Brown Pundits

“In Their Own Words informs contemporary discussions and analysis of this organization by mobilizing the vast corpus of LeT’s own writing…. I draw from these materials to advance two key claims about the organization. First, as is generally accepted, I argue that LeT’s ability to conduct complex terroattacks in India and Afghanistan-coupled with its loyalty to the Pakistani security establishment-render it incredibly useful as a reliable and obedient proxy. In fact, it is the state’s most duteous and governable agent. While it has long been appreciated that LeT is useful to the Pakistani state for its loyalty and lethality in conducting its militant operations in India and, more recently, in Afghanistan, analysts have overlooked its domestic utility to the state. This forms the second principal focus of my study. LeT/JuD stands in stark opposition to Al Qaeda, the Islamic State and the various Deobandi militant groups savaging the Pakistani state and its citizenry because it vigorously opposes violence within Pakistan. This stance puts LeT/JuD at odds with other Salafi and Deobandi organisations in Pakistan that propound the doctrine of takfiri[sic](excommunication and often murder) for Muslims who ‘misbehave’ by failing to live their lives as these organizations demand and expect and for those Muslim leaders who fail to impose shariat when they have the opportunity to do so. Not only does it argue against violence against minorities. This yields a surprising paradox: while LeT decries Hindus and Christians outside of Pakistan as the worst polythiests and worthy objects of militarized Jihad, within Pakistan it argues for their conversion through compassion, preaching and proselytization. LeT is one of the state’s most important partners in helping it manage the aftershocks of its long-term policy of using Islamist militants as state proxies.” (Page 3)

“The Pakistani state long ago developed two dangerous tools to reverse these purported crimes of Partition (“imagined” loss of parts of Punjab and Kashmir). One is the ever-expanding fleet of Islamist militant groups, as well as non-Islamist groups, that Pakistan deploys in India as well as Afghanistan. The second is a growing arsenal of nuclear weapons which makes it virtually impossible for India or any other state for that matter to punish Pakistan for using terrorism as a tool of statecraft or compel it to cease doing so. Pakistan acquired a crude nuclear device around 1983-4, after which Pakistan became evermore emboldened in its strategy of sub-conventional warfare as it continued making progress in developing its nuclear deterrant. Under this expanding nuclear umbrella, Pakistan became increasingly confident that India would not risk responding militarily to Pakistan’s various terrorist outrages in Kashmir and the rest of India. Equally important, Pakistan became steadily assured that the United States and the international community would intervene to prevent any conflict from escalating to an all-out war, with the always lingering possibility for inadverent or deliberate escalation to nuclear use.” (page 23)

“Several developments in Kashmir influcened Singh’s course of action. Perhaps the most important event that conditioned Singh’s options was an invasion of his state by Pakistanis. Troubles for the maharaja began when some 60,000 veterans of WWII returned to their homes in Poonch (Westen Jammu) to find that they had become subjects of Hari singh of Kashmir, whom they disliked because of his imposition of onerous taxes. These mostly muslim Poonchis, annoyed with becoming Singh’s subjects and outraged by the communally-motivated murders of muslims, ongoing through India, declared their preferance of joining Pakistan during a public assembly during August 1947.” (Page 29)

ISBN-13: 978-1727709261
ISBN-10: 1727709268

This is a very interesting book by
Montana University (adjunct)
Professor .
The author explains that th genesis
of this book was his:– (page-9)

“Two- month stay at the
Counterinsurgency Training Center in
Kabul, Afghanistan during the
summer of 2009. It was there that I
learned a great deal more about
Afghanistan–Pakistan relations in

general and ISI operations in
Afghanistan in particular.”

The book examines the following
issues in the writers own words:–
1. How has ISI evolved as an
institution exercising intelligence
and security responsibilities at
home and abroad? What were
the driving forces behind that
evolutionary process?
2. How does ISI fit into the larger
Pakistani Intelligence
Community?
3. What does the decades- old
relationship between ISI and
the CIA tell us about the larger
US–Pakistan security
relationship?

4. What is ISI’s record in providing
accurate and timely early

warning intelligence to decision-
makers?

5. To what extent has ISI
disrupted and abused Pakistan’s
democratic processes?
6. Is ISI a rogue agency or a state
within a state?
7. Can ISI be reined in and the PIC
(Pakistani Intelligence
community) reformed?
8. How has ISI employed UW
(Unconventional warfare) in
support of the state’s national
security objectives? To what
extent has UW been a
successful strategy
for Pakistan?
These are the very interesting
question that the writer has
formulated as stated in the books
beginning and has attempted to
answer in this most interesting book.
On page-7 I must add that some of
the authors sources have produced
some really classical pearls of
confusion and nonsense like late

Syed Saleem Shahzad and living
Steve Coll.

On page-7 our author starts
moralizing and states :–

How writers can assume such an air
of arrogance is hard to understand ?
Map of Kashmir on page 15 is
apology of a decent map.I am
surprised at the cartographical
poverty of our learned adjunct
professor.

Our author makes false and
uninformed assertions about how the

Kashmir proxy war started on page-
16 in a haste to blame the Pakistani

military for all the so called perceived
ills as the author views them.Like he
fallaciously claims that the idea of
Kashmir war originated from Colonel
Akbar Khan,DSO:–

The Muslim League’s high command
had tasked Mian Iftikhar ud Din
Minister for Refugees to prepare a
plan aimed at ensuring that the
Muslim majority state of Kashmir
should join Pakistan. Brigadier Akbar
Khan then serving in the Pakistani
GHQ wrote an appreciation ‘armed
revolt inside Kashmir ‘ on Mian
Iftikhar ud Din’s request.
The writers assertions on above
mentioned page 16 are nothing short

of sheer intellectual dishonesty as he
falsely claims that it was the army
colonel Akbar Khan who forced Jihad
in Kashmir on the government.This is
a factually incorrect statement.
On page 214 of his book Sardar
Shaukat Hayat the man directly
responsible for Pakistans proxy war
invasion of Kashmir clearly states the
sequence of events :–
“Seeing the Maharajas and Indias bad
faith,we therefore decided to walk
into Kashmir.I was put in charge of
operations.I asked for the services of
Brigadier Sher Khan and Brigadier
Akbar both of 6/13th Frontier Force”.
The author could have easily found
this book published in April 1995 but
did not ! And more deadly is his basic
intellectual dishonesty in preparing a
moral case against Pakistan Army by
falsely claiming that the invasion was
Colonel Akbar Khans idea forced upon

,civilians who were not very keen
possibly !
On page 16 our author starts making
basic factual mistakes :–

As a matter of fact the tribal invasion
of Kashmir began on 20th October
1947 and the tribesmen on night of
20/21st October had crossed the
Neelam River bridge in Kashmir.
Muzaffarabad had been captured on
morning of 21st October 1947, while
our author states that the tribal
invasion commenced on 22 October
1947.
On the same page 16 the author
makes broadbrushes like he states
that proxy war precedent was a
Pakistani innovation:–

He totally ignores or forgets or is not
aware that proxy wars was a British
inheritance of Pakistani state.
The British regularly used proxies for
their military purposes as in 1929
when they planned and executed a
huge operation with base in North
Waziristan to assemble a tribal
lashkar very similar to Kashmir 1947
to remove Bacha Saqao in Kabul.
The writer is bad and sloppy with his
sources also.He could have quoted
Colonel Yahya Effendis book
published in 2007 to reinforce his
elaboration of proxy war in
Kashmir.Effendi in his book examines
in detail how Pakistan Army
supported the war in Kashmir.

The writer could have inserted a
major Pakistani intelligence failure in
his book if he read all the available
sources carefully.
Like in late 1947 many days before
Indian Army arrived in Kashmir the
Indians by mistake sent the whole
war plan to Lahore by mistake.The
plan was sent to Pakistans Director
Military Intelligence Brigadier Sher
Khan in Pakistan Army Headquarters
but Sher Khan as per General Musas
narrative in his book “From Jawan to
General” just sat over the crucial
information.

On page 17 I started having serious
doubts about our authors research
when he totally falsely states that
Pakistans first Intelligence Bureau
boss G.Ahmad was a Bengali !

I am perplexed why on earth
American authors have to get
involved in such unnecessary and
fallacious matters.
The fact of the matter is that
G.Ahmad was a diehard Punjabi and
had no connection with
Bengal.Interestingly G.Ahmad was
brother of Aziz Ahmad and both
brothers had the unique precedent of
serving as Pakistans ambassadors to
USA one after the other.
On page 21 the author again starts
making nonsense statements like
elevating Sahibzada Yaqub to an
Indian ruling family while he was a
small time younger son of an Indian
nawab.

On page 22 , again the writer starts
making uninformed and naieve
statements like below :–

As a matter of fact Pakistans official
history of Kashmir war, published in
1970 , contrary to our brilliant
adjunct professors assertions states
that Pakistan wanted a ceasefire and
the very strategic aim of Pakistans
Operation Venus was creating
conditions where India should accept
a ceasefire.
But our brilliant author claims that
both Pakistan and India were
unhappy with ceasefire.

On page 50 our brilliant analyst
promotes Aziz Ahmad who was
Pakistans Foreign Secretary to the
rank of Minister of State !

The worst part of the book is the
authors sloppy handling of Pakistans
greatest strategic intelligence failure
in 1965.
Here he most unimaginatively quotes
Shuja Nawaz whose book was only
published in 2008 and gives a totally
“false and misleading picture of
Pakistans greatest intelligence
failure”.
In endnote number 6 our brilliant
author quotes Shuja Nawazs
books dumb passage below but
fails to explain what actually
happened and who failed in
Pakistans intelligence set up ?

The above is page 222 of Shuja
Nawaz’s book Crossed Swords
which our author quotes.
Shuja in turn quotes Major
General Shaukat Razas book
which also conveniently
hoodwinks who committed the
intelligence failure.
As Shaukat Riza meekishly and
evasively made a very round
about statement :–

Our brilliant adjunct professor leaves
the reader who hardly knows
anything into total darkness !
Major General Shaukat Riza in above
passage committed the worst
possible act of intellectual dishonesty.
He passed the total blame to
Pakistans foreign office whereas it
was Pakistans Director Military
Intelligence Brigadier Irshad Ahmad
Khan who had actually failed.

This I discovered only in March 2001
when I met and interviewed Major
General Naseer ullah Khan Babar who
explained as below :–

. Did the standard of training of the Army
improve after 1965 or not?
I would say that very few lessons were learnt. The
Army was run on personal likes and dislikes. Thus
Brigadier Irshad who was one of the principal
characters responsible for the intelligence failure as
Director Military Intelligence was promoted whereas
in terms of justice he should have been retired.
Characters like A.A.K Niazi who had nothing to do
with any fighting were awarded Hilal-i-Jurrat for
some action which never took place at Zafarwal
simply because he was from Ayub Khan’s unit. Thus
Niazi was promoted to General rank and we finally
saw him in East Pakistan. That is history. In 1962
while writing a.a k Niazi’s acr for the year 1960-61
Major General Atiq ur Rahman had written that
“This officer had reached his ceiling and should not
be promoted to Brigadier rank”. Unfortunately, it
was an Army run on personal likes and dislikes.
Niazi was from Ayub Khan’s unit! Ayub Khan
ignored Atiq ur Rahman’s report and promoted Niazi
to Brigadier rank.

22. Please describe this intelligence failure on part
of the dmi in greater detail ?
The ssg captured a despatch rider of the Indian
Army on the Jammu Samba Road on night 3/4
September 65 carrying the mail of the Indian 1st
Armoured Division. This mail bag was taken by
Director Aviation Brigadier Mahmud to the dmi
Brigadier Irshad who dismissed it as an Indian
deception plan! Thus the dmi insisted that the Indian
1st Armoured Division was at Jandiala Guru, East of
Amritsar while in reality it was in Samba area right
next to our jugular vein in Sialkot sector! Thus once
the Indian 1st Armoured Division attacked us
opposite Chawinda on 8th September we were
caught off balance. And then kept reacting to
situations. The initiative had been lost, thanks to
intelligence. The move of the formation takes 7-10
days, which acts as warning time.
Refers this scribes interview
published in Defence Journal April
2001 issue.
This interview was available on
internet and the so called brilliant
writer and chronicler on ISI could
have found it and quoted it .

Shuja Nawaz’s book was published
only in 2008 and also hoodwinked
like Shaukat Riza, Pakistan Army
Military Intelligence and not ISIs
greatest strategic intelligence failure
in history.
Brigadier Irshad the greatest
intelligence failure culprit in Pakistans
military history was given clean chit
by both Shaukat Riza in 1984 and
Shuja Nawaz in 2008 and now by our
brilliant author in 2017.
In chapter titled ISI at War I agree
with the writers analysis that ISI was
a total strategic failure in 1971 war.
A major failure of the author in this
chapter is the fact that ISI managed
to get hold of complete Indian plan to
attack East Pakistan in December
1971 but Pakistans military
leadership failed to tailor Pakistans
counter offensive plans .

This is a major failure of this book in
the sense that obtaining this Indian
plan was a major ISI coup.
Indian Western Command chief
Candeth in his book The Western
Front states that if Pakistan Army had
launched a pre emptive attack before
26 september all Indian plans to
attack East Pakistan would have gone
to winds.
So ISI had done a major intelligence
task by getting hold of this plan but
Pakistans military leadership failed,
not the ISI ,but our brilliant author
remains highly biased against ISI.
Certainly one quality he severely
lacks is intellectual honesty.
The writers knowledge about ISI role
in Afghan war is faulty for example
on page 114 he mentions a very
junior major Tarar but totally forgets
about the real ISI pioneer of Soviet
Afghan war Brigadier Raza Ali .

The authors sources about Akhtar
Abdul Rahman are incomplete . I
interviewed Colonel Salman of 2
Commando and ISI in 2000 and he
described Akhtar Abdul Rahman as a
mediocre and singled out Brigadier
Raza Ali as the real architect of ISIs
Afghan covert war.

Colonel Salman on extreme right.

The authors claim about suicide
bombings in Afghanistan is non
factual .
Below map from this scribes book
illustrates the point :–

On page 232 , evasive and tactful to
the point of being intellectually
dishonest our writer gives a light
touch to USAs total strategic
intelligence failure in Afghanistan in

correctly assessing ISIs true strategy
in Afghanistan :–

I wish he was more blunt and
truthful.
On page 237 the author states that
by 2009 all westerners thought that
no military solution in Afghanistan
was possible but has little to say
about Obama,Bruce Riedel,Mc
Chrystal and Petraeus pointless and
totally unnecessary so called surge of
2009-11 and the resultant massive
US casualties:–

On page 239 the writer repeats the
age old US nonsense about Haqqani
group but forgets that the real ISI
proxy which inflicted maximum
casualties on US army was Mulla
Omar group.

The writers assertions about ISI CIA
cooperatiuon in drone strikes is
interesting but fails to note that ISI
only allowing drone strikes in north
and south Waziristan created a huge
pashtun insurrection in Pakistan :–
(pag-271)

And the worst part is that the author
has nothing to say about the fact that
the so called CIA drones he
fallaciously calls successful failed to
target the real killers of US troops in
Afghanistan based in Pakistani
Baluchistan.

The writers criticism of ISIs wars in
Afghanistan is without substance :–
(page-291)

He has nothing to state about why
USA failed in Afghanistan and why
USA lacks the strategic resolution to
confront the Pakistani state and the
ISI ?
On page 296 our evasive and non
committal author gives the ISI a
clean chit :–

But he fails to analyse that the real
issue is not that ISI is not a state
within a state but the fact that
Pakistan is not an army with a state
but an army with a state.
More seriously all along the author
fails to analyse why the CIA failed as
an agency in judging true ISI
intentions in Afghanistan war that the
USA waged inconclusively .
I agree with the last paragraph of the
book :–

The book is interesting and thought
provoking.
Writing intelligence history of an
intelligence agency is no easy task ,
so Mr Owen deserves credit for that
.However he could still have done
better if he had been more careful
with his sources and more blunt and
truthful in his analysis.

gm

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