Does Britain need a Trump to handle Brexit

Brexit is such a contentious matter that I don’t know where to start.

My Arch-Tory tribal instincts have overridden my normal active Social Justice Ghazi mode and I don’t like to see Britain humiliated in such a manner.

Theresa needs to channel her Trump and signal a collective fuck off to the EU. The lecherous manner in which Juncker was handling her earlier today was simply shameful:


Dance like a monkey American politicians!

I have no real comment, aside from the fact that when this video started and I realized what it was about, I began to laugh really loudly and without any self-control. Am I the only one?

By coincidence I saw this video right after noting that Parag Khanna has a new book out, The Future Is Asian. Here is the summary from Amazon: “In the 19th century, the world was Europeanized. In the 20th century, it was Americanized. Now, in the 21st century, the world is being Asianized.” It should be re-Asianized (we’re friends on LinkedIn).


Aasia Bibi case comes full circle (part 3)

Shahab Ahmed began the first chapter of his book ‘What is Islam?’ with these words,
” I am seeking to say the word “Islam” in a manner that expresses the historical and human phenomenon that is Islam in its plenitude and complexity of meaning. In conceptualizing Islam as a human and historical phenomenon, I am precisely not seeking to tell the reader what Islam is as a matter of Divine Command, and thus am not seeking to prescribe how Islam should be followed as the means to existential salvation. Rather, I seek to tell the reader what Islam has actually been as a matter of human fact in history, and thus am suggesting how Islam should be conceptualized as a means to a more meaningful understanding both of Islam in the human experience, and thus of the human experience at large.”

The difference between ‘literal’ Islam (something I had been taught all my life-till that point) and ‘human experience’ of Islam (as theorized by Shahab Ahmed in the lines above) became acutely aware to me in the days and months following ST’s assassination. Where did the theory end and practice start? Does believing in something and doing things contrary to those beliefs hypocrisy or just the way things work? Are the five ‘essentials’ (Tauhid, Namaz, Roza, Hajj, Zakat) of Islam necessary to be performed if you just gain brownie points with God by killing infidels/blasphemers? I was also growing up in an environment of Islamist terror. Militants who professed to be better Muslims than us mere mortals (who performed the aforementioned ‘essentials’) were killing innocent people in Lahore, in Karachi, in Swat, in KP. How does a practicing Muslim reconcile his faith with the Islam professed by the militants? How does an ordinary Pakistani Muslim view the history of Islam? (a pol sci-major friend of mine recently said something very interesting on this topic. According to him, “actual” history doesn’t really matter to people. History in the public imagination is whatever the elites/mil-establishment want it to be )

Following my basic introductions to political theory and rudimentary economics(at IPSS and beyond), I began to think about the intersection of religion and politics. I probed some fundamental concepts regarding political Islam and how accurate they were, like the concept of Muslim Ummah and the statement that ‘Islam is a complete code of life’. While I was pondering over these questions, I was still living in the same social milieu that had existed around me.

I remember debating some 9/11 ‘truthers’ among my medical school classmates. They refused to entertain the notion that it could have been an Al-Qaeda operation, done by fellow Muslims. One day, I got into an argument with a burly, 6 ft 4 in guy in m class about the ‘complete code of life’ theory. I had probably mentioned it on my Facebook wall or in some Facebook group that I didn’t believe in the veracity of this claim because it was a newer (19th/20th century) addition to Islamic teachings. That tall, muscular guy approached me in the lecture hall the next day and said that he didn’t like my comment and that he was offended by it. I tried to reason with him but he got agitated and asked me to shut it because I was questioning religion which made him angry. I switched gears and changed the topic to save my skinny ass. A few days later, I was talking to a classmate who was among the very few friends I had and she said, Please do not get killed for your ideals.

For me, the public reaction to ST’s assassination was an eye-opening experience. There was a notion of a ‘silent majority’ in Pakistan, people who didn’t like mixing religion and politics (this theory was bogus and had no basis in fact). Fasi Zaka, a very intelligent commentator and writer on Pakistani society wrote, “After Salmaan Taseer’s death, Pakistan’s ‘silent majority’ finally spoke up. They liked it.”I heard someone in the ‘liberal’ (secular liberal or group B) circle say that ST’s death closed the door on critical discussion of blasphemy laws in the near future. It was a battle that we (secular-liberals) lost. We were grossly outnumbered and there was a very remote chance that we could incrementally chip at the edifice of blasphemy laws, for example by changing/improving the law of evidence or publicizing the historical consensus among Sunni Ulema that blasphemy is not punishable by death.

Instead, we have Khadim Rizvi and Tehreek-e-Labbaik (TLP), a ragtag group that can publicly mock the most powerful people in Pakistan and get away with it. ST’s death and Qadri’s hanging opened an avenue for these peddlers of hate to come out of their cubbyholes and wreak havoc on the “silent majority”(pun intended). Mohammad Hanif wrote about the aftermath of ST’s murder for The Guardian (full piece here), an excerpt of which is relevant to what I’m saying.

“So who are these people who lionize the cold-blooded murderer? Your regular kids, really. Some Pakistani bloggers have tried to get these fan pages banned for inciting hate. But as soon as one shuts down, another five crop up. Those who have trawled the profiles of these supporters have said that they have MBA degrees, they follow Premier League football, they love the Pirates of the Caribbean films. Miley Cyrus figures on lots of these pages.”

Qadri’s name became a brand (see here and here) that became synonymous with love for the prophet and the whole blasphemy debate. One could argue that in a country that was premised on the idea of a separate homeland for a particular religion, that religion would become the yardstick by which you proved your nationalism and patriotism.  As for me, I moved out. It became apparent a few years after the ST murder that things weren’t getting any better in my homeland. I could either suck it up and keep living or leave and start afresh. It was very hard to choose one of the routes but I chose the way out.

What about the few liberal spaces left in Pakistan? They are constantly shrinking. IPSS blew out of steam (and funding), NGO-funded youth groups and ‘Countering Violent Extremism’ (CVE) forums ran out of money after the US decided to decrease its footprint in Af-Pak. I was on an exchange visit (a misnomer, really, since no one ever visited Pakistan in return) to the US in 2012 and everyone at the policy level was talking about a post-2014 withdrawal scenario. There are still some valiant people working on secular ideas in Pakistan. Social media has helped but only a little bit. It has gotten the proverbial 72 seculars in Pakistan together on Facebook but it has also fueled the rise of a neo-Islamist political class that takes part in TLP protests and roadblocks. There are also certain bubbles in which you can dare criticize the state narrative such as LitFests and English newspaper op-eds. I remember talking to a pharmacy student whom I knew from a former workplace at Lahore Literary Festival and asking him what he was doing there since most of the conversation on stage there is in English (by decree or by choice). He replied that he was there just as a spectator to see how the ‘1%’ live in Pakistan and had not understood anything that was being discussed. The most important pockets of secular space consist of indigenous movements and organizations that work with people in their own language. I worked with two such organizations that communicated with people in their languages (Punjabi, Urdu, Sindhi etc).

Social media also helped tremendously in the information warfare raged by Milestablishment, turning former Musharraf-lovers into Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) followers. There is a lot of talk about a ‘youth bulge’ in Pakistan but policymakers and commentators rarely talk about the dangers of having a majority of poorly-educated young people who are taught actively and passively that they are victims of some unknown ‘agenda’ and that if they were given the right set of circumstances, they would conquer the world. I used to teach at private medical schools in two different cities of Punjab and I saw the moral and mental confusion that young people had about their lives and their futures. Youth and Naivete go hand in hand, however constant ideological propaganda about Islam’s greatness and Pakistan’s underdog status is a terrible fertilizer for young minds.

ST was not the first victim of this madness. Sabeen Mehmood was killed in cold blood on the streets of Karachi, Raza Rumi was attacked and his driver was killed, Mashal Khan was lynched to death. Each of these individuals tried to talk about secular values in society. What would become of the society? I don’t know. I don’t make predictions. Omar Ali asked me in November 2015 (in Lahore) about my thoughts on Pakistan’s future and I told him that things were doing downhill every passing day. I standby my pessimism.



Hindu genocide ongoing in Pakistan

Since there are some that insist that Hindu nationalists are as bad as Islamists, I want to share this tweet I stole from Omar:

Tiny communities tend to understand powerlessness. So when three dirt poor Hindu families arrived in lower Orakzai nearly two decades ago because they couldn’t make ends meet in Peshawar, the Shias decided to provide some shelter. The custodians of the imambargah in Kalaya Bazaar gave them some space outside to set up their secondhand winter clothing stall and charged them just fifty rupees in rent.

It was outside this very imambargah that a suicide bomber blew himself up on November 23, killing 34 people, mostly Shias, and injuring 56 others. Among the dead were also the heads of the three Hindu families, Mannat Lal, Amrat Lal and Saram Chand, who were selling socks and sweaters at their stall at the time.

Their families are doubly devastated, not just because of the deaths, but because they were all related. Amar Kumar has lost his father Mannat Lal, his paternal grandfather Amrat Lal and maternal grandfather Saram Chand. “What else can we do but leave,” he says. “There’s just my mother and grandmother left.”

I am sharing this important talk by Dr. Jain of Indus University:

The first 10minutes are about the humiliation and destruction of Multan’s Sun Temple, which till the 1000AD was one of the two most important Hindu sites in the Subcontinent.

The idol was covered in meat by the Arab invaders, held as hostage and desecrated (and is now in the British museum).

I relayed to LV the video and told her that she should never forget the Hindu blood spilt in the last millennia. Considering the parlous situation all religious minorities have in Pakistan; India must protect herself at all costs. I hope Congress don’t sell out India’s Hindu majority identity in their quest for power.


The Ambani wedding has no taste, no class and no intimacy

The Ambani wedding has jumped the sharked.

No taste, no class and no intimacy..

The elements are all in place but it just feels everyone’s been *paid* to attend and seems more an obligation than anything else. The form of a grand wedding is there but not the essence.

It’s telling they got Hillary & Kerry but not the Obamas; actually President (Bill & Barrack) didn’t bother to attend..


Forbidden Fruit. Military in Politics in Pakistan

From Dr Hamid Hussain. An old article (from 2003).

Forbidden Fruit – Military & Politics

Hamid Hussain



Politics and profession of soldiering has nothing in common. They are totally different but essential elements of any society. Politicians and soldiers have an interesting relationship in all societies. In societies where civilians are in control, military officers act in accepted boundaries though ready to defend their turf against civilian encroachment. In societies where political institutions are weak and there is lack of consensus on legitimate course of succession, soldiers gradually expand their area of influence. They gradually restrict the role of civilians in various areas and sometimes directly take over the state replacing the civilians. This generally accepted model does not mean that military as an institution has no relevance to the important policy decisions. Even in countries where the tradition of civilian supremacy is well established, military has a political role relating to national security, albeit a different one. One commentator has correctly pointed that “the military’s political role is a question not of whether but of how much and what kind”. [1]

This article will evaluate soldier’s attitude towards political activity and how it develops. This will be followed by the details of Pakistani experience of politicization of officer’s corps and how repeated and prolonged military rules have militarized the politics. In the end, the complex relationship between soldiers and politicians will be summarized.

Soldiers & Politics

Soldier’s disdain for politics and politicians is universal. Soldiers by nature of their training and job requirement place high value on discipline, recognized chain of command and espirit de corps. These values are essential for any professional army. Soldiers generalize these values and attitudes to the whole society without appreciating the difficulties and various conflicting demands by interest groups in a modern nation state. In under-developed countries, the problems are compounded by host of other negative social and economic factors. Discussion, debate and arguments about different points of view are essential ingredients of politics in every society. The nature of political activity is more chaotic on surface. Soldier’s concept of political order is based on the model of discipline, which he has learned in his barracks and daily life. “Institutions that permit disorder are condemned. The men who purposefully encourage disorder, as well as those whose inactions inadvertently allow for disorder, are dangerous”.[2] This is how soldier sees the political activity of his society. Political activity is seen as undermining of the discipline of society and politicians as opportunists and self-seeking demagogues. This thought process is at the root of how a military first withdraws respect and later support of any civilian government which is followed by kicking the quarrelling politicians out of the corridors of power. The chaos and instability caused by the weak civilian institutions is blamed for paving the way for military to take over the state. This is the universal justification used by all military rulers. Once the politicians are condemned as useless bunch, the question arises then who is competent to run the state? Now the self-righteous attitude of officer corps comes into play. In under-developed countries, military sees itself as the most modern institution of the society. In addition, being a member of a well organized and disciplined force and overdose of patriotic and nationalistic symbols reinforces the notion that soldiers are more competent than civilians. In countries where military is the dominant institution, the military leadership considers itself as ‘final arbiters of political process, final judges as to whether a particular turn of events is acceptable from their standpoint as the guardians of national integrity’. [3] Continue reading “Forbidden Fruit. Military in Politics in Pakistan”


The Evidence for Out Of India – Part I

I have earlier on in two of my posts here & here , cited several evidences which support migrations out of India or South Asia.

However, I haven’t put out all of these evidences in one place. So I shall, in this post, cite and quote as much as of the evidence as I am aware of. But I realise that if all of it was put in one post, it would become gargantuan and tedious to read. So I will break it up in 3 or 4 parts. This is the 1st part.  I would request Razib, Zack, Slapstik, Anan, Santosh, Vijay, Numinous, Fraxinicus, Snake Charmer & others to read and comment.


The Yamnaya cultural complex in the late 4th – early 3rd millenium BC on the Pontic Caspian steppe is currently the most favoured archaeological complex for the PIE or atleast the late PIE (i.e. IE languages after the early separation of Anatolian).

It has also been known since long that the Maykop culture in North Caucasus significantly influenced the genesis of the Yamnaya phenomenon and therefore some argue that the IE languages also likely spread to Yamnaya from the Maykop culture.

Now, it may be noted that Maykop shows several artifacts which are clearly of Central or South Asian origin. Let me quote the archaeologist Mariya Ivanova :-

Graves and settlements of the 5th millennium BC in North Caucasus attest to a material culture that was related to contemporaneous archaeological complexes in the northern and western Black Sea region. Yet it was replaced, suddenly as it seems, around the middle of the 4th millennium BC by a “high culture” whose origin is still quite unclear. This archaeological culture named after the great Maikop kurgan showed innovations in all areas which have no local archetypes and which cannot be assigned to the tradition of the Balkan-Anatolian Copper Age. The favoured theory of Russian researchers is a migration from the south originating in the Syro-Anatolian area, which is often mentioned in connection with the so-called “Uruk expansion”. However, serious doubts have arisen about a connection between Maikop and the Syro-Anatolian region. The foreign objects in the North Caucasus reveal no connection to the upper reaches of the Euphrates and Tigris or to the floodplains of Mesopotamia, but rather seem to have ties to the Iranian plateau and to South Central Asia. Recent excavations in the Southwest Caspian Sea region are enabling a new perspective about the interactions between the “Orient” and Continental Europe. On the one hand, it is becoming gradually apparent that a gigantic area of interaction evolved already in the early 4th millennium BC which extended far beyond Me- sopotamia; on the other hand, these findings relativise the traditional importance given to Mesopotamia, because innovations originating in Iran and Central Asia obviously spread throughout the Syro-Anatolian region independently thereof.

So the culture that apparently had a transformative effect on the steppe and probably brought the Indo-European languages on the steppe is said to have been in interaction  already with South Central Asia with several features of the Maykop phenomenon probably derived from there.

Now one may argue this influence seems to come to Maykop from Iran & Central Asia and how does South Asia come into the picture ? So let us quote a few passages from Mariya Ivanova’s book . In one of the sites, Dolmen 2, of the Maykop culture we find the following:-

The textile samples from Klady 31/5 consisted of very fine, 0.15-0.30 mm thin linen fibres. The threads were spun, plied, and dyed in two different hues of brown. In contrast, the fabric from Dolmen 2 was woven from a mix of wool with a plant fiber, possibly cotton

Cotton was rare in the bronze Age and is known earliest from Mehrgarh and Indus civilization in general. Its appearance in the Maykop culture links it with the Early Harappan phase. Even the wool found at the other site could have come from the East since the earliest evidence of wool was discovered at Shahr-i-Sokhta, a site which was in close contact with the Harappans (as we will see later) –

The earliest actual remains of a wool textile have been recovered at Shahr-i Sokhta I and date to the last centuries of the fourth millennium BC.

It may be noted that the earliest Indus Periphery sample that was recovered from Shahr-i-Sokhta dates to 3100 BC (i.e. precisely to the period when wool is found at the site).

Further, Ivanova discusses an axe of copper-lead alloy discovered from the Klady site –

The axe from Klady was not work-hardened and possibly never intended for use, as suggested by its elaborate decoration. It demonstrates that the north Caucasus belonged to an area of early use of copper-lead alloys. The earliest evidence for this material has been reported from the Indus valley and dates to the fifth millennium BC (Mille et al. 2004, 267). Terekhova (1981, 316) reports that during the Namazga II period artefacts of copper with high lead content were common at sites in the Kopet Dag piedmont.

So this copper-lead alloying technology possibly could also have spread from Early Harappans to Central Asia (Namazga) and from there to North Caucasus.

But this is not the only technology apparently borrowed from the Early Harappans. We may also note,

Finally, several metal artefacts such as animal figurines, axes with relief decoration, “forks”, and daggers with complex profiles were apparently produced in the lost-wax technique (Ryndina et al. zoo8). The earliest evidence for the lost-wax technique so far comes from the chalcolithic levels at Mehrgarh in north Baluchistan and dates to the fifth millennium BC (Mille et al. 2004, 267). Lost-wax casting was widespread in central and south- west Asia during the late fourth millennium BC.

So the Maykop culture also shows the use of lost-wax casting and this technique is also known to have been practiced the earliest by South Asians as demonstrated at the site of Mehrgah. This yet again shows the possible direction of exchange of technology and the important role of South Asia in it.

Ivanova goes on to describe the various copper based objects found at Maykop sites and then adds, “Most of the described copper objects have comparisons on the Iranian plateau and in central Asia, dating
to the early fourth rnillenniurn BC.


The absence of shaft-hole axes outside the Caucasus during the fourth millennium BC is striking. The only exceptions are probably the shaft-hole axes found in Level III, 6 at Mundigak in south Afghanistan.

Ivanova then moves on to the discovery of wheeled transport among the Maykop people,

Half of all third-millennium finds of wheeled vehicles between the Danube and Ural were uncovered in the region of Kuban. Trifonov (2004, note 2) interprets this striking concentration of early graves with wagons on Kuban as an indication of the spread of the wagon from this area into the steppe.

Pay attention to the bolded part. So the wheeled vehicle technology apparently reached the steppe from Maykop. Wheeled vehicle technolgy is considered by David Anthony as probably the most transformative technology that helped the steppe people spread their influence across a wide region in the form of the IE languages.

Now, let us note what Ivanova has to say about the appearance of the wheeled vehicles in Maykop itself,

The evidence for wheeled vehides dating to the preceding Maikop period, in contrast, is very tenuous… The vehicle from which the wheels at Novokorsunskaja originate might have been a two-axle wagon like the roughly contemporary wagon from Koldyri on the Lower Don (see Chapter 5). But it is also possible that the find from Novokorsunskaja was a two-wheeled cart. Clay· models of two-wheeled carts with rotating wheels attest to the use of this type of vehicle in central Asia and the Indus valley in the late fourth millennium BC. At Altyn-depe in south Turkmenistan, such models occur in the second half of the fourth millennium (Namazga III period) and become more common in the earlv centuries of the third millennium (Kircho 2009). Cattle figurines with holes in the withers for attaching the yoke have been recovered at Kara-depe (Kircho 2009, 30). Comparable models appeared in the Indus valley around 3500-3300 BC, during the Ravi-Phase of the Indus culture at Harappa.

So again, the link extends all the way to the Early Harappans and this time it is the technology which David Anthony deems as transformative for the spread of IE languages.

There is also evidence of long distance trade between Maykop and SC Asia. Cylinder seals of carnelian discovered at a Maykop site is similar to such seals found as far away as Shahr-i-Sokhta and Sarazm, both sites with significant Harappan contacts (as discussed later in the next post).

Another exotic item is undoubtedly the carnelian cylinder seal from Krasnogvardejskoe, engraved with a depiction of a stag and a tree (Fig. 4·5).145 A cylinder seal with a stag and a tree depicted in a remarkably similar manner has been found at Tepe Sialk IV… Further cylinder seals with animal depictions dating to the late fourth and early third millenniums have been unearthed at Sarazm III and IV in the valley of Zaravshan and at Shahr-i Sokhta I in Seistan.

Ivanova then proceeds to do a survey of the various animal figurines found on the Maykop vessels and concludes,

In conclusion, the north Caucasus, a geographic region which has  never been inhabited by lions, Asiatic gazelles and wild sheep, can be ruled out as the area in which the two silver cups frorn Maikop were designed and manufactured. The alluvial plains of Mesopotamia can be also excludedThe animal depictions from Maikop are unique indeed. However, they show resemblances to some of the objects from a hoard of five gold and seven silver vessels recovered during illicit excavations in 1966 near Fullol in north Afghanistan.

Further still,

Probably the most attractive and highly valued ornamental stone of exotic origin, lapis lazuli, has been found at only three sites north of the main Caucasus range… The most famaus source of lapis in the Old World is the mines of Sar-i Sang located in the Kokcha Valley in the Afghan province of Badakshan (Weisgerber 2004). Sources of secondary importance are situated in the Chagai hills in Pakistani ßaluchistan and in the Pamir mountains.

Ivanova finally sums it up as follows,

Let us consider the elements of central Asian origin in the material culture and technology of the north Caucasian societies. The most unambiguous evidence is provided by beads of colourful ornamental stones. Not only are the deposits of lapis lazuli, turquoise and possibly carnelian situated on the Iranian plateau and in the mountainous regions of central Asia, but the indirect supply with such materials via Upper Mesopotamia can be essentially ruled out. In the early fourth millennium lapis lazuli and turquoise were nearly absent in southwest Asia. Sites in Iran and central Asia, in contrast, provide ample evidence for the continuous exchange of these materials at least since the sixth rnillennium BC…An exotic fabric from Dolmen 2 at Klady, a rare red pigment from the same tomb, a unique bone pin with flat triangular head at Ust Dzheguta, and a carnelian cylinder seal with an engraved stag and tree motive from Krasnogvardejskoe all point to the Iranian plateau and its borderlands. Furthermore, the silver vessels with animal depictions from the kurgan of Maikop portray animal species which are native in Azerbaijan and west Iran, and resemble in style another gold vessel with animal decoration found at Fullol in north Afghanistan. Along with these exotic commodities, exotic ideas and technological knowledge reached the communities of the Maikop period from the southeast. Most shapes of locally made copper tools, for example, derive clearly from Iranian and not from Syro-Anatolian prototypes. Other technological peculiarities of the north Caucasus, like lost-wax casting, beads of gold and silver sheet over faience core, copper-lead alloys, copper-silver alloys, arsenic-nickel copper, use of silver and gold, manufacturing of metal vessels, may well originate from the “Irano-Afghan” cultural sphere, and not from Greater Mesopotamia. All these innovations were part of the technological systern in central Asia and Iran during the early fourth millennium BC.

So a whole host of artefacts of the Maykop culture ,that suppossedly brought ‘IE’ to the steppe, have their most likely origin in SC Asia. Isn’t this worth pondering ?

Ivanova also briefly comments on Central Asian and South Asian links,

Terracotta female figurines in central Asian (Geoksyur) style have been found in the lowest levels of Said-Qala in the Helmand valley and at pre-Harappan sites in the Indus valley… the presence of characteristic wheel-made pottery and seashell bracelets in Sarazm points to contacts with Baluchistan.

So we see a large interaction zone that starts in South Asia and stretches upto the North Caucasus. The direction of movement however is largely from Southeast to Northwest. This North Caucasian Maykop culture eventually ends up greatly influencing the steppe culture of Yamnaya which suppossedly spread the late Indo-European (PIE) culture. So one can see that South and Central Asia were already key drivers in an interaction zone that had the designated IE cultures on the steppe.


Having done a survey of the archaeological evidence we may now also look at some genetic evidences that directly link the Maykop and related cultures in the Caucasus with South Asia.


According to an ancient mtDNA study of 6 human samples from various Maykop sites –

…we used target-enrichment together with high- throughput sequencing to characterize the complete mitochondrial sequence of three Maikop and three Novosvobodnaya individuals. We identified T2b, N1b1 and V7 haplogroups, all widely spread in Neolithic Europe. In addition,we identified the Paleolithic Eurasian U8b1a2 and M52 haplogroups, which are frequent in modern South Asia, particularly in modern India

We have an mtDNA haplogroup M52, in one of the site of Maykop, which is today mostly found in South Asia and is likely of deep South Asian ancestry. Clearly its presence at one of the Maykop sites in the 4th millenium BC in North Caucasus along with the abundance of the artefacts of SC Asian origin that we discussed earlier, reveals that South Asians were indeed migrating towards Caucasus at that early period.

We have even more evidence still. In the 2016 study by Lazaridis et al which for the 1st time published the samples from Neolithic Iran, there were also 3 samples from Chalcolithic Armenia and this is what they say about these samples in the Supplementary Section of the paper –

All three males from this population belong to Y-chromosome haplogroup L1a-M27/P329. The M27 mutation is common in South Asian haplogroup L Y-chromosomes, but was absent in a survey of Y-chromosomes from Anatolia. Haplogroup L occurs at a very low ~2% frequency in present-day Armenians.

Considering the high frequency of this haplogroup among South Asians and its very low frequency among the present Caucasian or Near Eastern populations, this y-dna is also very likely of South Asian origin.

But y-dna L was not just found among the 3 samples from Chalcolithic Armenia. In a later study published this year which had a very comprehensive ancient sample set from the Caucasus, there were another 3 samples from late Maykop period which were designated as y-dna L but which was not resolved for its sublineages. Considering the presence of South Asian L1a already in Chalcolithic Armenia and also the presence of South Asian mtDNA M52, it may not be surprising that these L lineages were also L1a like those from Armenia.

Combine this with the fact that the y-dna J2a, a common haplogroup among South Asians and Iranians was also found in the Chalcolithic Caucasus samples and in the Narasimhan et al paper among the Chaocolithic & Bronze Age Central Asians. There are also many mtDNA found among these ancient Caucasian samples (mostly from Maykop sites) which are shared with South Asians (though not exclusively) such as T2a1, T2e, H2a1, H13ala, U4c1, U5a1b, U7b, U1a1a, U2e1b, R1a1a, I4a, W1.

The Narasimhan et al paper also shows us through several d-stats that the Armenia Chalcolithic and Armenia Early Bronze Age samples have quite a bit of ancestry sharing with Chalcolithic & Bronze Age Central Asia & Eastern Iran.

Therefore, not only do we find material evidence from the 4th millenium BC Caucasus of artefacts and technologies with South Central Asian origin like cotton, wheeled vehicles, copper-lead alloys, lost wax casting etc but we also see genetic evidence linking both regions with definite evidence of some human migration from SC Asia into the Caucasus. And from this same Caucasus region flowed the cultural assemblage and perhaps genes as well, which is said to have brought the IE languages to the steppe.

We can therefore observe that the Chalcolithic SC Asians were already linked to the suppossed IE cultures of the steppe during its early phases with influences going from SC Asia to Maykop and then steppe and not vice-versa.


Now for some evidence from animal genetics which further supports migration from South or Central Asia into the Caucasus but also the steppe.

Zebu is the South Asian native cattle which was domesticated in South Asia and is found from the earliest periods at the sites of Mehrgarh in Balochistan and Bhiranna in Haryana (both sites date to atleast 7000 BC and possibly even earlier)

According to this FAO webpage, “There are grounds for believing that zebus were raised on the territory of the present-day Azerbaijan 4000-4500 years ago. During the excavations of a stone burial ground in the vicinity of the city of Lenkoran the French archaeologist Jacques De Morgan unearthed and described a unique round seal of black and grey agate depicting a humped zebu bull covered with dense hair. This he dated to 2500-2000 B.C.

We can see from our earlier discussion that there was a transfer of technology and material assemblage with some human migration from SC Asia to the Caucasus during the Chalcolithic age. So it is very likely that the Azerbaijani Zebu could have reached the Caucasus around the same time.

But Zebu genetic inheritance is not just restricted to the Caucasus and it extends to the ancient steppe cattle as well.

According to a study of ancient and primitive European DNA, “The divergence of the BAI cattle as suggested by PCA (Figure 2c) can be attributed to an indicine genomic component which is identified in the ADMIXTURE (Figure 3) and D-statistics (Table 2) analyses. By analysing the genome-wide SNP markers, McTavish et al. (2013) and Decker et al. (2014) also reported an indicine influence on Italian cattle breeds. Using whole-genome sequences of ancient human DNA, Jones et al. (2015) and Haak et al. (2015) suggested massive migration of Yamnaya steppe herders as a source of dispersion of Indo-European languages to both northern-central Europe and India. These herders might also have mediated gene flow between Indian zebu and Ukrainian steppe cattle.

So here the authors are directly linking the presence of Zebu genetic admixture in the ancient Ukrainian steppe cattle to the Bronze Age steppe herders or in other words to IE expansions. But how would Indian Zebu get admixed in the ancient steppe cattle if it was not brought there by people ? Is it really probable that steppe pastoralists went all the way to SC Asia and brought back the Zebu cattle to the steppe on their return ? What is much more likelier to be the case is that people with origins in SC Asia, as they gradually migrated through Iran into the Caucasus and beyond probably also brought their Zebu cattle along with them.

But not only is there evidence of cattle migration from South Asia to the Caucasus and the steppe, there is also evidence of possible sheep migration.

As per this study on mtDNA diversity in Indian sheep,

Previous studies on mitochondrial DNA analysis of sheep from different regions of the world have revealed the presence of two major- A and B, and three minor- C, D and E maternal lineages. Lineage A is more frequent in Asia and lineage B is more abundant in regions other than Asia… The breed differentiation in Indian sheep was essentially due to variable contribution of two major lineages to different breeds, and sub- structuring of lineage A, possibly the latter resulting from genetic drift. Nucleotide diversity of this lineage was higher in Indian sheep (0.014 ± 0.007) as compared to that of sheep from other regions of the world (0.009 ± 0.005 to 0.01 ± 0.005). Reduced median network analysis of control region and cytochrome b gene sequences of Indian sheep when analyzed along with available published sequences of sheep from other regions of the world showed that several haplotypes of lineage A were exclusive to Indian sheep. Given the high nucleotide diversity in Indian sheep and the poor sharing of lineage A haplotypes between Indian and non-Indian sheep, we propose that lineage A sheep has also been domesticated in the east of Near East, possibly in Indian sub-continent.

Haplotype A is more widespread and frequent in Asia while mtDNA haplotype B is more common in Europe.

The above is an map from another paper which shows the relative distribution of various sheep mtDNA lineages. One can observe that the mtDNA A lineage (in Blue) predominates in Asia while mtDNA B (in Red) predominates in Europe. However, it is also evident that mtDNA A has a significant presence in the Caucasus as well as on the European steppe and Northern Europe. Considering its likely origin in South Asia and its presence in the Caucasus and steppe, this may again indicate that a sheep lineage spread out from South Asia to these two regions along with the Zebu cattle and was accompanied by human migration as well.

We also have evidence from actual animal aDNA.

There is ancient dog DNA from a Corded ware site that shows possible Indian dog and Indian wolf admixture. The study involved aDNA from 3 dog samples, one of which, labelled as CTC, came from a corded ware site in Germany. Corded ware culture, as many here would know, is considered the 1st IE culture in Europe proper which was heavily influenced by Yamnaya groups from steppe.

In a peer review file, the authors respond to one of the critics in the following manner,

A key finding of our analysis is indeed that CTC appears to share some ancestry that is predominantly found in modern Indian dogs (which we refer to as India-like as it is also found in Central Asian and Middle Eastern dogs). All analyses that incorporate some model of admixture show this. We would argue that visually CTC is approximately halfway between European and
Indian dogs rather than being “clustered with Indian dogs”, but nonetheless, any Indian-like component inferred from this PCA analysis is clearly significant, as correctly pointed out by the reviewer. CTC also appears to show a clear Indian component in both the NGSadmix and ADMIXTURE clustering analysis, on the order of 25% (so closer to modern Europeans and thus
consistent with the Neighbor joining tree analysis). The MixMapper and ADMIXTUREGRAPH analysis also point to other higher values of Indian-like admixture.

The below admixture graph from the same paper explains the likely path of admixture from Indian dogs into the Corded ware CTC dog sample.

Figure 5


Whether it be domesticated cattle, sheep or dogs, their movement is usually associated with the movement or migration of humans. In this case, we can see migration into the steppe of all three domesticated species from a likely origin in South Asia. So can we also detect some signs of human migration into the steppe. While we have clearly seen the signs of human migration from South & Central Asia into the Caucasus associated with a cultural and technological package, such evidence for steppe is much harder to come by. More so because of the absolute rarity of aDNA from South Asia.

But nevertheless, there is tentative evidence. Let us go through it.

There was this recent paper which was covered by Razib on his blog.

In it the authors make the following observation :-

The Bronze Age Srubnaya-Alakulskaya individuals from Kazburun 1/Muradym 8 presented genetic similarities to the previously published Srubnaya individuals.  However, in f4 statistics, they shared more drift with representatives of the Andronovo and Afanasievo populations compared to the published Srubnaya individuals. Those apparently West Eurasian people lacked significant Siberian components (NEA and SEA) in ADMIXTURE analyses but carried traces of the SA component that could represent an earlier connection to ancient Bactria. The presence of an SA component (as well as finding of metals imported from Tien Shan Mountains in Muradym 8) could therefore reflect a connection to the complex networks of the nomadic transmigration patterns characteristic of seasonal steppe population movements.

The South Asian ‘lilac’ component can be observed in trace components across most of the steppe samples above here. This ‘lilac’ component is also the one that peaks South Indian tribal groups like the ‘Mala’. So is this sign of AASI admixture on the steppe during the late Bronze Age ?

Even the Narasimhan et al preprint, observed that, “we examine the second set of outliers from this time period, those related to Turan. We see that these samples are drawn towards the BMAC on the PCA and have substantially higher proportions of Iranian agriculturalist related ancestry on the ADMIXTURE plot as well as by f4-statistics. These samples are at the southern end of our geographic sampling,  suggesting that the individuals of the Andronovo material culture horizon came into contact with the people of the BMAC at around 1500 BCE.

These outlier samples from the steppe dating to around 1500 BC, show evidence of BMAC admixture where models with the Swat samples or even the high AASI groups like Irula, work as good proxies for the 3rd ancestral source in these outliers.


However, it is possible that the Srubnaya individuals did not receive the AASI-like admixture directly but rather inherited through a steppe Yamnaya like ancestor. As can be seen below, even earlier steppe groups like the Yamnaya shows traces of AASI like ancestry component at k=15


The South Asian ‘lilac’ component is present also in a wide range of earlier steppe samples such as the Yamnaya and it is therefore likely that later steppe groups inherited it from these early steppe precursors rather than directly through BMAC contacts (which also looks quite possible).

The possibility of early southern admixture into the steppe during the Yamnaya period is also indicated by the qpAdm admixture model for the Yamnaya Ozera sample which can be modelled with a significant degree of confidence as having Sarazm_EN admixture. The 2 samples from Sarazm Eneolithic from Tajikistan dating to 3500 BC are the earliest Central Asian samples with AASI admixture. The Sarazm samples are also closer or share more alleles with Indian tribal groups with high AASI, in comparison to the BMAC main cluster which themselves have around 5 % AASI. Such a group with close genetic linkages to SC Asians acting as a good proxy for the southern admixture on the steppe again reinforces that some sort of genetic admixture ultimately originating from SC Asia may have mixed into the steppe groups.

Such southern admixture in the main sample set of Yamnaya can also not be discounted since the Yamnaya is already modeled as part Iran_Chl which is not so distant to populations like Sarazm_EN.



We may end by discussing the historical knowledge we glean from Greek sources regarding some tribes living in the Kuban valley of the North Caucasus.

Traces of Aryan tribes and names are also found in the northern Black Sea area in the Kuban region, as well as in the vicinity of the Caspian. These Aryan words, more archaic than the later Iranian forms,include the river name Sindes and the tribes Sindoi, Sindoi (in classical sources; cf. Skt. Sindhu- ‘Indus River; India’); the Kuban River (Cuphis, Kouphis, cf. Skt. Kubha ‘Kabul River’ in the Rigveda); the Caspian tribe Das- (cf. Skt. DAsa, dasyu- ‘foreign tribe’, OPers. dahyu- ‘province, district’): see Kretschmer 1943 (1944); cf. Uslar 1881:451, Thumb and Hauschild 1958:1:1.87, Trubacev 1976; Trubacev 1977 gives a list of names from this region with possible Indo-Aryan etymologies. The isolated location of these places north of the Caucasus gives reason to assume that Aryan tribes entered the area from the Near East via the Caucasus.

How and when these South Asian groups reached the Caucasus where they were recorded in antiquity is a matter of curiosity.

I shall in the next two posts, focus on evidence of Bronze Age human migrations from South Asia into Eastern Iran, Central Asia, Mesopotamia, Magan, Dilmun, Syria and the Tarim Basin.


Sex and the British-Indian Army

From Dr Hamid Hussain.

Some have asked questions about sexuality during the Raj as related to the army.  Enjoy.


When British arrived in India, India was sexually more liberal than Europe. Heterosexual and homosexual relations were common, open and celebrated in poetry and paintings.  Concubines were a common phenomenon practiced by all religious and ethnic groups.  In contrast, there was quite strict sexual repression in Victorian England.  There are two aspects of sexual relations; one relating to British soldiers and second British officers. In eighteenth and nineteenth century India, prostitution was legal and well-regulated in British controlled India.  In 1850s, there were seventy five military districts and in every district prostitution was supervised by authorities.  Doctors of Indian Medical Service (IMS) were responsible for regulating brothels.  All prostitutes were registered, minimum age for prostitutes was fifteen and women were provided with their own living quarters or tents that were regularly inspected.  Some establishments were quite large and brothel in Lucknow had fifty five rooms.  Prostitutes infected with sexually transmitted diseases were removed and not allowed to practice their trade until recovered.  Both native and European soldiers used these bazaars; however sepoys were discouraged to visit those prostitutes preferred by European soldiers.  Most British soldiers were from lower strata of the society and were not held to the standard of a British officer.  British soldiers visited prostitutes more often than sepoys.  One reason was that British soldiers were not married while sepoys were usually married men.   These bazaars were called ‘lal bazaars’ (red streets).  Both heterosexual and homosexual relations were common.  British regiments spent several years in India and many a times children were born of such relationships.  Special houses and schools were assigned as early as eighteenth century for these children.  Continue reading “Sex and the British-Indian Army”