India Has Sacred Land. Pakistan Has Sacred Purpose. The Comment Section Needs Neither.

Everyone; please do not violate our rules egregiously. If moderation collapses, I will stop doing it. And if that happens, the comment boards will descend into noise very quickly. That helps no one.

The comments are growing again after a lull, which is a good sign. But it also puts real strain on time. I would rather focus on writing and commissioning strong posts than constantly firefighting threads. If you value the quality of this space, help maintain it.

If anyone would like to volunteer as a balanced and fair moderator, step forward. Not a partisan enforcer. Not a factional referee. Someone steady. I have given BB authorship privileges because Kabir, while diligent, is beginning to police too aggressively, and BB, when restrained, can bring levity without venom. That balance matters.

On a separate note, a thought. Bharat, that is, India in her most sublime and civilizational sense, possesses something like sacred geography. Rivers, mountains, pilgrimage circuits. The land itself carries immense metaphysical weight as both the home and centre of Dharma.

Pakistan, by contrast, was founded less on geography than on mission. It has an animating purpose, often framed as unifying or protecting the Ummah,  but that is not the same thing as sacred land. One is spatial and civilizational; the other is ideological and directional. They are not equivalents, and confusion between them produces bad arguments.

Keep the debates sharp. Keep them serious. But keep them civil. If moderation fails, everyone loses.

When Even Jainism Becomes a Hack

And so, some students I know claim to be devout members of the Jain faith, which rejects any food that may cause harm to all living creatures — including small insects and root vegetables. The students I know who claim to be Jain (but aren’t) spend their meal money at Whole Foods instead and enjoy freshly made salads and other yummy dishes, while the rest of us are stuck with college meals, like burgers made partly from “mushroom mix”.

I was reading about Stanford’s accommodation culture when one detail stopped me cold. Some students, the article noted, claim to be devout Jains in order to escape the mandatory meal plan. Jainism, one of India’s oldest religions, forbids harm to living beings. That includes insects. In many traditions it excludes root vegetables, because uprooting a plant kills it. It is an ethic of extreme restraint, discipline, and care. The students claiming it, by the author’s own admission, are not Jain. They are optimisers. This is not a small lie. It is a revealing one. Continue reading When Even Jainism Becomes a Hack

Report on Op-Sindoor

Link to the entire report.

Nevertheless, sufficient elements appear to indicate that, by the morning of 10 May 2025, the Indian Air Force had succeeded in achieving air superiority over a significant portion of Pakistan’s airspace. This in turn enabled it to continue long-range strikes against enemy infrastructure at will, at least for as long as it retained sufficient stocks of munitions such as BrahMos or SCALP-EG. At the same time, the Pakistan Air Force had lost the ability to repeat the operations it had conducted so successfully on 7 May 2025, owing to the loss of its forward air-surveillance radars and the threat posed by S-400 systems to its AWACS standoff weapons delivery platforms, while its own strikes conducted between 7 and
10 May 2025 had been largely thwarted by Indian defences.

Meanwhile, Islamabad demonstrated its manifest superiority in strategic communication, which notably benefitted from support within Chinese, and to some extent Western, information spheres. The destruction of one or more Rafales, for example, effectively masked the defeat of the adversary air force, which had reportedly suffered at
least equivalent losses but had also proven incapable of defending its most important air bases or of delivering comparable, documented strikes against its adversary.

Operation Sindoor marked a significant evolution in Indian counter-terrorism doctrine, which now equates a terrorist attack to an act of war warranting a decisive response. It also eliminates the distinction between terrorist groups and their state sponsors, with the latter automatically becoming legitimate targets in the event of a renewed attack. Finally, it reaffirms New Delhi’s resolve, in such a case, not to be deterred by Islamabad’s nuclear arsenal. The potential for escalation on the Indian subcontinent therefore remains higher than ever, while developments since 1999 have constantly illustrated the stability/instability paradox

TL;DR take:
IAF won in air and the land after sustaining initial losses whereas PAF won in the media (which is not as trivial as it sounds).

 

Why It Is Still Acceptable to Insult India

This happened on an ordinary Cambridge street. Dr. V and I ran into acquaintances, who in turn had friends (from medical school; a grandmother & granddaughter) visiting from Australia. Polite introductions. Small talk. The weather. Then, inevitably, India.

One of the women mentioned that her husband was “half Indian.” She smiled and added that he had told her she would definitely not like India. This was offered casually, as if it were neutral information, not an insult delivered in front of two Indians.

Trying to keep the exchange courteous, I mentioned Sri Lanka; not as a deflection, but as a bellwether. Our mutual acquaintances had already mentioned enjoying seeing my birthday pictures from there so I thought it a natural segue.

It is often how people test their appetite for the subcontinent: more contained, more legible, still culturally rich. If one enjoys that, India follows naturally; if not, India can feel overwhelming. This was not a provocation. Yet the suggestion was met with laughter, as though I had committed a social error. It was after this, not before, that the tone hardened and the remark about her granddaughter emerged, delivered with surprising persistence, as if the earlier politeness had licensed open disdain.

Continue reading Why It Is Still Acceptable to Insult India

A Pakistani Wedding That Refused Not to Be Indian

There is a tweet circulating of Nawaz Sharif’s grandson’s wedding. It is meant to be ordinary; the bride wore Indian designers, Sabyasachi and Tarun Tahiliani. Instead, it is revealing, the extent of Indic soft power. The colours are unmistakably Indian: red, gold, marigold. The symmetry is ritualistic rather than theological. The staging is ceremonial, not Quranic. The aesthetics are not Arab, Persian, or Turkic. They are Hindu-Indian; not in belief, but in form.

This is not a criticism. It is an observation. For seventy-five years, Pakistan has insisted that it is not India. That it broke away not only as a state but as a civilisation. That Islam did not merely replace Hinduism but erased it. Yet when Pakistan’s most powerful family marries its children, what appears is not a purified Islamic aesthetic but a recognisably Indic one.

Civilisation does not obey ideology.

Islam in Jambudvīpa did not enter an empty space. It arrived in a world already shaped by colour,  hierarchy, procession, music, and spectacle. It adapted to that world. It did not abolish ceremony; it repurposed it. Nikah replaced vivah, but the social grammar remained. Weddings stayed long, public, ornate, and familial. They did not become austere. They became Muslim in name and Indian in structure.

Continue reading A Pakistani Wedding That Refused Not to Be Indian

India’s Eastern Face: Where Civilisation Dissolves Instead of Ending

Hard Edges and Soft Ones

India is unusual among civilisations in that most of its edges are real. They can be pointed to on a map and felt underfoot. The northwest is closed by the Hindu Kush, a wall that both protected and punctured India through invasion. The north is sealed by the Himalayas, which turned the subcontinent inward for millennia. The south ends cleanly in the Indian Ocean, a hard geographic edge that also became India’s great outward highway. These are faces with sharp contours.

India is bounded in the northwest by mountains, in the north by ice, in the south by water, and in the east by diffusion.

The east is different. It does not end. It thins.

A Boundary That Does Not Behave Like One

Geographically, there is a boundary. The Indo-Burman ranges run from Arunachal through Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, and down into Burma. They are real mountains, thick with forest, rain, and disease. But they are not high enough, cold enough, or empty enough to function like the Himalayas. They slow movement without stopping it. They divide ecologies more than peoples.

This matters because civilisation follows ecology before it follows flags.

Where India Becomes Something Else, Gradually

Continue reading India’s Eastern Face: Where Civilisation Dissolves Instead of Ending

South Asia Is an Ugly Postcolonial Euphemism

There is something faintly ridiculous about how often educated people insist on using the term South Asia as if it were a neutral, hygienic improvement on an older and supposedly “problematic” word. It is neither neutral nor an improvement. It is a bureaucratic euphemism invented to manage post-Partition discomfort, and it collapses the civilizational reality of the region rather than clarifying it.

The Indian subcontinent has had a name for millennia. It was called India because it lay beyond the Indus. Greeks used it. Persians used it. Arabs used it. Medieval Muslims, early modern Europeans, and the British all used it. The word survived because it described a geographic and civilizational unit, not because it flattered any modern state. The fact that the Republic of India later adopted the name does not retroactively invalidate its older meaning. Belgium did not abolish the word “Europe,” and Serbia’s existence does not make “European” offensive.

South Asia, by contrast, is not an ancient term misused by a nation-state. It is a late–Cold War academic construction, popularised by American area studies departments that were uncomfortable saying “India” once India no longer meant a single polity. It is a word designed to avoid an argument, not to resolve one. Like “Middle East,” it describes nothing from within the region itself. No one historically lived in “South Asia.” No one spoke “South Asian.” No one cooked “South Asian food.” Continue reading South Asia Is an Ugly Postcolonial Euphemism

The Demise of Brown Pundits Is Much Exaggerated

Every few months someone asks whether Brown Pundits is “dying.” I understand the instinct. The internet is littered with abandoned blogs. Attention is fickle. Writers drift. The centre does not hold. And yet, when I actually look at the numbers, the mood often turns out to be wrong.

We had a real dip. In September and October we were running at roughly 55–65k monthly readers. Then we fell hard, to around 33k. This month, we have bounced back to roughly 53k. That is a 60% jump on the trough. A lot of it is mobile. A lot of it is casual readership rather than the old-school desktop cohort. But it is still real people arriving, reading, and sharing.

The geographical pattern is also telling. India and the United States remain the main pillars, as you would expect. But Bangladesh has surged in a way we did not anticipate. That matters because it suggests we are not only a niche diaspora salon. We are also being read inside the region, by people who do not need South Asia explained to them. Continue reading The Demise of Brown Pundits Is Much Exaggerated

Dravidian Progressivism is a Scam

Chennai, without any doubt, is one of the better cities in the country. I agree with many of the issues raised by XTM here. Along with Hyderabad, Ahmedabad, and Bangalore, Chennai continues to fare better in many aspects of life compared to Mumbai, Delhi, Kolkata, and even Pune.

My Experience

While I appreciated the cleanliness and infrastructure of Chennai, I cannot say I came away with the same impression as XTM. Of all the Indian cities I have visited, I found Chennai less hospitable than Ahmedabad, Hyderabad, or Delhi. Even as a fluent English speaker, I struggled to hail autos or get directions. Surprisingly, I did not face this issue in the rest of Tamil Nadu. For older Hindi speakers with limited English, the experience is even worse. The issue is not simply language, but linguistic chauvinism (also present in Karnataka and Maharashtra, though to a lesser extent). A non-Tamil speaker often looks for Muslim individuals to ask for help in Chennai.

I had a wonderful time in Mamallapuram, enjoying the Pallava ruins and the beach, thanks to a very helpful Muslim auto driver. But enough of auto-wala stories.

Culture and Politics

Without comparing cities directly, it is important to recognize that culture may play a role in Chennai’s successes. However, correlation should not be confused with causation, and credit should not be misplaced. Any link between Chennai’s well-being and Dravidianism is tenuous or purely incidental at best. While successive Tamil Nadu governments aligned with Dravidianism have been relatively successful (especially compared to the North) in providing welfare nets, what direct connection do these well-run policies have with Dravidianism?

Let us compare Tamil Nadu with the rest of India on the metric that Dravidian progressivism claims to address: CASTE

Link:

Scroll piece : Caste endogamy is also unaffected by how developed or industrialised a particular state is, even though Indian states differ widely in this aspect. Tamil Nadu, while relatively industrialised, has a caste endogamy rate of 97% while underdeveloped Odisha’s is 88%, as per a study by researchers Kumudini Das, Kailash Chandra Das, Tarun Kumar Roy and Pradeep Kumar Tripathy. 

Put differently: caste endogamy seems unaffected by how anti-Brahminical or “progressive” a state claims to be. Tamil Nadu, the heart of the Dravidian movement, remains at below 3%, while Gujarat—often seen as Brahmanical and vegetarian—stands around 10% (15% in a 2010 study, though possibly overstated). However one frames it, Gujarat has more inter-caste marriages than Tamil Nadu.

Surprisingly, even Haryana and Punjab—traditionally associated with Khap Panchayats and honor culture—show significant inter-caste marriages, along with Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka, and Kerala.

While data on Haryana, Punjab, and Goa is contested, Tamil Nadu consistently lags, whereas its neighbor Kerala consistently leads, along with Maharashtra.

Crossing from Kerala into Tamil Nadu, the difference is stark: one in five marriages in Kerala are inter-caste, compared to fewer than one in thirty in Tamil Nadu. Would it be fair to blame Dravidian politics for this? That claim has more merit than attributing Tamil Nadu’s successes to Dravidianism. Tamil Nadu ranks alongside Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Kashmir, while Karnataka, Kerala, and even Andhra/Telangana are far ahead.

Even Kashmir, with a 65% Muslim population, has an inter-caste marriage rate just below 2%, lower than Dravidian-ruled Tamil Nadu. So, after 500 years under a “casteless” religion and 100 years of “progressive” Dravidianism, both Kashmir and Tamil Nadu lag behind Gujarat, Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh.

Link:

Additional Observations

This data does not fit neat narratives. I was surprised to see higher percentages of rural inter-caste marriages. Rates are negatively correlated with wealth and income (more strongly with assets such as land). Landed communities show stronger caste endogamy, for historically and pragmatically clear reasons. That Brahmins, as a group, have the highest inter-caste marriage rates is unsurprising, given how progressive (some might say deracinated) Brahmins have become in India.

One social metric where Tamil Nadu performs well is female foeticide. Tamil Nadu and Kerala are among the leading states less affected by sex-selective abortions compared to the rest of India.

Tamil Brahmins have generally been more socially aloof compared to Brahmins elsewhere in India (both anecdotally and objectively) and disproportionately occupied government posts in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The Justice Party movement, which arose in response, was initially a elite-feudal project, though Periyar’s early movement (also virulently anti-Brahmin) was more inclusive of Dalits and non-dominant castes. Over time, while retaining its anti-Brahmin rhetoric, the movement became a proxy for domination by landed and wealthy communities. Dravidianism today (or perhaps always) resembles what it claimed to oppose—Brahmanism. The dominant elites have simply shifted from Brahmins and the British to others who hold power today. Hatred alone does not create positive change.

It seems Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh understood the incentives for reform, while Tamil Nadu did not.

Anecdotes or caste violence are often dismissed when praising the Dravidian model of social progressivism. Comparative caste violence data is brushed aside under claims of underreporting or lack of Dalit assertion in other regions. But caste endogamy cannot be ignored. If anything that truly encapsulates Caste is endogamy.

Post Script:

Tamil politicians, both DMK and AIADMK, have run better governments in terms of welfare, industrialization, and infrastructure, and they deserve credit for that. However, linking these achievements to culture may not be wise. Geography is a more convincing explanation.

 

Brown Pundits