthy debate.
Let me in the spirit of that debate share some pieces of evidence that massively undermine the Steppe PIE origin theory and also manages to indicate a possible SC Asian connection & migration to the steppe that is of the pre-Yamnaya stage.
Who are the Indus Periphery people ?
From the pre-print of the Narasimhan et al paper, we got hold of 3 ancient Bronze Age samples which the authors contend, based on their genetic ancestry (which had significant levels of AASI ancestry and no Anatolian Neolithic farmer ancestry (ANF)) to have been South Asian in origin.
Since these 3 samples were found outside of the geographical expanse of the Harappan civilization (2 from Shahr-i-Sokhta in Eastern Iran & 1 from Gonur (BMAC) in Turkmenistan), they have been designated as Indus Periphery samples – implicitly under the assumption that they were migrants from the Harappan civilization.
It has been a long time since the Narasimhan et al preprint had come out in 31st March 2018, and we still await the peer-reviewed publication of the paper. However, there are a few things we already know about the final paper. One of these is the fact that the final paper, in comparison to its preprint, will have significantly greater number of samples from Eastern Iran and Central Asia, including as many as 14 Indus Periphery samples.
This is exciting stuff !
More specifically, 10 of these Indus Periphery samples are from Shahr-i-Sokhta are from Eastern Iran and 4 from the site of Gonur in BMAC.
This is a very important information !
Let me explain how it is so.
The Indus Periphery samples have been assumed to be Harappan migrants from South Asia into Eastern Iran and Central Asia, an assumption which is largely correct.
However, the Narasimhan et al paper went one step further and argued that these 3 Indus Periphery samples can be taken as a good sample representation of the entire Harappan genetic diversity which spread over a vast geographical expanse from Afghanistan in the West to Western UP in India in the East and upto the northern half of Gujarat in the South.
Clearly, the mature Harappan civilization had emerged by the assimilation of several distinct but interacting early Harappan cultures. The Early Harappan period is broadly defined by 4 cultural groups –
- The Damb Sadat or Quetta ware tradition of northern Baluchistan and southern Afghanistan,
- the Amri-Nal tradition of the southern Baluchistan and Sindh but also extending into Gujarat (Dholavira is considered a type site of this culture)
- The Kot Diji tradition of the Greater Punjab region
- The Sothi-Siswal tradition of North Rajasthan, Haryana, Western UP and also parts of Punjab.
The Kot Diji and Sothi-Siswal traditions were clearly the dominant cultural traditions in the formation of the Mature Harappan civilization and their sites were also typically larger in size than the other 2 traditions.
There are also greater nuances even within this broad 4-way classification. Therefore it is rather simplistic to assume that the 3 Indus Periphery samples give us a good estimation of the genetic diversity of the Harappans, without identifying the likely geographical origins of these Indus Periphery samples within South Asia.
And the fact that we have 10 Indus Periphery samples from Shahr-i-Sokhta and 4 from Gonur helps us a great deal in narrowing down their geographical origins within South Asia.
Archaeological evidence clearly shows that the site of Shahr-i-Sokhta only began to emerge around 3200 BC (very close in time to 1 Indus Periphery sample from this site which dates to around 3100 BC). And there is a lot of cultural similarities with the Chalcolithic cultural traditions of Baluchistan in the East, which has lead archaeologists to argue that there likely was migration from Baluchistan into Shahr-i-Sokhta.
To put it more directly and clearly, there was a significantly large input from the Chalcolithic people of Baluchistan in the formation of Shahr-i-Sokhta, including migration of people. The ancient DNA evidence has now confirmed it by showing the presence of as many as 10 Indus Periphery samples in Shahr-i-Sokhta (where perhaps the total no. of aDNA samples are unlikely to be more than 20-25).
By the way, hundreds of cattle figurines were discovered from the site of Shahr-i-Sokhta, and all the securely indentified figurines of cattle (more than 600 of them) are of the South Asian Zebu cattle.
The place in South Asia which was most directly involved in the formation of Shahr-i-Sokhta was Baluchistan and therefore it is quite safe to say that the Indus Periphery samples in Shahr-i-Sokhta are also migrants from Chalcolithic cultures of Baluchistan.
Furthermore, Shahr-i-Sokhta and the cultures of Eastern Iran in general and quite possibly Baluchistan as well, are said to have in turn significantly influenced the cultural formation of BMAC. So the 4 Indus Periphery samples from the BMAC site of Gonur could very well have been from these regions in Baluchistan or Eastern Iran in the South.
Now that we have identified the most likely place of origin of the Indus Periphery people within South Asia, let us understand the implications of this in terms of the genetic data.