Brown Pundits

The New York Times has a piece about the backgrounds of some of the young men who carried out the horrific massacre in Dhaka on Friday.

It seems that some of the attackers came from very exclusive private schools and top universities, and were born in upper-middle class families. This should be absolutely unsurprising to anyone who follows the news without excessive ideological filtering, since Islamist terrorists (and terrorists in all other revolutionary and millennarian movements in history for that matter) have come from all social strata. The attraction that violent revolutionary ideologies hold for young educated people in particular is well established; from Saint Just to Osama Bin Laden, young men with high ideals have been drawn to such endeavors. Joseph Conrad would not find these people surprising in the least, but since late-decadent Western civilization is now crawling with “intellectuals” who are more likely to disdain Conrad than read him, they manage to get surprised rather regularly by such things.

As our Indian friends like to say, “hota hai” (it happens).

But what struck me was the reaction of the kid’s parents. It seems that they are a bit shocked by their kids decision to go off and fight for Islam… But at least one of them described his “pre-brainwashed” son as “..quiet and pious, someone who prayed five times a day and frequented the local mosque.”

Hmm. Maybe that is where he first got to thinking about the importance of doing something for Islam?

Sure, most people who pray five times a day and frequent the local mosque are “moderate Muslims”, not terrorists, and will remain moderate Muslims for life. But every once in a while, one will take all that teaching tragically literally. Mr Kabir surely did not want his son to do that, but equally surely, he (unintentionally) set his pious son on that road. Once in a while, someone will become a tad TOO committed.

A truly “moderate Islam”, one that does not idealize an ummah-based multi-national militarlily dominant superstate, CAN exist. But its theology and institutions are not deep enough and strong enough yet. Someday they will be. It is the only way certain Muslim communities will survive while co-existing peacefully with non-Muslims in states and arrangements that do not privilege Islam. But until then, “quiet and pious” kids will remain at risk for brain-washing.

There are places in the world where the choice of jihadist Islam does not seem very irrational, even by modern instrumental and pragmatic standards. And it is of course possible (though perhaps not as likely as my postmarxist friends may wish) that the neo-liberal world order is itself about to collapse. In which case “moderate Islam” will not be the need of many Muslims. In a dog-eat-dog world, with no “superdog” or superdogs acting as worldcops, there will be many hot wars, and many Muslim communities will survive by becoming more militantly Muslim. War is not the best time to be one who compromises with the enemy and tries to get along with everyone. Who knows, their superior asabiya may even gain them some solid victories.

But total world domination by an Islamic Ummah does not seem on the cards to me. Which means that while some Muslim communities may be better off becoming more fanatical, others will desperately need to become less so in order to survive with (or under) infidels in secular or non-Muslim-religious societies. In these places, the “quiet and pious” youngsters will be an at-risk population. Until “moderate” and co-existence-friendly models of Islam develop their own institutions and theological foundations, to the point that their youngsters can take them 100% literally and seriously and still see no point in picking up a machete to hack some Berkeley student to death. i.e., where they are no longer “compromisers”, but where their fully honest Islamism is not at risk for jihadism because their theologians have long since made all the compromises necessary. Some small sects have already reached that point (Ahmedis and Ismailis for example). Others are on their way, but on their way is still far from arrived.

Mr Kabir may have put his son at risk they day he praised him and honored him for being such a “quiet and pious” Muslim.

An uncomfortable thought.

PS: I MUST add that this “at risk” status is itself historically contingent. Generations of Muslims lived in “traditional” societies from India to Africa to China who never seriously entertained any thoughts of transnational Jihad and lived as decently with fellow non-Muslim citizens as humans can manage in this world. But this is not their world. IN the world of today, traditional, classical Sunni Islam (“moderate Islam”) has been reconnected with its early imperial-jihad-friendly roots in a world keen on identities and rife with resentments..and that is just where we are. Today, Mr Kabir’s son is at risk.
Yesterday, maybe things were different, or maybe they were not (this point is heavily disputed, so we can leave it at that). Maybe it varied. To some extent, it always does.
But we are where we are..
There remains another objection/ That, true or not, this sort of discussion risks bringing more surveillance, mistrust, discrimination, etc. on the heads of Muslims who are mostly neither terrorists nor particularly prone to terrorism. I concede that possibility, but I think we should be willing to take that risk. Avoiding it may only make it worse (such avoidance, taken to ridiculous extremes in some (well-meaning) cases is one of the factors fueling the rise of Trump)

‘We will be killed one by one’: Berkeley student hacked to death in Dhaka massacre made haunting call to her father as she cowered from terrorists.

Post Script: As friend Shahid Mirza has raised the issue of police surveillance, I have to add that this post is not meant as recommendation for or against police tactics in any country. Police tactics are at one level a very tertiary level things, mostly practical administrative matters, and at another level are limited and (and in the better cases, humanely so) by constitutional protections. Neither of these issues was my concern in this post (though I did allude to the fact that this discussion COULD be used to justify surveillance, discrimination, etc, and I remain convinced that while that WILL happen, it can and should be worked out by MORE discussion, not by avoiding the topic).
What triggered this post was Mr Kabir’s pious son and his obvious surprise that his son had veered so far from his own human interpretation of Islam.  The thought was this: There are  (and always have been, see Mirza Ghalib for example) Muslims who have personal theologies that are immune to the call of free-lance jihad. But these individual (sometimes pre-verbal) theologies (which Mr Kabir in this case probably has worked out in his head) are not necessarily communicated to the kids. A few exceptions may be doing so, but many times parents who are teaching kids to be pious Muslims seem to expect that their own humane interpretations will get transferred non-verbally. This does not always happen. Sometimes the kids learn to love Islam from their parents and then learn the hardcore version from the mosque or the internet and miss the fact that their parents had good, reasonable and humane reasons for avoiding THIS particular interpretation. Some no doubt start thinking their parents are hypocrites. This can be dangerous. Then again, so many things can be dangerous. Why focus on jihadism? I have to sort this out when i get some more time. But I think we have seen enough examples to make this a valid topic of discussion.
Police tactics are a whole other business. And I sincerely hope that in countries like the US their better traditions of enlightened liberalism, constitutional government and rule of law will survive the urge to follow Trump and his ilk towards some sort of pogrom, or worse. Of course, the uglier sides of human nature and social action may triumph in the US, as they triumphed in many other countries on many other occasions (and yes, I am aware of other aspects of human nature and social action that happened in the US too, like the near-extermination of the Siberian-Americans, and slavery and its later penumbra; “liberalism, traditions of constitutional government and rule of law” are not the only traditions here either, but the better ones exist, just as the bad ones do. We hope the better ones are stronger).
We shall see. As individuals, our role may be more limited than we wish.

I continue to see almost universal condemnation or hilarity or schadenfreude about Brexit in my social media circle. Literally NO ONE is in favor it (except those who hate Britain and like Brexit in the sense of “this shit couldnt have happened to a more deserving lot”. I don’t know much about the actual mechanics and consequences and my current view is more or less “if all these intelligent people think it is a disaster, it is probably not going to be a good thing”, but I do feel that 50% plus of the British electorate (and a much higher percentage of the working class and the older citizens) voted for this thing, maybe we should also try to figure out why they voted the way they did? The easy answer is racism, but then, I am sure ALL these people are not just motivated by racism (how does that even work?) and I am sure there are lots of racists who voted for “remain” too (all the bankers can’t be suddenly free of racism 🙂 ). So here, in no particular order, are some comments I had on Facebook and I hope someone will let me know why I am wrong or where I may be right…Random thoughts on Brexit:

Xenophobia is part of this…but is it entirely foolish?
The Western super-elite (and their super-elite friends from other countries, including us, of course) are (at least materially) winners in this globalization until now and may feel great about it. But there are some other aspects to this love of complete and borderless globalization.

1. Obviously the Western proletariat are not happy and to think that they are just stupid people so their fears should not count, may be morally cloudy. It is likely (and perhaps even desirable) that neo-liberal globalization should continue, but those being expected to be swept aside may react..that too should be expected. Also, it is not just the proletariat. There is a substantial number of people who are attached to their own culture and cultural mores who are not comfortable with the new cultural rules of the postmodern Western elite (whether this is good or bad is a separate discussion). They do not want to become (and maybe cannot become) arugula eating, world-culture sampling, atomized, metrosexual individuals with fancy carbon footprints and anti-carbon-footprint posters on the wall. Their wishes may seem archaic and stupid to some of us, but they do exist. What is to be done about them? Have they been sold a bill of goods and are they feeling rebellious?

2.History has not ended. Organized groups (nations, religions, ideologies) control territory, try to expand their control and monopolize resources .. . It is possible that the nature of these boundaries and their defense will change as a connected world divides not on national or religious lines but between the new transnational super-elite and the underclass of all nations, but even that has not happened yet, not completely… Until then, the idea that we can just erase the border and let everyone go where they please seems unworkable and utopian. . The current system is based on certain cultures and their boundaries (which are always fluid, but DO exist) and how and by whom they are erased and replaced is important to many people. No?.

3.Some friends who live in Western countries (even in Britain) seem to be saying “you colonized us, now its your turn and you are complaining. Well, lump it”. But think about it…isnt this the xenophobes argument? that “these outsiders” hate us and our culture, and are only here to destroy us? We may feel we have a “right” to do that, but is it then very surprising if some of the older inhabitants don’t want to be destroyed? (this is NOT a majority view among my friends, but it does pop up. I am just saying, it is an interesting attitude when you think about it 🙂

I certainly do not have a clear position on this… I am still trying to learn. I could be converted 🙂 But I admit that I now tend to be skeptical of some of the elite-postmarxist eurocentric left-wing positions that are popular in my social circle. I am not convinced by the Right wing positions either, but they are so vanishingly rare in my group that I rarely have to bother arguing against them.

Finally, an exchange between me and a commentator (Mr Prasad) on 3quarksdaily.com sort of touches on these issues:

From Mr Prasad, talking about the above video:

This is grimly amusing to watch. Yeah, that convergence with Eastern Europe really is coming whether you vote remain or leave, because EE’s catchup growth is intrinsically easier than Britain’s. (Well, I suppose you can unwittingly try to speed it up, as today. Prediction: not much will change in that direction either.) They won’t merely be markets, they’ll also make products and do telemedicine and whatnot. You can’t expect Brits to perpetually make more than Poles for no earthly reason, simply because they are Brits. This globalization genie isn’t going to be squeezed back into the bottle, and the Chinese aren’t going back to starving in farms. Oh, meanwhile it’s more than just econ, those lorry drivers really are going to have job trouble when automatic cars become safer than regular ones.


The Trumpist / Sandersist solution is basically a collective stamping of feet angrily, denying trends instead of adapting to them. They rage (and how fashionably in the one case) about the evils of neoliberalism and the actually awful 1% and “the Establishment,” but fact is they have nothing half as good to offer as policy that’s growth-promoting and encourages measured global integration, together with redistributive taxation, retraining and moving up the value chain where at least you have comparative advantages.


What they offer is mood affiliation and folksy “real talk” masquerading as plain dealing. Real plain dealing would be “stop living in the past” and even (a variant on) that old chestnut “the rest of the world does not owe you a living.”


Next they can build a wall, or mine the English channel or something. Perhaps Farage can be deputized to whip the Hellespont, heck all of the Mediterranean why not.

My reply:
By the way, on The topic of “You can’t expect Brits to perpetually make more than Poles for no earthly reason, simply because they are Brits..” is a can of worms (as you well know). Leaving aside the issue of whether the Brits are (marginally) biologically smarter than the Poles (possible, but not very likely?), there is the issue of culture. If we assume that Danes and Gorkhas are equally intrinsically smart i.e. there is no biological constraint, then the remarkable difference in living standards and intellectual achievement (another can of worms, but lets go with it for now) has to be down to culture. If there is really something about British culture (nothing eternal, just what it has evolved to be at this particular stage in history) that makes it more successful (defined, for moment, in the way all my leftist friends would like to define it), then it is possible that this edge will persist for a few decades (which is about as far as we are really concerned with here). And the Brexiters would say that is exactly why they brexited, to keep it that way. Though it may be that Nirad babu was right..and whatever edge the English had is already gone. Which may mean that this particular vote was a tragic error.
No?

Mr Prasad:
Oh I certainly don’t mean to predict equal wages or productivity or innovation around the globe. Institutions, culture, and a head start all matter enormously, and I don’t buy the idea that all cultures and value systems are equivalently good or productive of progress and excellence. You knock on an open door with all that. [And the brexiters are right to notice that the replacement of melting pot strategies with multiculti isn’t working]. And why leave aside biology tout court, that’s just more theology. Especially going forward when there’s every reason to expect the Chinese will use CRISPR v10.0 to make their citizens more smart and healthy and what have you, and have a head start doing it.


What I think is simply:
a) that there will be a move in the direction of leveling, not that the outcome will be an absence of cross national disparity, and 
b) that the expectation in the normative sense, absent earthly reasons, that British *should* make more will seem less plausible with every additional corporation whose shareholders don’t care where the workers or customers are. Frankly they are more internationalist than the good comrades ever were. (Unlike the comrades they don’t feel more sympathy with Brits than Poles from across the Atlantic. Bully for them.)


And further that this trend cannot be stopped (at least without something drastic like large scale war – you can always hurt others by being willing to hurt yourself.) Western liberal states can mitigate downward pressures for working classes, try to move up the value chain, and should put in place something like a UBI (not that this is a panacea either, but it’s better than not having it).


Actual plain talk sounds like Lee Kuan Yew, not Jeremy Corbyn. But the chattering classes have revolution in their hearts. Bougies tend to find such dreams exciting, at least till their world starts to bern.


The exchange continues at 3qd: http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2016/06/mark-blyth-on-the-brexit-vote.html

Meanwhile, some people want a redo. In Islamic law, if you divorce your wife, then realize you were drunk and stupid, you can have her back, but she has to have sex with someone else first (she has to marry them too, but she really has to have sex). The Germans may demand some such humiliation if the Brits want a redo 🙂

Comments from Dr Hamid Hussain on an article from Khalid Aziz (first posted at this site, Khalid Aziz original is here). Dr Hamid’s comments are in red. At the end is a comment from Major Amin (in fuchsia) and a couple of completely tangential comments from me (in green) (Omar Ali)

From Dr Hamid Hussain:

A well informed friend wrote a detailed piece about Afghanistan and my comments.  
—————————————————————————-
Thanks Sir for an insightful and detailed review of the ‘snake pit’.  Old chap Machiavelli is the right person to read when trying to understand the region. I don’t know whether you are still engaged in Track II on this matter and on such forums discourse is more polite.  I’ll be a bit frank in my comments as I think we need to open more windows to let some fresh air. My own limited perspective is based on my own work and interaction with various players. I listen to every narrative and more interested in what ‘real’ thinking process is rather than national narrative which is mostly for public consumption.  National narratives have moved from comic now to the realm of absurd.  My comments in red and bold in your main text. 
“A great majority of mankind are satisfied with appearances, as though they are realities and are often even more influenced by the things that seem than by those that are’.  Machiavelli 

Warm Regards,

Hamid 



Significance of Stability in Afghanistan for Pakistan By  Khalid Aziz 

(Pakistan’s Afghan policy can be summed by Machiavelli’s quote “The people often deceived by an elusive good, desire their own ruin, and unless they are made sensible of the evil of the one and the benefit of the other course by someone in whom they have confidence, they will expose the republic to infinite peril and damage”.)

Introduction 


The world‟s best armies, composed of US and NATO forces, have battled in Afghanistan against the Taliban since December 2001 and by the end of 2014, the US had spent more than $ 1 trillion and the allies had lost numerous soldiers killed and many more injured. (On U.S. part, Afghan war started as revenge.  There was neither any planning nor a medium and long term war gaming.  It was an ad hoc project run by dysfunctional civil and military bureaucracies and evolved over the years depending on the ‘attention span’ at highest level.  Machiavelli said that ‘it is an infallible rule that a prince who is not wise himself cannot be well advised’.  Afghan project very quickly got on the back burner when U.S. forces marched towards Baghdad.  A broken Afghanistan has benefited a lot from the charity of U.S. tax payers but if I have to do it again, I wouldn’t waste even a biweekly paycheck on the project. U.S. is a net loser in this adventure.  We fought two wars with about two trillion dollar price tag on credit card.  Reminds me Machiavelli “whoever impoverishes himself by war acquires no power, even though he be victorious.  For his conquests cost him more than they are worth’.  I think it was Stephen Biddle who remarked about Iraq adventure that “American officials in Baghdad resemble apprentice sorcerers who had let loose forces they could barely understand, much less fully control”. Same applies to Afghanistan. There are many genuine national security aspects as far as U.S. is concerned but there are many cheap options.)

Pakistan has suffered considerably during this war; its financial losses amount to $ 107 billion and more than 21,500 civilians died during the war and the related wave of terrorism. Yet the Taliban remain resilient in Afghanistan. The region has suffered immensely and the war prevents economic growth and development. At the same time misgovernance and corruption adds to its risks. Although there is a draw-down of foreign forces in Afghanistan after December 2014, and US forces reportedly will be limited to about 10,000 troops who will provide capacity building to the ANSF and also support it in operations when necessary. Thus notwithstanding President Obama‟s claims, that he is ending the presence of the US troops in Afghanistan, for all practical purposes the Afghan war goes on – but in a different mode. (I partly agree with the policy but will even go further and suggest the number around 2-3 thousand.  Let Afghans decide what they want for their children. Local power elites always take foreigners for a ride for their own interests and play on their fears and ambitions.  It was Czarist Russia, British Empire, Communist Soviet Union, U.S.A. and Taliban yesterday and Daesh tomorrow.  It is a never ending game.  In fact, even a cursory look at history of Afghanistan proves this point.  During Raj, some Afghans regained their throne with British and Indian bayonets while those Afghan elite who lost on the buzkushi power playing field of Afghanistan enjoyed their pension at Ludhiana, Dehra Dun and Karachi. Read the special branch files of the Raj and you will be amused. Their fortunes have been upgraded. Today, some are enjoying comforts of power in Kabul while others living in luxurious estates in Dubai.  Both are paid by either money generated from lucrative drug trade or American taxpayers. No wonder that in 2009, Vice President of Afghanistan Ahmad Zia Masud landed at Dubai airport with $52 million cash in suit cases. Go figure it out how many suite cases you need to stuff 52 million dollars. Today one doesn’t have to wait 10 years for de-classification and Wiki Leaks cables provide good entertainment during free time. Sometimes prospect of hanging from the nearest lamp post spur a lazy person into action.)

It must also be said that it was the success of the Taliban on the battlefield that forced this revision in the withdrawal of troops scenario. The Taliban‟s ability to launch shaping operations, like the one that led to the capture of the Afghan city of Kunduz for fifteen days in October 2015 was a shock to the Afghans and the international community; the New York Times reported, “The insurgents held Kunduz for just 15 days, but during that time they destroyed government offices and facilities, seized military hardware, hunted down opponents, and freed prisoners from the city‟s two prisons”. 1 Why the Taliban targeted Kunduz and not any other city points to ancient rivalries that are at play in this war; the Ghiljai were settled in this region in 1885-86 when Alam Khan Nasher, a Kharoti who had rebelled against Amir Abdur Rehman, the Durrani King. (You bring an interesting point to the table but it needs a little more clarification. Pushtun settlements in north developed in the context of centralization of the state by Amir Abdur Rahman.  He was suppressing the rebellions in Pushtun and non-Pushtun areas.  In fact, he beheaded so many Shinwari Pushtuns when they rebelled that many crossed over and came under British protection.  For many years, Shinwaris on Afghan side used to come to British side to find young Shinwari men for their girls.  Same thing happened to Hazaras.  After pacifying north, he settled many Pushtun clans with twin objectives of having Pushtun elite dominance of the north and to remove troublesome Pushtuns from their ancestral lands thus diluting their strength.  After pacification of the north in late nineteenth century, the Pushtun settlements were established in northern areas especially Badakshan, Kunduz, Jauzjan, Faryab and Badghis provinces. Amir Abdur Rahman cleverly used his rival Ghilzai Pushtuns in the east and settled them in north thus cutting them off from their power base and diminishing their ability to threaten his rule. Durranis were settled there to utilize the fertile lands of the north as insurance to keep their loyalty and also act as guardians of northern frontiers. Certain tribes and clans are more represented in north. Ishaqzai (various clans), Barakzai, Popalzai, Alizai and Nurzai of Durrani stock and Hotaki, Tukhi, Taraki of Ghilzai stock as well as some Mohmand and Wardak are the main groups settled in north. In the civil war of 1990s, there were many rounds of ethnic cleansing in many areas and it will be interesting to know what the current census of Pushtuns in northern areas is? Taliban have made some inroads in these settlements and that is a bad omen for future.  If they kill non-Pushtuns or create enough instability to hinder trade then non-Pushtun backlash on Pushtun settlements will be inevitable.  This may result in punishment from government or non-Pushtun militias with aim of making life for these Pushtuns difficult enough to make them move out.  More important and relevant point in 2016 is that non-Pushtuns are in no mood to accept Pushtun dominance indefinitely.  Future is either for mutual respect and sharing in local resources or in the next cycle of civil war, we may see more displacement of Pushtun settlements in north. Ethnic pride among Pushtuns is no problem but chauvinistic and dominance themes will not take them very far in Afghanistan in 21st century.) 

While it is simpler for the US and NATO to have an easy to understand narrative of the war as, “War on Terror,” actually misleads analysis and hides the real drivers that are at play. However, due to an erroneous aggregation of causes can lead to the execution of ineffective policies; David Kilcullen an expert on insurgencies has identified this problem and has put it eloquently in his new book, “Dozens of local movements, grievances and issues have been aggregated…..into a global jihad against the West.”2 1 Rod Norland, Taliban End Takeover of Kunduz After 15 Days, The New York Times, 13th October 2015, accessed on 20.5.16; http://nyti.ms/27H27eW 2 David Kilcullen, “BLOOD YEAR: THE UNRAVELING OF WESTERN TERRORISM,” Chapter 2, Oxford University Press, New York, 2016. 2
The advent of ISIS in Nangarhar and cross-border raids into Pakistan by the escaped TTP elements, with safe-havens in Afghanistan, has caused further regional insecurity. While the failure of re-conciliation with the Taliban so far places a big question mark regarding the chances of peace in the region, we must not forget that other spoilers who can be best defined as criminal entrepreneurs, will avail themselves of any opportunity that they can find to make money by reducing the ability of the states to guard its people and interdict criminal activities like drug trafficking or gun-running that are the sources of employment and fulfillment of their ambitions that are unrequited due to lack of economic growth for a majority of people in certain parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan. (This is the political economy of war and state has to eliminate physically as much as it can and then increase the cost of participating in this enterprise high enough to make people think twice. This is then integrated with inclusive political economy to channel discontent via non-violent means.  In view of its history and continuous civil war over three generations, Afghanistan is in a state which Machiavelli described a ‘divided country’ and in a divided country, when a man is injured he approaches his patron for redress and patron to keep his own influence has every incentive to use violence to redress the grievance.  This is the pattern followed by various ethnic groups, tribes and clans. One thoughtful Afghan once told me that unless our people understand what belongs to the individual and what to the nation, they will never see a good day. Reminded me an episode when long after the last Soviet soldier had left, in the free for all fight, one group of ‘holy warriors’ over ran a town and looted the local school and cleaned everything.  In the end some wooden chairs and tables were left.  They couldn’t agree on what to do as they had no use at home for these items.  Finally they decided to chop the furniture and distributed it among the warriors to take home to use as fire wood.)

3 Geostrategic Considerations
Throughout history, the heavily populated regions of what now constitute Central Asia, Afghanistan and Iran had growing populations with limited resources to sustain them and were thus unable to generate incomes from trading or agriculture. On the other hand, to the South of this region lay the rich lands of the Indian sub-continent that was home to a very rich and diversified civilization and the Genetic plain alone, generated more than 25% of the world‟s GDP in the 16th and 17th centuries – roughly equivalent to China‟s position today. Kings of the region only knew of two ways to accumulate resources; either through taxes or by war and appropriating resources of weaker neighbors. Mahmud of Ghazni, a ruler of Turkish descent in Ghazni, that lies in today‟s Afghanistan invaded India 17 times in 27 years between 1000-1027 AD. There were other invaders like Babur, the Lodhis, and Khiljis, who came to India and established dynasties there. Another Afghan ruler Ahmed Shah Abdali, who ruled Afghanistan raided India nine times between 1747 to 1769. (Steppes and Afghanistan were sparsely populated countries. Paucity of resources forced them to become soldiers of fortune and predators.  They inhabited resource sparse regions and like any other highlander, descended on their richer and weak neighbors for loot and slaves. They were following the norms of their times.  The one who held power in his native land distributed the booty to his followers and when all the money was spent then he had to lead them again for the next installment; hence repeated invasions every few years –i.e. Mahmud and Ahmad Shah.  If he didn’t do that, he risked losing his own head.  Those who lost in their own land in the power struggle and lucky enough to keep their heads on their shoulder, headed to new pastures and established new fiefdoms and dynasties far away from their lands i.e. Lodhi, Babar.  They are worshiped as heroes today and it tells a lot about what is taught in history classes.)

After the East India Company defeated the Sikhs in the 2nd Sikh War of 1849 the Sikh Empire was dissolved. This brought the British close to what latter became Afghanistan and Central Asia. Britain‟s primary worry was to prevent Russia from threatening their „Jewel in the Crown,‟ that was India. It led to the following boundary creation in the region:  Demarcation of Afghanistan‟s Northern Boundary with Russia in 1885-• 1888  The Durand Line defining the boundary with India 1893-1895•  The Afghan boundary with Russia in the Pamir was delineated in 1895• settling the border between the protectorate of Bokhara and Kashmir, Chitral, Gilgit and Afghan regions of Badakshan and Wakhan. Guarding the North-Western Borderland 3 Khalid Aziz, “Country Paper on, “Drivers of Radicalism and Extremism in Pakistan,” published by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Islamabad, Pp. 21-23, http://bit.ly/1svgLp9, accessed on 20.5.16. 3
British India was very active and concerned in protecting its North-West frontier from any interference from the North; being a world power she had the resources to undertake the guardianship of the North-West. However, when it decided to grant independence to the sub-continent by dividing it into Pakistan and India; Britain for some reason did not make adequate arrangements for the future of this tricky region. Was it thoughtlessness or was there any other reason for this strategic forgetfulness? Did Britain suffer from strategic amnesia or was it a typical Imperial maneuver to keep the successor states dependent upon it for the provision of security? One answer to the mystery is available in the 6th February 1946 letter of the Governor General Lord Wavell addressed to the Secretary of State for India in London, recommended that a part of India comprising of NWFP, Baluchistan, West Punjab and Sindh may be created as another state to protect Britain‟s interest in this part of Asia.4 As we disaggregate the causes that have led to a continuation of hostilities in Afghanistan, we must not forget to underline the important geo-strategic feature of this region. Afghanistan, lies at an extremely important geographic location; to its East lies Pakistan, and a fifty miles long tongue of land in the Afghan Wakhan region acts as an entrant into the strategic Chinese Xinjiang province. To Afghanistan‟s North, lie the former Soviet Republics of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, that can become the source for future regional prosperity by exporting their abundant energy and mineral resources to Pakistan, India or Westward to the Middle-East and Europe. To its West, Afghanistan is bordered by the regional power-house of Iran, that is now emerging from years of isolation due to the sanctions imposed on it by the West. Further to Afghanistan‟s North lies Russia. As the withdrawal of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan began in 2014, two events put the world back into a familiar Cold War pattern. These events were connected to Russia‟s pre-emptive annexation of Crimea a part of Ukraine and its attempt to shape events in Eastern Ukraine to prevent an expansion of NATO, that was looking eminent. Some have suggested that the US may even be happy to remain in Afghanistan to apply pressure upon Russia and on China. If the US war goal in Afghanistan was the elimination of Al Qaeda as a threat in Afghanistan this was achieved in May 2011 with the death of Osama Bin Laden. Currently the US forces are presumably following a new goal to protect the Afghan state. It is speculated that the presence of US troops in Afghanistan provides her with a pivot to influence the Chinese bid to reshape the region by making it a hub of interconnectivity to other parts of the world based on „One Belt One Road,‟ (OBOR) concept. Ethnic Tensions and Alignments in Afghanistan Dalrymple while identifying the drivers of conflict in Afghanistan has highlighted the tribal conflict that is always simmering below the surface between two of 4 Khalid Aziz, Policy Report, “Causes of Rebellion in Waziristan,” (2007), RIPORT, Peshawar, P. 11, accessed on 21.5.16, URL: http://goo.gl/x2cyH3 4 Afghanistan‟s largest tribal confederacies.  (For a smart chap strategic significance can be a boon but for a dumb chap it can be a curse.  In a divided country, groups and factions can be bought by interested parties and this exactly happened in Afghanistan.  Everyone now has a dog in the fight in Afghanistan. For the un-initiated understanding Byzantine intrigues on Afghan chessboard can be a very dizzying experience.  Look at only one example; Gulbadin Hikmatyar.  For years he ate from the hands of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.  He was quite explicit in his anti-Shia rantings. He had no qualms in accepting Israeli weapons that they had captured from Palestinians when later were routed from Lebanon.  In First Gulf War, he somersaulted and started to cheer for Saddam Hussain. When Pakistan put its money on a different horse i.e. Taliban, and he was shunned by his former patrons, he took a residence in Tehran where he comfortably lived.  When Taliban started to creep into his power base in Kunduz and eastern Afghanistan, he had no qualms in passing intelligence to Americans so that his turf was protected from Taliban encroachment.  He was travelling on both tracks of the gravy train extracting resources from Afghan government read U.S.A. by cooperating in some areas and advancing his political and non-violent factions while at the same time taking handsome handouts from Tehran and others via factions who were shooting.  His son was in lucrative business partnership with governors. Kabul is a place where everyone is selling some information to someone.  In some cases, one person is selling different pieces of information to different patrons. Once you understand this basic point then you know why late Mullah Akhtar Mansur who was recently kicked upstairs to meet his 72 virgins (few young boys thrown as a bonus) held a Pakistani passport with valid Iranian visa. This chap like a busy executive was shuttling between Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan and Dubai. Outsiders can play their own little dirty games as they wish but they should fear the day when some really interested parties put their hands on the heads of some really pissed off Afghans and thoroughly alienated Baluchs in Pakistan and Iran.  I recall as early as 2001-2 when some nationalist Afghans swore that if neighbors don’t behave in the next round, they will make sure that Afghanistan doesn’t burn alone in this fire. Machiavelli told us long time ago that “once the people have taken arms against you, there will never be lacking of foreigners to assist them”.)

The Ghiljai are the largest confederacy in the country and ruled territories of what later became Afghanistan from 1000 AD to 1747, when they were supplanted by the competing confederacy of the Durranis in 1747. The Ghiljai number about 13 million of whom 9 million dwell in Afghanistan; Paktia in Afghanistan is the home of the tribe but they are also found in Jalalabad, Paktika, and Khost. Its largest tribe is the Suleman Khel while the next largest are the Kharotis. The Ghiljais are mostly herdsmen and thus nomadic in their life-style, as they are in search of pasture. Some 4 million Ghiljai live in Quetta, KP and the Punjab in Pakistan. The Niazi branch of Ghiljai in Pakistan live in Bannu and Mianwali. The Ghiljai, Tanoli live in the Tanawal region of Hazara mountains. Based on long term hydrological data available for Afghanistan and the dry Central Asian region indicates dwindling grass land commons for the last many decades. In some cases, in parts of Afghanistan, especially in the dry South, the water table has gone down, drying up the underground water channels forcing the land owners, who belong to the Durrani tribal confederacy to enclose the commons and prevent the Ghiljais from pasturing their herds. This has marginalized them economically and led many of them to find alternate livelihoods; many joined the Afghan armed forces. It has been argued that these dire circumstances pushed the Ghiljai to launch the communist coup against Sardar Daud in 1979 in order to wrest the state‟s control from the Durrani-Tajik clique to improve their livelihoods. Those in the lead of the take-over of power were Ghiljais associated with the Khalqi wing of the Afghan People‟s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). It is argued that when the „Mujahedeen‟ reaction organized by West and managed through Pakistan succeeded, the Ghiljai came back in the garb of the Taliban to control the Afghan state. 5  (It is interesting from historical and anthropological point of view but I’m not sure about its significance and impact on current scenario. Definitions are too broad to draw any conclusion.  Technically, an Ahmadzai in Afghanistan and a Tanoli in Pakistan come under the Ghiljai umbrella but I don’t see any connection.  They have no common interest in any area. Tanoli has even lost his Pushtu language and speaks Hindko. Having said that, this conflict inside a particular region where interests clash may be significant.)

General Stanley McChrystal Commander of US/ISAF forces in Afghanistan in 2009-2010, has argued in his report to President Obama in the „Commander‟s Initial Assessment,‟ (2009) that the ISAF commanders must understand the social and political dynamics prevailing in Afghanistan. Tribal unhappiness generates support for the insurgents and defeats the goals of the coalition.6 This refers to the issue discussed above of the need to disaggregating the problem. And this is something that we don‟t hear much about except as a periodic reference to it by some insightful writer. Within Afghanistan the 9/11 War, was diagnosed as a Pashtun rebellion against President Karzai‟s regime, which supported the empowerment of three ethnic groups – the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras of the North. This situation prevailed from December 2001 to the middle of 2006, when his Popalzai tribe became powerful in its own right as 5 Khalid Aziz, “Need for a Pak-Afghan Treaty on Management of Joint Water Courses,” Published by the Regional Institute of Policy Research & Training, Peshawar, (2007), see Pp 1-6, accessed on 21.5.16, URL: http://goo.gl/cldKy. 6 Stanley McChrystal, Commander‟s Initial Assessment (2009), Pp 2-4, accessed on 20.5.16, URL: http://on.cfr.org/1sFZ3jg 5 the US surged its forces in the South and it made the Southern tribes very rich and powerful as the Karzai clan spread its patronage widely in the South through President Karzai‟s brother Ahmed Wali Karzai. His death at the hands of his own body-guard prompted Britain‟s Guardian newspaper to state, “[His death], was the personification of modern-day Afghanistan – corrupt, treacherous, lawless, paradoxical, subservient and charming. Now with his violent death Karzai has also come to symbolize Afghanistan’s enduring tragedy.” 7 The ascendency of the non-Pashtuns prior to 2006-2007, was resented by them and helped spiral the insurgency. (Pushtun and non-Puhstun tensions in Afghanistan need a broader perspective.  In the civil war of 1990s, both communities perpetrated horrendous atrocities.  Rape was used systematically and civilians were indiscriminately slaughtered.  No foreign troops had ever committed such atrocities on Afghans.  This is the collective shame of Afghans but no one will talk about it.  If Pushtuns resented rise of non-Pushtuns in post 2001 then what about pre 2001?  Non-Pushtuns resented the control of the most retrograde movement ever seen even in Pushtun areas to control their lives.  Imagine what an educated Herati and Kabuli felt when a village Pushtun boy with scraggy beard and dirty clothes was beating his educated wife on the city streets with leather lash.  Her crime being that while covered from head to toe with Burqa had the audacity to show her ankles.  This treatment was given to anyone regardless of the ethnicity but the anger and hatred of non-Pushtuns was quadrupled. When the tide turned, non-Pushtuns tried to keep their hold on lever of powers and who would blame them. In peaceful areas in central and northern Afghanistan local communities have reaped the benefits of reconstruction and education and racing forward.  Male and female education among Hazaras is quite impressive.  These traditionally underdogs are excelling in many fields and winning large number of foreign scholarships of higher education.  Insecurity in south and east means that Pushtun is lagging behind.  In near future, how you are going to replace a well qualified non-Pushtun with an unqualified Pushtun? This is the question for Pushtun intelligentsia to ponder over?)

Although there is a counter argument to this finding that says that Karzai may have been beholden to the Tajik prior to the arrival of US troops into the South of the country when the influence of the Pashtuns re-emerged. It may be noted that once institutional changes are ushered it takes a long time to neutralize their effects. For instance, the Tajiks who constitute only 27% of the Afghan population, obtained 70% of the officer Corp jobs in the Afghan army. (I don’t know the source of these numbers but it is quite natural that initially non-Pushtuns fully cooperated to overthrow Taliban and were rewarded.  Just like during Durrani rule, all high posts in military and civil bureaucracy went to Psuhtuns. My own work on Afghan army evolution in the last ten years suggest that this has dramatically changed although I admit that real statistics are hard to get. As far as I recall, last time when I checked Afghan National Army was about 45% Pushtun including many mid and high level Pushtun officers.) 

Although Karzai is himself a Pashtun, yet as William Dalrymple comments, his presence then was seen not more than window-dressing.8 It is true that the power sharing agreement brought the national unity government of President Ashraf Ghani and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah on January 12th 2015 brought to power a new team. Thus far, real power in Afghanistan, still lies with the dominant tribal allegiances within the institutions that occurred from 2001 to 2015. President Ashraf Ghani is an Ahmedzai, Ghiljai, who belongs to the larger Ghiljai confederation. He has begun the process of modifying the leadership in important ministries and has begun to bring in former Khalqis belonging to his tribe. He has been able to do so in the Afghan Ministries of Defence, the National Directorate of Security and the Afghan National Security Council. More changes on these lines are expected in the future. Reaction has not been long in coming from the Durrani-Tajik combine when President Ghani‟s brilliant move to mend bridges with Pakistan, took shape during his visit to Islamabad in November 2014. President Ashraf Ghani took the initiative to bring about cooperation between Pakistan‟s premier intelligence agency the ISI and its Afghan counterpart the NDS, who signed an MoU of cooperation in May 2015. After its signing three things happened in quick succession in Kabul. In the back-drop of stringent criticism in public quarters against the MoU including criticism of the President by his subordinate Director of NDS, Mr Nabil.9 He shortly there-after resigned in protest. The MoU was also condemned in the Afghan parliament and Mr. Karzai, the former Afghan President stated in India, Pakistan‟s obstreperous neighbor, that the MoU was an embarrassment and will not be 7 Guardian 12th July 2011, Simon Tisdall, “Ahmed Wali Karzai, the corrupt and lawless face of modern Afghanistan,” http://bit.ly/1U6haomR, accessed on 21.5.16 8 William Dalrymple, “A Deadly Triangle,” Brooking Essay, March 2013, see section 2, URL http://brook.gs/KCpOOJ, accessed on 20.5.16 9 Afghan Analysts Network, Thomas Ruttig, “Political Cleavages over Pakistan: The NDS chief‟s farewell”, accessed on 21.5.16 URL: http://bit.ly/241dzNJ 6 allowed to remain.10 A statement that would be meaningful coming from someone who still wielded power. To embarrass Pakistan further, the NDS leaked that Mullah Omar, the recluse leader of the Taliban had died earlier but that Pakistan had kept it as a secret.11 This led to an enormous back-lash against President Ashraf Ghani, who in order to retain hold over power and be relevant in Afghan politics criticized Pakistan for terrorist bombings in Kabul in August 2015. (Ashraf Ghani made a genuine effort to placate Pakistanis to end the conflict but he miscalculated the immense hatred against Pakistan among general population in Afghanistan.  He didn’t build a reasonable consensus before embarking on the journey.  Another factor may be that he exaggerated Pakistani influence over Taliban.  Pakistan didn’t help Ashraf to bring some gifts to the table so that Ashraf could convince his critics to give Pakistan more time. I was of the view that the only way Ashraf’s gamble will pay if Pakistan hands him a major gift.  Whether Pakistan had the capacity or intention is another matter.  Pakistan’s problem is that it may have some influence on some factions but it cannot dictate to Taliban.  Those factions who resent too much of Pakistan involvement have already found sanctuaries inside Afghanistan and financial support from many other parties including Iran and Russia.  Everybody is responsible for the mess of forty years and now wants results in months. They need to come down to earth. As far as Afghanistan is concerned, everyone thinks that only they are doing the right thing and everybody else is messing up. My own view is that every country messed up according to its own ability and resources and it will need collective efforts to bring some order.  However, first condition is that every nation has to discard its previous notions and start fresh. I’m near sighted therefore don’t see any change in behavior of all the players. Another important factor is to be realistic about violence.  It is extremely naïve to expect that violence will be completely rooted out.  Even in well established states with good functioning government, violence of various sorts is inevitable.  In case of Afghanistan, as long as violence is kept below a certain threshold where it does not interfere with day to day functioning of government and ordinary life, I’ll consider it a success.)

Clearly, real power in Afghanistan still lies with the ethnic triumvirate of the Tajik, Uzbek and Hazaras, although the power is shifting now that President Ashraf Ghani has begun to bring in Ghijai into the power structure; thus clearly a large number of the Pashtun in whose areas the war is being conducted and who have been the main target of NATO/ISAF operations is ignored. This is one big weakness in the fabric of Afghan and West‟s counter-insurgency efforts. It is no wonder that despite the expenditure of billions of dollars and loss of countless lives, the Taliban have not been defeated or reconciled. This absence of ethnic coherence in Afghanistan indicates that unless a solution is found to the larger issue of the tussle between the Ghiljai and the Durrani confederacy‟s is ended the war in some form or another is likely to continue unabated. (In broken societies, this question never gets answered.  There are two dimensions of the problem; one perceptions of non-Afghans and other of Afghans.  As far as outsiders are concerned, first, we are told that conflict between Pushtun and non-Pushtun needs to be settled for peace, then it is between Durrani and Ghiljai.  Even if we miraculously achieve this goal then it will be between tribes, then clans then families.  As far Afghans are concerned they are of the view that the problem lies with foreigners who don’t understand Afghans.  They think that if outsiders stop interference then everything will be fine.  Everyone has the capacity to spoil the game.  Any disgruntled party can pay someone to put a bomb or send a suicide bomber – like any other weapon on the market you can actually buy and sell a suicide bomber.  A society that reaches this low point needs a lot of introspection and reflection.  In my view, even if all the gold of Fort Knox is transferred to Afghanistan, it will not solve their problems.  Only Afghans will solve their own problem.)

India’s Presence in Afghanistan In his insightful essay on the drivers of war in Afghanistan, Dalrymple begins by narrating how a female Indian army officer teaching English to army cadets viewed the events; “Major Mitali Madhumita, was awakened by the ringing of her mobile phone. Mitali, a 35-year-old Indian army officer from Orissa, had been in Kabul less than a year. Fluent in Dari, the most widely spoken language in Afghanistan, she was there to teach English to the first women officer cadets to be recruited to the Afghan National Army.” “It was a sensitive posting, not so much because of gender issues as political ones: India‟s regional rival, Pakistan, was extremely touchy about India providing military assistance to the government in Afghanistan and had made it very clear that it regarded the presence of any Indian troops or military trainers there as an unacceptable provocation.” 12 India‟s presence in Afghanistan is viewed as a mortal threat by Pakistani strategists who would wish that it was not so; yet India remains in Afghanistan and is associated with security matters, reviving memories in the mind of the Pakistanis of a previous Cold War Era when Afghan-India cooperation against Pakistan, when they actively sponsored the irredentist Pukhtunistan movement that at times boiled over into 10 The Hindu, Suhasini Haider, “MOU with ISI dropped says Karzai”, accessed on 21.5.16, URL: http://bit.ly/27KpRyV 11 The Hindustan Times, correspondent, “Mullah Omar „died two years ago‟, Taliban remain mum,” accessed on 21.5.16, URL: http://bit.ly/1OFi0Xy. 12 Brookings Institute, Brooking Essay, William Dalrymple, “Deadly Triangle: Afghanistan, Pakistan & India,” Section 1, accessed on 21.5.16, URL: http://brook.gs/KCpOOJ 7 hot contact with the use of Pakistan air-force and clash of militaries in Bajaur region of Pakistan in the early 1960s. Pakistan fears the re-emergence of a similar alliance and is likely to undertake counter-measures now that there is a strategic alignment also between the US, Afghanistan and India! It is therefore very worrying for Pakistani strategists to note the presence of safe-havens for Pakistani terrorists like Mullah Fazalullah and Mangal Bagh, as well as the Baluch insurgents.  (Mumbai carnage in 2008 was the turning point as far as Indian strategic community was concerned.  I heard from some in India’s strategic community that this issue could shift the balance in India in favor of hawks.  There was lot of ambiguity.  Pakistan’s ISI chief Lt. General Ahmad Shuja Pasha admitted that some former ISI handlers were involved but state was not mad enough to embark on such adventure.  India waited to see how Pakistan will act.  My own assessment at that time was that Pakistan had a very narrow window of opportunity. No one advocated some military operation or other grand scheme.  Only thing was to inform India through a back channel that two or three key players in Mumbai drama will soon meet their maker either a natural or unnatural death.  After all when the state decided, what it did to Mr. Malik Ishaq?  However, it was ten years too late and in this decade state lost the trust of Shia community. Some more water and blood flowed under the bridge but in this time there was a definite shift in India.  Indian National Security Advisor announced that ‘you can do another Mumbai; but you will lose Baluchistan’. In pre-2008 era there was no official meaningful support to Baluchs from any quarter.  In fact, Nawab Akbar Bugti sent a message to Hamid Karzai asking for a safe passage to Afghanistan before moving to hills where he was finally killed. Karzai checked with Americans and the answer was no.  Bugti was told to mend fences with Mussharraf.  This was communicated to me by a good friend of Karzai.  Similarly, there was no presence of Pakistani Taliban in Afghanistan.  It was frustration of a decade before many decided that Pakistan will only listen if it is paid in the same coin.  In my view, in post 2001 decision making process, Pakistanis have seriously underestimated two things; first how vulnerable they are and second failing to comprehend internal debates in American, Indian and Afghan security establishments. They don’t have to agree with these debates but they need to take into consideration the impact of the outcome of these debates on their own national security. It is their right to think that some Afghan Taliban could be helpful in their national security policy and follow on this line.  However, they should also be aware of consequences of such policy.  To be fair to Pakistanis, they are not responsible for all the ills of the region and to expect that they have the key to all the problems is unrealistic.  Even if they get out of the room, India still have to deal with discontent in Kashmir and Afghanistan have to solve its own problems.)

The Benefits of Peace for Pakistan: From the above description of the situation, and a different analysis of the drivers of conflict in Afghanistan, it is clear that peace will only come when the issues pertaining to the following class of disputed positions can be ameliorated;  Finding a solution to the on-going conflict between the Ghiljai and the Durrani• tribal confederacies  Creating greater economic opportunities for the marginalized members of the• Afghan population  Reconciliation with the Taliban will be best achieved by bilateral negotiations• between the Afghan government and the Taliban (or should it be conducted as peace building between the two contesting tribal confederacies?). This later is a new design and holds more promise that the QCG approach that grows out of the US‟s narrative of the 9/11 War on Terror and is thus flawed.   (Loss of large swaths of territory by Pakistan at the hands of militants is the direct result of Afghan policy when events spiraled out of Pakistan’s control as more powerful players landed in the neighborhood. However, the disaster was not inevitable.  I held the view in 2001 and advocated that Pakistan had a very narrow window to make a clean break as far as Afghanistan was concerned while at the same time make a proactive move to ensure that disorder doesn’t spread in its own territory.  Shell shocked retreating militants were robbed of even their shoes and money by local tribesmen in Kurram agency.  If state had asserted itself it could have protected its interests at a fraction of a cost.  Strategic myopia at the highest level prevented some common sense measures.  If only high command had read Machiavelli who said ‘one ought never to allow a disorder to take place in order to avoid war.  For war is not thereby avoided but only deferred to your disadvantage’.  We should remember that in 2001-02, the action needed was not war but assertion of state’s authority with vigor and punishing militant start ups promptly to send a message that state meant business. Pakistan deferred it to its own disadvantage. It had to spend lot of blood and treasure to regain the control back from militants. In the end, it did the right thing but in the process lost the good will of a large number of tribesmen. In my own interactions, tribesmen are extremely bitter about state policy that devastated their lands.  No wonder thousands of tribesmen from North Waziristan sought shelter in Afghanistan.)

Bridging the distrust between Pakistan and India on Afghanistan is essential• and must be initiated as early as possible.  (This is a tall order. Both countries are prisoners of their past and willing to mortgage their future for misplaced fear, envy and pride. The grand bargain now means that Pakistan has to wash its hands off Kashmir and let Kashmiris decide what they want and India pull back from a dangerous posture. Both countries are facing many internal pressures due to economic, political, ethnic and religious factors and these forces are straining internal cohesion of both societies.  This phenomenon is not limited to third world countries.  Look at Western Europe where brigade strength of alienated Muslim youth left for the killing fields of Middle East and now fighting for Daesh. It is true that India and Pakistan can stir troubles in each other’s backyard and give some sleepless nights to decision- makers of opposite side. However, igniting a fire in neighbor’s backyard is not a sound national security policy. A new vision directed by young global generation of both countries attempts to understand the other ‘out of the box’ and exert pressure on their own governments so that they desist from self-defeating policies. This is the hope for the future for both countries. It will be truly tragic if they decide to fight another battle on the killing fields of Afghanistan.)

Peace in Afghanistan can only come if the international climate remains• peaceful that does not bring tension to the region related to containment of Russia or balancing China by creating new pressure points. If we are lucky to obtain relief in the areas described above or at least begin to move in the right direction, then one can assume that the following benefits could flow for Pakistan and the region. Once peace is brought to the region the fires of extremism and radicalism will be extinguished. It must be noted that as stated earlier in this research the persons, who are benefitting most from regional unrest are the „criminal entrepreneurs,‟ who want unrest in the region and weak states, so that they may conduct their trade based on drug trafficking, smuggling, human trafficking and gunrunning. Such individuals have an interest in unrest, as it allows them to prosper at the expense of general insecurity for the majority of inhabitants.13 If relative security is created in the region, Pakistan will benefit as under:  Increase in trade with Afghanistan that today stands at about $2.5 billion• annually 13 (Ibid) 3, P. 2 8
Security will allow Pakistan and India as well as the other states in the• region to multiply regional trade by linking up with China, India, S. Asian region, Central Asia, Iran and the Middle-East. This alone can generate billions dollars‟ worth of trade and employment opportunities leading to an average regional annual growth rate of 8-10% per year. This will transform this region and convert it into a hub of economic growth meaning a better life for all its people.  Peace will improve the security situation in Pakistan and concomitantly• reduce its security budget.  It will expedite the completion of power projects like CASA – 1000 and the• TAPI project leading to propelling of industrial growth.  These changes will act as a catalyst for the China-Pakistan Economic• Corridor Project whose benefits will spread much further than envisaged at present.  This design of growth can only come about with the commitment towards• peace by the great powers and India and Pakistan. If peace can double Pakistan‟s total net assets through an 8 -10% annual growth could become a huge engine of regional growth. Naturally, its main beneficiaries are likely to be Pakistan itself as well as its neighbors Afghanistan, India, Iran and China. It is thus obvious that peace in Afghanistan will be of immense significance to Pakistan and the region as well as its poor masses who struggle to make two ends meet.  (I agree that dividends of peace are enormous for everyone.  However, every player is short sighted and their judgment is clouded by existing distrust and imagined fears.  Some Afghans are happy to carry foreigner’s gun and foreigner is happy to fight to the last Afghan.)
“Everyone may begin a war at his pleasure; but cannot so finish it”.  Machiavelli 


Comment from famous military analyst Major Amin: 
DONT AGREE . AFGHAN TALIBAN ARE A PAKISTANI PROXY BUT PAKISTANI STATE WANTS TO DESTROY ASHRAF GHANI REGIME IN TOTALITY THUS THE NON WILLINGNESS TO BRING THE TALIBAN TO TABLE.




My own (tangential) comments:

1. Regarding the Wavell quote and the fact that some (by no means all) British “strategists” thought it a great idea to have a “reliable” pro-British Muslim state on India’s Northwest frontier after they pulled out:
One may add to all this the fact that no person or even institution knows everything and foresees everything. The British had dominated the globe for a 150 years and the “strategic thinking” built around this domination was deeply ingrained in capable senior administrators. In hindsight, any Tom, Dick or Harry can see that there was to be NO British “strategic interest” in Central Asia or even India after Indian independence. They would be VERY junior partners in whatever maneuvering the US and Russia were doing against each other and if they were lucky they could make money in some ventures. That is all. But sane and intelligent people like Wavell were destroying the future of generations of Punjabis and Pakhtoons based on some notion of their “duty” to think ahead and keep British strategic interests in mind! 
In the long run, it does look like a tragic comedy.

2. It is interesting to see that Khalid Aziz sahib, with his patriotic (saner than most) Paknationalist glasses, repeatedly quotes Dalrymple. There is a lesson in there somewhere 🙂

3. Ideologies matter. But only a few people may be promoting a given ideology while fully conscious of its harshest implications (irrespective of what you think about the rightness or wrongness of an ideology, there will always be harsh implications when it comes to large human groups and their clashing interests, or maybe we should say, small elites and theirs). This is true of all dreams (the dream of India, of Hindutva, of America, of one world, of the Ummah, of the Middle Kingdom, whatever), but  the more fantastic ones do require more fantastic change and therefore, more fantastic sacrifice.. Pakistan is a very fantastic dream. It may be better if we can tone it down a bit 🙂

Of course, countless Paknationalists want what is best for Pakistan and its people, but only a small number are willing to get millions killed in that process. Unfortunately, those few are also the ones with the determination, the vision and the persistence needed to make great plans and put them into practice… 

But not to get TOO worked up about this vision thing, we are still human. When we were young Marxists, we believed that none of this dream BS matters. The means of production and so on and so forth. There is probably some truth in that, for better and for worse, that truth may sink ideological nightmares and dreams, eventually.... Besides, I have been told this is especially true in India, where The Man is mostly ignored as people get on with life. As Indians, who knows, we may yet sabotage all the grand schemes of great men. 
Inshallah 🙂

Continuing the random thoughts theme.

This week began with a drone attack that dispatched Mullah Mansoor to meet his 72 virgins. More details have since been revealed about the Taliban chief’s last journey and the Pakistani government has finally confirmed that he is dead, though the whereabouts of his remains are still a bit mysterious (it was reported that he has been buried in Spin Boldak, but the latest Pakistani government statement claims his body is still in Pakistan). The details of his life before the fatal strike are still confusing and contradictory.

Everyone has theories about the significance of this strike and whether it will weaken or strengthen the US-backed Afghan regime or the Pakistan-backed Taliban. Considering that Pakistan is a “major non-NATO ally” and a partner in the ANTI-Taliban coalition (and receives regular payments for these services, freely offered and repeatedly affirmed by Pakistani civilian and military leaders) AND is also the main backer of the Taliban and feels that the US-backed regime and US policy in general are actually a threat to Pakistan (a position also repeatedly affirmed by Pakistani civilian and military leaders, especially when they no longer hold official positions; incidentally this affirmation is shared  by many “pro-Western” Pakistanis), there is no end to the convolutions and contradictions in this situation. So it is impossible for an amateur/casual observer to claim that he knows what is going on and what “really happened”. All we can say is “what a tangled web we weave..” and leave it at that.
But while we may be in no position to say how and why this particular strike took place and who is playing against whom, we can still make a general observation that in war there are only two ways to make peace: either one side wins and the other side accepts defeat (or gets wiped out), OR both sides recognize they are not likely to win outright and there is a compromise position both sides can accept (no matter how unhappily). Now consider the position of the Taliban; if they feel they have no chance of coming back into power and the pain of carrying on is too much, then they may accept a US backed regime and make peace on those terms. But if they feel they can outlast the US and their losses are bearable, then what is the incentive to make peace? Considering that for 15 years the US has not made strategic victory a priority, and is still insisting that the Mullah Mansour strike was a one-off, why would the new leaders compromise? More of the same seems likely..

The other big news of the week on social media was the announcement by the council of Islamic ideology that they are working on an “Islamic” version of the women’s protection bill that would protect the position of women by prohibiting contact with non-mehram males (e.g. by banning female nurses contact with male patients), banning any art education that includes drawing living beings or sculpting them and by permitting husbands to “discipline” their wives by “lightly beating them” if needed. (incidentally, this problem has arisen because the Pakistani constitution has a series of “Islamic provisions” that require ALL laws to be “in accordance with the quran and sunnah”. Many of the framers no doubt thought this could be taken to mean whatever they wanted, but it does give an opening to mullahs and Islamic scholars over and above that afforded to them in countries like Egypt and Turkey).

Needless to say, this news led to a gleeful postings on Islamophobic sites, much outrage among  Muslim women and intense discussion about the locus standi of the CII, the “Islamic” nature of this Islamic proposal and the best way to stop this move. As any fan of Islamic jurisprudence will agree, the proposals are fully in line with classical Shariah law (of ALL major schools of Islamic law), but as these fans are also aware, this law was never fully implemented in the good old days and is even less likely to be enforced today. Very few modern leaders in Muslim nations have seriously considered (much less asked for) the institution of slavery or the practice of using female slaves as concubines, to be freely  bought and sold by Muslim males in a Muslim society. Yet these are also part and parcel of classical shariah. In short, there IS indeed some truth to the claim that contemporary Muslims do NOT necessarily practice (or support) all aspects of medieval Islamicate jurisprudence. But while most contemporary Muslims do not practice or vocally support particular Shariah rulings that are not in line with contemporary mores, they frequently support the abstract notion of “enforcing shariah” and they lack any clear alternative to that law. There have been institutional efforts and there are individual scholars who argue in favor of modern re-interpretation of classical shariah, but these efforts have NOT achieved critical mass. And all efforts at reform face the twin threats of apostasy and blasphemy memes, which have enough support in the Islamic world to make such reform a hazardous undertaking. But all is not lost. As the reaction to the “wife-beating” proposal indicates, this may well be the next shariah rule that will go the way of slavery and concubinage. Inshallah. 🙂

Finally, I happened to be at a Pakistani-American gathering yesterday and was somewhat surprised to run into a couple of vehement Trump supporters. One of them was a very observant Muslim who prays five times a day and is a pillar of the local Islamic center, but who was supporting Trump because “Trump will keep out terrorists who give a bad name to Muslims and who threaten our future and the future of our children in this great country”. And he is not alone. 
Then I woke up to see this tweet from Indian film director Ram Gopal Verma (who happens to have 1.83 MILLION twitter followers):

“3rd world people” like Varma are not necessarily fans of third world people. 

I still hope Hillary wins. I don’t think Trump is fit to be president (on ANY party’s platform). But I also think he COULD win. A lot of people are voting against the bipartisan consensus of the recent past. ..They may be voting for a worst alternative (at least, I think they will be, if they vote for Trump), but there is a lot of resentment and sense of betrayal out there. Interesting times.

I have been busier than usual, been reading more than before (trying to avoid Jaun Elya’s barb: “he was writing when he should have been reading”) and spending more time on Twitter than ever before, so blog posts have been few and far between. And with “products” due at work, things are not likely to change soon. So I thought I would try something different. Once a week or so, I will do something like an open thread. Just a few short comments on a few stories, most of them copied and pasted from comments I wrote on different internet sites. So here goes..

We Are Not Your Asian American (Political) Sidekick Razib Khan has a post up about “..(using Asian Americans) as a prop, often in a mendacious manner.” . Read the whole thing. When I did, I had a thought about why some Asian-Americans (mostly in left-liberal academia and it’s media periphery) are so eager to embrace a certain “we, the oppressed POCs of America” theme:

I would add that while Asian Americans in general suffer from discreet (or not so discreet) anti-Asian quotas that are put in place to limit their numbers in elite institutions, the kind of Asian-American intellectuals who write books about “POC solidarity” and run blogs called “racialicous” are in a different category; they are net (niche) beneficiaries of the “Asians as picked-upon-POC” framework they promote about Asians in America and this provides an obvious motivation for them to stick to it… For example, it gives them victim status in a social and academic setting where victim status is a very desirable good.

I understand that Asian Americans are not getting jobs on diversity quotas in most places, but the victim status still has clear psychological and social benefits and I strongly suspect that it also protects mediocre work (or whatever passes for work in the social sciences) from criticism OVER AND ABOVE the protection enjoyed by their White colleagues. Imagine 5 equally mediocre bullshitters who happen to be critical studies faculty at a liberal institution. They are not all equally protected. The White faculty member may benefit from connections and “White privilege”, the Jewish faculty from Jewish networking, but what defends the Asian guy? He or she has to rely on the POC card. Maybe they are still at a disadvantage versus equally mediocre Jews or Whites, but it is better than nothing. My point is that this motivation cannot be excluded when we think of WHY some Asian-American intellectual is pushing X or Y crap. In fact, I can think of examples of Indian-American writers and intellectuals who are clearly not being held to very high standards by the New York Times types and I suspect that successful manipulation of White guilt/POC privilege plays a part..


Of course, then there are those (few) intellectuals who are genuinely committed to a specific vision of world revolution and their views about the karma of brown folk follow naturally from that framework. Just to be clear, I am not thinking about them when I think of over-priviliged Asian-American kids blogging on Racialicious. Though both parties are happy to use each other, they are not the same. But truly committed revolutionary Marxists are few and far between. They can be criticized on other grounds, but psychological satisfaction and postmarxist postmodern BS are not their basic framework.

A commentator on another Razib Khan post (a post that touches on the touchy question: “Why Not Close Humanities Departments?”) wondered if shutting down the humanities would not take away a safety valve, one where ” the left was effectively “tamed” in the U.S. They became part of the establishment through being allowed a little safe space away from capitalism. .”

I disagreed as follows:

Your argument rests on the assumption that college humanities departments have no real-world consequences at all, so it is safe to put leftists there and let them spout endless reams of pure bullshit….. But while they may not have immediate consequences, they may still have longer term consequences, no?… after all, they do set the intellectual agenda to some extent. ..it may be enough to matter. (This is my favorite theory for why a smart person like Edward Said spewed so much nonsense; he knew it was nonsense, but he was fighting a war and all is fair in love and war. He was doing nothing less than bringing down Western civilization, opera and all. Samson option)


On the other hand, there is always the possibility that social change happens a few years (at least) ahead of any effort to conceptualize or understand it. So if we are doomed, we are doomed. ..in this theory, it may still be possible for scattered individuals to grasp what is going on in some limited area and take advantage of foreknowledge, but even they only know a few things, not the overall picture.
It is what it is, nobody is in control and nobody can consciously alter the big picture… Fate rules everyone.

It is a cheery thought somehow 🙂

The New York Times has a piece about the rise of the Right (Austria’s Election Is a Warning to the West) which is remarkable for its total lack of self-awareness. The writer seems completely oblivious to the possibility that the endangered liberal consensus may have itself have some issues that have led it to this pass; maybe parts of the liberal framework are not very realistic? (as in “aligned with the world as it actually is”) Could it be that one reason a buffoon like Trump has a serious shot at becoming president is because the mainstream liberal worldview contains some elements that seem far too unreal/laughable/wrong to far too many people? 

Anyway, the sky may not be falling. Or at least, not completely so. I remain in the “weirdly optimistic’ camp. There will be crises, but there will also be recoveries and new roads to new places..not necessarily recovery of specific parties or specific forms of liberalism… but the arc of history bends towards individualism and autism and more technology, with decreasing everyday violence in the more developed countries… Some places may crash and burn though…

Last but not the least, the BJP appears to be replacing a moribund Congress as India’s “national” party . I posted this article from respected (liberal, not pro-BJP) columnist Siddharth Vardrajan on Twitter with the comment ” I am not too optimistic abt a soft-landing for Hindutva (not all their fault btw, but bottom line= hard”. I was asked to explain what I meant, so I will try: I mean that the BJP includes many people who are nationalist and pro-capitalist but whose “soft Hindutva” is willing to imagine an India that is a country of laws, where non-Hindus (even Muslims) have rights and protections just like everyone else (though not more than anyone else). This is a vision that could be workable. And I would not mind at all if it was made to work, even imperfectly. But there are many things working against it. An obvious one is the “hard Hindutva” band, who really cannot conceive of an India with 200 million Muslims and X million Christians (the “non-dharmic faiths”) living as equal citizens (of course this group regard this fact as the fault of Muslims and Christians, who are seen as followers of alien ideologies that aim to undermine and eventually replace the ancient (Hindu) civilization of India, etc etc). This group is not easy to keep in check, especially if BJP comes to enjoy greater power, unfettered by alliances with “secular” forces. This particular threat to a peaceful and harmonious Indian future is frequently mentioned and is never too far from the mind of liberal commentators and this alone may prevent a “soft landing”, but there is more; there is the fact that Muslims do in fact include elements who are also unwilling to aim for a truly secular India. There are going to be jihadis and suicide bombers in India’s future, and as we have seen elsewhere, the very presence of groups this bigoted and this willing to kill can shift the entire culture towards sectarian warfare and “back to basics” civil war. There is also a very concerted Christian missionary effort that may not match the transnational loyalties of the ummah, but that does have money, modernity and Western support behind it and trouble (justified or not) is easy to imagine. Then there is capitalist disruption and India’s not so ready for prime-time infrastructure, state and intelligentsia.. and last but not the least, there is India’s Westernized postMarxist Left. Enuff said.

A soft landing will need visionary leadership and lots of luck. Need i say more?

With that cheery thought, i look forward to next week 🙂

PS: Here is Aasem Bakhshi on Lesley Hazelton’s book about the Shia-Sunni split (and about popular history writing in general). 

And don’t miss Aqil Shah’s excellent piece, which blows away the “drone blowback” theory so beloved of the regressive Left.

And memories of Josh Malihabadi for fans of Urdu poetry 

and to show that I am not completely lacking in self-awareness about what I am doing here, a quote from Nate Silver’s mea culpa about his Trump predictions:

“Without a model as a fortification, we found ourselves rambling around the countryside like all the other pundit-barbarians, randomly setting fire to things…”


Words to live by