Category: War & Military History
Pahalgam and Aftermath
Posted on Categories Brown Pundits, Geopolitics, India, Indian Subcontinent, Kashmir, Pakistan, Partition, Postcolonialism & the Global South, Religion, War & Military History, X.T.M10 Comments on Pahalgam and AftermathSomeone on Twitter asked me for my opinion on Pahalgam and its aftermath now that several months have passed. I wrote up a quick reply, which I am posting here. I realize I am not writing much on this blog these days, but life has been busy and I barely keep up with Twitter and reading books, this blog gets pushed down.. But lets see if this sparks some discussion. Continue reading Pahalgam and Aftermath
What did Asim Munir talk with Trump
Posted on Categories Pakistan, Politics, United States, War & Military History66 Comments on What did Asim Munir talk with TrumpNow that the blog has a lease of new life i thought why don’t I join the fray.
Funny that Asim Munir is having lunch with Donald Trump only a day after Trump was having X diarrhoea threatening Iran and its leadership.
What could potentially be the points of discussion one wonders. I have a few wild thoughts.
- Trump is asking for Pakistani help against Iran. Either back-channel negotiations and/or direct intelligence. I am not sure of this one as this seems for a Pro-India cope which sort of makes sense of the ceasefire.
- Pakistan wants to remain the only Nuclear Islamic nation and hence is willing to get into bed with Zionists in Trump towers while giving a middle finger to Ummah.
- The felid marshal wants swip up some Tomahawks to counter Brahmos.
- Trump in all his infinite wisdom is playing at 56D Chess against China via flirting with the felid Marshal and Dumping Modi after a brief fling (or maybe it never was a fling).
- Trump wants to learn some catty dictatorship from the felid Marshal for the 3rd term.
Ironically Modi declined US invitation which seems to be related to either claimed US mediation into Op Sindoor or Israel Iran war.
Finally Sorry Amey and Poulasta but the podcast episode on OP Sindoor was terrible. Cant have a podcast where Omar’s wisdom is interrupted as frequently as that with all the rants and interruptions.
I hope to write a longish post from India POV about Op Sindoor and the future as soon as i get some brainspace.
Be civil in comments.Ā
Why Iran Is Not Iraq
Posted on Categories Geopolitics, History, Iran, Islam & the Middle East, Religion, War & Military History, X.T.M11 Comments on Why Iran Is Not IraqThese reflections are evolving, and may shift without warning. The winds of changeāDivine or otherwiseādo not move by human forecast.
In the Western imagination, the idea that Iran could somehow be ādealt withā like Iraq is a dangerous illusionāone rooted not just in hubris, but in historical illiteracy.
Yes, Iraq was once the cradle of civilization. From Ur to Babylon, and later Baghdad under the Abbasids, its glories are undeniable. But geopolitically, Iraq is a lowland nationādeeply enmeshed within the Arab Mashreq, itself a corridor between Egypt and the Persianate world, susceptible to invasions, internal fragmentation, and competing powers.
Iran, by contrast, is a fortress civilization.
Israel, India, and the Rise of Defensive Asymmetry
Posted on Categories Geopolitics, India, Palestine, Gaza & Israel, Politics, Science, War & Military History, X.T.M80 Comments on Israel, India, and the Rise of Defensive AsymmetryA Pause in the Offensive:
Without getting into the ideological or emotional dimensions of current conflicts, one point stands out: both Israel and India seem quietly surprised by the defensive resilience of their adversaries.
Whether itās Iran-Israel, India-Pakistan, or even Russia-Ukraine, a pattern is emerging: offensive campaigns that assumed rapid success are stalling against increasingly capableāand surprisingly tenaciousādefensive postures.
In classic military doctrine, a successful offense requires a 3:1 superiority. That logic appears to be inverting. What we may be witnessing is a shift in the scientific and technological balanceānot just in weaponry, but in surveillance, cyber, and even psychological endurance as evidenced by the Iranians on national television in this clip, IMG_0631.
Continue reading Israel, India, and the Rise of Defensive Asymmetry
Belated Podcast: Operation Sindoor (and Bunyan al Marsoos)
Posted on Categories Geopolitics, History, India, Pakistan, Podcast, Politics, War & Military History3 Comments on Belated Podcast: Operation Sindoor (and Bunyan al Marsoos)Another Browncast is up. You can listen onĀ Libsyn,Ā Apple,Ā Spotify, andĀ StitcherĀ (and a variety of other platforms). Probably the easiest way to keep up the podcast since we donāt have a regular schedule is toĀ subscribeĀ to one of the links above!
In this episode Amey hosts myself (omar) and Poulasta (our resident Bengali expert) to talk about the recent India-Pakistan kerfuffle. Amey was ready for war, but we found common ground š (as usual with India and Pakistan, a lot of the discussion is about partition and related misunderstandings)
Jet Lag: India, Pakistan, and the Theatre of the Air
Posted on Categories Brown Pundits, India, Pakistan, Politics, War & Military History, X.T.M71 Comments on Jet Lag: India, Pakistan, and the Theatre of the AirSince the commentariat canāt resist a good Indo-Pak exchangeāespecially when it involves fighter jetsāhereās a fresh contribution to the theatre. Personally, Iām much more interested in Concord cafĆ©s and JD Vanceās selective memory, but one must feed the algorithmic gods. So hereās what S. Qureishi gleefully shared:
A day after Subramanian Swamy accepted 5 jets were down in a Hindi interview, Indian CDS Gen Chauhan accepts jet losses in the recent encounter to Bloomberg. Whatās more he accepted that the Indian planes did not fly after May 6-7 and were grounded,
Take that as you will. Fog of war, political spin, or just belated candorāeither way, the skies are louder than the silence.
As an aside, Iāve always found Pakistani commentary on Indiaāthe civilizational motherland, however estrangedāto be oddly fixated. Itās like staring into a mirror with the lights off.
Anywayācomment away, and please play nice. After all, xperia2015 has author privileges and can selectively void what he likes.
Obituary: Major Agha Humayun Amin
Posted on Categories Major Amin4 Comments on Obituary: Major Agha Humayun Amin
Major (retd) Agha Humayun Amin passed away in Lahore on February 21st 2025 at the age of 64 (or so, I never learnt his exact date of birth). The son of an army officer (his late father Brigadier Amin was an Engineers officer who laid the famous triple minefield near Sialkot in 1971), Agha joined the army in 1981 in the 67th Long course. He was commissioned into a cavalry regiment (PAVO cavalry, a storied regiment of the British Indian Army, a fact of which Major Sahib was very proud).
Agha was very popular with his coursemates, but tended to run into trouble with his superiors because of his unconventional lifestyle and unwillingness to be a sycophant. He and the army therefore parted ways in the 90s and he spent a good part of his remaining life in Afghanistan, working as a free lancer and providing various services to companies operating there. But his main interest and the quality that made him famous was his interest in military history. He was Pakistan’s premier military historian and the author of multiple books and over 200 articles in various publications. He was a stickler for accuracy and had no time for people who were ready to bend the facts to fit a paticular narrative. For Major sahib, the truth was sacrosanct and errors of fact were unforgiveable. Interpretation is a different matter. His opinons tended to be salty and sometimes unconventional (but equally, sometimes they felt shocking because in a country where delusions and fantasies can rule, a very conventional assessment could sound shocking).
I personally met Major Amin online about 20 years ago and we remained in touch online till the day he passed away, but I only met him a few times in person on visits to Lahore (he also met my father a couple of times there), so I am not the best person to comment on his personal life, but agha sahib seems to have had a LOT of friends and was very much a “yaraan da yaar” (loyal to his friends, and down to earth and fun loving). But I can tell you that i have not met anyone in Pakistan who read more books than Agha sahib. Military history (especially the history of the British Indian army) was his forte and he seems to have read everything and had opinions about everything, but he also read a lot of psychology and had a fondness for Western art (where his favorites were 19th century and early 20th century realistic and impressionistic art). His own worldview was very old fashioned in some ways: he admired great men (of any party or ideology) and had no time for the kind of bureaucratic mediocrities who get promoted by being sycophants. He was also a believer in inherited qualities and generally dismissive of Democratic pieties, but his focus was on military excellence (or mediocrity, as the case may be).
We are lucky to have had someone like him in the subcontinent. Thanks to his efforts, a LOT of detailed (and accurately detailed) information about the recent military history of the Indian subcontinent has been preserved. He will be missed.
Writings and podcasts with Major Amin at Brownpundits can be found here.
Major Amin on the Failure of the Pakistani invasion in the First Kashmir War
Posted on Categories Major AminMajor Amin sent over an extract from his writings about the 1947 attempt to grab Kashmir using tribal lashkars and why it failed. Obviously from a Pakistani POV, but an objective one.. There are formatting issues that I found hard to fix, but you will get the gist.
Liaquat Ali Khan and Malik Ghulam Mohammadās Kakkezi relative Railway battalion major Khursheed Anwar was the biggest reason for the tribal invasionās failure on Muzaffarabad-Srinagar axis.
As per Sardar Shaukat Hayat who was closely connected with leading the invasion , the tribal invasion was planned in September 1947 but Khursheed Anwar disappeared to get married to a Muslim League worker.[1]
Pakistani state had two excellent choices , as military commanders to lead the main tribal attack on Muzarrafarabad-Srinagar axis . These were Major Taj Khanzada DSO,MC and Gen Zaman Kiani, sword of honour of IMA and ex chief of Indian national army.
Such was the criminal parochialism in the newly created Pakistani state that a railway battalion emergency commission was handpicked by PM Liaquat and his finance minister Malik Ghulam Mohammad,on grounds that he was Ghulam Mohammads Kakkezai clanmate and relative from Jullundhur.[2]
It was most irrational to pick up a man whose only qualification was petty intrigue and fomenting riots and who had no military knowledge.
But that is how the All India Muslim League was run , right from its creation in 1906.
Continue reading Major Amin on the Failure of the Pakistani invasion in the First Kashmir War
Major Amin: How the British Ruled India (and the USA failed in Afg)
Posted on Categories Major Amin2 Comments on Major Amin: How the British Ruled India (and the USA failed in Afg)
Some Musings from Major Amin.Ā
What the US could learn from the British ?Ā An English Private Company Conquered India and Chastised Afghanistan not by superior weapons but a superior strategy
Agha H Amin
What the US could learn from the British
ā¢ July 2024
When I researched the English East India Companys history of conquest of India I arrived at the following conclusions :—
1. An army which was 80 % native was used to win the battles against Indians,Nepalis,Bumese,
2. The weapons used were almost similar although the company had an edge in superior strategy, superior tactics, better synchronisation of firepower and movement, superior naval power.
3. After 1780 native states also increasingly mastered European way of warfare that were then considered the best in the world through increased use of European military instructors.
4. However superior diplomacy and superior naval power to switch troops worked in companys favour.
5. The elimination of French naval power after the 1789 revolution also removed the only major naval threat to the English company.This was significant as it is questionable if the Americans could ever have won their War of Independence without French naval support. It was lack of naval interdiction which enabled the British to deploy the biggest army in British history to India in 1858. An army bigger than those used in Europe or the Americas till that date.
6. The companys costs of war were low as native troops constituted 80 % of the army and were very low paid as compared to private european troops or British Army regiments hired for India.
7. It was superior strategy and diplomacy through which the British held India in First World War with just 15,000 troops.
8. It was a superior system under which Indian Army with a large Muslim component was successfully employed against Muslim states like Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan etc.
9. Brilliant employment of the old Roman strategy of Divide et Impera or Divide and Rule enabled the British to control India with a very small British military presence and a corp d elite of just 500 civilians who made key decisions.
10. Various races and ethnicities and religions and sects were brilliantly pitched against each other and a healthy balance was maintained.
11. Afghanistan’s government was controlled with just a small personal retainer to the Afghan king of about 15 Lakh Rupees per year by a private company. Afghanistans foreign relations were kept subservient to the British successfully from 1842 to 1919 and the Nadir Shah dynasty was also installed in Afghanistan in 1929 with British largesse.
12. A small example of setting things right by attacking the centre of gravity. In theĀ 1890s and 1900s it was seen that foreign weapons were arriving in North West India. The origin appeared to be Oman . A naval squadron was deployed and the weapons supply route cut.
13. In 1850-1880 the religious militancy threat was eliminated by creating new sects and religions and infiltrating 80 % of Indian Muslim religious scholars and Mullahs.
14. German efforts to use Afghanistan as a base were totally defeated in Afghanistan.
15. Russian efforts to woo Afghanistan were firmly checked from 1839 to 1947 with a gap of 1919-29 when Afghanistan was hostile.
16. Brave enemies like Nepal were treated with chivalry and their manpower used in British Indian Army as a corp d elite.
17. Brave enemies like Sikhs were specially cultivated and recruited in the army and they proved a strategic asset against any Muslim uprisings .
18. Punjabi Muslims were correctly identified as politically docile and militarily useful and used as mercenaries in the army , sometimes as a counter balance against Sikhs who became increasingly anti British after 1918.
19. Their government was just at non political level, financially clean, forgiving politically, but eliminating ruthlessly where their enemies were regarded as a threat. Thus they treated Afghan kings and opponents chivalrously and gave them estates in their exile in India.However where they saw an enemy who was irreconcilable even that enemys body was destroyed and his place of burial kept secret and his houses raised to ground level as with Pir of Pagara in 1942.
20. Their policy was executed by administrators mostly from British aristocracy but younger sons who could not acquire the family estate ! Educated in Roman and Greek classics who understood how the Roman Empire was run.
21. A relative remembers how the civil servants in the academy were taught how to deal with each man differently !
22. The foundation of British rule was justice at basic level , creating good rural infrastructure , reward of lands and estates to loyal classes ,sophisticated intelligence , divide and rule,maximum use of natives , rewarding old foes if it was politically sound and exreme Machiavellianism at policy level.
23. All intelligence records were destroyed on transfer of power in India leaving no clue for future analysts ! A relative in the Indian Intelligence supervised burning of some records !
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BRITISH AND US POLICY
ā¢ THE US UNITED THEIR ENEMIES INSTEAD OF DIVIDING THEM.
ā¢ THE US RELIED ON UNRELIABLE AND DOUBLE DEALING STATES LIKE PAKISTAN WHICH COMPROMISED ALL ITS STRATEGIC INTERESTS.
ā¢ THE US FAILED TO RELY ON SMALLER BUT MORE SECULAR AND STRATEGICALLY RELIABLE ETHNICITIES LIKE THE KURD, BALOCH , HAZARA, UZBEK ETC.
ā¢ THE US FAILED TO INTERDICT AND DESTROY THE FINANCIAL AND LOGISTIC SUPPLY LINE OF INSURGENTS.