Afghan Conundrum II

By Omar Ali 6 Comments

From Dr Hamid Hussain. As usual, he gives sensible advice, but it is not going to be heeded. On this issue, I think Major Amin is right, there will be a civil war, Pakistan will take sides, PTM will not be reconciled and will instead be further demonized, things will not get better.
I also hope I am wrong. (Omar Ali)

Dr Hamid Hussain’s post follows:

One can only highlight signposts of a complex issue. Following is one such exercise.

Hamid

Pakistan’s Afghan Conundrum

Hamid Hussain

“On earth, it’s hard and heaven is far away”.  Afghan proverb.

 Afghanistan is going through another transition with many uncertainties causing hope and fear.  Pakistan has a long history of involvement in Afghan affairs.  President Donald Trump tweeted on 08 October 2020 that all American troops will be home from Afghanistan by Christmas. This surprised everyone in Washington and Pentagon, State Department and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials were scratching their heads and contemplating how one single tweet has undermined the bargaining position of United States.  This also sent shock waves in General Head Quarters (GHQ) of Pakistan army.  Prime Minister Imran Khan government is not even pretending to have any role in Afghan affairs and has handed the Afghan file to the army.  Imran Khan wrote an op-ed piece for Washington Post pleading Americans not to leave Afghanistan in haste for Pakistan fears it will face all the negative fallout. 

There will be review of Afghan policy with the arrival of new administration in Washington in January 2021. However, domestic issues will suck all the oxygen and it is not likely that new administration will be able to spend significant economic, military and political capital on a side show in Afghanistan. President Trump is now the wild card before President elect Joe Biden takes oath on 20 January 2021.  He can order complete withdrawal of American troops by the end of the year that can make any course correction for new administration very difficult. Pakistan’s hope is that new administration keeps current level of forces and economic lifeline to Afghan government until meaningful progress is made on intra-negotiations front.

Changing dynamics of Afghan security invariably will have impact on Pakistan’s western border.  Taliban strategy is to consolidate and then gradually expand its hold from rural to urban areas.  They are leaving major population centers alone for now but in many cases consolidating surrounding countryside.   In case of Kabul, they are in the process of encircling the capital by increasing footprints in neighboring provinces.  In the last three years, Taliban poured in the eastern Nangarhar province to fight Daesh and in this process were helped by Iran, United States and Afghan government.  Now, they sit on the eastern gate of Kabul.  In the west, in Wardak province they have increased their gains.  In the southeast, they have completed control of major parts of Logar province (Azrah district).  Parwan, Kapisa and Laghman on northern border of Kabul have also seen increasing Taliban presence in the last ten years. Taliban slowly moved from mountains and valleys to rural areas of Parwan and now in a position to threaten two strategic highways connecting Kabul with central and northern Afghanistan.  Similarly, in Kapisa (especially in Pushtun dominated Taghab and Afghanya valleys) and Laghman (Alingar & Alishang districts) provinces, Taliban footprint has increased.  Recently, Taliban have increased military pressure on major population centers and attempted to isolate Lashkargah; provincial capital of Helmand.  It also swept into districts surrounding Kandahar city and threatening to cut off connection between Kandahar and Lashkargah. They want a dominating military posture to extract maximum concessions during negotiating process with goal of complete control of the country.

Rural areas are the zones of major contest between Taliban and Afghan government forces and their local allies.  United States Special Operations Forces (USSOF) recruited locals into Afghan Local Police (ALP) and worked closely with these forces for village stability operations.  In provinces bordering Pakistan, ALP played a significant role in keeping Taliban at bay as presence of Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) was very thin or completely absent in these areas.  ALP was like an irregular militia and its role was mixed; in some areas they were very effective with support from their local communities while in other areas they became an unaccountable and abusive militia.  United States stopped ALP funding and it was officially disbanded on 30 September 2020.  No preparation was done for winding down this important peg of security and this will have impact on the security on both sides of Durand Line. After the peace deal with United States, aerial and special forces nigh time assaults ceased thus emboldening Taliban to come out of the shadows and increase pressure on Afghan security forces. The morale of Afghan forces plummeted when they were asked to cease offensive operations and now hunkered down in defensive positions.  Defection rate will be directly proportional to the shrinking of Afghan government political, military and economic muscle.

Afghan civil society has seen a dramatic change with marked improvement in education and global connectivity.  The younger generation born after US arrival in urban centers is educated and upward mobile.  This is seen as a threat and in recent months Taliban have targeted journalists, human rights and female activists.  They want to instill fear in this segment of population.

There are too many players on the field and Pakistan will be juggling with many balls.  Depending on the degree of residual American presence especially intelligence assets, Pakistan will have hot and cold spells on that front.  One recent incident shows the complexity of the problem.  On 25 October 2020, Afghan special forces killed a senior al Qaeda leader Abu Mohsin al Masri. He was killed in the Taliban controlled Andar district of Ghazni province. The incident can be interpreted in two ways.  Afghan government can point to Americans that al Qaeda leaders are under direct Taliban protection and killing of al Masri is a proof of Taliban lies to Americans.  The other narrative that I suspect may be true is that Taliban passed on the information about al-Masri and then moved out of the area to allow Afghan special forces to claim the hunt. In this way, they gave a solid proof to the Americans that they have cut ties with trans-national extremist groups and earned some brownie points.

China has increased its engagement in Afghanistan by meeting all Afghan groups. Chinese interests are related to security and economics.  On security front, main concern is vulnerability of Chinese soft underbelly in Xinjiang province and Uighur Muslim problem.  In this context, China has set up security presence along Tajikistan-Afghanistan border and working with Afghanistan to secure Wakhan that borders Chinese Xinjiang province.  China has started a massive project of pouring Han Chinese population to change the demographics of Xinjiang combined with complete suppression of ethnic and religious identity of Uighurs as a permanent solution.  The largest concentration of Uighur extremists under the banner of Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) found refuge in camps of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Waziristan.  ETIM suffered a heavy blow from operations of Pakistan army and remaining fighters scattered.  Small numbers are in Afghanistan and not a serious threat at present.  However, China exaggerates this threat and very sensitive about it.  China’s concern is that if a cold war starts between United states and China then ETIM can be used as a useful proxy in view of complete alienation of Uighurs. Recently, State Department quietly removed ETIM from its list of terrorist organizations.  If Uighur card is used then a strong base will be Kyrgyzstan with secondary possible front from ungovernable pockets of Afghanistan.  Like many neighboring Central Asian states, Kyrgyzstan is a weak state rife with corruption and powerful influence of transnational organized crime.  This structure is headed by an autocratic ruler.  There is a powerful Uighur clan involved in transnational business and operates like a Mafiosi.  If such groups are roped in by hostile forces, then lot of trouble can be stirred.

China is aware that economic activity cannot occur in the absence of security.  It is using its influence to work with Afghans to work on a cooperative model.  It is exerting its influence on Pakistan quietly to encourage them to work towards peace.  When Pakistan-Afghanistan border was closed after another spat, it was Chinese advice to Pakistan that opened the border. Few years ago, Aynak copper mine project in Logar province got lot of media attention but so far there is no traction on the project.  Russian interest is mainly security related and focused on preventing extremist Islamist groups gaining foothold in Central Asian Republics bordering Russia.  Turkey bringing Syrian mercenaries to Azerbaijan during Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is a new potential threat of extremist penetrating into troubled Muslim dominant Dagestan and Chechnya regions of Russia.  Russia has a military base in Tajikistan and will keep channels open with all Afghan factions to get their cooperation in keeping a cordon sanitaire along its tumultuous border.  In this context Russia will also work with Pakistan.

Iran is happy to see the departure of American troops. Emergence of Daesh in Afghanistan was viewed with grave concern and this was the reason a tactical alliance was made with Taliban in its fight against Daesh.  However, Tehran does not want collapse of existing structure and sees a negotiating settlement as an acceptable middle ground. This will keep Taliban influence limited and not a major threat.  Tehran has increased its cultural influence especially in areas bordering Iran.  Quite on Syrian front prompted return of Shia Afghan fighters of Fatimayoun Brigade to Iran and Afghanistan.  If a civil war breaks out then these battle hardened Shia fighters with operational links with Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRG) and Hezbollah will be the backbone of new Shia militias defending their territories. This will exacerbate sectarian tensions in the region.

Indian presence in Afghanistan though exaggerated is a concern for Pakistan.  Indian national security doctrine has taken a new sharp right turn under the influence of National Security Advisor Ajit Doval.  His own personal experience in covert operations against Pakistan has shaped his world view and threat perception. He has not kept any secret of Indian strategy.  Gone are the days of meaningful engagement with Pakistan on Kashmir under Congress and previous moderate leadership of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). 

In 2019, abrogation of Kashmir special status, complete lock down with medium to long term strategy of changing the demographics of Kashmir as permanent solution changes the calculus.  India wants to re-pay Pakistan in the same coin and to decease threat along its border is happy to see long term deployment of large number of Pakistani security forces along western border with Afghanistan.  It wants Baluch insurgents and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants keep Pakistani security forces busy on western border and thus limiting Pakistan’s options along Indian border.

Afghanistan’s role is complex in this equation and depends on its relations with Pakistan.  It tried to avoid being entangled in India-Pakistan rivalry.  Baluch leader Nawab Akbar Bugti had asked President Hamid Karzai government for a safe passage but was refused.  It was after this refusal, he moved to Kohlu hills where he was eventually killed by Pakistan army.  Afghanistan also tried to restrict Indian involvement with Baluch militants inside Afghanistan.  This was the main reason that some of the covert operations were run by India from Iran.  Afghan leadership’s frustration of increasing violence by Taliban resulted in allowing India to increase its footprint.  It was due to anger and not as a long term state policy.  If a rapprochement occurs between Taliban and Afghan government, then they may ask India to close Kandahar and Jalalabad consulates to placate Pakistan.  If security situation deteriorates in eastern and southern Afghanistan, India may close these consulates due to security concerns.  However, if next round of civil war starts then India will enhance its partnership with all Afghan factions against Taliban with back up presence in Tajikistan.  In September- October 2020, former members of Northern Alliance Atta Muhammad Noor and Abdul Rashid Dostum visited India. These former warlords have openly stated that they will not allow Taliban in their backyards without a fight.

Shrewd Taliban have sent conciliatory signals to Indians promising them that their struggle is for Afghanistan and they will not allow any group on its soil to work against Indian interests.  The most interesting statement was from Taliban spokesperson about Indian revocation of special status of Kashmir. When Pakistan publicly stated that Indian actions in Kashmir may jeopardize peace process in Afghanistan, Taliban spokesperson promptly rejected this notion stating that Afghanistan peace process is not linked with Kashmir and advised India and Pakistan to solve their problems bilaterally. India’s covert operations against Pakistan from Afghanistan will be directly related to Pak-Afghan relations. In the absence of a minimum agreement between India and Pakistan, proxy war will continue. If Indian actions cross a certain threshold, then Pakistan will tap into the rising discontent among Indian Muslim population to create a new internal front for Indian security apparatus.

There is deep mistrust of Pakistan among a large segment of Afghan population.  Support of Taliban has cost Pakistan good will of all Afghans against Taliban.  With American withdrawal, Pakistan may find some proxies like Gulbadin Hikmatyar, but such proxies have proved to be more headache than facilitators of Pakistan’s interests.  Pakistan invited Hikmatyar for a visit not after deliberation and as a piece of a well thought out policy, but it was a knee jerk reaction to visit of Dostum and Noor to India.  They asked Hikmatyar not to issue any statement against Afghan government from Pakistani soil.  However, typical of such warlords, he denounced Afghan government as illegitimate raising suspicions in Afghanistan that Pakistan was up for another round of mischief in Afghanistan. His party is enjoying the benefits of being part of Afghan government and bureaucracy while he embarrassed Pakistan.

Nothing is static and security challenges evolve and transform overtime.  What has changed in the region in the last two decades as far as Pakistan’s security is concerned?  The most dramatic and serious threat is emergence of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).  One major blind spot in Pakistan’s threat assessment is failure to understand linkage between TTP and Afghan Taliban.  They have similar social, economic, political and ideological background.  They have interactions at various levels and some foot soldiers rotate between two organizations.  Afghan Taliban are dependent on Pakistani support therefore they tried to mediate between Pakistan army and TTP though unsuccessfully. Afghan Taliban consider Afghan government illegitimate and puppet of foreigners especially United States.  TTP holds same sentiments about Pakistani state and security forces.  Until now, Afghan Taliban have kept a safe distance from TTP and refrained from attacking it despite Pakistan’s earnest desire. Once Afghan Taliban are more independent politically and economically, there will be further reasons not to spend political and military capital on confronting TTP although trying to influence TTP not to attack Pakistan security forces. Taliban have asked TTP fighters inside Afghanistan to get registered and avoid cross border attacks, but it is unlikely that such measures will be fruitful.

In the last fifteen years, Pakistan army has fought many sanguine battles against TTP to wrest back control of large swaths of territory along western border.  In this process, TTP was pushed across the border into Afghanistan.  Now with more ungovernable spaces in Afghanistan and prospective American withdrawal, TTP is changing its own strategy.  It has embarked on a three pronged approach for operational flexibility.  There are pockets along the border in Paktiya, Nangarhar, Khost and Kunar provinces. From these locations, it launches cross border attacks on Pakistani security forces and then retreats.  In case of prospective American withdrawal and further weakening of Afghan security apparatus, Pakistan will have flexibility to attack TTP bases inside Afghanistan along the border.  To offset this advantage, TTP has infiltrated back cells into former tribal territories where they have started Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks, small scale ambushes of security forces and target killing of locals.  In another interesting move, some TTP cadres along with other foreign militants have moved deeper into Afghan territory well away from the border making any Pakistani operation difficult and hazardous.  Using Logar corridor, many TTP militants have moved into Wardak.  In addition, western districts of Nangarhar (Khugiani, Surkh, Hesarak) are seeing increased concentration of TTP.

In the fight against TTP, there was large scale collateral damage and local population suffered.  Counter insurgency is a dirty war and extra-judicial killings, large scale sweeps, humiliations and prolonged detentions alienates the population.  A soldier killed in attack is followed by sweep of the locality, abuse and detentions and cycle is repeated.  In this exercise, for every soldier killed, a whole village is alienated.  This led to emergence of grass root Pushtun Tahhaffuz Movement (PTM) blaming army for first supporting militants and then destroying their lands to crush militants.  Army made a major mistake by blaming PTM as anti-state thus alienating the group that could have been its major asset against militancy.  Army arranged for surrender of militants and allowed them back without taking local population into confidence.  This has raised suspicion among locals and every target killing in blamed on these surrendered militants and hence complicity of the army.  During military operations, many Pakistani families from Waziristan living close to Afghan border crossed over to Afghanistan.  They are living in refugee camps in miserable conditions.  Every effort should be made to bring them back to prevent it from becoming another festering wound that can have security implications.

Counter insurgency is a long and painful journey with no short cuts.  Center of gravity in counter insurgency is population.  If population is lost then army will be chasing the ghosts forever.  The first step in the right direction is engagement of local population and leadership of PTM.  The gulf of mistrust will be bridged by engagement and this in turn will lower the tone of anger and not the other way around. PTM is a grassroot organization standing on the platform of non-violence.  It started in former tribal areas but found a broad based support not only among educated Pushtun middle class in urban centers but also non-Pushtuns of similar backgrounds.  It can become a bridge between army and local communities.  A sustained, multi-level engagement will generate confidence and local communities will become the source of information and intelligence that will prevent entrenchment of militant cells.  Baluchistan with its long border with Afghanistan is another front.  Alienation of Baluch and nationalist Pushtun elements of the province leaves no local partner with security forces.  Simply pouring in more army and paramilitary forces is not the solution.  Meaningful engagement and especially a serious dialogue with Baluch to bring them into the tent is the first step in the right direction.  Army cannot be the sole arbiter of national security policy with no buy in from the population.  Pakistan is facing social, political and economic challenges and in these times, no policy will be fruitful without public support.  The road to peace is paved with wisdom, patience and understanding.  In the absence of it, soldiers will be running in circles fighting the same battles again and again.

“Be patient with your enemies and forgiving of your friends”.  Afghan proverb

Acknowledgments: Author thanks several people from different back grounds with knowledge about the ground realties for their candid views.  All errors and omissions as well as conclusions are author’s sole responsibility

Hamid Hussain

[email protected]

07 November 2020

 

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6 Replies to “Afghan Conundrum II”

  1. Afghanistan quagmire can be resolved when ALL non Afghan forces take their hands out of it , and let Afghans come to a consenses and political resolution either through war or through negotiations or a mixture of both. Either for war or negotiation, no Non Afghan should have any favourites or ‘strategic designs’ on Afghanistan. All countries except Pakistan may be willing for that. Pakistan thinks Afghanistan is it’s backyard and has some kind godgiven right to intefere by supporting most regressive and violent factions.
    After the Soviet withdrawal , I think the then ISI chief suggsted to Benazir to close all Afghan refugee camps, send them back and close the borders completely whatever happens . That was a rare outburst of sanity which was not followed up. Pakistan does not have any justification under inmternational law or morally by interfering in Afghanistan by supporting violent factions like Haqqani network or taliban – not that Pakistan has ever bothered about both. pakistan does not have the wherewithall to control Afghanistan in any meaningful way or contructive way Pakistani interference would bring only more instability and invite more outsiders.
    Pakistan has interfered in Afghanistan from early 1970s under Z.A.Bhutto. that was even before Soviet occupation or communists coming to power. Bhutto was the first leader to set the policy of grabbing Afghanistan by stealth. But the present pakistani narrative is that it got involved in Afghanistan only after Soviet invasion. And since the US got involved by giving armed support to the Mujahideen, the US is somehow responisble for the rise of taliban and Al-queda.
    Anyhow no sensible course for Afghanistan and Pakistan for the next 10 years.

    Afghanistan is a collapsed and failed state – which invites forieign forces. A big myth is spun that Afghanistan cannot be conquered by outsiders , all the way from Alexander to USSR to Donald Trump. The fact is failed states is an open season for outsiders who will withdraw when nothing useful to be gained by interference

    Kingdom or later Najibullah rule could have brought peace

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    1. Pretty good and informative text and VV’s comment. It would be good if someone in the near future explain the old history of this region when everything started. But this history is still under embargo. I think this is a key reason because we don’t know the exact etymology of the words ‘afghan’ and ‘pashtun’ (pushtun?). Leena promised to explain these meanings but disappeared somewhere. She may come back when she sees above VV’s new hat; (TGH ‘topghan hors’ – sounded to me from this region but he also disappeared). It was mentioned Alexander and I may present my information. In the above text about him I’ve just explained who he was.

      Wiki says that ‘afghan’ is a ‘land of pashtuns’ but this does not explain anything. We already know that STAN is a Serbian word that means ‘the place of living’. What about ‘afghan’?

      While we are waiting for Leena, let me propose the meaning which is maybe already explained somewhere by someone. The name ‘afghan’ comes from ‘afion’ what means ‘poppy’. We know that the Afghanistan is the biggest producer of opium. It means that we have two countries with same name. Makedonia is ‘POPPY VALLEY’ (in Serbian – ‘mak’ is ‘poppy’) while Afghanistan is MAKISTAN i.e. ‘Poppystan’ 😊. Later we will see ‘Pashtun’.
      Leena K – all yours!

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      1. Leena is maybe a Muslim girl who took a Friday off or she is too shy to present in front of so many pundits. In this case, neither VV’s hat nor his promising smile can do anything to make a change. Whatever, I have to ask the rest of the audience if anyone amongst them can answer the question about the meaning of the word ‘Pashtun’.

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  2. Reading about the complex dynamics of Afghans, Pakistani Pashtuns and Baloch on the western front of Pakistan, it has to acknowledged that the Pakistani state and military establishment has a difficult hand. Some of it is no doubt the fault of the Pakistani deep state, but even if they had played all their cards perfectly, this would still have been a difficult region to manage with the best will in the world. And this (Baluchistan + KPK and Pashtun tribal areas) is not a small strip of land- its roughly half the land mass of Pakistan.

    From an Indian perspective, we need to thank our lucky stars. Without the challenges on the western front, Pakistan would have made life much harder for India in Kashmir. It’s not a surprise that India was at its worst in Kashmir in the 1990s- a period that coincided with Pakistan being at its strongest on its Western front.

    From a more historical perspective, India got lucky as well. Partition saved India the headache of managing an essentially unmanageable North West frontier. The “loss” of West Punjab, Sindh and a small part of Kashmir is a price worth paying for not having to manage such a difficult frontier- it would have sucked a lot of resources of the Indian state in managing security issues- precious resources that have thankfully been used for welfare measures in the Indian heartland.

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  3. @Milan

    “Afghan” is the Persian exonym for Pashtun, just like how South Asians refer to us as “Pathan”.

    “Afghanistan” simply means “Land of the Pashtuns” in Persian.

    Which is why some Tajiks feel that the nation should be renamed “Khurasan”. Much more inclusive.

    If it were up to me, Yaghistan would be a good traditional choice (“Land of Rebellion”); the country has been known by that designation for centuries. But again, probably exclusionary of non-Pashtuns, since that designation only applied to the Pashtun region (including contemporary northwestern Pakistan).

    With respect to the term itself, the origins are obscure (and open to debate). But it’s certainly an old one (probably much older than “Pathan”, which is just a straightforward Indian corruption of Pashtun/Pukhtun).

    ^ Slapstik is the man for the job (he’d be able to offer some substantive insight).

    With regard to Pashtun/Pukhtun though, it’s generally assumed that “Pashtun” is related to “parswāna” (cognate with Persian).

    ^ Which is rather interesting; the two greatest Iranian peoples derive their separate names from the same original root!

    Again though, Slapstik is the man for the job. Not my field.

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    1. Excellent Heidegger, thanks for you reply. I will reread it carefully. It seems that there are still some dilemmas. I will present my version so as I did in case of Makistan. I don’t think that Slapsie will respond, for some reasons he blocks all my comments (I believe since I semi-jokingly ‘discovered’ that he is a cryptooit guy who finally, but without much pride, came out). It would be useful for global audience if he or someone else answer the meaning of RG. I can’t imagine that I could be an obstacle for such explanation which has a global significance. Stay cool and comment more often.

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